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Abstract 
Maximilian Paul Owre: United in Division: The Polarized French Nation, 1814-1830  
(Under the direction of Dr. Lloyd Kramer) 
 
This dissertation analyzes the political culture of the Bourbon Restoration (1814-1830), the 
first stable post-revolutionary, post-Napoleonic regime in France. It uses recent theoretical 
developments in cognitive linguistics and frame analysis to examine the impact of a 
polarized political conflict between liberals and ultraroyalists, the era’s two main factions, on 
French society. Drawing on published and archival sources such as formal political treatises, 
pamphlets, poems, popular songs, and state administrative and police records, this 
dissertation shows how polarized frames for understanding and participating in political life 
made the division between Left and Right a pervasive social metaphor. Each chapter outlines 
the frameworks that liberals and ultras used to understand the nation and conduct politics in a 
polarized public sphere. These ideas spread to diverse locations in France and among varied 
social classes, triggering further polarization in society. Specific case studies focus on events 
such as the expulsions of the Abbé Grégoire (1819) and Jacques-Antoine Manuel (1823) 
from the Chamber of Deputies and the 1823 military intervention in Spain to illustrate the 
political struggles that grew out of two mutually exclusive conceptions of the French nation. 
The central claim of this dissertation is that an overarching frame of Left/Right national 
division that had its origins in the revolutionary era evolved into the normative paradigm for 
modern French politics during the Restoration. This division has informed French 
conceptions of the nation and its political life, and has helped the French people negotiate the 
legacy of the Revolution to this day. This sense of irreparable division in the French public 
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sphere also suggests that national identity is not a static concept but rather a dynamic process 
that relies on interactions between opposed ideas of the nation in the same polity.  
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Introduction 
The Polarized Nation in Restoration France 
 
“There are in France two principal parties, that is to say, two great 
orders of interests that fight: these are, on one side, the partisans of the 
new regime; on the other, the partisans of what one called twenty years 
ago, the ancien régime.” Anonymous, (1819)1
“I will not divide, like him, France into two nations; I will not admit in 
the midst of us a former nation and a new nation; I will agree with him, 
however, if he wants, that there really exists in France two separate 
parties of opinions.” Isidore-Marie-Brignoler Gautier (1822) 2
Irreconcilable Nations 
In April 1814, Bourbon King Louis XVIII returned to the throne hoping to realize the 
grand reconciliation of his subjects, his children. Some revolutionaries, republicans, 
aristocrats, and royals, exhausted by war and exile, hoped for national unity and served the 
king. Other returned émigrés could not contain their vengeance. Through their intransigence, 
they opened the door for Napoleon to embark on his own failed “Hundred Days” attempt at a 
post-revolutionary settlement. After thousands more perished at Waterloo in June 1815, 
Louis came back once again, but no one pretended any longer that France was one family. 
France was a nation, irreconcilably divided. All remembered that during the preceding 
twenty-five years French hands had removed French heads and French émigrés had fought 
                                                 
1 Anon., Examen du libéralisme. Par un libéral (Paris: Bailleul, 1819), 23-24. 
 
2 Isidore-Marie-Brignoler Gautier (du Var), Coup d’oeil sur la véritable position des partis en France, 
adressé aux électeurs de la Ier série; par un ami de la légitimité et de la Charte, 3d ed. (Paris: Pillet Ainé, 
1822), 3-4. 
 
French armies. All remembered how two sets of partisans had imagined two different, and in 
their views, perfect French nations, and set them against each other in a twenty-five year 
bloodbath. These same partisans now faced each other chastised under the watchful eye of an 
indignant and angry continent. They thought of the Restoration as the endgame in their 
struggle, a grand experiment in reconciliation or final victory for one side. But there was no 
resolution as another Revolution brought an end to the Bourbon monarchy a mere fifteen 
years later. Their division persisted, and persists in France to this day.  
The Restoration in France (1814-1830) was a fifteen-year dialogue on the meaning of 
the nation that began and ended in political violence. Judging from its unstable origins and 
sudden violent end, its demise seems inevitable in retrospect. The period’s political actors 
seemed unable to resolve revolutionary-era tensions between progressive and conservative 
ideals, a fact some historians are tempted to use as an excuse to dismiss its lasting 
contributions to France’s political culture. But the opposed partisans of these ideals 
nevertheless participated together in France’s first stable representative government, and, 
despite their constant contestation, created in concert the first post-revolutionary, post-
Napoleonic French society. French citizens of all types absorbed and joined in a grand debate 
about the essence of their nation. They read about it in the era’s relatively free press and 
voluminous political pamphlets, or directly engaged in the debate in assembly halls, on the 
street, in cafés, and in courthouses. Throughout the era and everywhere in France, people 
used the polarizing terms of this debate to define themselves and their nation, and to 
distinguish “true” French patriots from corrupted imposters.3 The conceptualized division 
                                                 
3 The discursive battle over patriotism and worthiness had a long history in Old Regime France. See, 
among others, Jay M. Smith. Nobility Reimagined: The Patriotic Nation in Eighteenth-Century France (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 2005), and John Shovlin, The Political Economy of Virtue: Luxury, Patriotism, 
And the Origins of the French Revolution  (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006). 
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that separated people became an integral part of the French identity. Polarization rather than 
consensus dominated Restoration political culture, and during the period, the French came to 
accept a division between the Right and Left in politics, culture, and society as the normative 
paradigm for their nation.   
The two points of view expressed in the citations at the head of this introduction, the 
first from an anonymous liberal pamphleteer and the second from an ultraroyalist candidate 
for political office, were not isolated opinions. They outline the parameters of the 
Restoration’s highly-publicized dialogue on the nation and its polarized political world. 
Some interpreted polarization as the clash between two groups loyal to two conflicting 
conceptions of society, while others thought the nation was by definition unified but 
threatened by political division. Almost everyone, however, acknowledged the pervasiveness 
of the Left/Right divide in the public sphere and considered it integral to any discussion of 
the nation during the Restoration. In addition, the vast majority of commentators on 
contemporary society—not without their own opinions— traced the origins of this divide to 
the French Revolution. They often and sometimes imprecisely described the two main 
political camps of the age, liberals and ultraroyalists (ultras), as the inheritors of, 
respectively, the revolutionary and counterrevolutionary ideologies of popular sovereignty 
and absolutism.4 Both liberal and ultra politicians and writers fed this discourse of division 
by loudly proclaiming ideals of sovereignty, legitimacy, and the social order laden with 
implications for the makeup of the nation. While few could vote in the new political system, 
                                                 
4 Throughout this dissertation, I refer to active politicians on the Left during the period regardless of 
ideological differences as “liberals” when they acted in concert. When their differences are salient, I refer to 
particular subgroups by name. When broadly discussing liberals and marginalized groups to their left, I use the 
term “leftists” if the context allows it. I also occasionally use the term “royalist” to describe moderates or ultras 
when the context requires it. I am confident that at no point in this dissertation will there be any mistaking who 
is on the Left or Right because of my use of terms. 
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and even fewer were eligible to run for office, debates about remaking the French nation and 
state within the context of past and current divisions extended well beyond an elite circle of 
politicians and electors. Throughout the period, a steady chorus of voices repeated these 
common themes about polarization until nearly everyone, from street activists to 
intellectuals, thought about the nation in partisan terms and believed in the irreparable 
division of France.  
Analyzing Restoration France within the paradigm of division between those who 
accepted revolutionary progressive ideals and those who rejected them resurrects an 
admittedly old-fashioned view of modern European, and indeed, World History. Fifty years 
ago, R.R. Palmer, posited that the “Atlantic World” in the early nineteenth century was a 
battleground for the forces of “democracy” and “aristocracy.” “The Revolution,” he wrote, 
“was a conflict between [two] incompatible conceptions of what the community ought to 
be.”5 While oversimplifying historical reality, Palmer’s dichotomy does describe well the 
behavior of those who engaged in the Restoration debate on national identity. On one side 
were those who broadly accepted the Revolution’s legacy of civil, political, and social 
reforms, believed that the people had a right to participate in their government, and favored 
legal equality over hierarchy. These “leftists” broke into many camps based on their 
particular understandings of these principles and included moderate royalists, conservative 
doctrinaire liberals, progressive liberals, radical republicans, and even authoritarian 
Bonapartists. Despite differences on specific policies, all of these leftists and most self-
                                                 
5 Palmer posited that the confrontation between two groups whose fundamental ideas of community 
differed “took the form of revolution and counterrevolution at the close of the [eighteenth] century, and of 
democratically and conservatively oriented philosophies thereafter.”  R.R. Palmer, The Age of Democratic 
Revolution: A Political History of Europe and America, 1760-1800, vol. 1, (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1959), 22.  
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proclaimed “moderates,” agreed on the value of legal equality and believed that the people 
had some role to play in government. Ultras, on the other hand, were a more monolithic bloc. 
They considered the Revolution an abomination that had overturned the forces of order; and 
while willing to participate in representative institutions, ultras believed democratic tenets 
should never displace absolute monarchical sovereignty.  
The purpose of this dissertation is to explore how these two opposed political camps 
framed their conceptions of the nation, how these frames spread widely within the polity, and 
how they affected political culture and behavior in multiple levels of society. I argue that 
thinking in terms of national division was the dominant mode of Restoration politics, and this 
understanding of domestic division helped people accept and negotiate the aftermath of the 
Revolution’s legacy of conflict. It was during the Restoration that the French people 
internalized the idea of irreparable internal political division as the salient characteristic of 
their nation.  
Division characterized post-revolutionary France on multiple levels. Indeed, a 
dynamic exchange between action and reaction dominated cultural, intellectual, and political 
thought during most of the nineteenth century in Western Europe.6 Older narrative histories 
of the Restoration, such as Bertier de Sauvigny’s classic work, The Bourbon Restoration, 
largely accepted the Left/Right political dichotomy and the conflict between the main 
                                                 
6 This tendency towards conceptual polarity is examined in Jean Starobinski, Action and Reaction: The 
Life and Adventures of a Couple (New York: Zone Books, 2003). The lasting effects of the Enlightenment as a 
source of dichotomous divisiveness in society, culture, and politics are explored in Darrin McMahon, Enemies 
of the Enlightenment: The French CounterEnlightenment and the Making of Modernity, (Oxford: Oxford UP, 
2000) and Harold Mah, Enlightenment Phantasies: Cultural Identity in France and Germany, 1750-1914 
(Ithaca, Ny/London: Cornell University Press, 2003). This dichotomous understanding of the world is also 
apparent in the contemporaneously developed Hegelian system and in the great feud between Neo-Classicists 
and Romantics in art and literature. 
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political factions of the period drove their narratives and analyses.7 Other historical accounts 
of this era explore complexities in political thought and social trends and emphasize the 
Restoration’s importance as the first stable post-revolutionary period in French history, but 
they do little to dispel the impression of constant political conflict.8 A recently published 
collection of essays, Repenser la Restauration, paints a vivid picture of the period’s diversity 
of thought in politics, literature, art, drama, and religion. But this variety in cultural 
expression coexisted with the consistent emphasis in the public sphere on the lingering 
bitterness over the revolutionary legacy.9  These works rightly dispel longstanding clichés 
about the Restoration which portray émigré Old Regime nobles returning to France in 1814 
aiming to roll back the clock to 1789.  Challenging older narratives, recent works describe 
the bitter bipolar political contestation of the age as a backdrop to the era’s contributions to 
modern France’s political and institutional development. These works all share an air of 
coyness in “working against the grain” to show that the Restoration had a productive and 
dynamic social life despite its unresolved tensions.10 They largely avoid, however, 
addressing the prevalence of political contestation during the period, or how people’s 
                                                 
7 The first primer most turn to for the period’s history is still Guillaume de Bertier de Sauvigny’s, The 
Bourbon Restoration, trans. Lynn M. Case (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1966). 
 
8 Recent histories of the Restoration  include, Eric Le Nabour, Les Deux Restaurations, (Paris : 
Tallandier, 1992), and Emanuel de Waresquiel and Benoit Yvert, Histoire de la Restauration 1814-1830: 
Naissance de la France Moderne (Mesnil: Perrin, 1996). Historians often group the Restoration with the July 
Monarchy in their analyses,  see, for example,  André Jardin and André-Jean Tudesq, Restoration and Reaction, 
1815-1848 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), Isabelle Backouche, La Monarchie Parlementaire, 
1815-1848  (Paris: Pygmalion, 2000),  and Jean-Claude Caron, La France de 1815 à 1848 (Paris : Armand 
Colin, 1993).  
9 Jean-Yves Mollier, Martine Reid, and Jean-Claude Yon (eds.) Repenser la Restauration (Paris :Nouveau 
Monde, 2005).  
 
10 See for example, Emmanuel de Waresquiel’s essay, L’histoire à rebrousse-poil: Les élites, la 
Restauration, la Révolution (Paris : Fayard, 2005). Another perspective on Restoration elites and their cohesion 
and disunity in the political life of the period is found in Steven Kale, French Salons: High Society and 
Sociability from the Old Regime to the Revolution of 1848 (Baltimore/London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
2004).  
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experience of this contestation impinged on political life and the development of French 
national identity.  
Recent more focused case studies of Restoration politics and culture have introduced 
new theoretical perspectives to the historical analysis of the period, reexamining ideas, 
events, and new social spaces for the post-revolutionary reconstruction of French political, 
cultural, and social life. New works on political thought and action during the Restoration 
add nuances to the simple categorization of political actors according to the rubric of Right 
and Left by exploring the perspectives and strategies that differentiated leftists, portraying 
ultras as modern politicians capable of working within representative systems, and noting the 
savvy use of a relatively open political press by both sides.11 Some scholars have shifted 
their emphasis from the elite male politics of the era to focus on post-revolutionary issues of 
gender and the reordering of French political and social categories around new conceptions 
of masculinity, femininity, and the family.12 Studies of Restoration social classes have also 
                                                 
 
11 For nuances in liberal thought of the period see Aurelian Craïtu, Liberalism under Siege: The 
Political Thought of the French Doctrinaires (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2003),  and Annelien de Dijn, 
“Balancing the Constitution: Bicameralism in Post-revolutionary France, 1814-1831,” in European Review of 
History 12 (2005): 249-68, and Dijn, “Aristocratic Liberalism in Post-revolutionary France,” in Historical 
Journal 48 (2005): 661-81. These works build from a body of literature exploring politicians’ attempts at 
moderation including Vincent E. Starzinger’s, Middlingness; Juste Milieu Political Theory in France and 
England, 1815-48 (Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, 1965), Pierre Ronsavallon, Le Moment 
Guizot, (Paris: Gallimard, 1985), and Laurence Jacobs, “’Le Moment Liberal’: The Distinctive Character of 
Restoration Liberalism,” The Historical Journal, 31 issue 2 (Jun., 1988). For recent work on the nineteenth 
century legacy of Bonarpartism see, Sudhir Hazareesingh, “Napoleonic Memory in Nineteenth-Century France: 
The Making of a Liberal Legend.” MLN 120 (2005): 747-73 and R.S. Alexander, Bonapartism and 
Revolutionary Tradition in France: The Fédérés of 1815, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). For 
ultras’ effort to use propaganda and democratic institutions to galvanize public opinion see David Skuy, 
Assassination, Miracles and Politics: The Royalist Reaction in France in 1820 (Montreal: McGill University 
Press, 2003) and  Peter Davies, The Extreme Right in France, 1789 to the Present: From de Maistre to Le Pen 
(London: Routledge, 2002). Good treatments of the  liberal press are Ephraïm Harpaz, L’École Libérale sous la 
Restauration (Geneva: Droz, 1971) and Charles Ledré, La Presse à l’Assaut de la Monarchie 1815-1848 (Paris: 
Armand Colin, 1960). 
 
12 See, for example, Jo Burr Margadant, “The Duchesse de Berry and Royalist Political Culture in 
Postrevolutionary France,” in The New Biography: Performing Femininity in Nineteenth-Century France (Jo 
Burr Margadant ed.), (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), Denise Davidson, France after 
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provided novel insights on the roles of labor, the family, and political identity in modern 
France.13 These works reveal a society undergoing radical transformations in personal and 
public life. They point to the dynamism of a period in which people sought new bases for 
social cohesion and developed new codes of political behavior outside the world of elite 
politics.14 Yet, these recent works do not answer some fundamental questions about 
Restoration social and political life. How did this creative and dynamic reordering of 
ideologies and social structures cope with the volume of political voices proclaiming the 
permanent incompatibility of the nation’s citizens? While they were experiencing the post-
revolutionary transformations of ideologies, family life, and social status, how did the French 
people experience and internalize the dominant discourse of division?  
These recent works on the Restoration point to the difficulty of applying broad 
abstractions to human experiences, which are always more complex than generalizing 
theories can explain.15 And yet, ironically, the French people increasingly relied on 
                                                                                                                                                       
Revolution: Urban Life, Gender, and the New Social Order (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
2007), and the forthcoming work by Rachel Fuchs, Contested Paternity: Constructing Families in Modern 
France (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), which promises to explore changing notions of 
family life in the context of post-revolutionary concepts of authority and individuality. For the revolutionary 
reordering of the family see Lynn Hunt, The Family Romance of the French Revolution (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1993). These works draw on a rich body of literature reexamining the role of gender and 
women in France during and after the Revolution including, Joan W. Scott, Gender and the Politics of History 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), Scott, Only Paradoxes to Offer: French Feminists and the 
Rights of Man (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), and Mona Ozouf’s famous rebuttal, Women’s 
Words: An Essay on French Singularity (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997).  
 
13 See Sarah Maza, The Myth of the French Bourgeoisie: An Essay on the Social Imaginary, 1750-1850 
(Cambridge MA/London: Harvard University Press, 2003) and Steven Rowe, “Writing Modern Selves: Literacy 
and the French Working Class in the Early Nineteenth Century.” Journal of Social History 40 (2006): 55-83, as 
well as Davidson, France after Revolution.  
 
14 For the contributions of the disenfranchised to the political dialogue on the meaning of post-
revolutionary France see, Sheryl Kroen, Politics and Theater: The Crisis of Legitimacy in Restoration France, 
1815-1830 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000).  
 
15 The tension between experience as a category of historical analysis and its multifarious nature in real 
life is examined in Martin Jay, Songs of Experience: Modern American and European Variations on a Theme 
(Berkeley/Los Angeles/London: University of California Press, 2005). Jay admits to the difficulty in defining 
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abstractions to describe their community and explain the multiple transformations of social 
and political structures that their nation had witnessed.16 While the substantive content of 
Restoration discourse on the nation dealt in abstractions such as “the people,” “the patrie,” 
“the nation,” “sovereignty” etc., these ideas entered popular consciousness through vibrant 
media and immediate experiences. Abstract ideas became the currency of public culture—
they filled its press, its songs, its speeches, its public demonstrations—and, as such, they 
shaped the conceptual frameworks through which people understood their world. While 
acknowledging the diversity of social experiences during the period, it is also necessary to 
recognize that political actors in the Restoration public sphere constantly repeated the widely 
shared abstraction of a divided France and that people acted on their belief in a divided 
France. Indeed, I argue that the shared belief in political polarization may have provided 
some stability in this shifting post-revolutionary social world. 
At the risk of generalizing, it is fair to say that most French people, like citizens of 
other nations, think of their national identity largely in unproblematic terms. They believe 
that geographical, cultural, sociopolitical, and/or historical ties forged over two millennia 
created a set of characteristics binding individuals together as a nation, and that these general 
similarities have been strong enough to override specific events periodically dividing the 
                                                                                                                                                       
experience or identifying it in historical analysis but argues we cannot do away with it as a means of 
understanding the past.  
 
16 Pierre Rosanvallon claims that the French addiction to abstractions in social and political thought 
“drained the social of substance” and made experiencing political community and social cohesion impossible 
without entities to intervene between the people and the state. Pierre Rosanvallon, The Demands of Liberty: 
Civil Society in France since the Revolution, Arthur Goldhammer trans., (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2007), 71-72. The equalizing discourse of democracy—itself a grab bag of abstract concepts such as the 
“people,” “the nation,” “sovereignty,” etc.—had been absorbed over the twenty-five years before the 
Restoration and was still employed by the Restoration’s political institutions. For the transmission and 
acceptance of democratic discourse in various strata of French society during the Revolution see, James 
Livesey, Making Democracy in The French Revolution  (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), 
especially page 165. 
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people.17 Theorists of nationalism usually explain the development of the modern idea of a 
unitary nation as either a state driven response to economic or social change, or an 
autonomous and positive reaction of individuals seeking to counter the atomizing social 
forces that accompany the march of progress.18 Some theorists describe the development of 
national identity as a response to international competition, while others see it as a product of 
political ideology.19 Despite the variety of explanations for the emergence of nationalism in 
modern nations, most theories assert that a single mode of nationalist thought characterizes 
each country, making it possible to identify normative forms of nationalism in different 
countries. For example, many assert that French nationalism, is a “liberal” nationalism that 
champions the “political” bases for national cohesion, while German nationalism is 
“reactionary” and emphasizes “ethnic” solidarity.20 Ahistorical analyses and theorizing about 
                                                 
17 Pierre Nora’s magisterial Lieux de mémoire is in a sense a catalogue of historical institutions, events, 
and ideas, the memory of which serves as the basis for national cohesion in France.  Pierre Nora (ed.), Les lieux 
de mémoire (Paris: Gallimard, 1983-94). Of particular importance to this study is Marcel Gauchet’s article, “La 
Droite et la Gauche” in Les Lieux de Memoire (Pierre Nora, ed.,), vol. 3 (Paris: Gallimard, 1993). Gauchet 
believes that these concepts have more impact on French memory than they exerted in the Revolution.  
 
18 Two well-known state models of nationalism are Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1983) and Eric Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, 
Reality (Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990). There is a wide range of theoretical models 
of nationalism in the constructionist or modernization school, but all share this aspect of state-driven national 
bonding. See Joseph R. Llobera, “Modernization Theories of Nationalism” in Encyclopaedia of Nationalism, 
Athena S. Leoussi (ed.) (New Brunswick, NJ and London: Transaction Publishers, 2001), 184-92. In contrast to 
these more cynical conceptions of state-driven nationalism in modern societies is Gregory Jusdanis’ theory, 
according to which the nation becomes a necessary cultural construction when the homogenizing forces of 
modernity threaten a citizen’s sense of self. See Jusdanis, The Necessary Nation, (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2001). 
 
19Representative of the former school of thought is Liah Greenfeld, Nationalism: Five Roads to 
Modernity (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1992) and  specifically for the French example, David Bell, The Cult of 
the Nation in France: Inventing Nationalism, 1680-1800 (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2001). Bell also emphasizes 
the politicization of the nation and the centrality of the nation in French politics. The role of popular sovereignty 
in the formation of national identity is addressed in the context of political framing in this dissertation. For 
studies on its relation to French nationalism and national identity see, Chimène I. Keitner, The Paradoxes of 
Nationalism : The French Revolution and its Meaning for Contemporary Nation Building (Albany, NY: State 
University of New York Press, 2007) and Lloyd Kramer, Nationalism : Political Cultures in Europe and 
America, 1775-1865 (New York: Twayne, 1998).  
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the “nation” and “nationalism,” or efforts at creating an overarching model of modern 
nationalism, can lead scholars to occlude differences and countervailing trends within nations 
that may in fact be just as essential to understanding how people experience living in “the 
nation” at any specific moment in time. 
 In the French case, some historians have tended to accept at face value the efforts of 
revolutionary Jacobins and later politicians of the Third Republic who sought to unify the 
French nation politically, socially, and culturally. They apply teleological approaches to the 
issue of nationhood—as though the aims of earlier state initiatives to create a homogenous 
society led directly to France’s contemporary centralized state and strong national culture.21 
In fact, those who comprised the supposedly unified French nation have always lived in a 
divisive political climate in which many models of the nation competed.22 Both the myth of 
                                                                                                                                                       
20 The French themselves have gone to great lengths to perpetuate this idea. See Ernest Renan, Qu’est-
ce qu’une nation et autres écrits politiques, (Raoul Girardet ed.) (Paris: Imprimerie National, 1996). The classic 
iteration of this dualistic theory of nationalism appears in Hans Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism, A Study in its 
Origins and Background (New York: Macmillan, 1944). This dichotomy in the nature of nationalism is related 
to another set of categories in theories of nationalism, the primordial/constructivist debate. This dissertation 
does not presume to resolve the debate between primordialists, who presume that the nation is an organic entity 
inherently bounded by its ethnicity and culture, and constructivists, who assert that the nation is an artificial 
political construction used to mobilize citizens. Anthony Smith’s approach, however, provides a good guide for 
connecting national culture to the political program of nationalism. He suggests that cultural artifacts, ethnicity, 
and language of social groups reflect real historical distinctions, but that these are not generic in nations—
nations are in fact heterogeneous entities with multiple histories. Nationalism as a political program draws on 
these real distinctions to mobilize people to act in support of the nation.  See, Geoff Eley and Ronald Grigor 
Suny (eds.), Becoming National: A Reader, (New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), and Anthony 
Smith, Theories of Nationalism, (London: Duckworth, 1983, 2nd ed.).  
 
21 The political, cultural, and social changes that paved the way for a national consciousness have 
received extensive treatment in Eugen Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 
1870-1914 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1976). Isser Woloch describes the implementation of 
revolutionary and Napoleonic administrative reforms and their retention in the Restoration as a basis for 
national cohesion in Woloch, The New Regime: Transformations of The French Civic Order, 1789-1820s (New 
York: Norton, 1994). 
 
22 This tension between the representation of Republican national unity and the reality of political 
division has generated a wealth of literature. Pierre Rosanvallon suggests in his most recent foray into this 
debate that the “great divide” in French society was not caused by individuals’ or cultural groups’ resistance to 
Jacobin centralization.  Instead, the real divide in France is between the claims of intermediary bodies in civil 
society and the efforts of the central state to atomize individuals in the process of homogenizing the nation. See 
Pierre Rosanvallon’s, The Demands of Liberty: Civil Society in France since the Revolution, Arthur 
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an essentially unified French national character and the historical factors that prevented the 
realization of this ideal nation drew their strength from the violent upheavals that closed the 
eighteenth century and ushered in the modern era. Coming on the heels of nearly twenty-five 
years of warfare and political violence, the Restoration was an especially divisive period that 
left an enduring political legacy with inescapable implications for the formation of modern 
French identity. The Restoration was the arena in which the French first framed the conflict 
between post-revolutionary national unity and national division, and, as such, deserves 
special attention in historical discussions of modern French national identity.  
Identity and Political Frames 
 Left/Right polarization in post-revolutionary France was not only an observable 
historical phenomenon; it was also intrinsic to the development of modern French identity, 
both on an individual level and in the broad shared sense of a collective political culture, and 
it persists today.  Abstract and absolute conceptions of metaphysical or physical identity are 
the domain of philosophers and neuroscientists. “Identity,” therefore appears in these pages 
as a heuristic term to describe deep-seated components of human consciousness created 
through processes of cognition. Because it relies on humans to create it through cognition, 
identity is changeable depending on feedback processes between the mind and the exterior 
world. “National identity” as a heuristic concept, I suggest, emerges through the workings of 
                                                                                                                                                       
Goldhammer trans., (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007). Rosanvallon claims that both liberals 
and royalists looked to assert these intermediary bodies against the hegemony of the state during the 
Restoration. Another recent work that challenges the myth of French exceptionalism and contrasts it with the 
historical reality of past and present divisions is Jack Hayward’s, Fragmented France: Two Centuries of 
Disputed Identity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). See also,  Brian Jenkins, Nationalism in France, 
Class and Nation since 1789 (Savage, MD: Barnes & Noble, 1990), Caroline Ford, Creating the Nation in 
Provincial France: Religion and Political Identity in Brittany (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 
Edmond Marc Lipansky, L’Identité Française: Représentations, Mythes, Idéologies (La Garenne-Colombes: 
L’Espace Européen, 1991), Jean de Viguerie, Les Deux Patries, Essai Historique sur l’Idée de Patrie en France 
(Bouère: D.M. Morin, 1998), and Herman Lebovics, True France: The Wars Over Cultural Identity, 1900-1945 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992). 
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three principle factors: (i) cognitive processes in structures in the unconscious mind; (ii) 
interactions between individuals and the culture in which they live; (iii) the influence of 
competing political ideas which people use to explain their national community or their roles 
in it. I argue that the Left/Right paradigm and the discourse of national division which 
developed over the course of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth-centuries became 
imbedded in minds during the Restoration through constant exposure to political 
contestation. French people consciously and unconsciously used this framework—
increasingly to the exclusion of other models—to explain their political reality and act 
politically. In this sense, polarization became an essential aspect of French identity. 
 This changeable nature of identity also impinges on conceptions of the interior self. I 
do not subscribe to single theory of the self but rather emphasize insights from a few salient, 
and at times conflicting, scholars on the subject, especially when their insights resonate with 
my own analysis of French national identity during the Restoration.23  I accept Charles 
Taylor’s assertion that people’s identification with the “good life” underpins all modern ideas 
                                                 
23 In the chorus of historical debates about “identity” since the “cultural turn” of the 1980’s and ‘90’s, 
the words “identity” and “self” have taken on multiple and often amorphous meaning. Jan Goldstein refers to 
this as a “widespread conceptual muddle about, what, exactly, is the quarry being sought,” Jan Goldstein, The 
Post-Revolutionary Self: Politics and Psyche in France, 1750-1850 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2005), 2. Just a few examples pointing to the volume of “identity studies” in France are, Michael Wolfe 
ed,, Changing Identities in Early Modern France (Durham, NC/London: Duke University Press, 1997), Steven 
Ungar and Tom Conley, eds., Identity papers: Contested Nationhood in Twentieth-Century France 
(Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), Sheila Perry and Máire Cross (eds.), Voices of 
France: Social, Political, and Cultural Identity (London/Washington: Pinter, 1997), Jeff Bridgford (ed.), 
France, Image and Identity (Newcastle-upon-Tyne, UK: Newcastle-upon-Tyne Polytechnic Products, 1987), 
Fernand Braudel, The Identity of France, 2 vol. (William Collins Sons trans.) (London: Collins, c1988-1990), 
Michael Wintroub, A Savage Mirror: Power, Identity, and Knowledge in Early Modern France (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 2006), and Joseph F. Byrnes, Catholic and French Forever: Religious and National 
Identity in Modern France (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2005). Lawrence D. 
Kritzman believes an eclectic approach that considers exploring multiple sources of identity from social identity 
to collective memory as an opportunity for scholars to find new historical hermeneutics. Lawrence D. Kritzman, 
“Identity Crises: France, Culture, and the Idea of Nation,” in French Cultural Studies: Criticism at the 
Crossroads (Marie-Pierre Le Hir, Dana Strand eds.) (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2000), 
25. 
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of the self.  According to Taylor, realization of selfhood implies the recognition of an optimal 
moral framework, one explicitly superior to any other option, and the application of this 
moral framework to construct and guide one’s life.24 Textual evidence from the Restoration 
certainly suggests that those who emphasized an ideal nation linked their view of France to 
their own convictions about personal morality and values. My argument, however, draws 
more heavily on Jerrold Seigel’s work on the development of ideas of the self in Western 
history. 25  His contention that conceptions of the self are varied and adaptable and draw on 
multiple resources for their expression is in line with my heuristic theory of identity. He 
suggests that multiple arenas of human experience namely, the biological, the 
relational/social, and the reflexive inform ideas of the self. These different fields for 
conceptualizing the self and identity reach imaginatively across disciplines to better postulate 
how contexts that range from the physical functions of the brain to the social environments in 
which people live provide resources for self-fashioning and understanding the self in relation 
to the exterior world.26  
 Modern society provides many opportunities and arenas in which people can 
conceptualize and refashion their selves. The social and political chasm opened by the 
Revolution and the atomizing effects of Napoleon’s centralized state made Restoration 
France a particularly fertile period for reconceptualizing the self. Jan Goldstein and Seigel 
                                                 
24 Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of Modern Identity (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1989), 19.  
 
25 Seigel’s contention that there is no one “true self,” nor is there one history of it, and that historical 
context impinges on the conceptualization and articulation of an idea of selfhood is also germane to the 
arguments presented here. He writes, “…it [the history of the self] is the story of attempts by people, formed in 
different environments and possessed of different resources and intentions, to make sense of the complex and 
often puzzling relations between the parts of their lives.” Jerrold Seigel, The Idea of the Self: Thought and 
Experience in Western Europe Since the Seventeenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 
44.   
 
26 Ibid., 1-5. 
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both assert that people in this period felt a new need to identify and realize a more 
autonomous self that could withstand the pressures of a changing social world. The 
inadequacy of Enlightenment models of the self and the failure of revolutionary attempts to 
transform the categories of “citizens” and “subjects” led Victor Cousin, for example, to 
embark on a new educational program that encouraged students to “reconstitute humanity 
inside themselves.”27 The era of Restoration political contestation also coincided with the 
emergence of Romanticism in France, a movement Warren Breckman characterizes as, “a 
commitment to self-expression, [and] a desire to unite the liberated individual with a greater 
whole.”28 The Romantic individual’s impulse to commune with the sublime in spirit and art 
also carried an overtly political element—a yearning for social cohesion. Post-revolutionary 
romantics saw their world as “divided and dualistic,” and thus strove to find “points of 
connection and integration” in their search for social and political reconciliation.29 Post-
revolutionary trauma lent an air of urgency to the quest for individual self-actualization and 
rehabilitation of the sociopolitical unity of the French people—however chimerical the latter 
                                                 
27 Ibid., 474. Goldstein writes, “Thus the Cousinian moi was defined as a dynamic will capable of 
molding the world and as a foundational principle that endowed private property with metaphysical status.” 
Goldstein, Post-Revolutionary Self,  12. In a sense, people on both sides of the great post-revolutionary divide 
were trapped by the state. Cousin’s emphasis on creating an individual endowed with confident autonomy was a 
reaction to state centralization and its alienating effects. The state and its representative institutions were the 
only venue left for articulating a community that helped people realize their full individual potential. In other 
words, in order to realize oneself, one had to engage in politics. For Cousinianism as a reaction to the state, see 
Seigel, 469-71. Rosanvallon, as mentioned earlier, sees civil society as the buffer between the state and the 
atomized individual. Rosanvallon, Demands of Liberty. 
 
28 Warren Breckman, “Introduction” in European Romanticism: A Brief History with Documents (New 
York: Bedford/St Martin’s Press, 2008), 3. 
 
29 Ibid., 17, 18. Not surprisingly, considering France’s political history from 1789-1830 Breckman 
writes that “French Romanticism, was explicitly, combatively political. Although French Romanticism,” he 
continues, “may have been more a response to the traumas of the Revolution than its promises, it mirrored the 
highly politicized nature of post-revolutionary society.” Ibid., 27. The nexus of Romanticism and politics for 
liberals is examined in, K. Steven Vincent, “Benjamin Constant, the French Revolution, and the Origins of 
French Romantic Liberalism,” French Historical Studies 23, no. 4 (2000): 607-637. 
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idea might have been.30 This societal angst over the broken and divided social world also 
helps explain the strong discourse of reconciliation that went hand-in-hand with polarizing 
partisanship during the Restoration.31 The Romantics’ emotionally charged attempts to 
conceptualize a new individual and define its place in the greater whole of humanity and 
nature, in short, often merged with a wider quest for new national identities.  
 During the Restoration, people tried to assert their individual autonomy even as they 
longed for social cohesion. If we accept the arguments of those social theorists who claim 
that identity is inherently social in origin and expression, it follows that post-revolutionary 
disunity naturally impinged upon people’s sense of self. 32  According to proponents of 
“social identity,” societal relations and conditions comprise the arena for the performance of 
identity, making the very idea of the atomized individual a fiction, regardless of the anxiety 
people may feel about their personal sense of alienation.33 According to recent theorists such 
as Steph Lawler, society consists of a shared set of codes that allow for predictable outcomes 
in a wide variety of social interactions, from the mundane (e.g. the transfer of property) to the 
                                                 
30 Dominick LaCapra addresses the problem of writing about traumatic events because of their 
lingering divisive effects. “A crucial issue with respect to traumatic historical events is whether attempts to 
work though problems, including rituals of mourning can visibly come to terms with (without ever fully healing 
or overcoming) the divided legacies, open wounds, and unspeakable losses of a dire past.” Dominick LaCapra, 
Writing History, Writing Trauma (Baltimore/London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), 45. 
 
31 Moderation and reconciliation are discussed in Chapter One. For the persistence of this strain of 
thought in the July Monarchy, See Jean-Claude Caron, “Louis-Philippe face à l’opinion publique, ou 
l’impossible réconciliation des Français, 1830–1835” French Historical Studies 30 (2007):  597-621. 
 
32 As sociologist Steph Lawler recently claimed, identity is a “social and collective endeavor, not an 
individual odyssey.” Steph Lawler, Identity: Sociological Perspectives (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008), 104. 
The social origin of identity also makes identities changeable and potentially unstable. Bernd Simon writes, 
“Our identities emerge from our involvement in such relationships at various levels of social organization, and 
they are critically affected by changes in the organization and interpretation of these relationships.” Bernd 
Simon, Identity in Modern Society: A Social Psychological Perspective (Malden, MA/Oxford: Blackwell, 
2004), 19. 
 
33 For other theories on the juncture of society and identity see also, R.F. Baumeister, Identity: Cultural 
Change and the Struggle for the Self (New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), and Anthony 
Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991). 
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complex (participation in national politics). Individual identities, in this view, develop as 
people act in relation to societal codes and expectations. People are always accepting or 
rejecting widely-held narratives that explain the past or present social cohesion of a particular 
group, and employing social “frames” that help them navigate social situations.  Such 
narratives and frames shape individual identities because they are accessible, 
comprehensible, and acceptable to other individuals; and society constantly reconfirms them 
in daily social interactions. 34  Their widespread acceptance also necessarily provides a basis 
for a group identity. Applying Lawler’s premise to the case of Restoration politics suggests 
that the era’s divided sociopolitical world offered two dominant narratives for “framing” 
interpretations of the recent past and the political present. These competing frames in turn 
fostered the creation of two types of social identity and two groups of individuals who 
adopted these different identities.35 By extension, the framing of political concepts of the 
nation generated two loosely cohesive political camps in which individuals used the words 
“nation,” “the people,” and “sovereignty” (among others) in very different ways to create 
alternative models of a national society that would allow people to perform their political and 
                                                 
34 Lawler is indebted, as I am, to Erving Goffman for the concept of sociological frames. She writes, 
“For Goffman…human essence is not (as it is now commonly assumed) in our genes, nor is it in some idea of a 
‘soul.’ Indeed, it is not innate in any way. Rather, it is dynamically and temporally done. There is a continuity 
of character, but it is not innate or ‘natural’; it is achieved through series on series of performances. And these 
performances are fundamentally and intrinsically social.” Ibid., 110. I argue that the texts and events described 
in these chapters are all examples of different performances of the nation based on frames.  Lawler also 
employs Paul Ricoeur’s idea of narrative emplotment to explain how narratives and stories make social 
interaction possible. See, Paul Ricoeur, “Life in Quest of Narrative,” in On Paul Ricoeur: Narrative and 
Interpretation (David Wood, ed.) (London: Routledge, 1991).  
 
35 Categories of individuals are not absolute and can shift with social interaction. Lawler is clear that, 
although identity is first social and comes from interaction in the social world, this means that individual 
identity can be as variable and diverse as the social world in which the individual is embedded. She writes, “So, 
one threat to the notion of a stable, coherent self—its ‘internal homogeneity’—is the recognition that no one has 
only one identity; and indeed those identities may be in tension…A second threat comes in the recognition, that 
identities, equally, rely on the expulsion of what they are not.” Ibid., 3. Rejection of opposing frameworks is an 
explicit condition in a conscious identification with a political identity.   
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social roles and find a broad, “national” meaning in their lives. Both of these camps 
implicitly considered the social identity that derived from the acceptance of certain frames of 
the nation to be synonymous with an optimal national identity. It is only in these connections 
between individual identity and the social world that the idea of “national identity” has any 
specific meaning beyond a semantic identification with shared traits. In this sense, national 
identity implies living and acting on shared conceptual ideas and behaviors that bind people 
together in a social community and also define individual identities.  
Erving Goffman famously posited that social/cultural frames are essential to 
conceptualizing and engaging with exterior social reality.36 Through analysis of the creation, 
dispersal, and use of shared cultural concepts, one can chart how ideas move through society 
and how they inform the meaning of objective “reality.” Applied to politics, frame analysis 
clarifies how political concepts can create social networks that mobilize people and help 
them foster cohesive political and social groups. Understanding how frames work in different 
historical contexts can help bridge the gap between political culture or discourse, and 
political events or actions.37  If we accept the notion that culture is more than a system of 
symbols and also entails putting symbolic systems into practice, frames can provide insights 
into how intellectual systems and political practice interact.38 During the Restoration, the 
                                                 
36 Erving Goffman, Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience (New York: Harper 
Collins, 1974). See also, Charles Lemert and Ann Branaman (eds.), The Goffman Reader (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1997).  
 
37 Marc W. Steinberg, “Tilting the Frame: Considerations on Collective Action Framing from a 
Discursive Turn.” in Theory and Society, vol. 27, No. 6 (Dec., 1998), Steinberg suggests, “Frame analysis 
provides us with considerable insight into the ideological dynamics of structuring opposition, mobilizing actors, 
and sustaining cohesion necessary for successful collective action.” Steinberg, 846.   
 
38 Without delving into a complicated—and frankly irresolvable—discussion on the meaning of 
“culture,” I accept William Sewell’s theory by which, “…culture…should be understood as a dialectic of 
system and practice, as a dimension of social life autonomous from other such dimensions both in its logic and 
in its spatial configuration, and as a system of symbols possessing a real but thin coherence that is continually 
put at risk in practice and therefore subject to transformation.” William Sewell, “The Concept (s) of Culture,” in 
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political cultural “system” was comprised of “symbols”—the political words and concepts 
that the two main camps employed to explain their social world and political priorities—and 
of the political practices that used these symbols in crafting policy, writing, singing, voting, 
and/or joining political groups.39  
It is easy to become swamped in this sea of competing theories of individual identity, 
social identity, framing, and culture, all of which can help explain and contextualize political 
polarization in Restoration France. Frame analysis, however, has universal applicability, and 
theorists have recently employed its tenets and methods to demonstrate how political culture 
is inherently tied to the way people think, how social groups form, how political polarization 
develops, and, by extension of these three elements, how political identity is formed. 
Cognitive linguist George Lakoff offers a promising explanation of these three overlapping 
elements in his most recent work, The Political Mind. 40 This work brings together evidence 
                                                                                                                                                       
Beyond the Cultural Turn: New Directions in the Study of Society and Culture, (Lynn Hunt and Victoria 
Bonnell, eds.) (Berkeley/Los Angeles/London: University of California Press, 1999), 52. 
 
39 Mabel Berezin suggests that political culture is a “matrix of meanings” that permeates the symbols, 
practices, and beliefs which arise in the practice of politics in a “bounded collectivity.” Mabel Berezin, “Politics 
and Culture: A Less Fissured Terrain,” in Annual Review of Sociology, vol. 23 (1997), 364. Margaret R. 
Somers, “What's Political or Cultural about Political Culture and the Public Sphere? Toward an Historical 
Sociology of Concept Formation,” in Sociological Theory, Vol. 13, No. 2. (Jul., 1995), pp. 113-144. See note 46 
below for how framing could also be used to explain cultural practice as a feature of the human subconscious.  
 
40 George Lakoff, The Political Mind: Why We Can’t Understand Twenty-First Century Politics with 
an Eighteenth-Century Brain (New York: Viking Press, 2008). The Political Mind specifically aims to explain 
partisan polarization in contemporary America and serve as a handbook for conducting progressive politics. The 
theoretical bases Lakoff uses to explain partisanship are not historically specific, however, and thus are 
applicable to other situations in which division characterized the polity. Written for a general audience, The 
Political Mind provides the clearest, most comprehensive explanation of his theory of the mental “embodiment” 
of language and meaning and its role in political thought  outlined in the following more academic works. See, 
George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Metaphors We Live By (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 
Lakoff, Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things:  What Categories Reveal About the Mind (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1987), Lakoff, Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and its Challenge to Western 
thought (New York: Basic, 1999), and Lakoff, Moral Politics: How Liberals and Conservatives Think 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002).  Psychologist Drew Westen offers a  similar approach to political 
analysis that stresses the role of emotion in the process framing. See, Drew Westen, The Political Brain: The 
Role of Emotion in Deciding the Fate of the Nation (New York: Public Affairs, 2007). Westen’s analysis is 
intriguing because he applies his ideas to case studies of American presidential elections. 
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from the neurological sciences as well as Lakoff’s theoretical work in linguistics to explain 
the processes by which polarizing partisan concepts enter the mind and become guides for 
articulating political ideas and interpreting the political world. He posits that political frames 
and their constituent metaphors are not simply heuristic explanations—rather, frames are 
created unconsciously in the human mind when the brain processes language, and they 
become hardwired through neural circuits fired by the reception and cognitive linking of 
words, concepts, and emotions. According to Lakoff, words are learned and processed in a 
semantic assembly of frames.41 He emphasizes that recent medical and scientific studies of 
cognition in the brain have confirmed the biological validity of this semantic premise. All 
intelligible data become objects in our brains—they literally trigger a predictable neural 
firing—and then are grouped together with related concepts triggered in different areas of the 
brain to create conglomerate meanings, in other words, frames. This process is called “neural 
binding.”42  Semantic frames become inscribed and strengthened through the reception and 
repetition of language. The keys to strong cultural and social frames are thus exposure and 
repetition: 
 “Language gets its power because it is defined relative to frames, prototypes, 
metaphors narratives, images, and emotions. Part of its power comes from its 
unconscious aspects: we are not consciously aware of all that it evokes in us, but it 
is there, hidden, always at work. If we hear the same language over and over, we 
will think more and more in terms of the frames and metaphors activated by that 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
41 He uses the example of “buy” to show how the brain processes words through the use of frames. In 
this case, the mind draws on an existing frame for commercial transactions that includes related terms such as  
“product,” “sell,” “price,” “buyer,” “seller,” etc. Ibid., 22.Lakoff subscribes to the theory of semantic frame 
assembly outlined in Charles Fillmore’s work. For more on Fillmore see the collection, Charles Fillmore, Form 
and Meaning in Language (Stanford, CA: CSLI Publications, 2003). 
 
42 He cites the following example of the creation of a simple frame: “When you see a blue square, it 
appears as a single object. Yet the color and shape are registered in different parts of our brain. Neural binding 
allows us to bring together neural activation in different parts of the brain to form single integrated wholes.” 
Lakoff, 25. Emotional content also is wired to concepts through this process. See note 44. 
20 
 
language. And it doesn’t matter if you are negating words or questioning them, the 
same frames and metaphors will be activated and hence strengthened.”43  
Thus, when politicians compete in the public sphere using keywords to define their positions, 
they provide the raw data for the creation of political frames with strong emotional content in 
people’s brain structures.44 Frames for left-wing positions, frames for right-wing positions, 
and the overriding frame of the competition between the two are all generated through 
repeated exposure to rival opinions, and to commentary on their irreconcilability. The final 
step in forming the political frames through which people understand their society and 
arrange their social world occurs, Lakoff contends, because we have what scientists call 
“‘mirror neuron circuits’ in the premotor cortex that fire when we either perform a given 
action or see someone else perform the same action.”45 These circuits help people identify 
the appearance of frames when they encounter them in public discourse, and also recognize 
the difference in frames that do not match one’s own.  
 This theory of framing is particularly relevant to partisan polarizations in which two 
morally laden and emotionally charged ideas of the nation compete with each other.46 Lakoff 
                                                 
 
43 Lakoff, Political Mind, 15.  Emphasis added. 
 
44 Lakoff demonstrates that the process of cognition and framing contains an emotional element as well 
that, in political framing, plays an important role in the strength of a particular frame. The basic neural 
operations of hearing and processing a word occur in one area of the brain and the emotional connotations 
accompanying all input occur in deeper brain structures where emotions are generated. The interpretive frame is 
created by “neural binding circuitry” that links the two areas together. Therefore, “narratives and frames are not 
just brain structures with intellectual content, but rather with integrated intellectual-emotional content.” Thus it 
is not surprising that partisan differences often revolve around different definitions of the same word, and that 
resulting battles over meanings are often far more emotional than logical. Ibid., 28. See also, Westen, The 
Political Brain. 
 
45 Ibid., 39. 
 
46 Lakoff claims that the frames of conservative and progressive thought in contemporary American 
politics are formed early in life with different models of family life that construct conflicting frames of 
responsibility and authority in the mind. “The point is simple,” he writes, “Metaphorical thought is natural. We 
have a Nation as Family metaphor. We have two different idealized models of the family [paternalistic authority 
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sees the simple Left/Right paradigm as a metaphor that does not actually fit political reality. 
People tend to be “bi-conceptual,” he claims, which means that people may use progressive 
frames for some aspects of their sociopolitical life and conservative frames for others. They 
nonetheless use the bipolar metaphor to describe their positions on all issues because this 
metaphor exists in the brain as the normative frame for understanding politics. Political 
identity then becomes an act of self-identification. Shaped by the conceptual hegemony of 
polarization in their minds, people make a conscious choice to identify with one or the other 
side of the polarity or they may reject both frames. It is this conscious declaration of 
identification or non-identification with these subconscious frames that best explains 
individuals’ opinions and makes people declare themselves to be “liberal,” “moderate,” or 
“conservative.”47  The exertion of free will to choose one’s position does not, however, 
suggest the victory of the conscious mind over subconscious frames. Lakoff writes, “And yet 
the left-to-right scale metaphor is no concocted hoax.” Lakoff writes, “It is real as a 
metaphor; it is in people’s brains.”48 It follows that people are especially prone to use this 
metaphor when their world is saturated with media proclaiming the polarization of the nation. 
Lakoff thus offers a universally applicable neurological theory of how political ideas 
and polarization become embedded in the mind. Assuming that brain functions have not 
altered dramatically in the last two hundred years, we can explore how the same processes of 
                                                                                                                                                       
and paternal/maternal nurturing], which are mapped by the metaphor onto two very different views of the 
nation. Our modes of moral and political thought are taken from these schools.” Ibid., 82. According to this 
theory, the paternalistic model of authority often cited in ultraroyalist discourse would have been created early 
through exposure to paternal authority in the home. Rachel Fuchs offers a promising foray into this connection 
between private and public conceptions of morality and authority in nineteenth-century France. See Rachel 
Fuchs, Contested Paternities.  
 
47 Ibid., 70. 
 
48 Ibid., 47. 
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inscribing political frames in the brain and acting on them were also in place during the 
Restoration period in France. Indeed, such frames will form whenever and wherever there is 
enough political and cultural “data” to form them in the human mind.49 This does not mean, 
of course, that historical context no longer can inform our understanding of political culture; 
on the contrary, it is the historical context that produces the specific frames for each 
historical era. People in the Restoration used their own social, semantic, and narrative 
resources to create political frames and live through them, and they expressed their 
experience of living within a divided polity in ways specific to the period. A common theme 
of the era, for example, was to bemoan the “spirit of party” (esprit de parti) and to consider 
all explicit identification with a discrete and exclusionary group of likeminded citizens an 
affront to national unity.50 In fact, there were no formal political parties in France during the 
Restoration, so the polarizing contestation was often more abstract or personal than formal or 
institutional. Without organized political parties that could have empirically distinguished the 
lines of bifurcation in society, the French people relied on sociopolitical stereotypes to 
express their concern over post-revolutionary division in the nation. Although we can follow 
Lakoff in assuming that real brain structures conditioned people to think in terms of 
polarization, the pervasive partisanship and commentaries on national division—when 
combined with the lack of formal parties to channel political initiatives and help people 
                                                 
49 Following Sewell’s theory of system and practice, one might argue that the system is only put into 
“practice” at the time of neural binding, at which point culture then becomes more hegemonic and individual 
agency less capable of expressing itself outside of frames.  
 
50 For the resistance to parties in French political life, see Raymond Huard, La naissance du parti 
politique en France (Paris: Presses Sciences Po, 1997), 16-20.  Ironically, this attitude often emerged in the 
most partisan of texts. Throughout this dissertation, “partisanship” is used as a translation and application of 
esprit de parti. Reference to a group whether abstractly describing the “two sides,” or mentioning specific 
groups such as “liberals,” “moderates,” “ultras,” etc. does not refer to political parties as they are understood in 
America or France today. The emergence of political parties in France during the Third Republic is addressed in 
the conclusion.  
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define and articulate opinions—also gave rise to an idea of a divided nation in the “social 
imaginary.”51 Division in the social imaginary exacerbated the emotional components in 
people’s conceptions of the post-revolutionary nation and drove them to emphasize the 
divisions in the cultural media and political events that make the Restoration a distinctive 
case study of political framing.  
 What, then, is the import of polarization during the Restoration, and what can be 
gained from exploring how it emerged in political thought and action in the period? This 
study of imagined and real divisions in the French polity focuses attention on the 
Restoration’s crucial role in the formation of post-revolutionary France. The constitutional 
monarchy of the Restoration brought the Left and Right together for sustained dialogue on 
the meaning of the nation. For the first time since the Revolution had introduced democratic 
practices and representative institutions to France, the French people had the opportunity to 
practice politics in a dynamic but relatively stable public sphere for an extended period of 
time. These conditions allowed for the hardening of polarized frames, and also habituated the 
French to internal division as the normative paradigm of the nation. The relative stability of 
the Restoration provided an opportunity for the development of the acceptable bipolar frame 
which emerged during this era and thereafter insulated the French from prolonged domestic 
                                                 
  
 51 My own ideas on the social imaginary have been informed by Charles Taylor, who describes the 
social imaginary as different from theory: “There are important differences between social imaginary and social 
theory. I adopt the term imaginary (i) because my focus is on the way ordinary people “imagine” their social 
surroundings and this is often not expressed in theoretical terms, but is carried in images, stories, and legends. It 
is also the case that (ii) theory is often the possession of a small minority, whereas what is interesting in the 
social imaginary is that it is shared by large groups of people, if not the whole society. Which leads to a third 
difference: (iii) the social imaginary is that common understanding that makes possible common practices and a 
widely shared sense of legitimacy.”  Taylor, however, considers the issue of social cohesion a philosophical 
one, whereas frames that operate according to the same three conditions he outlines suggest a deeper, physical 
reality beneath and explaining the social imaginary.  Charles Taylor, Modern Social Imaginaries, (Durham, NC: 
Duke University Press, 2004), 23. For more on the concept of the social imaginary as an ethereal source of 
legitimization, see Cornelius Castoriadis, The Imaginary Institution of Society (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
1997).  The implications of imagination in nationalism are discussed in Benedict Anderson, Imagined 
Communities (London: Verso Books, 1991). 
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political violence. Although France has of course suffered deadly internecine strife since 
then, the irreconcilable extremes of the Terror and the violence that characterized the 
revolutionary and Napoleonic eras has not been repeated. Without the Restoration serving as 
an apprenticeship that taught opposing groups how to conduct politics in a divided society, 
later episodes of political bloodshed might have repeatedly ushered in despotic regimes that 
forestalled polarization by quashing political life altogether.52 Instead, the violent episodes of 
1830, 1848, and 1870 were relatively short-lived before politics reemerged within the 
paradigm of Left and Right to meet new conditions in new regimes.  
“Framing” has become a catchword in the mouths of contemporary political pundits 
with little interest in understanding its role in history or historical debates. It is of course 
commonly used in the simplistic sense of “framing” an argument, but recently political 
strategists have also begun drawing on Lakoff’s theories of cognition to develop more 
effective messaging—namely, to speak to voters through pre-existing frames or supplant 
those frames with new ones.53 This dissertation thus serves as a case study of political 
framing in an era and culture far removed from the contemporary American context in which 
many of these theories and approaches have been developed.  It examines cultural media 
from the past to see how the framing of Restoration politics reflected polarizing processes 
that have characterized the development of modern democracies. Although historical and 
                                                 
52 Indeed, the closest thing to this in France’s post-Restoration history was the Second Empire, but 
even then, the move towards liberal government and the emergence of a viable opposition in the 1860’s suggest 
that Napoleon III prudently allowed polarized politics to emerge.  
 
53 Lakoff himself has been a political guru for the Democratic Party, writing handbooks that explain 
how partisan framing works, and how to succeed in a political system with competing frames. George Lakoff, 
Don’t Think of an Elephant!: Know Your Values and Frame the Debate, The Essential Guide for Progressives 
(White River Junction, VT: Chelsea Green, 2004).  Conservatives too are explicitly engaging with political 
framing to better sell their message. See, Frank Luntz, Words That Work: It's Not What You Say, It's What 
People Hear (New York: Hyperion, 2007). 
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cultural contexts differ in every particular period, analyzing discourse and behavior with the 
concept of framing helps identify what is universal and what is specific in the way political 
ideas arise and shape public opinion and actions in each historical era. Without overstating 
the similarities between the present and earlier periods, this dissertation seeks to explain how 
people analyzed and participated in nascent democratic politics during the Restoration and 
offers a means of linking our own experiences of polarization and framing to those of people 
in the past.   
Methods and Structure of the Argument 
I began this project with no preconceptions about the strength of Restoration partisan 
language. The original intent was simply to apply some of the quantitative methods used in 
sociological frame analyses to various sources to show how concepts combined into political 
frames. But the repetition of key terms and concepts in these sources was so salient that it 
made the prospect of quantitative analysis overwhelming. A quantitative approach risked 
losing sight of history’s lived experiential aspect. A statistical analysis of political terms and 
their movement through the culture would artificially posit causal connections rather than 
provide a compelling narrative to explain their cultural ubiquity.54 The phenomenon of 
polarized rhetoric during the Restoration was pervasive and atmospheric. Sources in the 
Archives Nationales and the Bibliothèque Nationale document the general feeling of division 
which pervaded the public sphere and provided a general context for particular divisive 
statements. This dissertation demonstrates how the constant “chatter” about division reflected 
                                                 
54 Paul McLean provides a specific model for the frame analysis of historical documents with his work 
on Italian Renaissance letters in, “A Frame Analysis of Favor Seeking in the Renaissance: Agency, Networks, 
and Political Culture,” in The American Journal of Sociology, vol. 104, No. 1 (Jul., 1998), 51-91. I do, however, 
think a quantitative approach can help show the effectiveness of specific propaganda campaigns. My first post-
doctoral project will analyze “felicitations” of judges during the Spanish War (see Chapter Three) using a model 
similar to McLean’s.  
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a state of mind and was not just the result of purposely designed political campaigns. The 
divisions inhered in the minds of a broad spectrum of French citizens and gave rise to 
discrete experiences, varied elocutions of opinion, and particular modes of thought and 
action. Pamphlets, speeches, poems, songs, police reports, and private letters provide prolific 
expressions of the idea of a divided nation. Some bemoaned this condition while others 
exacerbated it, and many more tried to sidestep it through mockery or by denying its hold 
over the people, but the sense of division remained present and fundamentally powerful. 
 The following chapters examine the intersections between ideas about the divided 
nation and the way people acted upon their own frameworks for understanding the nation. 
The first and last chapters examine documents written throughout the period to demonstrate 
the pervasive influence of “division” as a “frame” for Restoration political actors and 
witnesses. The middle three chapters focus on specific events between the years 1818-1823 
which further polarized the Left and Right. These five years witnessed a transition from the 
dominance of moderation in government to the hegemony of conservative ultraroyalism. The 
events and texts analyzed in these middle chapters contributed to this transition and brought 
the idea of irreconcilable partisanship to the forefront of political thought.  
 Chapter One defines the two broad schools of political thought about the meaning of 
the nation during the Restoration. It first considers texts that defined the ideological bases of 
the Restoration government and its founding document, the Constitutional Charter (La 
Charte). It shows how the two camps drew on different ideas of sovereignty, public opinion, 
representative government, and class privileges to define the post-revolutionary nation and to 
construct the political frames that made consensus and reconciliation impossible. This 
chapter also examines less rarified texts such as pamphlets and poems that heightened the 
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sense of incompatibility between the two schools of thought. Polemical texts used the genres 
of philosophical dialogues and political debates to reiterate political positions outlined in 
more theoretical texts. These dialogues portrayed fictional characters who personified the 
interaction between two incompatible political camps and two opposing conceptions of the 
nation. The last section of this chapter examines texts proposing moderation and national 
unity to show how even these ostensibly conciliatory texts derived their impact and relevance 
from the battles of more polemical opinion-makers. As a whole, the chapter describes the two 
dominant “frames” of the nation, outlines the ideological themes that underpinned them, and 
notes the most common types of media in which they appeared.  
Chapter Two examines the interaction between ideology and events that emerged in 
debates and discussions of the expulsion of the former revolutionary Abbé Grégoire from the 
Chamber of Deputies in 1819. It contrasts Benjamin Constant’s theoretical ideas of public 
opinion, which drew heavily on Enlightenment ideas of the coercive power of reason, with 
the realities of Restoration polarization to show how the use of abstract concepts of national 
unity became ineffectual in polarized political situations. The specific case of Grégoire 
shows how liberals became paralyzed by their abstract conceptions of public opinion and 
thus failed to develop an effective means of opposing his expulsion without further 
polarizing the nation. This episode began the process of hardening the division between the 
two camps which steadily widened over the course of the period.  
 The 1823 French military intervention in Spain to rescue the Spanish King Ferdinand 
VII from a liberal junta is the subject of Chapter Three. Using published and archival 
sources, it shows how a parallel war in 1823 took place on the domestic front, where the two 
competing camps used the language of warring nations to paint their political opponents as 
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foreigners whose ideological frames were incompatible with what it meant to be French. 
Both sides drew on the events of the recent past—namely, the execution of Louis XVI and 
Napoleon’s Peninsular Campaign—to explain their support or opposition to the war, but they 
also marshaled the specific ideological prejudices of Restoration politics to brand their 
opponents as the real enemy. In their calls to war, ultras reemphasized the monarch’s 
ultimate authority in society and his role as the paternal protector of the people and the 
Church. Liberals, for their part, thought intervention was an affront to the idea of popular 
sovereignty and the division of powers that the Charter had ostensibly established in France. 
This chapter considers the debates and propaganda surrounding the war as forums for 
articulating the two camps’ conceptions of the French nation. It also suggests that two 
opposing forms of nationalism were in play during the period—a liberal one based on liberal 
conceptions of popular self-determination, and an “illiberal” one based on the fusion of 
religion, monarchy, and military power. The clash of these two camps demonstrates that the 
era’s political culture became the site for a prolonged debate over two competing types of 
nationalism. Public articulation of these contrasting ideologies helped to spread discourses on 
the characteristics of the nation in public consciousness and to strengthen the sense of 
division in the nation.  
Nationalist discourse often makes reference to an incompatible “other” to help define 
the essential meaning of the nation. Chapter Four examines the controversial expulsion of the 
deputy Jacques-Antoine Manuel from the Chamber of Deputies.  His speech opposing the 
Spanish War in 1823 provoked vehement ultra denunciations both of Manuel and his liberal 
supporters. The ultras’ indignation swelled into a countrywide discourse concerning the 
inherent unworthiness of leftists in France to be citizens. During the mock trial of Manuel in 
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the Chamber of Deputies, both sides argued for or against his expulsion by summarizing their 
respective conceptions of the nation and the representative system of national government. 
Liberals expressed their loyalty to the idea of popular sovereignty and its embodiment in the 
Chamber of Deputies, while ultras emphasized “natural” laws predating the Restoration 
government to justify their actions. Manuel’s expulsion transformed him into a political 
symbol. For liberals, he became a symbol of the righteous French citizen resisting ultra 
iniquity and oppression, and for ultras he became the symbol of all that was anathema to their 
understanding of the true French nation. These ideas spread throughout France as police 
officials monitored Manuel’s whereabouts and reported on public expressions of support for 
his ideas among leftists in the streets and in communities in general. These state officials 
used the language of “unworthiness” to portray him and his supporters as dangers to the 
monarchy and France. Leftists throughout France accorded Manuel the status of a national 
hero—the personification of liberal virtues and beliefs—and embarked on subscription 
campaigns to honor him. These competing discourses of unworthiness and hero worship 
spread throughout France whenever Manuel’s name arose, even so far as to turn reaction to 
his death in 1827 into yet another dramatic public clash over political principles.   
Politics during the Restoration was the domain of elites. The public sphere, however, 
also included non-elite commentaries on the political discourse of the period. Lower class 
individuals with no access to the political machinery drew upon the same divisive frames that 
fueled elite contestation in the Chamber of Deputies and the press. Chapter Five analyzes 
popular urban songs to see how the frames that informed political discourse during the 
Restoration filtered down into popular culture. Both liberal and ultraroyalist accounts of 
politics and the nation found their voices in songwriters such as the leftist Paul-Emile 
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Debraux and the ultra Charles-Joseph Rougemaître who composed easy-to-sing partisan 
works for their popular audiences. Urban songwriters also formed societies that became 
alternative communities outside of elite spheres, and several eschewed partisanship precisely 
because it did not speak to the concerns of the lower class. This chapter illustrates how the 
lower-class rejection of elite political partisanship foreshadowed the creation of explicitly 
class-based political self-identification—the “socially conscious” Left that supplanted 
liberalism in the years that followed the Revolution of 1830. This rejection of partisanship, 
however, also depended on the strength of the dominant competing political frames for its 
relevance. Although they eschewed the political battles that raged above them, these 
songwriters felt compelled to react to them. Their songs mocking politics or lamenting social 
disunity testify to the strength of the framing that elites employed to articulate conceptions of 
the nation and rally their supporters. 
The conclusion to this dissertation addresses the concept of division in French history 
after the Restoration. It considers France’s later colonial empire and the emergence of formal 
political parties in the Third Republic as “release valves” for polarization. It also analyzes 
polarization in the context of democracy and offers some reflections on the challenges of 
living in a divided polity that are still relevant today in France, America, and elsewhere. 
 This dissertation is not a work of political theory; it is a story of the French people in 
a specific historical period. It offers, of course, only one of the “frames” that could be used to 
tell the story. There is nothing new about the story of French division. One need only 
consider France’s turbulent history to see polarization between Huguenots and Catholics, 
Jansenists and Jesuits, and Patriots and Aristocrats in the centuries before the Restoration; 
and the Dreyfus Affair, Vichy France, and the continuing conflict over immigration show the 
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persistence of intense internal divisions after this period. Nor is there anything specifically 
French about polarization in societies with democratic institutions. In other early nineteenth-
century societies, for example, Chartists and Tories staked out uncompromising positions on 
the nature of government in Britain and the partisans of abolition and slavery brought 
polarization to the point of bloodshed in America. Polarization is a feature of democracy 
dating back to the stasis between class interests in the Athenian polis. The ubiquity of 
polarization in societies with democratic institutions, however, does not diminish the need for 
examining this phenomenon. Indeed, its constant reappearance in almost all democratic 
societies suggests why this feature of political life calls for further study in France and in the 
many other nations that generate internal polarizations as they set out to produce national 
unity.  
 The French, like peoples of all nations, do not have one national identity. Individual 
identities are constantly reconstituted when people engage in the social world, and one’s 
sense of national identity is constantly reasserted when people use political frames to 
articulate and act on an ideal conception of their nation. For French people during the 
Restoration, the only resources with which they could construct a new national identity were 
the polarized frames of revolutionary and counterrevolutionary politics. Although the 
adoption of these frames necessarily divided the French people, making them painfully aware 
of the lack of ideological national unity, they also helped both camps accept the nation as the 
product of a necessarily constant conflict between political principles. This realization indeed 
made the French people during the Restoration united in division.  
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Chapter One 
Rival Frames: Defining and Contesting Post-Revolutionary France 
Introduction 
 In 1817, a review of a political pamphlet in Archives Politiques made the following 
pronouncement: “It is a dilemma of our current situation that many people do not really 
know [in] which party they are.” The review went on to classify leftist and centrist 
politicians, progressing from most liberal to moderate as “independents,” “liberals,” 
“constitutionalists,” “doctrinaires,” and “ministériels.” The political ideology of these groups 
differed but all, the author claimed, cherished the liberal benefits of the Revolution as 
preserved in the Constitutional Charter. They stood opposed to an ultraroyalist minority who 
rejected civil liberties and progressive values and wanted a return of unfettered monarchical 
power and noble privilege. In the author’s estimation, there were really only two parties in 
France.1
This conclusion reflected the deep political divide during the Restoration. The 
Revolution had conditioned the French to conceiving of their nation and society in terms of 
polarized blocs of Left and Right—it was the narrative for virtually all politics of the era. 
While conflicts often arose between particular factions grouped together by the review’s 
author, these were merely internecine squabbles and of far less significance than the more 
                                                 
1 Anonymous, review of “La Session de 1817; aux habitans de l’Ain et du Rhône,” by Camille Jordan, 
Archives Philosophiques, Politiques, et Littéraires,  5 Vols. (Paris, 1818) microform, 80. Many believe that 
François Guizot wrote this review. 
 fundamental political and social struggle between broadly-conceived progressives and 
reactionaries. Although politicians tried to deny or circumvent the idea of division, all who 
engaged in the public sphere had to address this great split in French society, and all found 
themselves labeled according to this paradigm. No one escaped partisan polarization. 
Over the past twenty years, historians have resisted this simplistic appraisal of 
Restoration politics. They explore the diversity of political thought and action on either end 
of the political spectrum in works that, when considered together, seem to counter the 
assessment in the Archives politiques. Aurelian Craïtu and Lucien Jaume have explored the 
French liberal tradition, pointing out the salient differences between moderate doctrinaires, 
who did not subscribe to popular sovereignty, and indépendants who did.2 Alexander Skuy 
and Darren McMahon have shown how ultras understood the political reality that evolved 
during the Restoration and learned how to manipulate public opinion to win elections and 
secure power in a modernizing polity with constitutional limits and a centralized state.3 R.S. 
Alexander examines the behaviour of Bonapartists and republicans during the Hundred Days 
and places them in the context of the liberal opposition to the Bourbon regime.4 Another 
trend in Restoration historiography juxtaposes the stereotype of Restoration bipolarity with 
an actual convergence of public opinion among elites in a society of notables.5 A recent 
                                                 
 
2 Aurelian Craitu, Liberalism Under Siege: The Political Thought of the French Doctrinaires (Oxford: 
Lexington Press, 2005), and Lucien Jaume, l'Individu effacé : Ou le paradoxe du libéralisme français (Paris : 
Fayard, 1997). 
 
3David Skuy, Assassination, Miracles and Politics: The Royalist Reaction in France in 1820 
(Montreal: McGill University Press, 2003), and Darrin McMahon, Enemies of the Enlightenment: The French 
CounterEnlightenment and the Making of Modernity (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2000). 
 
4 R.S. Alexander, Bonapartism and Revolutionary Tradition in France: The Fédérés of 1815 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). 
 
5 As Pamela Pilbeam notes in an introductory primer to the age, “between 1816 and 1827 the vast 
majority of members of the Chambers of Deputies belonged to no group at all and would have simply thought 
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 essay by Emmanuel Waresquiel, a leading French historian of the period, downplays the 
importance of the contentious politics of the Restoration, suggesting that political division 
was simply a discursive political tool that elites used to curry favor. Historians, he claims, 
have fallen into the habit of reinterpreting elite discourse and the age in general from the 
perspective of this discursive division. He aims to go “against the grain” and decouple elite 
political discourse from historians’ interpretive gloss.6 Waresquiel and other contemporary 
historians who downplay Restoration political polarization, however, do not address how 
people of all social classes may have actually experienced the ubiquitous proclamations of 
the nation’s duality in the era’s public sphere. While highlighting important complexities, 
they downplay the significance of the widespread emotional reactions to polarization that 
dominated Restoration politics and culture.  
These two approaches, the first which breaks down and reveals complexities within 
Restoration partisan stereotypes, and the second which deemphasizes the significance of 
polarization, both offer valuable insights.7 However, this rethinking of the Restoration does 
little to explain why the metaphor of a divided Restoration was so powerful and persistent at 
the time. In an effort to break down stereotypes and simplifications, historians have given 
little weight to the power of imagination, misconception, and obstinate belief to shape 
interpretations of reality.  
                                                                                                                                                       
of themselves as royalists.” Pamela Pilbeam, The Constitutional Monarchy in France, 1814-1848 (Harlow, 
England: Pearson, 2000), 16. 
 
6 Emmanuel de Waresquiel, L’histoire à rebrousse-poil: Les élites, la Restauration, la Révolution 
(Paris : Fayard, 2005).  
 
7 Another recent foray into the nature of post-revolutionary France suggests that the “great divide” in 
French society was not caused by individual resistance to Jacobin centralization; rather, it was a struggle over 
the claims of intermediary bodies of civil society and the atomizing central state. According to Ronsanvallon, 
both liberals and royalists looked to assert these intermediary bodies against the hegemony of the state during 
the Restoration. Pierre Rosanvallon, The Demands of Liberty: Civil Society in France since the Revolution 
(Arthur Goldhammer trans.) (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007).  
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 When historians encounter “myths” held in the past that were at odds with historical 
“reality,” they often try to find objective “truth,” rather than exploring how false or simplistic 
notions became embedded in popular thought and informed people’s ideas and actions.  
Nonetheless, some historians do explore the “social imaginary” to explain how imagined 
conceptions of society influence people and help them understand their world.8 This chapter 
is in one sense a study of the idea of national division in the social imaginary of the 
Restoration. Within a public sphere dominated by political struggles to define the post-
revolutionary nation, people’s exposure to two rival “imagined communities” led to the 
creation of a disheartening third and utterly divided imagined nation. 9 But historical studies 
of the social imaginary, though offering a compelling hermeneutic, do not fully explain why 
conflicting ideas become so powerful and hard to displace. I argue that the Restoration’s 
imagined national divide developed into a semantic frame hardwired in the brain. This frame 
inhered in people of all political persuasions and became the dominant interpretative 
paradigm for politics, affecting how people thought and acted.  
During the Restoration, revolutionary and counterrevolutionary political ideas were 
already well established frames, but the struggle between these two systems of thought in a 
relatively stable polity was a novel development. One did not have to articulate intellectual 
political positions to be part of this struggle. Evidence from the archives suggests people 
                                                 
 
8 Sarah Maza recently resurrected Castoriadis’ “social imaginary,” originally theorized to explain how 
people imbue their government with legitimacy, to address issues of class.  Christine Haynes also writes about 
the social imaginary as a site for discerning difference and identifying new social archetypes in a changing 
public sphere. That both authors are using the idea to describe post-revolutionary society and culture suggests 
that conditions in the public sphere during the Restoration were particularly suited to its application. Sarah 
Maza, The Myth of the French Bourgeoisie: An Essay in the Social Imaginary, 1750-1850 (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2003), and Christine Haynes, “An ‘Evil Genius:’ The Construction of the Publisher in 
the Postrevolutionary Social Imaginary,” in French Historical Studies, vol. 30, no. 4 (Fall 2007), 559-595. 
 
9 Benedict Anderson’s theory of nationalism is helpful in conceiving a shared frame of a nation. 
Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (London: Verso Books, 1991). 
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 acted implicitly and explicitly on revolutionary-era assumptions about the makeup of the 
nation. Sheryl Kroen, for example, identifies political culture and practice in public spaces 
outside the world of literary elites. She shows through her investigations of Restoration 
police records how political contests between the government and an activist population 
served to “transpose the struggles of the revolutionary period to the nineteenth century.”10 
Kroen’s case studies illustrate the divisive political culture of the Restoration among diverse 
populations, testifying to the wide reach of Restoration polarization. The dynamic between 
protesters and the state that she examines in her work, is a reflection of the polarized 
mentality of the French during this period. Kroen’s case studies reveal clashes over many of 
the same rival frames that are the focus of this chapter. She shows them alive and in play in 
spaces dominated by urban artisans, students, and workers, and in many of the explosive 
political events that characterized the polarized French community. Her study is not 
concerned with ideas in “high culture” or in the political philosophies in print at the time, but 
rather with the lived experience of post-revolutionary conflict in a variety of settings.  
Yet writers in literary society, some no more elite than the street activists Kroen 
studies, were the vehicles for the polarized frames that all politically active people brought to 
their public lives. Partisan texts portrayed a divided France and provided the lexicon that 
gave the period’s politics their vitality and viciousness. They espoused ideal visions of the 
nation based on progressive and conservative frames, and put them to the service of factions 
in their treatises, poems, pamphlets, and songs. Works as diverse as Chateaubriand’s exegesis 
of the Charter and an anonymous provincial’s fictional dialogue offered utopian visions 
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 predicated on political victory over the internal enemy.11 The Restoration’s writers fused 
these two exclusive visions of an ideal nation together when they wrote about contemporary 
politics, propagating the frame of national division. This chapter returns to the literary sphere 
to identify the constitutive elements of this new frame of national division, revealing the two 
main ideological constructs in play and their marriage in the Restoration’s dominant 
framework of post-revolutionary division. The texts analyzed in this chapter reveal the power 
of each side’s ideology to craft compelling conceptions of an ideal community, but they also 
show the even greater power that opposition to rival frames brought to political writers’ 
ideas. While these authors propagated particular ideological positions and the frame of 
division, they also were victims of its coercive power to define the paradigm of their own 
political lives.  
Historians of the eighteenth-century will no doubt notice that I do not address many 
antecedents of the arguments put forward in this chapter.12  This is intentional. Restoration 
political actors did indeed draw explicitly and implicitly from pre-existing ideas about 
politics, society, class, and culture—most of them from the Old Regime and revolutionary 
periods. They also often used the narrative of French history, especially from the preceding 
few decades, to make their arguments; and these narratives played major roles in their 
framing of the nation. But I am primarily interested in new iterations of old ideas in the 
context of post-revolutionary contestation. The union of rival ideas in a stable public sphere 
placed old theories and recent memories in a dynamic exchange unique to the era. Instead of 
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 looking at its sources, I interpret the political thought of the era as the product of cognition 
through the frames that political actors had brought to the Restoration and constructed during 
the period.  Therefore, the familiar content of some of these frames and historical narratives 
notwithstanding, I will not trace their development from their origins or through their 
turbulent careers.  
This chapter opens by identifying rival frames of the nation, government, and society 
during the Restoration in liberal and ultra interpretations of the Constitutional Charter.13 
Rival conceptions of popular and absolute sovereignty formed the poles of liberal/ultra 
debate, but subsidiary arguments about interests and privileges also arose.14 This first section 
also explores poems and pamphlets that portrayed the Charter as the vehicle for national 
reconciliation and unity until partisanship came to dominate Restoration discourse. This 
chapter turns next to more partisan texts such as satirical dictionaries written to help people 
understand their political rivals through mockery, and literary dialogues that portrayed 
political actors in a polarized society. These writings strengthened the idea of a divided 
France, permanently in conflict. In the final section of this chapter, I address calls for unity, 
tolerance, and moderation from the era that seemed to run against the grain of partisanship. 
People wrote in the spirit of union et oubli (unity and forgetting) demanded bythe Charter 
because the polarization offered no positive vision of national cohesion, only perpetual 
conflict. But, in fact, calls for unity were often thinly disguised reiterations of the same 
liberal or ultra terms and ideas that underlay division. In the end, moderation needed the 
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 contrast of division for its ideological existence and in practice rarely stood up to the 
hegemony of polarization. Even if one claimed a middle ground, political enemies seemed 
incapable of recognizing anything but the great monolithic “other.” 
 Restoration political actors ensured that polarization became the normative paradigm 
for understanding and belonging in the French nation. Writers, politicians, and activists of the 
period created a dynamic of contestation that bound people together even as it pushed them 
to political extremes. In the process, political conflict reinforced the idea of national 
bifurcation and trumped ideas of national reconciliation. The Restoration, therefore, through 
its temporal proximity to the revolutionary and Napoleonic eras and its relatively stable 
public sphere, was a seminal period in the development of modern French national identity. 
The rival frames of the nation that fueled contestation in the period and the frame of national 
division continue, respectively, to divide and unite the French people.  
Part One: From the Unifying Charter to the Divided Nation 
It is sometimes difficult to discern the political affiliation of Restoration authors who 
wrote about the Charter because most commentators expressed similar platitudes about 
France’s new constitution. There were some extreme royalists and republicans who disliked 
the Charter, but whose voices—especially the latter—were not welcome in a public sphere in 
which nearly all politicians thought the monarchy and the constitution were necessary 
stabilizing forces in post-revolutionary France. Overtures to unity and moderation and calls 
to forget the past became standard tropes in discussions of the Charter, presenting an 
optimistic assessment of France’s political future. The Restoration’s relative stability derived 
from this consensual acceptance and admiration for the constitution. Indeed, the relatively 
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 minor changes to the document after the July Revolution of 1830 confirm the Charter’s broad 
appeal as a foundation for French government and society.15  
 Behind this veil of utopian political rhetoric, however, lurked substantial differences 
in the philosophical assumptions that underpinned both sides’ acceptance of the Charter. The 
Charter covered questions of authority, legitimacy, and sovereignty in its provisions for 
interaction between government institutions, but it lacked clear ideological articulation of the 
meaning of these concepts. This lack of specificity encouraged thinkers to rely on their own 
respective prejudicial understandings of political theory to construe its core principles. Each 
side imagined that its interpretation of the Charter was correct and outlined the ideal 
government for France. They compared the Charter’s government with past monarchical and 
revolutionary systems, however, which inhibited the effective use of the constitution to 
negotiate the new sociopolitical conditions of the Restoration. When politicians or writers 
professed their love for the Charter, their partisan rivals distrusted their intentions. Soon after 
its adoption, the Charter was provoking disunity as much as its early enthusiasts had thought 
it would promote harmony, and preventing the realization of political reconciliation.  
 Constitutions provide more than structure for governments and guidelines for their 
operation; they embody foundational assertions about the character of nations. Those who 
write them presume that their provisions best suit the needs of their nations’ governments, 
people, and social orders. The rival interpretations of the Charter during the Restoration 
reflect differing conceptions of the nation. Exegeses and praise of the document confirmed, 
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 strengthened and set at odds the two dominant frames of the nation in currency during the 
period and provided a basis for interpreting the nation as irreparably divided.  
Praising the Charter 
 After twenty-five years of near continuous conflict and millions of French and 
European deaths, restoration of the Bourbon monarchy offered relief for a war weary nation. 
Whispered disdain for returning nobles and repudiated revolutionaries notwithstanding, texts 
from the Restoration’s early years were generally optimistic. The Left could take solace in 
the establishment of representative government after Napoleon’s imperial dictatorship, while 
the Right celebrated the return of France’s rightful monarch and his noble coterie. Both sides 
considered the Charter to be the aegis of the new system, guaranteeing the safety and security 
of both people and king. Belief in the Charter’s palliative potential remained strong even in 
the midst of the bitter conflicts that periodically erupted throughout the period.   
 The dedicatory poem was the most common medium writers employed in praise of 
the Charter. Authors from both sides of the political divide penned verses that accentuated 
the positive and unifying aspects of the constitution. Their odes to national unity through the 
Charter often accompanied exasperated calls for an end to partisanship. A poem from 1820, 
for example, referred to the Charter’s “command” for national unity. “Tribunals, citizens, the 
Charter orders you,” the poem’s author “le Gendre” proclaimed, “Union and peace are what 
she commands.”16 An overarching ideal of concord reigned in many works, even when 
writers employed more partisan language that hinted at the differing ideological 
interpretations of the Charter. “Michel B.,” the author of an 1828 poem on the Charter’s 
virtues declared that peace during the Restoration was only due to reassertion of monarchical 
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 rights. “Concord followed the flags of legitimacy,” he wrote, calling for all to praise first the 
king for his gifts of peace and the Charter.17  
 The Charter brought about peace because it ostensibly healed divisions and brought 
old enemies together. Its most important contribution in this regard was its incorporation of 
both liberal and monarchical principles. Some poets interpreted this conciliation of rival 
principles in the constitution as a call for union between the people who held them. In 1825, 
poet René Marcé wrote that by taking an oath to the Charter, the newly crowned King 
Charles X had conjoined defenders of the Revolution and royalist counterrevolutionaries as 
coequal participants in the new order. He proclaimed that “By the lilies France is guarded, / 
The Union, this divine charm, / Joins the palms of the Vendée, / And the laurels of the banks 
of the Rhine,” 18 Some went further back in history to suggest an even deeper fusion of 
French values in the Charter. An anonymous poet from 1824 praised the choice of the 
Bourbon King Henri IV’s image as a replacement for Napoleon’s profile on the medallion of 
the Legion of Honor—preserved in article 72—because it brought together Henri’s 
conciliatory spirit and the courage of Austerlitz’s victors.19 Through these conciliatory 
aspects, the Charter represented “an eternal monument of the healthy alliance of monarchy 
with liberty.”20 This optimistic belief in the Charter’s perfect marriage of old and new found 
its proponents across the political spectrum.  
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  Despite whatever past divisions the Charter may have healed, however, the obvious 
contemporary divisiveness of Restoration politics remained. And yet, even this found 
resolution in some odes to the Charter. In 1819, an anonymous poet proclaimed that the 
Charter could render “our political ills” harmless through its dictates. He promised that, “We 
will live henceforth on free land, / Where the powers of the Charter have imposed balance.21 
Such belief in the power of the Charter to heal division persisted through the Restoration, and 
for this reason, it assumed a near sacred status among politicians of both sides, and 
particularly among liberals. 
 The mandate of forgiveness incorporated into the Charter promised personal and 
collective security for many in France. In 1820, an anonymous pamphleteer wrote, “to want 
the security of all, peace, and public tranquility, that is being faithful to the Charter.” 22 
Finding consensus around these concepts proved easy—there were few who would want the 
antitheses of them—and so loyalty to the Charter became a shared ideal regardless of 
ideology. Thus an important element of French identity derived from basic admiration for 
France’s new constitution. Attachment to the Charter became more than a political position; 
it was the very “quality of being a good Frenchmen, good citizen, and good royalist.” 23  
 Some writers on both sides of the political divide warned against reviving arbitrary 
royal or revolutionary governments because the Charter’s institutions were better than all 
preceding French governments. Whatever the meaning of specific articles of the Charter—
and differences abounded over them—it was the fundamental law of the land and, as such, 
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 was inviolable. Authors warned against infringement of the Charter’s articles. Violating the 
Charter, even for a “good deed,” some writers claimed, risked creating a pretext for further 
abuses.24 Captain Moncey, a former soldier turned liberal pamphleteer, wrote in 1819 that 
the king’s oath to the Charter at his coronation confirmed its inviolability. While touting the 
sacred status of the Charter, however, Moncey touched on the element that most often incited 
division, namely its poorly-defined relationship between the king and the people. He wrote, 
“In vain would the successors of the king pretend to be able to undermine the Charter: they 
would have neither the right nor the power to do so….because the people who want to defend 
their rights are much more powerful when they are supported by Divinity....” 25  When 
liberals made the Charter a sacred text that the king himself could not alter, they raised it 
over the monarchy as the foundation for the nation and exposed deep-seated differences over 
the meaning of French sovereignty, legitimacy, and authority. This tendentious reading posed 
a challenge to royalists and thus undermined the Charter’s power to heal France’s political 
and social ills. Unguarded optimism over the Charter merely glossed over different 
interpretations of its meaning.   
The Charter and the Liberal Frame of Sovereignty 
 The Charter’s apparent unification of opposed principles and groups within a 
representative system of government, also made it the context for contestation over mutually 
exclusive notions about legitimacy and the nation. Articles providing for the democratic 
practices of negotiation and debate left room for dialogue on the relationship the Charter 
established between the king and the people. Despite the absolute executive power accorded 
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 the king in the Charter’s preamble, its concessions to representative government, while 
providing basic parameters for the operation of its two Chambers (Deputies and Peers), left 
the meaning and role of the “nation” per se poorly defined. Debating the role of the Charter 
in defining the nation became a trigger for heated exchanges.  
 Abbé Henri Grégoire, a veteran of revolutionary and Napoleonic assemblies with 
exposure to a variety of constitutions, was not enthusiastic about the Charter after its rushed 
debut in 1814. He noted that “France is without doubt the only civilized country in which one 
writes, discusses, and adopts a constitutional Charter in three days.” He quickly seized on the 
absurdity of considering the document “national” if it was imposed from above without 
consulting the people. Grégoire asserted that sovereignty could only come from the nation 
because “a nation belongs only to itself” and not to individuals or royal families.26 The 
Charter should mirror the nation as a testament to its rights and the duties it affirms, he 
reasoned, and thus should have presented a more complete picture of the nation it 
represented, from its monetary units and weights and measures, to its regulations and 
resources for public instruction and industry.  Incorporating these changes that define 
people’s everyday lives, Grégoire believed, would give the constitution a “more popular 
character.”27 Grégoire presented a Jacobin interpretation of a constitution as a comprehensive 
outline for all aspects of life and the full exercise of the people’s sovereignty. This 
conception of a constitution, namely laying out all the parameters of the nation with the 
intent of making a people rather than coming from the people, was an extreme position in 
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 Restoration politics.28 But less-encompassing liberal visions of the nation still suggested that 
the people were its guiding force, even if the Charter’s articles did not define the nation in its 
totality. 
For liberals and royalists alike, the Charter’s legitimacy depended on its source of 
authority. Did this authority ultimately derive from the king as sovereign, or did it derive 
from a contractual arrangement between the king and the sovereign people or nation? This 
debate over whether the Charter was “octroyé” (granted) or a “contrat” (contract), echoed 
throughout the Restoration, and liberals almost universally lined up in favor of the latter. 
Even doctrinaires who denied the validity of popular sovereignty allied in sentiment with 
liberals who opposed the absolutist alternative. The share of sovereignty that the people’s 
representatives wielded in the Restoration’s Chambers, however, differed from the unfettered 
popular sovereignty of the revolutionary Convention, and imposed limits on the political 
initiatives that Restoration-era representatives were obligated to or could make.29 Many 
liberals thus suggested limits to popular sovereignty in the Charter without denying the 
concept’s validity. A liberal pamphleteer, for example, explained in his, De la souveraineté 
de la nation [On the Sovereignty of the Nation] (1819), “We know that the nation is not able 
to govern by itself, nor intervene directly, in any manner, in the acts of the government.”  
Trusting neither the people nor their representatives alone to wield the sovereign power of 
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 the nation, the author explained that governments exist because of and for the nation. Yet he 
also thought that the sole sovereign act of the nation itself was to fix the principles and means 
that should govern it. 30 According to this theory, the Charter was the product of popular 
sovereignty, but also the sole manifestation of the people’s contribution to national 
sovereignty. Thus, the Charter remained a testimony to the people’s bestowal of power, 
reaffirming the fundamental rights of the people to determine their government while 
limiting the people’s actual participation in governance.  
What precisely then was the relationship between the nation and the king? In 1826, 
the liberal deputy Eusèbe Salverte wrote that “. . . under a constitutional regime, the patrie is 
the property of the citizen, as citizens are the property of the patrie; one does not exist 
without the other.”31  Liberals like Salverte who believed in the popular character of the 
Restoration government without conditions, thus had to reevaluate the role of the king in the 
exercise of sovereignty. The author of De la souveraineté, for his part, maintained that the 
king had been merely wise enough to “read” the needs of his people and devise the Charter, 
but that these needs and the nation preexisted. He believed that according to the contractual 
nature of the Charter “he [the king] only enters [the agreement] as a party.” Although the 
king existed before the Restoration, the author contends, he could not sign a contract with 
himself; therefore, the other party had to be the nation.32 The Charter—its contractual nature 
assumed–thus confirmed the existence of the nation as an entity outside of the government 
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 that had the moral authority and agency needed to negotiate with the king and, if necessary, 
assert its independence. 
The author of Souveraineté also pointed out, however, what the Revolution had 
already demonstrated. Namely, that when abstract “nations” assert political rights, in reality 
they become the victims of power-hungry individuals who act in their name. Nations needed 
trustworthy mediating powers through which to act, and the king was the only such power 
available during the Restoration. The king therefore still had a dominant place in the liberal 
reading of the Charter, but his power was susceptible to manipulation and arrogation at the 
hands of self-interested members of the government and the Chambers. According to the 
Charter, the king alone could propose amendments to the constitution, but the author of 
Souverainetéé claimed that only an ad hoc council of the people could approve such 
changes.33 This popular council, and not the Chambers, would confirm the French nation’s 
right to self-determination. This formulation rejected the idea of ultimate monarchical 
authority even as it confirmed the king as the government’s engine and mediator.  
The Restoration’s representative system with its miniscule electorate and even 
smaller pool of eligible candidates clearly did not reflect the liberals’ grandiose language 
about the people’s role in government. Liberals thus had to reconcile their allegiance to the 
people with the lack of popular access to the Charter’s political system. Some liberals like 
Salverte did suggest that it was in the constitutional regime’s interest to have an ever-
increasing number of active citizens and never to allow a reduction in the electorate.34 But 
there was no chance that universal suffrage would emerge to make the Chamber of Deputies 
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 the “true voice” of the people because the memory of the Revolution’s democratic 
dictatorship persisted. How, then, could sovereignty be transferred from the people to the 
government without opening the door to despotism? One liberal philosophy called for 
dividing sovereignty between governmental bodies to maintain the principle of representation 
but also to prevent a unitary body from claiming full sovereignty. Charles-Philippe 
Marchand, for example, suggested a tripartite division of sovereignty into the two Chambers 
and the king preserved representation while shielding the people. “Representative 
government is not a subtle theory,” he wrote, “it is easily explained: [it is] the sovereignty of 
the three powers to which the Charter gave the right and the mission to make the 
laws.....Each of the three powers possess a part of it.”35 The Charter became the glue that 
kept the parts together and ensured that the government would not abuse the people’s grant 
of sovereignty. 
 Some liberals believed that although peoples worldwide inherently possessed ultimate 
sovereign authority by natural right, only the French people had the experience and 
constitutional history necessary to create a working hybrid government. Their ability to 
reduce the despotic potential of both absolute and popular sovereignty thus became a central 
tenet of the liberals’ conception of French national identity. In 1830, shortly before the July 
Revolution, M. Mézard wrote that the Charter preserved the French tradition of monarchy 
limited by fundamental laws that had started with the Salic Law determining the French 
kings’ succession, and continued with unwritten codes developed through the centuries. The 
Charter simply codified fundamental laws that were the link between the governed and the 
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 governing.36 Through consolidated fundamental laws it provided a solid foundation for the 
nation, and although it was a contract of sorts between the people and the king, it was, more 
importantly, a symbol of the unity deeply embedded in the history of France. “Therefore, the 
Charter is outfitted (revêtu) with a strength superior even to that of a contract,” Mézard 
claimed, “since it cannot be annulled by either of the parties.”37  
The liberal frame of the nation in the Restoration thus centered on the Charter as the 
embodiment of France’s past and present—it was the tangible manifestation of French 
identity. Theoretical ideas of sovereignty, in the end, mattered little compared to the liberals’ 
almost religious praise of the Charter. Based on its confirmation of the long relationship 
between the people and the king, the Charter, Mézard asserted, had become “an object of 
veneration for all the French . . . where it is, in a word, to politics what dogmas are to 
religion.” 38 Even in the early years of the Restoration, Mathieu-Noël Rioust called the 
Charter, “our political gospel” and an “object of the national cult.” 39 Some went so far as to 
proclaim the Charter itself as “a Salic property that belongs legitimately to the French people, 
just as a crown does to the oldest son of the reigning dynasty.” 40 It is indeed remarkable that 
such assertions about the fundamental importance of the Charter to the idea of the nation 
developed in such a short time. By 1830 it had already become for many liberals the political 
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 expression of France’s most distinctive national traditions and the incarnation of the French 
people. 
The Ultra Frame of the Paternal Nation 
The ultras’ political framing of the nation began and ended with the king as the father 
of his people. They demonized popular sovereignty and denied an amalgamated sovereignty, 
and many considered the Charter and its government insufficiently monarchical. 41 Yet, like 
their liberal counterparts who spoke more stridently about the people’s role in government 
than they believed or acted, many Restoration ultras who put the king’s rights first in 
sentiment hesitated to embrace unlimited monarchy in practice. Some ultras even professed 
to understand the appeal of popular sovereignty but nonetheless considered it impossible to 
institute. In 1830, M.R. Cabueil, for example, commented on the people’s real power and 
importance but thought the nation incapable of governing itself. The monarchy was thus 
“born of necessity” and imbued with a constitution that made its behavior predictable. 42 The 
ultimate goal of politics for many ultras was to reconcile the king’s absolute authority with 
the king’s own constitution.  
Royal authority and the traditional prerogatives of religion and the family were at the 
heart of the ultra national identity. For proponents of this monarchical, religious, and 
paternalistic conception of society, popular sovereignty was a dangerous legacy of the 
Revolution. In 1823, Abbé Toutain recalled the revolutionary era to declare that when 
“nations” govern society the “factious become the oppressors and butchers of their fellow 
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 citizens.”43 Toutain thus proclaimed that “sovereignty of the people is a ridiculous dream,” 
and that “sovereignty and equality, in one state, are the destruction and extinction of all 
society.”44 Whereas some liberal champions of the Charter saw the king’s oath to it as a 
testament to the people’s sovereign sanctity, Toutain suggested that neither the adherence of 
the monarch to the constitution nor his accession to the throne were acts that expressed 
deference to popular sovereignty. He claimed instead that sacred power alone invested the 
king with authority—just as the ordination of a bishop rather than his election is the source of 
ecclesiastical authority. 45 Once a nation agrees on a family to rule over all and consecrates 
the sovereign through the recourse of divine sanction, the people remain outside of all 
governance. Kings do not rule by brute strength or riches, but by the vital essence of royal 
power that they receive directly from God, the aspect of their persons that makes them 
objects of holy veneration.46  
Ultras placed the family metaphor at the center of their conception of the nation. The 
“king as father” and “father as king” had a long history in France and many émigrés’ 
speculations on the political philosophy of the Restoration began and ended with these 
paternal anchors of social order.47 Theories of patriarchal authority blended state-of-nature 
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 arguments and “common sense” with religious conviction to create an ostensibly irrefutable 
political philosophy grounded in natural law and self-evident truth. Ultras claimed that 
absolute monarchy was the natural government of France—that all other options were 
“unnatural” and more importantly, “un-French”. Abbé Thorel, in a treatise first published in 
1807 and reprinted a third time to popular acclaim in 1821, elaborated a typical theory of 
paternalistic monarchism and the “absurdity of the sovereignty of people.” Before explaining 
how ultras understood the Charter, it will be helpful to examine Thorel’s treatise in some 
detail to understand ultras’ opinions about the nation in the context of a paternalistic 
conception of society.  
In Thorel’s system, God is the source of all authority. He alone invested the first 
father Adam with dominion over the Earth and, more importantly, over his family. Citing 
Puffendorf’s concept of the multiplication of families as the source of the “people,” Thorel 
intended to demonstrate that the idea of the “people,” if one must have recourse to it in 
political theory, was at best an extrapolation of family, and any other definition was an 
artificial construction.48 He contended that instead of chaos developing from the 
multiplication of families, all of humanity’s forefathers retained Adam’s God-given 
authority. 49  Reason dictated that this authority could not be randomly created or split into 
pieces and parceled. Instead, authority passed from father to the eldest son, increasing its 
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 scope with each generation’s addition to the pool of subjects.50 Likewise, the nation only 
exists in its origins as the subject of the absolute sovereignty of a king. Therefore, the 
Bourbon kings, as legitimate holders of this ancient sovereignty, and as chiefs of a great 
nation with a growing pool of subjects increasing their authority with each century, sat at the 
head of society by natural right.  
Thorel did not deny that contracts confirming sovereign authority existed, indeed, he 
noted their practical benefits. Legitimate sovereigns, Thorel asserted, had the right to 
delegate authority and negotiate its parameters as they saw fit. This transmissibility of 
sovereignty accounted for the variety of legitimate governments in the world. Republics and 
even full democracies could be legitimate governments, Thorel concluded, only in societies 
where paternal forces devised them as repositories of authority. 51 In these legitimized non-
monarchical governments, authority was assumed to rest in political institutions, rather than 
in the people who held office within them.52 In representative systems like that outlined in 
the Charter, for example, Thorel insisted that “Sovereignty resides not in the nomination [of a 
representative] but in legislation.”53 Sovereignty, in his estimation, did not change its essence 
in different forms of government—its source was always paternal authority and never the 
people.   
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 Thorel therefore directed his ire at contractual theories like Rousseau’s General Will 
by which people build society from the ground up, contributing their own sovereign will to 
create a greater authority.54 On a practical level, Thorel warned that popular sovereignty 
always devolved into the rule of the “lowest classes”—a fear many liberals shared.55  More 
significantly, it was theoretically and theologically impossible to realize popular sovereignty 
because individuals’ wills were synonymous with their indivisible souls and could not 
become dissociated from them in the form of the General Will.56 Thorel claimed that the 
proponents of popular sovereignty fundamentally misunderstood the difference between the 
soul and authority—two essential but markedly different aspects of the human condition. 
Personal authority, Thorel believed, was by definition a product of hierarchical relations and 
not the actuation of individual willpower. Thorel’s conception of authority thus was “neither 
the General Will, nor the particular will, nor a composite of votes and wills,” but rather, the 
God-given force of the fatherhood that kept families and nations together. 57 Sovereign 
paternal authority therefore undergirded all rightful governments and alone legitimized 
enacting governmental policy. Political authority in this construct remained an heirloom that 
fathers received as protectors of their families, and by extension this paternal political 
authority was the necessary guarantor of the great family of society and nation.  
Paternal authority was a common element in the ultra frame of the nation and Thorel 
was only one of several conservative Restoration theorists, politicians, and writers who 
subscribed to this paternalistic view of political authority and the nation. Many ultras held 
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 narrower conceptions of paternalism than Thorel, and denied the legitimacy of any system of 
government other than monarchy. In 1826, Jérome-Joseph de Momigny extended the 
monarchical ideal to explain paternal authority in the household. He asserted that fathers 
acted as monarchs and their children were subjects whose individuality derived solely from 
their membership in the family. In turn, these family units became the “individuals” of the 
kingdom. All the families of a nation belonged in a hierarchical chain of monarchies that 
descended from God, to king, to lords, and finally fathers. Religion served as the glue that 
held these monarchies together. 58 Momigny thus took the consequences of paternalism to 
their extremes by excluding the individual and all civil rights from political consideration. He 
stretched the implications of paternalism to such an extreme that the Charter became an 
obstacle to the perfection of the monarchy. According to him, it did not protect the new order 
as much as preserve republican political ideas damaging to the interests of the monarchy and 
antithetical to patriarchal society.59  
Despite such condemnations of the Charter by some theorists who adopted the 
paternal model of society, most ultras wanted to reconcile their paternal framing of the nation 
with the Restoration’s representative government and the post-revolutionary division in 
French society. The Marquis de Préaulx simply dismissed alternative interpretations as trivial 
theoretical distinctions. In 1823, he wrote that “in theory, the king alone is the true 
representative of the nation: in the practice of government, the nation must believe that it is 
represented on the outside by the king alone, in the inside, by the king, the Chamber of Peers, 
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 and the Chamber of Deputies.” 60 Préaulx believed that the monarch alone could “represent” 
the people’s interests, thus denying all real power to the chosen representatives of the people. 
Popular acceptance did not validate the Charter. Its validity derived instead from the “free 
will” of the king to accept the constitution or not, and not from the people who agreed to its 
conditions.61 When the king chose to accept the constitution, he confirmed his sovereignty 
but also revealed for all to see the great burden it imposed on him.62 He ruled as a “sacrifice” 
for his children and when these children used his government to fight among themselves, the 
fault never lay with the monarch but with certain ungrateful children. The poet Montaudon 
de Valangin in his 1822 work Les libéraux aux enfers [Liberals in Hell], for example, 
described liberals as the biblical “second sons” responsible for all partisan divisiveness. The 
“first sons,” implying here kings and ultra supporters, received authority from the Father and 
honored his laws to assure that peace reigned in the family. “The second, on the contrary,” 
Montaudon wrote, “falls prey to discord, / In disorder alone seeks joy.”63 Family was thus an 
effective metaphor for national belonging, and nothing hurt more than a family divided. 
Liberals countered paternalism by claiming that fathers normally only wield authority 
over their minor children. 64  By extension, this would mean that all citizens remained 
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 children in a system of paternal authority. Liberal pamphleteer J.M. Giacobbi suggested that 
a representative government relied on subjects “considered as adults submitted to reason 
rather than as slaves to authority.”65 To such complaints, Thorel rejoined that a father’s 
authority never ceases and, more importantly, the link to the universal authority of God 
remains regardless of the relationship to the human father.66 What made the paternal idea so 
powerful and difficult to refute, however, was that most people living in the male-dominated 
world of nineteenth-century France regarded it as a self-evident truth. Fathers were the 
inherited and elected heads of society who dominated the public sphere, so their accepted 
authority made a perfect model for the ultras’ conception of state authority. It is little wonder 
that many liberal young men of the era, by contrast, embraced a creed that downplayed the 
implacable authority of their fathers in favor of a philosophy that empowered the 
individual.67
The two sides’ respective theories of political authority and legitimacy informed their 
readings of the Charter, and also defined two basic frames for understanding the contested 
nation during the Restoration. They described how two groups of people imagined the 
community in which they lived, the philosophical foundations of their government, and the 
links between their contemporary world and the recent and distant past. The liberal frame 
conflated the people and the nation and made them the philosophical centerpiece of the 
Restoration political settlement as partners with the king, regardless of the actual political 
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 rights accorded or denied to citizens. Ultras envisioned the nation as a unified whole with one 
legitimate guiding force, the king/father who was the model for all fathers in the maintenance 
of a Christian social order. When politicians referred to these differing theoretical 
assumptions in political debates, their passionate allegiance to them hardened rival concepts 
of “national identity.” Their ubiquity made them the source of division, transcending the 
niceties of political theory to become exclusionary biases that colored almost every aspect of 
cultural expression. Political opinions inherently became assessments of the “natural” and 
correct way to be French. To understand one’s political, and by extension, national identity 
during the Restoration was to accept one of these political models, or deny them both. 
Regardless of the choice, everyone lived within the contested terrain of the nation that 
resided between ideological poles. Whatever their separate implications for identity, it was 
impossible to avoid the divisive effects of political frames in conflict during the period. I 
suggest that constant battles between partisans of these frames, eventually created the 
Restoration’s third dominant frame of national division.  
The Frame of Division: Politics, Public Opinion, and Class 
Despite the partisanship that colored both sides’ interpretations of the Charter, it 
remained on a practical level a guideline for everyday political practice. By putting the 
clauses of the Charter into play—electing deputies, interacting with judges and peers, and 
negotiating the contentious relationship with the king’s ministry—politicians of the 
Restoration placed their conceptions of the French nation in the center of specific debates. 
The more tenacious politicians’ allegiance to one or the other conception of the Charter’s 
meanings, the more they saw that conception mirrored in their political decisions. 
Disagreements over policy came down to discussions of the Charter, and when it seemed that 
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 a violation of its principles had occurred, or the other side misunderstood its meaning, 
arguments ensued that called the very nature of France into contestation. Debates about 
policy thus often became debates about the identity and meaning of the French nation and its 
people.  
Many astute politicians realized that such contestation was a natural by-product of a 
representative system. An anonymous 1822 pamphlet written by an “ex-préfet,” for example, 
surmised that rising and falling fortunes of factions and the cyclical disturbances of elections 
were “healthy crises” that rejuvenated the nation. “Through them all the powers of society,” 
he wrote, “are so perfectly weighed that, although subjected to a continuous movement of 
action and reaction, and each pushed to its own sphere by the impetuous force of opinion, 
they operate regularly their annual revolution with as much regularity as those celestial 
bodies that move guided by divine wisdom.”68 Others believed that once the vast majority of 
politically-active citizens accepted the Charter and its resultant government as legitimate, the 
contestation would merely reflect an emotional bifurcation and not a genuine split in the 
nation itself. In 1828, the self-declared “moderate royalist” Jean-Baptiste-Louis-Joseph 
Billecocq pointed out that, “. . . one mutually accuses the other of violating the Charter. Thus, 
whatever the sincerity of one or the other in the expression of this solicitude for it, it remains 
that the source of contention is always present and they are reduced to combat on the same 
terrain.”69 Through mutual acceptance of the Charter, both sides tacitly accepted the 
existence of the other as an element of the representative system. This recognition, was not, 
however, strong enough to overcome the divisive partisan prejudices.  
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 The strength of a government with democratic elements lies in its ability to tolerate 
opposition. During the Restoration, a series of political events, the ex-préfet’s “crises,” tested 
the limits of this tolerance, as the government shifted its ideological center with the election 
of new chambers or the changing of ministries.  The writer/politician, the Comte de Pradel, 
accepted that all societies give birth to a diversity of opinion, but he praised the institution of 
constitutional monarchy which “gives to this opposition a systematic march and a uniform 
goal that removes all danger.” 70 He warned, however, against expecting the political 
infighting to lead to stability, stating that a perfect balance of forces was “chimerical.” The 
best one could hope for was a constitution strong enough to prevent one faction from 
overpowering the other.71 Although Pradel had confidence in the government’s ability to 
placate the opposition, he underestimated the power of partisan ideology to influence public 
opinion. Faced with the reality of partisanship that trumped the unifying power of the Charter 
and its government, he berated the ministry for its failure to offer countervailing opinions of 
its own and its tendency to react tentatively to the initiatives of the two power blocs in the 
Chamber of Deputies.72 Pradel hoped that the administration could maintain public peace by 
asserting itself between the clashing factions. Yet when politicians associated their political 
ideas with the identity of the nation, ministerial initiatives to maintain a tranquil political 
environment made the government itself potentially treasonous if its policies contravened the 
ideological imperatives of either side.   
                                                 
 
70 J.-J.-B.-F. Chardebeuf, Comte de Pradel, Des Principes de la monarchie constitutionnelle et de leur 
application en France et en Angleterre (Paris: Le Normant, 1820), 68. 
 
71 Ibid., 23. 
 
72 Ibid., 83. 
63 
 
 Political practice is the intermingling of private and public interests. The government 
of the Charter, like all participatory political systems, provided opportunities for particular 
interest groups. Optimists like Billecocq praised this facet of the Restoration, claiming that 
under the government of the Charter public affairs became everyone’s business for the first 
time in the history of France. He asserted that this connection between the public and private 
was the best means of instilling the “authority of moral ideas” in citizens, of bringing them 
all together in unified support of the government. 73 But, again, dominant political 
conceptions of the Charter made differentiating private and public interests difficult. In other 
words, liberals who believed the people were partners in the Charter tended to support 
policies that guaranteed personal freedoms and opened government access to a wider pool of 
citizens; whereas ultras who believed that the Charter consolidated a paternal order, tended to 
support positions that solidified their places in the patriarchal chain of authority. Public 
policies derived from these philosophical antecedents generated accusations that opposing 
political positions benefited special groups rather than the general interests of France. 
Inconsistencies between political theory and practice posed particular challenges for 
liberals who maintained that the popular will found its voice in the Charter. The protection 
and empowerment of individuals inherent in the liberal credo clashed with the collectivism 
implied by the General Will. Despite a broad consensus against mass democracy among 
liberals, a place for individuals as partners in the political process was necessary if the 
identity of the nation emanated in large part from the people. Moderate doctrinaire liberals 
like Pierre-Paul Royer-Collard and François Guizot circumvented this problem by favoring 
passive rights for all citizens while denying altogether the rights of participatory citizenship 
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 for the great majority of the people.74 For many other liberals, however, this theoretical 
quandary remained. How does one confirm the importance of the people as partners in the 
Charter while protecting the stability of the state? The liberal writer Giacobbi, for one, 
believed that the people’s participation in the political process through elections (when 
possible) or petitions strengthened the state and legitimized the representative system. “When 
that happens,” he wrote, “they [the people] regard the state as a portion of their individual 
property, and instead of putting the public interest ahead of the private, they are led to mix 
them together.”75 In turn, representatives were expected to actively incorporate the people’s 
wishes into their political programs.  
If the nation itself were to participate in crafting public policy, however, a filter was 
needed to avoid having private interests dominate the genuine people’s voice. “Public 
opinion” was the term Restoration politicians typically used for this control on popular 
participation in the political process. For liberals, it was the incarnation of the enlightened 
population of a nation, but it was also a term on which there was no liberal consensus (see 
Chapter Two).76 The liberals’ frequent recourse to it, however, showed how compelling their 
framing of the nation was—one simply could not avoid finding a place for the people in 
politics if they were an essential part of the identity of France. Ultras, for their part, simply 
adopted the use of “public opinion” to describe that element of the populace that agreed with 
them—a familiar political practice.  
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 Many partisan arguments that relied on public opinion differentiated between the 
“true citizens” of public opinion—those who agreed with their positions and accepted the 
same framing of the nation—and others whose self-interests excluded them from public 
opinion. When liberals realized that representative government could support social groups 
who had private interests at odds with their own ideology, the natural response was to 
exclude these people from the body of public opinion. If the citizens were the patrie and their 
enlightened opinions gave the new order its strength, those who worked against them 
necessarily were “bad citizens” or even “foreigners.” Charles-Philippe Marchand, for 
example, called his ultra enemies the “anti-national” faction.77 The more moderate Narcisse-
Achille de Salvandy, went so far as to declare that an ultra “voluntarily ceases to be French” 
when proposing initiatives contrary to de Salvandy’s conception of good policy.78 The 
metaphorical purging of the body politic was the only recourse for those who believed in the 
popular will and the influence of public opinion on the exercise of power. Excluding political 
enemies’ from the polity allowed liberals to maintain the fiction that France’s individual 
wills merged and bestowed legitimacy on the government of the Charter.  
Salvandy, loyal to the concept of disinterested public opinion, claimed that 
“independent citizens are those for whom the applause of factions is not able to corrupt . . . 
who frankly dare to place themselves between the extremes.”79 In practice, however, the 
Charter offered no magic formula to dispel the Restoration’s political culture of exclusion. 
Liberalism ostensibly implied tolerance for opposition and the embrace of negotiated 
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 solutions, but when explaining the meaning of the constitution and the role of the 
government exposed essential differences between liberals and ultras, the liberals shed their 
moderate tone. With no shared understanding of the Charter, the nation for them no longer 
denoted the union of disparate elements from both sides of the revolutionary divide but rather 
the grand majority of correct-thinking leftist people. This great mass of the people comprised 
those who transcended the historical divide, whose newfound allegiance to the Charter—as 
understood in partisan terms—made them the “generous elements of public opinion.” 80 
From a broad ideology of tolerance, a brand of liberal intolerance developed to the point that 
the liberal Charles Comte suggested that the Chambers needed to be composed of 
“homogenous elements” in order to function properly. 81    
Ultras used even stronger language of political exclusion. The Marquis de Préaulx 
interpreted liberal enthusiasm for the Charter as a disingenuous front for the desired fall of 
the monarchy.82 But when ultras proclaimed it as a document that emanated from the king’s 
authority, he tried to show that they were the true champions of the constitution. Préaulx 
suggested that only a “miserable and puerile vanity” prevented liberals from giving up their 
utopian visions of society and accepting the absolutism implied in the octroyé clause of the 
Charter’s preamble.83  He conceded that there was room in France for those rehabilitated 
liberals whose folly had led them to fallacious interpretations of the constitution, but he also 
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 promoted an “eternal war on the destructive principles which have caused all our evils.” 84 
Representative government had thrust the “people” on ultra politicians and writers who did 
not have strong ideological conceptions of the people other than as paternal subjects on 
which to base their policies. To make the system work, those whose principles went against a 
set of core values of the nation simply had to be regarded as bad children, traitors, foreigners, 
or even subhuman. The extreme ultra, Jérome-Joseph de Momigny, whose dismissal of the 
Charter has already been noted, saw two opposed societies in France. He adopted a 
Manichean worldview with good royalists on one side and their inverted image in the liberals 
who perverted all good French characteristics by challenging the social order. Despairing of 
ever achieving unity between the two societies, he promoted instead the complete destruction 
of the nation’s bad elements.85 In the end, Momigny argued, there were two incompatible 
forces in France, and ridding the country of liberals was a precondition for any constitution 
or government.  
In addition to the abstract ideas of people and authority, class issues left over from the 
Old Regime and the Revolution also gave rise to political division. As the Restoration elite 
divided along political lines, a tendency to over-emphasize the disparities of social class 
emerged despite the reality of increased homogenization among the sociopolitical elites. The 
most partisan ultras reveled in class distinctions that separated “honest men” from the 
liberals. The ultra daily, L’Oracle, for example, proclaimed that the liberals were “not worthy 
of being even the least of our servants.” 86 Meanwhile, liberals often castigated ultras for 
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 wanting to recreate a feudal order. Behind these simpleminded aspersions, however, the issue 
of class had real implications for conceptualizing the new order. When the Charter confirmed 
the revolutionary values of equality before the law and access to positions by merit, it forced 
political thinkers to reimagine the political and theoretical bases for a blatantly unequal social 
world. Political events and policies resurrected the class issue throughout the Restoration, but 
one moment in particular set the tone for the entire period. 
When Louis XVIII prorogued the reactionary ultra-controlled Chambre Introuvable 
(Chamber of Deputies) on 5 September 1816, dismissing all deputies and calling for new 
elections, many thought it spelled the end of ultra participation in the government. After the 
Hundred Days in 1815, ultras had grown comfortable wielding power within the 
representative system despite their ideological prejudices against such a system. The 
dissolution forced many to reevaluate the Charter and its government. Stung by the seeming 
betrayal of the king, ultras reevaluated the constitutional monarchy in social terms that spoke 
to the class interests of the nobility rather than simply the relationship between king and 
people.  Many chose to read the Charter as a document that confirmed royal power while also 
propping up the aristocracy as the nation’s spokespersons, thus reviving a noble claim that 
had been a common theme in eighteenth-century French political culture.87
The famed romantic writer turned politician François-René, Vicomte de 
Chateaubriand, had established himself as a figurehead of noble ultraroyalism at the onset of 
the Restoration. In 1816, he wrote De la monarchie selon la Charte [Of the Monarchy 
According to the Charter] to persuade his fellow ultras of the benefits of the constitutional 
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 monarchy despite the Chamber’s dissolution.88 His mélange of liberal ideas on freedom of 
the press and his explicit acknowledgement of the Charter as the sole legitimate choice of 
government for France rankled some ultras, but Chateaubriand also defended aristocracy in 
power.89 Chateaubriand assured his ultra readers that, unlike the legislative system of the 
early Revolution (which was based on the National Assembly’s power to veto royal 
opposition) the Charter did not delineate a “system” for the exercise of legislative power, but 
rather a political “order” that the king’s absolute veto guaranteed. Its provisions for the 
separation of powers and respect for due process rested upon the unshakeable authority of the 
throne, assumed to be a natural ally of noble interests.  This guarantee of stability in the 
throne would protect the sociopolitical order from political instability—including the 
temporary setback of the dissolution. 90  
By championing its preservation of social order, Chateaubriand tried to convince 
ultras that the Charter reflected their conception of the nation and could help them achieve 
their political goals. The Charter’s order, he specified, included a privileged place for the 
aristocracy. Ultras questioned the wisdom of representative bodies—especially in light of 
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 their recent removal from one of them—and supported their misgivings with unsophisticated 
analyses both of the Old Regime they pined for and the Restoration government under which 
they were actually living. Chateaubriand, however, suggested that the Charter’s “order” 
formally protected the practical interests of the nobility with the establishment of the 
Chamber of Peers; but it also protected them in philosophical terms by defining royal power 
within a hierarchical political order and not as an arbitrary force potentially as harmful to 
noble interests as it was to individual liberty. Ultras, he claimed, could solidify and expand 
their power by patiently using the Charter’s provisions in coordination with the ministry. 
Thus, he chided his fellow ultras, “we don’t have the courage to brave the little 
inconveniences, in order to acquire great advantages.”91  With this sentiment, Chateaubriand 
ironically proclaimed the Charter’s defense of a rigid sociopolitical order while 
simultaneously declaring it changeable enough to obtain and solidify political advantages 
specifically for the ultra nobility. This attitude reflected a cynical view of constitutional 
forms such as Charter—they were both guarantors of public freedom and tools for special 
interests. 
In the post-dissolution days of 1816, many liberals and moderates saw a contradiction 
between Chateaubriand’s professions of faith in the Charter and royal authority and his 
allies’ complaints against the moderate ministry. They considered the ultras’ claim that the 
purging of the legislature usurped the people’s wishes as a smoke screen for preserving 
aristocratic privilege. In response, the doctrinaire Amable-Prosper Barante, reprimanded 
ultras who, after 1816, could no longer reconcile their royalism with the Charter. Barante did 
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 not read the Charter simply as a formal and static declaration of laws. Like Chateaubriand, he 
considered it “a means” and not an end in itself. He asserted that the king had made the 
correct political move by leaving noble privileges out of the new constitutional monarchy. 
For Barante, such an omission better represented the longstanding nature of the French 
monarchy as protector of the nation. “All the kings of France who wanted to establish order 
and calm” he claimed, “have always made alliance with the nation against the privileged and 
their pretensions.”92  The Charter’s “order,” he suggested, should guarantee the progress of 
the people’s liberty by responding to the needs of the people, not noble interests. The Charter 
had to be flexible to incorporate politics, but the policies created in its institutions should 
only bring progressively more liberty to the people.93   Barante’s Charter was a symbol of the 
promise of the king to his people to protect an evolving social order that derived both from 
the recent revolution and the long history of alliances between the king and the nation in the 
Old Regime.  
 For more liberal observers, the debut of the Charter meant much more than the 
introduction of a political modus operandi for solidifying a social class or protecting the 
evolution of society. The liberal Jacques-Charles Bailleul lambasted Chateaubriand in 1818 
for separating the nobility, what he called the “former privileged corps,” from the nation.94  
Bailleul specifically rejected the notion that the Charter could serve the political ends of 
nobles who had abandoned France during the revolutionary and Napoleonic eras. Instead, he 
believed that because the Charter rested on a symbiotic relationship between the king and the 
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 entire nation, it transcended its particular provisions for exercising power to become an 
incarnation of the mutually-supporting interests of the monarch and the people. In Bailleul’s 
view, the monarchical interests that Chateaubriand saw as allied to ultraroyalist sentiments 
“are in the center of the nation itself, in this Charter which has become a common and 
national good; in this Charter which, despite all their efforts will never become an instrument 
of harm in the hands of the royalists of M. de Chateaubriand.”95  Bailleul repeated the liberal 
claim that the Charter was the embodiment of the nation’s interests—both the king and the 
people—and not simply a rulebook for conducting government business to further the ends 
of an incorporated nobility. Liberal writers, in short, claimed that the Charter offered a 
political system for a royal-popular alliance against a nobility that no longer represented the 
French nation.  
The liberal and ultra frames of the nation, the two main paradigms used to describe 
sociopolitical conditions and institutions during the Restoration, came to dominate the public 
sphere. Liberals and ultras, however, articulated their theories about the Charter, the 
government, the meaning of the nation and/or people, and their prejudices against each other 
in the context of political conflict. In a hotly contested political sphere, their two frames of 
the nation naturally incorporated within them an oppositional dynamic. People of all classes 
and with varying personal opinions became habituated to the incessant contestation between 
two seemingly incompatible sociopolitical groups. An overarching frame of national division 
thus developed when politicians and writers from the two sides developed and voiced their 
ideas in relation to the domestic political “other.” In people’s minds, this frame of national 
division influenced the way the French understood and described their world. One could not 
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 read a book, look at art, attend a religious ceremony, or simply talk at a café without 
engaging with, and more often than not, propagating the idea of national division. As 
political events heightened public bitterness, this overriding frame of national division grew 
more dominant. The next section of this chapter analyzes works that propagated the frame of 
national division through partisan texts. While reinforcing the constituent elements of both 
sides’ ideologies, these political texts explicitly employed them in ways that reinforced the 
idea of a divided nation. Their authors imagined idealized visions of national unity, but used 
them to divide the national community. 
Part Two: National Division in Partisan Texts   
The Confusion of Tongues in Satirical Political Dictionaries 
 There is perhaps no aspect of culture that informs national identity more than 
language. The French, in particular, take pride in their language as a primary attribute that 
binds the nation. During the Revolution, initiatives to stamp out regional languages, patois, 
and dialects in favor of a homogenous version of French developed in response to theories of 
popular sovereignty—if the people as a whole were to exercise their authority, they had to 
speak in one voice.96 During the Restoration, the importance of language as a component of 
national identity continued, but the focus of a “politics of language” changed to 
accommodate the varying conceptions of the nation in circulation at the time. Political 
partisanship, in particular, colored the debate on language and shifted it away from a 
discussion of dialects and regional language to differences in political lexicons. Writers 
reinforced the conception of a divided France through often satirical dictionaries of opposing 
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 factions’ “languages.” There could be no unified nation when the opposed parties who 
participated in its political life could not agree on definitions of key terms.  
 In 1823, the liberal writer Charles-R.-E. Saint-Maurice complained in his Petit 
dictionnaire ultra [Little Ultra Dictionary], that ruling ultras “have denatured the sense of 
different expressions that they exploit to their profit.” 97  Contemporaneously, the ultra 
Michel-Nicholas Balisson de Rougemont declared in the Petit dictionnaire liberal [Little 
Liberal Dictionary] that “the same expression, employed by two writers of differing opinions 
has two definitions.”98 In both cases, these writers offered, their satirical dictionaries as 
guides to understanding the true intentions of political opponents. Their jabs went so far as to 
exclude certain concepts—ideas fundamental to being a French citizen during the 
Restoration—from the opposition’s lexicon as unknown or foreign concepts. The following 
are but two examples: 
ROI.--It is by accident that this word was included in the liberal dictionary; 
it is not in usage in this language.99
 
PATRIOTISME.--It is by error that this word was included in this 
dictionary of the ultras; it is not at all in usage in their language.100
While the authors offered the examples above in jest, their dictionaries did, however, 
reflect serious political conceptions of the nation articulated by theorists of both camps. By 
mocking the opposition’s positions on essential concepts such as sovereignty, rights, and 
representative government, the dictionaries reinforced the irreconcilable nature of the 
differences between the two sides. The dictionaries abound with examples of the rival 
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 political theories that could foster division and turn abstract concepts into concrete barriers 
between the sides. The authors’ definitions for their opponents’ conception of sovereignty are 
a case in point: 
SOUVERAINETÉ: Supreme authority. Since the fall of Napoleon, the liberals only 
recognize that of the people; any other in their eyes is usurpation.101
 
SOUVERAINETÉ: Despotism. The ultras do not recognize any true sovereignty in 
the history of France but the reign of Louis XI and of Charles IX. All others in their 
eyes showed weakness on the throne. … In general, sovereignty is a cake that the 
ultras would really like to see divided; on the condition, however, that their vassals 
would not be allowed to share in it.102
These oversimplifications reflected the authors’ prejudices more than they addressed their 
rivals’ actual beliefs. In the former, ultra Balisson de Rougemont wanted to highlight the 
contradiction between liberal support for Napoleon, and liberals’ belief in popular 
sovereignty. In the latter, Saint-Maurice accused the aristocracy of supporting absolute 
sovereignty in name, while advocating in reality a system of government that favors noble 
privilege. 
 Partisan dictionaries were not serious political testaments in and of themselves 
because their ironic and flippant tone makes it hard to see where lampooning ended and real 
criticism began. They do, however, reflect biases that the two sides brought to the political 
process.103 Both authors used these satirical texts to highlight the irrationality of the other’s 
ideas and to suggest that something more inherent than ideas separated the ultras and liberals. 
How they were received is unclear, but like most polemical texts, there was undoubtedly an 
audience for each that looked past the jabs and agreed that, if not outright foreign, their 
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 political enemies spoke a language incompatible with France, her king, and the Restoration 
government. The ultra daily l’Oracle complained about the inability to communicate 
intelligently with liberals but explained that “…indignation makes us bear it until these 
frenzied men, learning to respect reason, come to merit that we speak to them in our noble 
language.”104  Claiming incomprehension made it easier for both sides to avoid genuine 
discussion and made the frame of national division more obvious in the public sphere.  
The Nation in Dialogue 
Restoration-era writers used treatises in dialogue form to portray France’s 
polarization. Philosophical dialogues had a long history both in France and throughout 
Western history, but their popularity in Restoration debates coincided with the developing 
frame of national division. Fictitious conversations between royalists, moderates, and liberals 
attempted to demonstrate the possibility of negotiating the divide in the nation, resolving 
discord into the promised unity of the Restoration. Despite good intentions, these texts often 
resolved the conflict by pointing to one side of the political debate as the way to resolve 
France’s political conflicts. Most dialogues ended with the conversion of one of the 
characters to the opinions of the other, suggesting that domestic tranquility could only come 
about through the victory of one side; that France’s hoped for unity only could rest on 
political homogeneity and on optimistic visions of the end of France’s post-revolutionary 
division.  
Dialogues reduced the often complex political debates to simple choices of Left or 
Right. They reiterated partisan interpretations of the political scene and tried to condition the 
public to be reactive rather than conciliatory; in other words, to choose a side rather than look 
                                                 
 
104 “Avis,” L’Ultra/L’Oracle de France, I.2 (1819): 49. 
77 
 
 for compromise. Political dialogues polarized people even though their stated goal often was 
to overcome partisanship. Repeated stereotypes and extreme portrayals of one side’s policy 
offered stark choices for “undecided” readers. The dialogues emphasized the relevance of 
partisan ideas to political decision making and stressed that only certain opinions suited 
France.105 They thus gave the reader a sense of the stakes involved in choosing sides.  In this 
aspect, they are good examples of how division and partisanship incorporated people into the 
nation’s political world, and how the concept of a divided France spread. 
Some dialogues simply told the story of one friend converting another to his way of 
thinking. “J.B.” the author of the dialogue, Pierre et Paul, ou le libéral et l’ultra converti 
[Peter and Paul, or the Liberal and the Converted Ultra] (1822), implied that the adoption of 
the liberal position was for the good of the converted as well as the country. Paul, the newly 
“liberalized” ultra, utters an epiphany speech typical in new converts: 
You have convinced me, I will brave all evils, 
I embrace the party of all the liberals: 
In vain, one boasts of heroics from old parchments 
In order to blind me by vain promises. 
I believe that merit is what one must seek  
And that the noble honest man is equal to the worker. 
I become proud and free as much as one can be 
I know to love a God, without adoring a priest 
Who says to me that if I praise liberty, 
‘My brother, vanity, all that is only vanity.’106
This post-conversion speech reiterated many of the themes that liberals employed to attack 
ultras. It railed against nobles and priests while praising liberty and equality, demonstrating 
again how the Restoration’s visions of unity often contained the seeds of division.  
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  Not all dialogues that used the biblical partnership of Peter and Paul ended with such 
an agreement. Pierre et Paul, ou le chemin blanc [Peter and Paul, or the White Road] 
(1817), portrayed two friends split along party lines. Pierre, the liberal, opens the dialogue 
professing that all spoken words should lead to greater conciliation, but his ultra friend Paul 
counters that only a deluded person would want everyone to think alike.107 The two are stuck 
in a conundrum, both wishing for national unity, but the realist Paul thinks the liberals’ 
overheated passions and their lack of reason prevent it from emerging. He states, “Every day 
we see good sense cast off by foolishness and truth stifled by hypocrisy. It is in vain that one 
searches to conciliate spirits, dissipate defiance, extinguish the enmities, to combine finally, 
all the parties into a single one, that of reason and truth.”108 Paul believes there will always 
be irrational revolutionaries ready to destroy the monarchy, making a complacent partnership 
based on reason a foolish political goal. Here, the dialogue portrayed partisanship and 
political passion as the norm and suggested it was unrealistic to expect anything else in post-
revolutionary France.  
 In an anonymous dialogue from the  département of the Creuse, Nous ferons-nous 
ultras? [Should We Make Ourselves Ultras?] (1820), an ultra character, M. Mobile, and M. 
Franc, a liberal, debate the upcoming elections. Throughout the dialogue, Mobile echoes ultra 
talking points from Paris, but Franc counters that blindly allying with power offers voters 
little insight into the real political questions at hand. What is at stake, Franc claims, is the 
nation itself; and the choice before voters is between two radically different conceptions of it. 
Elections offered voters a chance to choose the principles that could best resolve lingering 
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 issues from France’s history and prepare a foundation for her future. A vote was not simply 
for candidates or even parties but also for those principles of governance that matched voters’ 
conceptions of the nation. Thus the choice did not just concern who would hold political 
office, but also whether the liberals’ or ultras’ core principles would inform policy and 
provide the outline for post-revolutionary nation building. 109 Through Franc, the author of 
Nous-ferons promoted the idea that individual choices affected the French identity, and that 
people far from Paris had a say in the Restoration debate over the meaning of the nation.   
After showing that partisan choice is essential to confirming France’s identity, Franc 
recalls the long history of liberal principles in France, and claims they better represent the 
king’s own desires. Franc explains to Mobile that the aristocracy has always been the source 
of French political division and still is, because of aristocrats’ longstanding enmity for 
reform. When Mobile equates voting for liberals with attacking the king and the Charter, 
Franc asserts that France’s monarchs had always forged alliances with the people against the 
nobility. Indeed, the nobility had shown itself more likely to serve foreign kings in times of 
crisis, as it had done in the Revolution.110 According to Franc, however, the worst aspect of 
the ultras was the contradiction between their values and their actions. While they 
championed their feudal rights and duties to the nation, they were fully aware of the changing 
nature of French society. Ultras, Franc claims, know they need to participate in representative 
politics, and have honed their false democratic rhetoric to sway feebleminded voters like 
Mobile. Ultras were more than willing to manipulate public opinion to succeed in democratic 
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 elections, but they still pranced about like courtiers. They were, in short, outdated and 
deceitful Don Quixotes turning gullible voters into their Sancho Panzas.111  
 Regardless of the ideological position of their authors, dialogues pointed to the 
importance of political participation. The ultra writer, M. Desvaux, warned against apathy in 
his dialogue, De l’indifférence en matière de politique et de ses conséquences [Of 
Indifference in Political Matters and Its Consequences] (1823). In this work, Phoedon, an 
ultra, encourages his friend Arion to become more involved in politics. Arion responds that 
he does not understand how his own political participation could make a difference, that the 
monarchy should be strong enough without him.112 Phoedon then reminds him that “two 
parties divide France;” one loved by the king and the other hated. Public duty demanded that 
good citizens protect the king’s interests against “the bad ones” (les mauvais), in this case, 
liberals. When Arion claims he does not understand, Phoedon explains that the meaning of 
“liberal” has changed from, “a grand and generous soul” to “a fomenter of disorder, a 
dangerous being.”113  Desvaux’s text thus performed multiple services for the ultra cause: it 
stirred up support for the ultra policies, it placed liberals outside the boundaries of acceptable 
national norms, and it rehashed the discourse of mutual incomprehensibility.  At the end of 
the work, Phoedon successfully persuades Arion to embrace the ultras and actively engage in 
politics.114 The dialogue, like Nous-ferons, thus also argued for the necessity of choosing a 
political side and reinforced the normative dynamic of national division.  
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 The dichotomous nature of the Restoration’s political dialogues offered little 
opportunity for moderation as a political sentiment. When it did appear, the “moderate” 
character often became the focus of partisan proselytizing. In an ultra dialogue entitled, Sur 
l’esprit de parti. Dialogue entre un modéré et un ultra [On the Spirit of Party.  Dialogue 
between a Moderate and an Ultra] (1818), the author Fé Fondenis used the dialogic form to 
show self-proclaimed moderates the liberals’ faults. His ultra character tries to convince a 
moderate friend that liberals are irrational and inherently unworthy of the nation. The ultra 
dismisses his friend’s faith in the Charter as the bulwark of the regime and claims that 
nefarious liberals prevent laws alone from assuring society’s repose. According to the ultra, 
liberals have no religious morality. They lack the “paternal fury” of religion, the character 
claims, and thus have no “brake” on their ambitions. 115 When the moderate character 
complacently asserts that France’s safety depends on forgetting about the past, the ultra 
counters that “forgetfulness does not remove the appetite.” He implies that liberals, 
conditioned by revolutionary success and frustrated by their contemporary lack of power, 
could never submit to the authority of a monarch.116 If liberals could not forget their 
erstwhile glory in the Revolution, the author Fondenis suggested, the rest of France should 
not forget the risk they posed.  
 Moderates in partisan dialogues were often either blank slates for conversion, as in 
Fondenis’ work, or subtly disguised partisans who demonstrated dispassionate analysis in 
contrast to the rabid opinions of their counterpart. The latter featured in Rigomer Bazin’s, De 
la monarchie sans la Charte, ou nouveaux doutes éclaircis par un constitutionnel [Of the 
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 Monarchy According to the Charter, or New Doubts Clarified by a Constitutionalist] (1816). 
In this dialogue, the “constitutionalist” Ariste tries to explain to his ultra friend Edouard that 
the new Restoration regime provides more stability for France than did the Old Regime. 
Edouard though, distrustful of the language with which Ariste attacks intransigent ultras, 
specifically takes issue when Ariste describes ultras as the “party of feudalists.” When 
Edouard complains that, in his “lexicon,” “‘party’ always takes on a bad light,” Ariste 
counters that “party” only denotes a group of people with shared opinions and principles. 
Realistic people, he claims, expect the holders of similar political ideas to merge in voting 
blocs.117 Indeed, for Ariste, people divided into parties based on opinion better suited French 
society than the Old Regime’s hierarchy.118 He blames ultras for making opinions 
irreconcilable when they use divisive labels such as “factions” for their political enemies.119 
Despite his attempt to make Edouard look naïve, the author Bazin actually made Ariste, the 
sensible moderate character, the real partisan in the dialogue. 
Dialogues responded to the incessant exposure to politics French people faced during 
the Restoration by serving as forums for honing debating skills. In the ultra journal, 
L’Oracle, a dialogue between two royalists with different political temperaments aimed to 
sharpen the ultras’ political discourse. Written in 1819, at the apogee of the Restoration’s 
“liberal phase,” the text portrays the two characters, “C” and “U,” discussing ways to 
diminish the influence of the “hydra of independence.” U urges ultras to avoid ridiculing 
their political rivals and focus instead on attacking the opposition’s ideas. “Their strength is 
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 not in the sword,” he declares, “it is in the seriousness and the enthusiasm that they bring to 
their discussions.” Ultras in contrast, U contends, often present frivolous and superficial 
arguments to the detriment of their own and France’s reputation.120  U believes ultras can 
lead liberals to accept the ultra ideology by using “the cold-bloodedness of reason and the 
seriousness of science.”121 The editors of L’Oracle knew that partisan ideology had great 
exposure in the public sphere, and so resorted to the dialogue form, so often employed in 
philosophical treatises, to suggest debating strategies with which to counter the opposition’s 
ideas. Only through reasoned refutation could the French nation demonstrate that it possessed 
the mental resources to prevent another revolution and bolster her standing in the world. 
Nothing short of France’s international reputation was at stake. 
Restoration writers followed the characters in l’Oracle’s advice and used the dialogue 
format to debate political theory. When questions of sovereignty, legitimacy, and the 
meaning of the Charter arose in the context of personal interactions, the dialogues’ authors 
reinforced the role of ideas in creating partisan identities. Yet, some dialogues exposed the 
complexities of Restoration political thought and defied rigid classification. Royalist Claude-
Antoine Goupil’s, Dialogue sur la Charte entre le maire d’une petite ville et celui d’un 
village voisin [Dialogue on the Charter between the Mayor of a Small City and that of a 
Neighboring Village]( 1819), presents such a case. Goupil used the dialogue form to expound 
on the benefits of the Charter and ostensibly promote ultra principles, but in the text, he 
surprisingly echoed many liberal sentiments. The mayor of the large city, for example, 
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 assures his friend that the king granted the Charter to establish a “tempered monarchy” that 
ensured that all French people, regardless of rank or birth, would enjoy equal rights. He tells 
the minor mayor that a tempered monarchy had supplanted absolutism, and declares that the 
Restoration’s representative bodies had united the nation and the king.122 Goupil specifically 
praised the way in which the Charter had incorporated the Aristotelian notion of balance 
between democratic, aristocratic, and monarchical forces to ensure a peaceful society.123   
 Goupil echoed the ideas of many moderate liberals when he praised the Charter’s 
division of powers, but, as a good ultra, he also considered the king the only real authority in 
France—an idea with illiberal implications for individual liberty. The “big mayor” in the 
dialogue suggests that when the king took an oath to uphold the Charter, he placed the “seal 
of religion” on it, and especially on its clause declaring his ministry solely responsible for the 
government’s actions.124 Turning more pointedly partisan, the mayor then contends that the 
king’s sacred authority allows him to ignore Article 11 of the Charter which prevented the 
state from persecuting French citizens for their actions during preceding regimes. The 
executive power that the king brings to foreign affairs, the mayor proclaims, also applies to 
protecting the domestic security of his people. Thus the king, and by proxy his ministry, has 
the authority to decide who should and should not serve in the government regardless of the 
Charter’s intent. 125  This conclusion turned Goupil’s seemingly moderate explanation of the 
Charter into an apology for political exclusion.  
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  Goupil’s own ambivalence and seemingly contradictory conclusions challenged the 
Restoration’s polarized public sphere. During the period, people brought the frame of 
national division to bear on their culture and society, and sought resolution of politically 
ambiguous situations according to its terms. When the loose ends in Goupil’s fictitious 
dialogue confused partisans, therefore, a real dialogue emerged in the French press in order 
to discern on which side of the great divide Goupil stood. Liberal journalist Etienne Aignan 
praised Goupil’s measured analysis of some aspects of the Charter but attacked the author for 
his critique of “false philosophy” as the source of revolutionary violence.126 Aignan claimed 
that while Goupil praised the liberal benefits of the Charter, he also attacked the principles of 
Enlightenment thought that made these benefits possible. Liberal principles, Aignan wrote, 
did not create the Terror, people did.  Similarly, people, namely ultras, and not philosophical 
ideas now threatened the Restoration regime. Instead of attacking liberal philosophy in his 
explanation of the Charter, Aignan suggested that Goupil’s mayor should tell his colleagues 
to protect it against ultras. Aignan’s review clarified Goupil’s political stance for liberal 
readers. Targeting a few key concepts, he identified Goupil as a member of the enemy 
faction.  
Ultras and liberals were not the only writers to produce dialogues during the 
Restoration. Self-proclaimed moderates likewise reacted to and incorporated the frame of 
national division in literary dialogues. Ministériels, self-proclaimed moderates in support of 
the centrist ministries of 1816-1820, used the dialogue form to attack partisans to their left 
and right, and to bemoan the divisive effects of polarization on the country. In the 
anonymously written, Le masque tombé, dialogue entre un ministériel et un ultra [The Fallen 
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 Mask, Dialogue between a Ministerial and an Ultra] (1818), the independents, left-wing 
liberals such as Constant, Lafayette, and Manuel, came under fire for harboring clandestine 
republican sentiments, but the ultras bore the brunt of the attack. The author argued through 
his ministériel character that only the moderate ministry and its supporters understood the 
king’s intentions and thus were the only force capable of reversing the “spirit of party.” The 
idea of ultraroyalist opposition to the government perplexes the ministériel character in 
Masque tombé. He cannot fathom how people can claim that they are staunch supporters of 
the monarchy when their resistance, “outrages the king, offends the nation, and becomes a 
powerful obstacle to the reestablishment of order.”127   
 The author of Le masque tombé turned the dialogue between his ministerial and ultra 
characters into a debate on the meaning of the label, “royalist.” His ultra character describes 
the overall political strategy of his faction: to arrogate the mantle of royalism and thus make 
the ministériels uncomfortable when they attacked ultra initiatives. 128 The ultra argues that 
polarization occurs because principles and doctrines are less important to the people than 
popularity and passion in politics. To attack the ministry’s doctrines, therefore, the ultras 
attacked the ministers themselves because “doctrines will succumb with the men who defend 
them.”129 The ministériel counters that the ultras’ resentment for the government and their 
insistence on pushing their religious and absolutist program will only serve to radicalize the 
people further, and undermine all royalists whether ultra or moderate.130  
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 The moderation in texts such as Masque tombé was illusory as polarization persisted 
in them as the normative mode for conducting politics. In the semantic debate over the 
meaning of “royalist,” the ministériel claims to follow a middle road, but largely falls into the 
habit of polarizing the political discussion. While repeating the theme of national 
reconciliation, he employs exclusionary language to brand the ultras as unfit for participating 
in the Restoration government. This persistent trend to use a dichotomous interpretation of 
Restoration politics reveals the frame of national division’s power to not only define the 
semantic field of contestation, but also the parameters of political affiliation. The author of 
Masque tombé claimed to want to save France from division, but on closer reading his text 
aims merely to redefine the categories of factions. While bemoaning the Left/Right split, the 
author actually repositioned ministériel moderates as defenders of the Left.  
 Ultras benefitted from a polarized polity because their uncompromising conservative 
positions became much more easily recognizable and defendable when juxtaposed with 
liberal relativism. Naturally, the ultras attacked the ministry when its members promoted 
policies that the ultras considered too progressive. To prevent the Center from reconciling 
with the Left, they rigidly defined the term “royalist” as a synonym for “ultra.” In an 
anonymously written anti-ministériel dialogue from 1817, the ultra author objected to 
ministériel professions of royalism and called the ministers “infras,” or those who profess 
royalism but crave only power.131 The author’s ultra character stresses in the dialogue that 
the Restoration pitted religion against revolution, and this was a battle that left no room for a 
moderate middle ground. The ultra denies ministériel accusations of infidelity for challenging 
the king’s government, claiming that he and his colleagues could differentiate their dislike of 
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 the government from their love for the king. “We cherish its [the monarchy’s] paternal 
authority, transmissible in his august race by the order of primogeniture. If that is what you 
intend when you speak of government, then we are in perfect accord,” the ultra tells the 
ministériel, “but if the word government expresses in your thought, the ministry, there is 
where we differ.” This dialogue reveals how the frame of national division derived from the 
ideological positions of its constituent left-wing and right-wing frames. By themselves, these 
constructs left no place for moderation. In the overarching frame of division, moderates 
could not withstand the power of a polarized perspective on politics. In this case, ultras used 
the dialogue form to strengthen polarization by casting moderate ministériels at worst, as 
enemies as threatening as liberals; and at best, as insignificant bystanders in the fundamental 
battle of beliefs.132
 In the last days of the Restoration, the dialogue form drew upon the starkest contrasts 
between liberals and ultras, and confirmed the impossibility of compromise between the 
forces of revolution and reaction. The ultra Ollé de Mantet’s Dialogue entre un royaliste et 
un libéral [Dialogue between n Royalist and a Liberal] (1830), used the literary dialogue 
format to reaffirm the familiar octroyé interpretation of the Charter and its implications for 
the nation. When the liberal character in the dialogue claims that the people and the king 
form a partnership, the ultra rebuts that the Charter has always remained a document that the 
king could give or revoke. Indeed, Montet argued through his “royalist” that the Charter only 
served the nation if the elected deputies formed a majority for the protection of the 
monarchy, in which case “all the men of honor will no longer form but a single will.” 133 
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 Months before the July Revolution a dialogic political conversation still described national 
unity in France as a political act of conformity and conversion. Mantet’s dialogue testified to 
the strength of division as the dominant frame for conceptualizing the nation—a fact that the 
approaching violent confrontation between the Left and Right would only strengthen.  
Part Three: The Paradox of Moderation  
 Despite the great diversity of thought on either side, the popularity of divisive 
pamphlets, satirical dictionaries, and dialogues during the Restoration testified to polarization 
as the dominant theme in the public sphere. The two most common frames, loosely described 
here as the liberal and ultra frames were not, however, the only ideological choices in 
currency. Doctrinaire liberals, ministériels, and moderate royalists—people like François 
Guizot, Pierre Royer-Collard, Casimir Perier, and Prosper Amable Barante among others—
professed principles that pulled from both the Left and the Right, and they often declared 
themselves above the partisan fray. But these politicians of the “juste milieu,” many of them 
in the moderate ministries of the early years of the Restoration, railed so strongly against 
partisans of both sides that they often fueled polarization.134 In the process, as witnessed in 
the dialogues against ministériels, they found themselves characterized as partisans of either 
side or branded as simply irrelevant to the post-revolutionary struggle. In the end, the notion 
of pure independent moderation as a political identity was largely a fiction. Self-proclaimed 
“moderates” needed polarization to provide the imagined political space of the middle 
ground on which they staked their positions. But, more importantly, they were incapable of 
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 preventing people from using the frame of national division to label them as members of the 
Left or Right. 
As illustrated in the texts praising the Charter, the Restoration settlement itself 
promoted unity and moderation as the nation’s core values. Early in the period, especially 
before the Hundred Days, calls for unity, tolerance, and moderation filled political pamphlets. 
Prejudices, demands for conformity, or poorly-concealed partisanship dressed up as 
“moderation,” however, often lay behind conciliatory sentiments in these texts. In 1815, for 
example, Paul-Auguste-Jacques Taschereau de Fargues wrote that the nation’s safety 
depended on the unity of its citizens’ opinions and goals. Disjointed public opinion weakened 
the nation, he claimed, and pragmatic “unity” in the Charter’s system would not alone suffice 
to prevent instability if people used government institutions to pursue self interest. Therefore, 
the nation demanded genuine unity of opinion.135 Taschereau’s tone was moderate and 
conciliatory, but his demand was clearly unrealistic and totalitarian. Many of these early calls 
for national unity contained similar delusional initiatives for the complete erasure of all pre-
existing opinions, as if removing the political frames that guided behavior depended only on 
exhortation.   
Polarization is emotionally destabilizing in general, but in the Restoration’s post-
revolutionary context, it contributed to especially acute social anxiety. Moderate texts from 
the era thus often depicted the psychological damage partisan debates in the public sphere 
wreaked on families and individuals. An anonymous pamphleteer wrote in Tolérance pour 
les opinions [Tolerance for Opinions] (1815), “How many times have we seen fathers at 
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 odds with their children, households dissolving, families in discord following these unhappy 
political discussions?”136 The only recourse the author offered was an emotional plea for 
France to unite, though he admitted that the French might be conditioned to political division. 
“French, French,” he pleaded, “tolerance is not so much our virtue; it agrees poorly with the 
vivacity of our character. But will we do nothing for the king, for the patrie?”137 The 
author’s assessment of the French character was accurate judging by the course of the next 
fifteen years; simply calling for people to rally to the king was a naïve denial of the deep 
theoretical differences that pervaded the political establishment and would inhere in the 
frame of national division.  
 The highpoint of Restoration “moderation” came with King Louis XVIII’s elevation 
of Elie Decazes as his favored advisor.138 Although not officially the head of the ministry 
until the end of 1819—and even then he only held the post for less than two months— 
Decazes dominated the political establishment from the dissolution of the Chambre 
Introuvable (largely his idea) in September, 1816, to the assassination of the Duc de Berry in 
February, 1820. During this period, both ultras and liberals alternately felt excluded from the 
decision-making process depending on the overall tenor of the political scene. Decazes 
himself could not abide the hot-headed politicians on the Left and Right, and often employed 
draconian measures to ensure that the government’s centrist candidates won elections to the 
Chamber of Deputies, and clamped down on partisan activities throughout France.139 His 
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 ministériel supporters in the state bureaucracy, however, carried out his policies with such 
verve that they only strengthened the partisan convictions of both sides. Both ultras and 
liberals during the Decazes years thus considered the ministry a tool of their political enemies. 
Decazes’ own conservative concern for order, especially when he served as Minister 
of Police, gave rise to several initiatives to stamp out partisanship and preserve public peace. 
For example, while he liberally suggested and implemented the relaxation of press laws, he 
had no tolerance for transmission of partisan ideologies outside of Paris. Decazes considered 
the spread of partisan texts in the provinces a source of instability, and tried to stop their 
dispersal by cracking down on the activities of colporteurs, or traveling peddlers. He ordered 
prosecution for the sale of any unauthorized text that disturbed the public peace. In official 
dispatches (circulaires), he warned officials in the provinces that colporteurs can reach even 
the smallest hamlet spreading “the spirit of faction to the most isolated.” He was not, 
however, above using them to spread ideas that discredited ultras and liberals in the 
countryside. In a circulaire from 1815, he suggested that “legitimate authorities” could turn 
their activities to the benefit of the state by spreading “useful truths.”140 It seemed Decazes 
did not mind a nation filled with political opinions so long as those opinions mirrored his 
own.  
Decazes’ actions reveal two important aspects of state “moderation” during the 
Restoration. First, they confirmed that division dominated the public sphere, since stopping 
its spread became the state’s top priority. Second, they reveal the immoderate means that 
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 ostensibly moderate state actors employed to counter liberals and ultras. Decazes saw no 
contradiction in conducting a divisive partisan campaign to stop his political enemies from 
fighting each other. In the process of quashing partisanship, he betrayed his own tendencies 
to group certain people under the privileged status of “moral” men—a step towards labeling 
people as worthy or unworthy of participating in French public life.   
The activities of the ministry from 1816 to 1820, earned the undying enmity of 
followers of both political persuasions. Such sentiments generated a genre of “moderation 
literature” that championed the representative system and its polarized politics as a foil 
against state power. While not conceding on any ideological issue, these texts ostensibly 
offered a framework for conducting politics with one’s political enemies. The liberal writer, 
Pierre-Louis Lacretelle’s, Des partis et des factions; et de la prétendu aristocratie 
d’aujourd’hui [Of Parties and Factions: And of the Supposed Aristocracy of Today] (1818), 
praised “parties” as the bulwarks of a representative government.  “Parties are necessary 
elements in a free regime,” he wrote, “They are systems of opinions on the res publica in the 
mass of citizens.” Factions, on the other hand, were conglomerations of people with isolated 
interests who entered into parties and corrupted them.141  These factions damaged both ultras 
and liberals and turned healthy ideological polarization into national division. Fortunately, 
Lacretelle claimed, preeminent and reasonable politicians in either camp could internally 
manage these wayward groups. The real danger to the Restoration compromise came from 
those not in parties, the “neuters,” people forever destined to adopt opinions not their own, 
and who subsequently used those opinions to serve their own interests above the public good.  
It was these people, he claimed, who were ready to accept tyranny if their ends demanded it. 
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 In political struggles between the two main ideological positions, they entered into the fray 
but added nothing of value, vitiating “real” moderation while damaging the efficacy of 
parties by encouraging them to be reactive and intransigent.142  Lacretelle, in particular, had 
no patience for those who chose not to ally with anyone out of respect for the “juste milieu.” 
“In politics,” he wrote, “the juste milieu can only be in the principle that concerns matters at 
hand…real moderation is a force in the soul and a dignity of character....false moderation is 
only a composition. . . It is piece by piece or altogether, weakness, cowardice, and disguised 
calculation.”143 Real virtue in politics demanded a balanced approach that applied 
consistency in principles and moderation in the application of them. Thus, “real moderation” 
demanded two parties of reasoned partners willing to compromise and yield in matters of 
state.144 Lacretelle’s vision of moderation depended upon polarization; his theory was the 
closest to acknowledgment of the benefits of national division during the era.  
The most optimistic appraisal of the Restoration’s political scene envisioned a 
potential alliance between the ultras and the liberals in an active campaign against the 
ministériels. In 1817, the “constitutional royalist” Gabriel de Bourbon-Busset wrote, “the 
ultraroyalists and the independents have always been in agreement on a principal point; that 
it is equally right to reject passive obedience that only suits slaves and brutes. They have 
always witnessed the same sentiment; that is a profound contempt for the ministériels.”145 
Bourbon-Busset saw moderation and conciliation not in terms of ideology and political 
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 theory but rather as a shared commitment to defend the rights enshrined in the Charter that 
allowed both sides to articulate their visions for the nation. Bourbon-Busset overstated the 
extent to which both ultras and liberals equally desired press freedoms and the relaxation of 
“tribunals of exception” (courts not stipulated in the Charter often used to prosecute political 
crimes), but his call to minimize the power of the ministry over the Chambers found 
followers in both camps.146 He believed, perhaps naively, that the coalescing of the two 
sides’ principles would occur when they worked together to protect the Charter from an 
overreaching ministry. If the two parties could “. . . reunite their talents and their efforts so 
that we enjoy the full and entire execution of this fundamental law [the Charter],” Bourbon-
Busset claimed that both ultras and liberals would magically convene in the juste milieu 
where public opinion wanted them to be.147 Bourbon-Busset’s optimism about the ability to 
merge the two parties in defense of the Charter did not offer any real solution for ridding 
France of its polarized politics, it merely substituted another bogeyman for both parties—the 
nefarious middle.  
 As we saw in poetry praising the Charter and in dialogues, the most common 
sentiments of reconciliation were often poorly-concealed propaganda pieces for one of the 
two dominant political frames. The liberal writer and politician Benjamin Constant may have 
genuinely desired the peaceful coexistence of different parties, but his attempted program to 
“reunite the parties in France,” (De la doctrine qui peut réunir les partis en France, 1817) 
made no concessions to the ultras’ ideological framework. Constant believed that the ultras’ 
acceptance of the Charter, its conditions, and its governmental forms would, if it was genuine, 
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 “put an end to the domestic evils of our patrie.” 148  He reasoned—foreshadowing the 
neurological theory of political frames by nearly two centuries—that representative processes 
inculcate democratic language in their participant and held the key to unifying France’s 
divided polity: “The moment is favorable,” Constant opined, “the government, the deputies, 
the opposition, all of France, holds today to the same language. It is impossible that this 
language does not influence the men who speak it. They will penetrate themselves with the 
principles of liberty by repeating them.”149 Although, seen over the longue durée, Constant’s 
idea about the power of democratic language seems plausible, he ignored the fact that the 
ultras repeated their own absolutist interpretations of the Charter in the same representative 
institutions in which liberals participated. At its core, Constant’s theory offers an adaptation 
of the same facile idea of conversion that many partisans considered the best option for 
reuniting France. The power of political framing in the Restoration was so strong that those, 
like Constant, who held to an idea about the meaning and essence of the nation, could not see 
beyond their preconceptions. Constant expected the coercive power of his frame for 
understanding his nation and its government to transform the body politic into a society with 
shared values and beliefs. He forgot that his political enemies had their own frames through 
which they understood their place in the government, and they too had their own conversion 
fantasies.  
 For hard core ultras, the religious element of paternalism made pure moderation or 
conciliation unlikely and indeed anathema. The ultra M. Coustelin, for example, wrote 
“Moderation in the exercise of domestic life is an admirable quality....but in politics to serve 
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 moderately one’s king and one’s patrie, means to only employ for them a part of one’s 
faculties; to fill moderately one’s duties. It’s bad to acquit oneself like this, to defend or 
encourage moderately virtue, and repress moderately vice....” 150 Partisan divisiveness 
required a passion and conviction that was incompatible with moderation. Luckily, for all 
who accepted and thrived from the divided polity of France, chances for the success of 
moderation during the Restoration were small.  
Conclusion 
 In 1820, a year of particularly bitter and turbulent fighting between ultras and liberals, 
the reputable printer Pillet published a romance novel by the mysteriously named M. René de 
G*** entitled, La libérale et l’ultra, histoire veritable [The Liberal (Lady) and the Ultra]. In 
the preface, the author stated that he wrote the novel to warn France of the dangerous “spirit 
of party” that divided the nation. 151  The book traces the turbulent history of two star-crossed 
lovers, Alphonse and Olympe, whose political affiliations kept them apart. Alphonse is an 
ultra from an émigré family while Olympe belongs to a family of liberal ex-Napoleonic 
notables. Throughout the story, the Restoration’s notable moments of political turmoil 
provide dramatic tension, and this constant penetration of the political into their personal 
lives keeps the couple from reaching their romantic idyll. In the spirit of Romeo and Juliet, 
the novel ends with Olympe’s suicide. “Alphonse,” writes Olympe in her farewell note, “it 
was written in my destiny that I would never be happy, not even with you whom I love! A 
cruel dissemblance of opinions has rendered us eternally strangers and maybe even odious to 
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 each other.”152 Fortunately for the democratic history of modern France, the suicide of the 
Left was not in the cards, but the country never overcame its own history of ill-suited 
partners. The ambivalent dynamic that drew the French Left and Right together and pushed 
them apart as it did to Olympe and Alphonse persists in France to this day.  
 To sum up the Restoration as a family feud between two radically opposed political 
groups admittedly oversimplifies the era. Yet, the sheer volume of pamphlets, speeches, 
novels, poems, and letters that complain about this condition of society cannot be discounted 
in searching for nuance. The duality of political society became the dominant discourse of 
the era. As such, it demands analysis and consideration as possibly the most significant factor 
contributing to the development of post-revolutionary French national identity. Political 
theories from the revolutionary era that came into conflict during that period coalesced 
during the Restoration into two broadly conceived conceptions of the nation. These two 
schools of thought influenced French foreign and domestic politics for the remainder of the 
nineteenth century. Although nearly all major differences in modern French political 
philosophy can trace their origins to the bifurcation of society during the Revolution, the 
possibility of their cohabitation in a stable polity only emerged in the Restoration.  
 The Restoration’s politicians and writers drew from the Revolution’s well of political 
ideas and inculcated their themes in the populace through their participation in the Charter’s 
government and their own commentaries on politics in literary texts. The left-wing and right-
wing frames for the nation already existed but they had never before been placed in 
prolonged juxtaposition. The Restoration offered a political system in which proponents of 
each frame defended and honed their ideas through political contestation. Ideological ideas of 
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 proper governance informed both sides’ conceptions of the Charter, and their interpretations 
of that document, in turn, expressed two ideal national identities. During the Restoration, 
therefore, the two camps possessed two different and rival frames for understanding the 
nation. These two conceptions of the nation hardened the more they faced resistance in the 
public sphere, and created an overarching dynamic in the social imaginary of two clashing 
nations.  
 I suggest, however, that this development was not just imagined. As I noted in the 
Introduction, contemporary research in neurological science and cognitive linguistics point to 
the link between pervasive discourses and the development of frames in the subconscious 
mind. These frames affect people’s interpretations of their reality and their behavior in social 
situations. During the Restoration, these two rival frames provided bases for social cohesion 
in the form of partisan identities. For those frustrated partisans who participated in politics 
and the literary public sphere, conflict with the “other” became the sine qua non of their own 
ideological positions. For those who simply witnessed political conflict or read about politics, 
this conflict itself overrode its constituent parts, until social cohesion derived as much from 
the frame of national division as it did from the ideologically opposed frames of the nation. 
Over the next four chapters, we will see how all three frames influenced political texts and 
actions, and informed French identity.   
 In the midst of all the divisive rhetoric, political violence, and failed initiatives to 
make the Restoration compromise work, a new form of national identity emerged. The texts 
reviewed in this chapter illustrate how division became the norm in French political culture. 
Without partisanship’s emotional content, the differences between the sides may never have 
become so viscerally connected to the idea of being French, and the sense of national 
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 belonging would have remained isolated on either side. The authors cited above were all 
passionately invested in creating the post-revolutionary nation, and yet, they could not avoid 
the fact of polarization. In the end, national division was the only idea of France on which all 
sides could agree. Although polarization and the conflict it triggered were often painful and 
mean-spirited, they made clear to all that joining the nation meant joining the debate on it.  
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Chapter Two 
Polarization and Public Opinion: Benjamin Constant  
during the Grégoire Affair of 1819 
Introduction 
Abbé Henri Grégoire had little enthusiasm for the Restoration of the monarchy, and 
considering his past, it was not surprising that ruling royalists did not care for him either. As 
a former member of the revolutionary Convention, he had voted for the execution of Louis 
XVI, an act which had branded him a regicide. Equally distasteful to royalists was his service 
during the Revolution as bishop in the short-lived Constitutional Church of France in which 
he had promoted progressive anti-papal Catholicism.1 Throughout his long career as a 
clergyman and politician and into his semi-retirement during the Restoration, he remained an 
outspoken defender of human rights, championing Jewish civil liberties and advocating the 
abolition of slavery. After years of defying Napoleon, Grégoire might have welcomed a 
constitutional monarchy, but his history, republican principles, and obstinate character 
assured that royalists kept him at arms length. Although some proclaimed his innocence in 
the matter of regicide and suggested that he re-enter public life, as an anonymous ultra 
pamphleteer noted, being a regicide was “an honor that he claims, and one that cannot be 
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stolen from him without injustice.”2 For ultras no crime was more heinous than regicide; it 
was one act not covered by the spirit of reconciliation that ostensibly characterized the 
Restoration.  
Grégoire’s unexpected, and unsought, election to the Chamber of Deputies in 1819 
naturally shocked the entire political establishment. Already a lightening rod for controversy, 
his sudden appearance at the center of public life sparked a series of events that further 
polarized an already divided polity. The scandal following Grégoire’s election in September 
and his subsequent expulsion from the Chamber of Deputies in early December was a major 
factor in ensuring that partisanship rather than accommodation became the dominant mode of 
Restoration political life. Up to that point, practicing political moderation had been a 
challenge for those caught between a liberal Left and an ultraroyalist Right.3  The 
Desolle/Decazes ministry, supported in the Chamber of Deputies by doctrinaire liberals and 
moderate royalist ministériel deputies, had struggled particularly hard to hold to the juste 
milieu. Dispirited ultras still stinging from the dissolution of the Chambre Introuvable in 
1816, however, and liberal “independents” who were anxious to protect the Charter from its 
reactionary enemies and promote progressive policies both considered the ministry a 
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potential enemy in the Center, and often struck at the middle as well as at ideological 
opponents on the Left or Right.  
In the midst of growing tension in this three-way contest for political power, an ironic 
and cynical act of sabotage sparked the Grégoire affair. Ultras in the département of the Isère 
voted for him to defeat the ministry’s candidate and embarrass the government. They planned 
to publicize the election as evidence that the ministry, the monarchy’s instrument of 
authority, had become so radical, lax, or both, with its tolerance of “revolutionary” liberals 
that a regicide could win a seat in the king’s government. Grégoire became a cause célèbre, a 
pariah, or an embarrassment to members of the political community depending on their 
political affiliation. The Chamber of Deputies, with only one vote in his favor, ultimately 
denied Grégoire’s admission. This near unanimous vote by those on both the Left and Right, 
however, belied the inexorable polarization of the French polity that the Grégoire episode 
exacerbated. 
 This chapter examines Grégoire’s election and expulsion and its political 
ramifications for the period largely from the perspective of the liberal writer and politician 
Benjamin Constant, a leader among the progressive “independent liberal” deputies and 
journalists.4  In the previous chapter, I broadly outlined some of the ideological frameworks 
that divided the French.  This chapter reveals how contingencies (events, people, etc.) made 
                                                 
 
4 The most informative examinations of Constant’s life are, Kurt Klocke, Benjamin Constant: une 
biographie intellectuelle (Geneva : Droz, 1984), Tzvetan Todorov, A Passion for Democracy: The Life, the 
Women he Loved, and the Thought of Benjamin Constant  (New York: Algora, 1999), and Dennis Wood, 
Benjamin Constant: A Biography (London: Routledge, 1993). For more on his political and intellectual ideas, 
see Biancamaria Fontana, Benjamin Constant and the Post-Revolutionary Mind (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 1991), Steven Vincent, “Benjamin Constant, the French Revolution, and the Problem of 
Modern Character,” in History of European Ideas, no. 30 (2004): 5-24, Vincent, “Benjamin Constant, the 
French Revolution, and the Origins of French Romantic Liberalism,” in French Historical Studies, vol. 23, no. 
4 (2000): 607-37, and Stephen Holmes, Benjamin Constant and the Making of Modern Liberalism (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1985). 
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the abstract principles of governance associated with those frames unsuitable guides for 
conducting politics in the real world. When confronted with the Grégoire situation, Constant 
wavered between his allegiance to popular sovereignty and the corollary demands of the 
“people,” and his desire for a stable constitutional government. He was particularly 
concerned that supporters of Grégoire’s candidacy would rely on demagoguery and 
overheated rhetoric to defend the Abbé and thus play into the hands of ultras who wanted to 
paint the entire Left, including in their estimation, the ministry, as dangerously radical. In 
spirit, Constant supported Grégoire’s right to take a seat won through a legal—if 
controversial—election, but feared that independents would lose the influence they had 
gained in the Chambers in 1818-19. This trepidation led to his and his colleagues’ timid and 
inconsistent response to the extra-constitutional act of expulsion.  
 Constant faced his most difficult challenge in managing public opinion. Despite his 
extensive theorizing on politics, society, and government, and years of political experience, 
Constant’s approach to engaging public opinion revealed the inconsistencies that plagued his 
thinking on the subject. During the Grégoire crisis, his loyalty to an abstract theory of public 
opinion hindered his efforts to defend the Abbé’s honor while protecting the independent 
liberals’ political fortunes. His inability to reconcile his ideological idea of the “people” with 
an effective political strategy, revealed how inchoate ideas such as “public opinion” led to 
ineffectual political practice. Constant and his liberal colleagues’ did not meet their 
constituents’ expectations or act in a coherent manner during the crisis because they had not 
yet found a suitable language or political strategy that resonated with their political frames. 
They first had to accept that the frame of national division, with its divisive implications for 
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political life, had become the dominant paradigm for political thought and behavior, and it 
demanded politics according to its own terms. 
In the twenty-first century, one approaches “public opinion” with warranted 
skepticism; it has become either a questionable product of polling or a catch phrase 
marshaled in defense of a particular political stance, but “public opinion” carried different 
meanings in the early nineteenth century. Most French politicians and writers of the 
Restoration had only limited experience in conducting electoral politics and interacting with 
the public through a relatively free political press. To make up for a lack of experience, many 
subscribed to philosophical categories of the Enlightenment or marshaled the political 
rhetoric of the Revolution to promote their ideas about the polity and representation, and 
bandied about the term “public opinion” with the same reckless imprecision as twenty-first 
century politicians.5  
In his influential work, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, Jurgen 
Habermas describes the ascendancy of public opinion in the eighteenth-century as a feature 
of political life in the “public sphere.” According to Habermas, the emergence of this sphere 
laid the groundwork for modern democratic societies by ensuring the development of forums 
free from state interference in which the people’s opinion could coalesce and then enter into 
formal political discourse outside of state institutions.6  He suggests that those engaged in the 
public sphere truly believed that individual interests, opinions, and wills would merge into a 
                                                 
5 George Lakoff contends that such reliance on eighteenth-century modes of thought—in particular, the 
belief in reason’s coercive power to influence opinions—still hinder effective progressive politics. See George 
Lakoff, The Political Mind: Why You Can’t Understand 21st-Century American Politics with an 18th-Century 
Brain (New York: Viking Penguin, 2008), 5-15. 
 
6 “The public sphere in the political realm evolved from the public sphere in the world of letters,” he 
claims, “[and] through the vehicle of public opinion it put the state in touch with the needs of society.” Jürgen 
Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois 
Society, (Thomas Burger, trans.) (Cambridge, MA: MIT press, 1991), 31. 
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rational consensus on optimal policy choices for society as a whole.7 Habermas’ paradigm 
explains how citizens in absolutist states developed rival ideas about sovereignty and 
legitimacy as “abstract, depersonalized laws”—the end products of rational deliberation in 
the public sphere— and thus created the philosophical foundations of representative 
democracy.8  
In reality, however, political contestation in representative institutions most often 
revolves around practical issues and individual personalities rather than obtuse political 
categories. Habermas’ theoretical explanation of social and political change thus does not 
adequately explain how believing in a theory of rational public opinion affected actual 
political conduct once representative democratic institutions emerged.9 Furthermore, it 
obscures the connections between real people, institutions, and events in political life.10  This 
lack of specificity hampers the application of Habermas to developments in the eighteenth-
century, and offers even less insight into later political developments. Those nineteenth-
century politicians who tried to apply categories of political thought developed in the 
eighteenth-century public sphere to political action in post-revolutionary France faced a 
similar challenge of reconciling theory with practice.  
                                                 
 
7 Ibid., 83.  
 
8 Craig Calhoun, “Introduction,” to Habermas and the Public Sphere (Craig Calhoun, ed.) (Cambridge, 
MA: MIT press, 1992), 14.  
 
9 Habermas discusses in particular the inability of the French to find a means of incorporating public 
opinion into bourgeois constitutional government. This made developing a new system of government that 
granted access to the bourgeoisie a political priority. “Whereas their British contemporaries understood the 
public spirit as an authority that could compel lawmakers to legitimize themselves,” he writes, “in France the 
continuing isolation of society from the state manifested itself in the fact that, in the minds of these intellectuals, 
the critical function of opinion publique remained strictly separated from legislative function.” Habermas, The 
Structural Transformation, 96. 
 
10As Dale Van Kley writes, Habermas’ conceptual framework posited “a public opinion devoid of 
either a specific public or any particular opinions.”  Dale Van Kley, “Review: In Search of Eighteenth-Century 
Parisian Public Opinion,” in French Historical Studies, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Spring, 1995): 216. 
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The French Revolution, in fact, had exposed how unsuited to representative 
institutions this eighteenth-century conception of public opinion was.11  Mona Ozouf 
describes how French political theorists of the eighteenth century imagined public opinion as 
a “tribunal” set against abuses of power. By the time of the Revolution, its litigious 
connotations had turned it into a polemical catch phrase like those bandied about in trials to 
persuade a jury.12 In theory, rational public opinion was supposed to serve as a legitimate 
force opposing the a priori claims of monarchical sovereignty, but in practice—namely, in its 
usage in political tracts—it was simply a rhetorical device. One major problem with the 
application of public opinion was that theorists imagined it in monolithic terms rather than as 
a conglomerate expression of individual interests. When revolutionaries tried to articulate a 
new vision of the nation outside of monarchical absolutism, they could not reconcile one 
concept of the nation represented by depersonalized public opinion, with a vision of the 
nation as the conflation of all individual wills and interests into the General Will.13 After the 
political vacuum of the Napoleonic years, Restoration politicians thus had to wrestle with 
three vying strains of public authority as they attempted to negotiate in a representative 
system: monarchical absolutism, Old Regime style public opinion, and the claims of popular 
                                                 
 
11Keith Baker writes that “‘Public Opinion’ had become [by time of the Revolution] the articulating 
concept of a new political space with a legitimacy and authority apart from that of the crown: a public space in 
which the nation could reclaim its rights against the crown.”  Keith M. Baker, Inventing the French Revolution, 
Essays on French Political Culture of the Eighteenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 
199. For a full treatment of the development of the concept see chapter 8, Ibid.,167-99. For more on public 
opinion during the Old Regime see also, Daniel Gordon, “‘Public Opinion’ and the Civilizing Process in 
France: The Example of Morellet,” Eighteenth-Century Studies vol. 22, no. 3, (1989): 302-28.  
 
12 “Public opinion,” Ozouf writes, “had become a concept of recourse just as ductile and elastic as the 
opposing concept of abuse, the polemic function of which seemed boundless.”Mona Ozouf, “‘Public Opinion’ 
at the End of the Old Regime,” The Journal of Modern History 60, Supplement Issue (1988): 12. 
 
13 Baker claims that this tension was resolved to the detriment of public opinion as an operative 
concept during the Revolution when ruling Jacobins eschewed the idea of a rational, engaged public and instead 
offered the even more abstract ideas of popular sovereignty and representation as proxies for the voice of the 
people. Baker, Inventing, 198.  
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sovereignty. In a nation convinced of its divided nature, public opinion remained the under-
examined but over-used claim to authority between the rival ideas of absolute and popular 
sovereignty. Claiming the support of public opinion could be the political equivalent of 
claiming to represent the nation as the sovereign people or the nation as a family under the 
king.  
The Grégoire episode offers an example of how political principles and theories 
influence policy and practice. The first section of this chapter examines Restoration ideas 
about public opinion to provide background for why politicians acted the way they did when 
engaging the public. The second section discusses Constant’s theory of public opinion during 
the era. The chapter then turns to Constant’s political activities, in particular, his ambivalent 
and failed efforts to manage the liberal oppositional rhetoric, and reveals the difficulties of 
conducting politics effectively during the era without further polarizing the polity. The final 
section describes how the Grégoire case unfolded over the course of the fall of 1819 and how 
Constant’s efforts to exert control over radical public opinion proved ineffectual. It shows 
him caught between managing the liberal response to Grégoire’s expulsion and honoring the 
leftist population’s opinions on the matter; opinions which threatened the status of liberals in 
the government and, in turn, the safety of the representative system as a whole. 1819 brought 
the beginning of the end of moderation in power. By the time of Grégoire’s expulsion, the 
deepening of post-revolutionary polarization had trumped Constant’s efforts to carefully 
manage the crisis and had sacrificed the possibility of moderation to the inevitability of 
partisanship.  
The events and ideas presented in this chapter reveal the complicated nature of 
political behavior during the post-revolutionary period. While people’s exposure to politics in 
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the press reinforced the shared frame of national division, partisan politicians and writers 
acted on the presumption of national unity according to their own frames. Ironically, when 
politicians acted on the claims of an abstract monolithic “public opinion,” a more divided 
public resulted. Although the strong strain of moderate politics during the era seemed to defy 
this general trend towards polarization, the alienation of the centrist ministry during the 
Grégoire crisis points to the difficulty of maintaining the juste milieu in the face of 
uncompromising beliefs in the nature of the nation. Nuances and complexities emerge in this 
chapter that defy the characterization of the nation during the Restoration as simply divided 
between Left and Right, but it was these same ambiguities that ironically led to a further 
polarization of the political establishment. 
Part One: Public Opinion in Restoration Political Discourse 
The installation of representative government under the Restoration and the advent of 
a free press after fifteen years of Napoleonic repression made the “public” suddenly relevant 
again in French politics. While severe limitations on suffrage and varying levels of 
censorship denied the greater populace unfettered access to the political system, markedly 
more open public forums for the expression of political ideas nonetheless gave the 
Restoration its effervescence and character as an age in which politics was on everyone’s 
mind. Politicians and writers of all political persuasions considered engaging the populace 
essential to conducting politics. In this environment, “public opinion,” regardless of its 
theoretical underpinnings, became a virtual partner in producing and promoting political 
positions; a partner whose support everyone claimed. 
The divided polity in which Restoration politicians operated made it difficult to claim 
the clear support of public opinion. In an age when contestation was the norm and the nation 
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suffered from a deep sense of division, readily apparent political differences worked against 
any conception of a unified, rational, and disinterested public opinion. If Restoration 
politicians held that public opinion was a monolithic rational force in the sense of the Old 
Regime, they could not simultaneously regard it as the viewpoint of the particular individuals 
and social groups that destabilized their political world. Rather than being an environment, as 
Keith Baker claims for the Old Regime, “between absolute authority and revolutionary will” 
in which public opinion could operate, the Restoration’s bitter political climate ensured that 
the pristine concept of public opinion would wallow in the mud of factional fighting, 
preventing any universally accepted definition of the “real” opinion of the public from 
emerging.14 Politicians and theorists of the age thus had to contend with the cheapening of 
the idea of public opinion; while still vaunting its power, they confirmed its status as a catch 
phrase in the hands of polarized actors, all of whom claimed somewhat unconvincingly to 
espouse the true opinion of the nation.15  
 The Restoration’s political press became the forum for engaging with and claiming 
the allegiance of public opinion. Early in the Restoration, liberals and several prominent 
ultras defended press freedoms because they felt that speaking and listening to citizens was 
necessary in a representative system. This broad agreement between left-wing and right-wing 
politicians, however, occluded ideological differences about the source of political 
                                                 
 
14 Baker describes how French politicians of the Old Regime disdained British party politics used 
public opinion to “imagine a form of political practice that would acknowledge the new authority of ‘the 
public,’ on the one hand, while avoiding the conflicts and instabilities of a politics of contestation, on the other.” 
The Restoration with its contestation was thus no place to put such an idea of public opinion into practice. Ibid. 
 
15 Ozouf writes : “One [idea of public opinion] was modern, and carried the individualistic and 
egalitarian premises of public opinion to their logical consequences. This view refused to see public opinion as 
more than the spontaneous result of combined dissidences and divergences which thrust up from the bottom, 
starting with opinions, those teeming, eternally preexistent volitional atoms. In this perspective, public opinion, 
which arose from the social, was not in the hands of political authority.” Ozouf, “Public Opinion,” 19. 
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legitimacy, the nature of the nation, and the role of press as either an instrument of opposition 
or a bulwark for state authority, all of which emerged in the various partisan journals of the 
period.16  Regardless of the varied content of journals and pamphlets, many agreed with 
Chateaubriand when he wrote in 1816, “There is no representative government without 
freedom of the press. Here is why: representative government clarifies itself through public 
opinion on which it is [also] based. The Chambers will never know this opinion if it does not 
have any organs [for communicating it].”17 Authoritarian distrust of the press remained 
strong among state officials, however, and as politicians assumed positions of power in the 
ministry, the urge to silence opposition papers often arose. Debates over the press and 
initiatives to curtail it were thus a constant feature of political life and became especially 
acute in 1817, 1820, 1827, and 1830, when conservatives (including ministériels in 1817) 
tried to pass or successfully enacted laws limiting press freedoms. These periodic debates 
naturally became forums for articulating the role and meaning of public opinion in the 
political system.  
 Chateaubriand believed that individuals had the right to voice their opinions in the 
press, but he offered an abstract and more static conception of public opinion’s actual role in 
governing. For him, public opinion—after the press “clarified” it—became fixed once the 
electorate’s votes had legitimized it. In a representative system, the public would respond to 
the reasoned persuasion of politicians and writers, confirm or reject elite opinions through its 
votes, and then remove itself from the process. He believed that the press could indeed help 
                                                 
 
16 For readership and the varieties of political sentiments in the press of the era see Charles Ledré, La 
Presse à l’assaut de la monarchie 1815-1848 (Paris: Armand Colin, 1960), 25-85. 
 
17 François-René Chateaubriand, Vicomte, De la monarchie selon la Charte (Paris: Le Normant, 
1816), 42 
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“clarify” public opinion, but that once clarified, the political system would rest on a chain of 
opinion from the people, to the deputies, to the ministers, ensuring that all participants in the 
system would be familiar with the needs of the people.18 His view was common among 
politicians on the Left and Right who believed that constitutional forms were the best 
compromise between mass democracies in which public opinion wielded too much power, 
and autocracies in which it was entirely stifled. Considering the miniscule electorate and the 
public’s lack of real access to the political system, identifying those in the government with 
public opinion paid lip service to the people while maintaining their impotence. 
Chateaubriand preserved public opinion as a monolithic force, even as he removed it from 
power. This act of legerdemain concerning public opinion at least avoided the pitfalls that 
came with those who tried to act on theories of public opinion that assumed both its 
uniformity and its constant agency in the political process. 
 The Restoration’s hybrid monarchical/democratic system and polarized public sphere 
challenged assumptions of a unified public will. Early in the Restoration, some moderate 
pamphleteers like Paul-Auguste-Jacques Taschereau de Fargues simply denied the reality of 
political division among the populace and still believed public opinion could (and should) 
coalesce naturally into consensus. He made unity of opinion a necessary precondition for the 
political system’s survival, suggesting that disjointed public opinion weakened the nation by 
exposing it to factions. To fight the divisive effects of partisanship, he demanded unity in 
individual opinions.19 The advent of factional politics, however, did not shock those who 
                                                 
 
18 This fixity of opinion can be seen in the title to one of his chapters in his De la monarchie selon la 
Charte, “The ministry must come out of public opinion and from the majority of the Chamber of Deputies,” 
Ibid., 61-62.  
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thought that political differences were natural, and that people should look for agreement 
only among likeminded citizens. L. Hubert, for example, believed that the deliberative 
processes that formed public opinion could lead to rational consensus, but he admitted that 
more than one rational opinion could exist in the nation. Hubert wrote that political parties 
were the organs of a clarified, rational public opinion that allowed differences in opinion to 
enter into the political process only after reflection had confirmed their rational legitimacy. 
For him, parties ensured that likeminded citizens would come to the most reasonable iteration 
of their respective positions and weed out pride, egoism, ambition, and other features of 
individual interests.20 Through this means, the political system could rest on differences, but 
these differences would not generate the destabilizing passions of unmanaged individual 
opinions.  
 Elections and the barrage of publicity that accompanied them forced writers to 
address the role of majority and minority opinions in the nation. Some associated public 
opinion with the simple majority of individual opinions, and considered parties the products 
of minorities who moved against the will of the people. Joseph-Philippe-Etienne Rey, for 
example, believed that the majority could only express itself as public opinion without the 
interference of parties. “In the social body,” he attested, “opinion is the national thought that 
is composed of the majority of individual opinions, and if the laws express the national will, 
all is in harmony; … as long as factions last, the morale of the nation finds itself perplexed 
and in a state of continual anguish.”21 This model of public opinion, sensitive to 
                                                                                                                                                       
19 Paul-Auguste-Jacques Taschereau de Fargues, De la necessité d’un rapprochement sincère et 
récipoque entre les républicains et les royalistes, par un ami de la France et de la paix publique (Paris: Paris, 
1815), 36. 
 
20 L. Hubert, Nécessité des partis politiques sous un régime constitutionnel  (Paris : C.F. Paris, 1817), 
12-13. 
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manipulation and contingent upon the numbers of likeminded individuals, reflected the desire 
of many that the Restoration system of government legitimize itself on the basis of popular 
consent. This line of reasoning among leftist constituencies hearkened back to belief in 
popular sovereignty and the General Will, but it relied on capricious individuals to make the 
“right” choices. An anonymous writer for the ultraroyalist newspaper L’ultra, although 
equally distrustful of parties, discounted the role of the majority in making up public opinion. 
“It is not the populace who judges these high questions: it [public opinion] is only the echo of 
a small number of men at the head of the nation. It is for these men principally that we 
write...”22 These two differing conceptions of the role of actual people in forming public 
opinion, one emphasizing natural majorities and the other promoting the stewardship of 
elites, did not fall within neat ideological boundary lines: ultras, when victorious in elections, 
claimed the allegiance of the majority of citizens who represented public opinion, while 
several liberals, especially the doctrinaires, believed that opinion must be promulgated from 
above.  
 One solution, more rhetorical than practical, to the problem of conducting politics in 
the presence of an attentive populace was to assume that the people would come to share the 
politicians’ opinions through exposure to elite discourse and create a “public opinion” in line 
with reasonable thinking—one that could ensure that the “will of the people” resided in the 
government. As an advocate of moderation, Gabriel Bourbon-Busset, wrote in 1816, “There 
exists but a single happy revolution, it is that which general opinion realizes. This opinion 
forms itself from the words of the wise. This word becomes that of the people, and the 
                                                                                                                                                       
21 Joseph-Philippe-Etienne Rey, Réflexions sur l’état présent de la France, moyen de rémedier à ses 
maux, ou le retour de l’age d’or; dédiées à tous les Français (Paris: Lefebvre, 1816), 4-5. 
 
22 Anon., “M. Benjamin Constant et M. Manuel,” in  L’Ultra/L’Oracle de France, vol. I no.4 (1819): 
121. 
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government, struck by its justice, knows to hear it and make it triumph.”23 A year later, 
Busset figuratively placed ultras, ministeriels, and liberals before the “tribunal” of public 
opinion to see if they reflected the “words of the wise.” He determined that all three could 
reasonably claim the support of public opinion so long as they were dedicated to the 
constitutional system that French public opinion had settled upon as the optimal form of 
government for the nation.24 Bourbon-Busset hoped public opinion would restrain political 
passions because it had chosen both monarchical sovereignty and the protection of liberties 
in the Charter. In his view, the compromise that public opinion had desired was now an 
institutional reality. The “wise men” had spoken and they had demanded monarchical 
sovereignty. They installed the Charter and now expected the rest of the polity to abide by 
the government’s dictates now wrapped in the mantle of public opinion’s legitimacy. All 
sides needed to uphold the government because public opinion allegedly established a system 
agreeable to all parties; in fact, government institutions themselves became manifestations of 
public opinion.25  
Part Two: Benjamin Constant and Public Opinion 
Benjamin Constant’s own ideas about public opinion developed in the political 
climate of the Revolution. He recognized the tension between popular or collective 
sovereignty and individual liberty and his concern over these potentially incompatible ideas 
                                                 
 
23 Gabriel de Bourbon-Busset, Philosophie politique par Bourbon-Leblanc (Paris: Renauderie, 1816), 
44. 
 
24  “The ultraroyalists and the independents are the two extremes of the political line,” he wrote, 
“Public opinion placed in the center wants to render to one and the other the justice that is due to them by 
reason of the talents they deploy, the services they have offered, or want to offer.” Bourbon-Busset, Les 
ultraroyalistes, les indépendants, et les ministériels au tribunal de l’opinion publique (Paris: Renaudière, 1817), 
32-33. 
 
25 Ibid., 20. 
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permeated his ideas about public opinion and its role in politics. During the Restoration, he 
struggled to conduct politics in the spirit of reconciliation and unity—for the sake of 
preserving the constitutional system that ensured liberty for individuals—while accepting 
that real individual opinions were fractured and polemical, and that when placed at odds with 
other opinions they led to contestation damaging to the system. His ideological presumptions 
about the nature of public opinion and sovereignty, both contradictory and abstract, 
influenced a political and rhetorical strategy that failed to satisfy either the demands of his 
constituents’ voiced opinions or his desire to avoid polarization.  
Constant assumed that conducting politics in a representative system required 
interacting with public opinion, and in theory, he believed that proper usage of elections and 
the press would ensure that the public’s interests were satisfied. Instead of simply massaging 
the press to create a simulacrum of public opinion that matched his political agenda, 
however, Constant genuinely tried to reconcile an abstract conception of public opinion with 
real individuals’ desires. He thought that managing liberal rhetoric would help the genuine 
voice of the people—a conflation of individual opinions—to emerge. 
Constant, more than most people of the era, appreciated the difficulty of negotiating 
between theory and practice when it came to the public. He was, after all, a theorist with his 
own conception of public opinion, a politician beholden to his constituents, and a journalist 
responsible for helping to “clarify” opinions in the minds of the populace. While Benjamin 
Constant did consider public opinion the “life of states,” in practice he had difficulty 
clarifying how one should interact with it and conduct politics according to its dictates.26 In 
the Old Regime tradition, Constant thought of public opinion as a “magic circle” that limited 
                                                 
 
26 Ozouf, “Public Opinion,” 19. Ozouf also cites Constant, Principes de politique (Geneva : Droz, 
1981), 137. 
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despotism in the modern age. So long as public opinion remained a product of reason, he 
believed it should be an effective deterrent to the arbitrary use of power.27 Biancamaria 
Fontana notes, however, that Constant also thought that because public opinion emanated 
from real individuals it was inherently a destabilizing political factor.28 According to 
Fontana, Constant believed that “opinion could retain its [legitimate] nature only when it 
emerged spontaneously from civil society, without the mediation and interference of political 
authority.”29 Despite his cautious approach to engaging the public, Constant’s own political 
journalism obscured the line between his belief in the disinterested nature of public opinion 
and his desire to inform and influence his readers. 
 The problem of speaking and listening to real social groups was more than one of 
philosophical bias or style, for reliance on public opinion when opposing the government 
could challenge the representative institutions that Constant cherished.30 Although Constant 
himself believed that “opinions [alone] are never guilty,” he felt that acting on untamed 
popular opposition endangered civil society and struck at both the government and the 
people.31 In other words, if public opinion emphasized solely opposition it challenged the 
                                                 
 
27 Fontana gives an excellent analysis of Constant and opinion in her chapter “Government of 
Opinion,” Fontana, Benjamin Constant, 82-95. 
 
28 Ibid., 83. Fontana’s point is strengthened when one considers the overall place of the individual in 
Constant’s liberalism. The dichotomous tension between individual and state played a central role in Constant’s 
thought and explains some of his contradictory actions. Most scholars contend that Constant believed a liberal 
state was the first necessity for the protection of individual rights. Historian Lucien Jaume, however, suggests 
that Constant prioritized the individual over the state and thought that government must remain a neutral place 
for the negotiation of competing claims with no power in and of itself. See Lucien Jaume, l'Individu effacé, 19, 
130. 
 
29 Fontana, Benjamin Constant, 85. 
 
30 Stephen Holmes suggests that, “Constant’s attitude toward publicity, in other words was inherently 
ambiguous: it can poison the air as well as cleanse it.” Holmes, Benjamin Constant, 251. 
 
31 Benjamin Constant, “De la doctrine politique qui peut réunir les partis en France,” Cours de 
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orderly constitutional practices that prevented despotism. Thus, while making claims based 
on public opinion, Constant “was equally preoccupied with the need to ensure the efficient 
and undisturbed functioning of government which opinion threatened.”32  This vision of 
individual opinion as suspect or beholden to personal interest rather than societal good was 
common among Restoration politicians, and yet, paradoxically, it was not uncommon for 
writers to admonish politicians and writers for trying to change people’s minds. 33 Rey, for 
instance wrote that “the intention of the people is always pure when no influence maligns it 
or seizes it.”34 Constant, for his part, faced a quandary: as a journalist his job was to 
influence opinions, but as a politician he was to submit to the dictates of public opinion.35  
Applying this conflicting set of principles resulted in an equally disjointed set of 
political practices. Constant’s milieu of self-titled “independent liberals”—so called to set 
themselves apart from the “slavish” moderate doctrinaires or ministériels—including such 
luminaries as the Marquis de Lafayette, the millionaire banker Lafitte, and the fiery orator 
Jacques-Antoine Manuel, made up the most progressive bloc of deputies. Their press organs, 
Le Mercure de France, La Minerve, La Renommée, and Le Constitutionnel, were among the 
most widely read journals in France. With the rise of their political fortunes in 1819, they 
could convincingly argue that they represented public opinion. But just as revolutionary 
                                                 
 
32 Fontana, Benjamin Constant, 88. 
 
33 Ozouf sums up his conundrum: “…just as authorities in classical antiquity were faced with the 
insubordination of individual liberty, public opinion was faced with the caprice of individual opinion, with 
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Jacobins acting on the abstract ideals of the Enlightenment were, as Furet argued, destined to 
commit acts of terror because of the uncompromising ideal of the General Will, so too was 
the behavior of independent liberals linked to their discursive assumptions.36 Unfortunately 
for Restoration liberals, their desire for moderation prevented them from fully acting on their 
theoretical assumptions about the polity. This led to them making contradictory choices—and 
in the Grégoire case making no choice at all—which revealed their political impotence. If 
they thought public opinion threatened their own political credibility, they were inclined to 
break away from abstract principles.  
Rhetorical allegiance to the abstract nation and lack of formal party structure made 
conducting politics difficult for independent liberal deputies. In principle, they thought they 
represented both real individuals and the abstract nation, and made grand speeches about 
their role as the defenders of the people’s interests. In their engagement with the people, they 
seemed unable to strike a balance between advocating for the abstract “nation” on the whole, 
for the small number of people who actually voted for them, or for their “constituents” in 
their départements. They could not communicate in any real way with the abstract nation, 
and they could not substitute a small electorate for the nation.  Personally taking into 
consideration the opinions of thousands of individuals in their respective départements was 
impossible and would necessarily expose differences in real opinions in the land. In short, if 
representative government meant advocacy, allegiance to an abstract idea of public opinion 
complicated the relationship between the governing and the governed.37 Formal political 
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parties would not have solved this theoretical conundrum, but they might at least have 
consolidated the efforts of liberal politicians to confront crises. Without party organization 
and discipline, politicians had recourse only to rhetoric, which led them to base their claims 
on abstract principles rather than actionable goals. Without a platform, they had no basis for 
practical goal-oriented interaction and disputation. Resorting to rhetoric laden with imprecise 
philosophical and political concepts inevitably resulted in the hollow polemics that 
characterize a clash of general principles. These problems became clear to Constant as he 
communicated with his fellow liberal politicians and supporters in his constituency, and 
engaged with the greater public through his journalism. 
 Despite Constant’s clinging to the idea that accurately informed public opinion would 
back the most rational and moderate policies, many of his liberal friends still felt compelled 
to inculcate opposition, and recklessly tailored their rhetoric to satisfy leftist elements that 
voted for them and read their journals. When elements of the public responded favorably to 
their progressive initiatives, independents interpreted this as public opinion’s desire for a 
more radical agenda. The inherent danger to this approach was that what resonated with a 
certain leftist segment of the population gained legitimacy as ‘public opinion,’ and had the 
coercive power to dictate the behavior of politicians. Because of their desire to respond to 
political sentiments in the populace, independent liberals transformed the notion of public 
opinion into a more modern concept of political popularity, and in the process exacerbated 
radical passions that fed partisan polarization. Their rhetoric incorporated two unresolved and 
mutually exclusive assumptions: the belief that public opinion is legitimate because it 
                                                                                                                                                       
judgmental nature of politics (its reflexivity, in contemporary terminology), an art by which individuals 
transcend the immediateness of their experience and interests, and ‘educate’ their political judgment on their 
own and others’ opinions.”  Nadia Urbinati, “Representation as Advocacy: A Study of Democratic 
Deliberation,” in Political Theory, Vol. 28, No. 6 (Dec., 2000): 760. 
121 
 
expresses self-evident reason and the belief that politicians and writers must court the masses 
to create and then satisfy public opinion.38 This tension paralyzed the independent liberals 
during the Grégoire crisis. When pressed, they proved unwilling to sacrifice their political 
positions by heeding the dictates of their constituents who wanted them to unconditionally 
support Grégoire, and unable to articulate the reasons for their tactical withdrawal before 
ultras who had no qualms about taking advantage of their manufactured political crisis to 
claim the allegiance of public opinion. 
Before the Grégoire affair, Benjamin Constant had every reason to be confident in the 
rule of public opinion as he conceived it: the electorate had been supportive of the 
independents, his bloc enjoyed a reasonable (albeit at times contentious) relationship with the 
centrist ministry, and he had been instrumental earlier in 1819 in successfully fighting an 
attempt to curtail freedom of the press. In short, the public was voting rationally, 
constitutional forms acceptable to a rational populace stood, and the press remained free 
enough to ensure political transparency. Despite these successes, 1819 was anything but 
politically peaceful and the free press actually exacerbated competition among rival factions, 
all of whom claimed to represent “public opinion” in partisan terms that destabilized the 
system.  
In the process of conducting politics, commenting on politics, and staying in touch 
with his constituents, Constant himself had to contend with the contradictions in his own 
concept of public opinion, while wrestling with the flood of opinions on politics that came 
from his colleagues, constituents, and political rivals. He may have believed that if 
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independents remained vigilant against resorting to demagoguery in the name of public 
opinion they could prevent the Right from using the election of Grégoire to paint them as too 
radical for monarchical government. Unfortunately for independents, there was no 
disciplined consensus among them on how to interact with the people and ensure that public 
opinion was behind them. If independents uniformly had believed that public opinion meant 
at least consensus among likeminded citizens, and if they had spoken in one voice on the 
Grégoire affair, they might have succeeded in showing that they were with the “people” on 
the issue. They discovered, however, that their differing interpretations of what public 
opinion meant, how it formed, and how it could be used it to mobilize support led to an 
incoherent response to crisis and a failure to capitalize on their popularity.  
Part Three: Constant and Oppositional Rhetoric in 1819 
Despite the vicious tone in the press and in the chambers, most elites who participated 
in politics enjoyed relatively cordial relations and shared Paris’ salons in comfortable 
proximity with each other.39 The rhetoric of contestation in the public sphere, however, 
painted the Restoration political scene in uncompromising polarized tones. People of the era 
characterized their age as a time of condemnation, fear-mongering, exacerbated emotions, 
and vicious personal attacks replete with exaggerated political language. Because hyperbole 
was suited to the spirit of contestation that many liberal deputies and journals assumed public 
opinion dictated—and to match the bile of ultras—the independent liberals of Constant’s 
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milieu entered 1819 publicly bellicose and determined not to give ground. Constant quickly 
became aware of the need to fashion a modus operandi that balanced polemics and 
moderation in order to appeal to public opinion while still protecting the liberals’ own 
standing in the Chambers. Constant’s tergiversations over how best to speak politically 
exposed the inconsistencies and ambiguities of his approach to engaging public opinion in a 
representative system encumbered by polarizing rhetoric.  
Exchanges between Benjamin Constant and Charles-Louis-François Goyet, a liberal 
journalist and political activist from Sarthe, the département Constant represented as deputy, 
highlighted two different approaches to managing rhetoric and engaging public opinion.40 
Goyet, who wielded considerable influence among liberals in the département, wrote often to 
Constant in Paris to keep him apprised of local public opinion.  Despite the warm 
relationship that they nurtured while Constant represented the département, they often 
disagreed on the appropriate way to address and respond to the populace. In December 1818, 
for example, Goyet sent Constant a letter on the upcoming election (Constant’s) for 
publication in the popular La Minerve, with his blessing to “. . . correct, emend, deduct from 
[the letter]” as he saw fit.41 Yet when Constant sought to soften the tone of the letter, Goyet 
cautioned against excessive changes, suggesting that his tone was purposely forceful in order 
to “give hardiness to a few overly timid liberals.” 42 For Goyet, public opinion’s dictates 
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were obvious: because public opinion reflected the opinions of people with whom politicians 
agreed, it required forceful words and action in its name in order to reassure the people in the 
countryside who composed it that politicians were listening to them.  
Goyet recognized the tendency of leading liberal politicians to oscillate between 
defiance and pragmatism, but still felt that Constant and liberals in Paris should courageously 
stand behind the opinions of the populace. He told Constant that vacillation would not suffice 
to satisfy the public in the Sarthe, reminding him that “if I had ceded over the past year to 
observations dictated by timidity, four ultras would still be deputies [of the Sarthe].” Goyet 
pointedly suggested to Constant that La Minerve’s cosmopolitan sensibilities did not speak 
for the people who supported liberals in the departments.43 Nonetheless, the editors of La 
Minerve were unwilling to publish Goyet’s submission because of the sensitive political 
climate, forcing an embarrassed Constant to relay the news to Goyet of its rejection by the 
editorial staff.44 Goyet accepted the decision but not without some bitterness over the 
cautious tone in the paper. 45
  This exchange embodied more than a rural versus city debate; it demonstrated that 
liberal politicians who comprised the national face of opposition had no consensus on how to 
engage public opinion. Two factors hindered them: the first was lack of an organized party 
structure with a platform. Without a platform they had no systemic link to the populace, or a 
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means of ensuring that the people’s representatives would hear the will of public opinion. 
Instead of joining a forum for practical political interactions, when liberal politicians entered 
the political fray in Paris they had only rhetorical weapons based on abstract and inconsistent 
political principles behind them. The second problem arose from the principles themselves, 
especially those that informed liberals’ understanding of public opinion. Goyet wanted to 
make a frank appeal to the restive inhabitants of the Sarthe, while the editors urged more 
politesse to avoid damaging the delicate balance of politics. He seemed to belong to the camp 
that believed public opinion resided in the collectivity of voluntary wills—in other words, the 
majority opinion of his département that had awarded Constant his seat. Without a 
programmatic approach to engaging public opinion, Constant, and presumably the editorial 
board of the Minerve, offered rhetorical support for broad ideals that they and the leftist 
populace shared, but did not feel compelled to voice the actual opinions of people, 
particularly if they were incompatible with the deputies’ political strategy. Their emphasis on 
managing rhetoric thus made them an unstable link in the chain of authority from public 
opinion, through the press, to the government. Goyet’s disagreement with the editors 
confirmed that the politicians in Paris and the grassroots opposition allied along uncertain 
lines. The caution displayed by Constant and the other editors of La Minerve, on the other 
hand, suggests that, at least in early 1819, influential liberals still exerted some control over 
how their colleagues in the press responded to and reached out to public opinion. 
 For all of Constant’s embarrassment at the rejection of Goyet’s letter, he often urged 
caution when confronting political enemies. In February 1819, the month in which La 
Minerve rejected Goyet’s letter, Constant called on independent liberals in the Chamber to 
temper their radical speeches. He noted how debates touching on the most basic liberal 
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causes such as fighting a bill to further restrict the electorate grew dangerously heated. 
Urging moderation, he warned “The voice of liberty is strong and resounding, but it may 
wound ears still little habituated to hearing it.” Despite this warning, many liberal deputies 
continued to strike back at their political opponents with ardor. They followed Goyet’s 
inclination to voice the “people’s will” and emphasize its oppositional nature, rather than to 
mitigate the threat that overheated contestation posed to the institutions that purportedly 
represented the desires of the people. Constant called this predilection for stormy rhetoric a 
“heritage of arbitrary times” undermining the governmental institutions that best preserved 
and protected civil liberties.46   
 Constant, nonetheless, sent a mixed message to the deputies in session. His own 
rhetorical strategy emphasized flexibility over consistency and he often changed his view of 
proper conduct in debate.47 Soon after urging liberals to soften their rhetoric, he criticized the 
deputy Marquis Trophime-Gerard de Lally, “a name honorable in the splendors of liberty” 
for his “tender feelings” while speaking against a restrictive election law. According to 
Constant, de Lally “spoke with sweetness bordering on weakness” and did a disservice to the 
critical nature of the debate.48 Lack of experience in representative governance made it 
difficult for politicians like de Lally and even Constant to know how strongly to defend the 
principles that they, and ostensibly public opinion, supported without harming their 
reputation or being perceived as tools of special interests.  
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 For Constant, politics was an eternal negotiation between principles and their 
application, and different contingencies dictated which policy, and which rhetorical strategy 
to marshal to his cause.  Constant’s mixed signals to the deputies reflected his political 
flexibility, but not all minds were as perceptive and nuanced as his and some simply 
disagreed on how to represent public opinion. Many of his friends thought they were engaged 
in a crucial battle to establish a post-revolutionary nation in the face of political enemies bent 
on undercutting progressive principles. These liberals, convinced that Restoration politics 
consisted essentially of fighting a monolithic “other,” understandably ignored his calls for 
prudence and expressed themselves in the hyperbolic tones that they thought public opinion 
demanded. Constant, also affected by post-revolutionary divisiveness, had faith in the “magic 
circle” of public opinion and its ability to arise spontaneously and rationally against 
encroachments upon liberty, but he underestimated the emotionally traumatizing effects of 
polarization. When events emerged that demanded liberals rally around their principles, 
Constant often abandoned his quibbles and marshaled his writing and rhetoric to speak for 
leftist opinion in the nation whose claim to the title of public opinion was simply a rhetorical 
expediency. The end results of Constant’s wavering approach to rhetoric and public opinion 
were contradictions and paralysis in the face of the ultras’ more cohesive and comprehensive 
political maneuvering. 
During the summer of 1819, however, liberal deputies still gained seats in the 
Chamber and won several political battles, including easing censorship laws to ensure that 
public opinion had access to political news. Their successes bolstered their confidence and 
suggested that they were indeed representing the will of the majority of the nation. Perhaps 
overconfident from their electoral and legislative victories, they employed an ever more 
128 
 
strident tone of opposition, angering ultras and alienating the ministry and the moderate 
ministériel deputies. When the Chambers went into recess for elections in August, the press 
became the primary forum for garnering the support of the populace, and soon proved 
incapable of resisting the hyperbolic rhetoric that divided the nation and put all the liberal 
gains of the year in jeopardy. 
Part Four: Polarization and the Grégoire Crisis 
The Collapse of the Moderate Center 
After proroguing the ultra-dominated Chambre Introuvable in 1816, Louis XVIII 
entrusted power to a ministry filled with many former Napoleonic statesmen; competent men 
trained in administration under a despotic system.49 Elie Decazes, as discussed in Chapter 
One, had the most influence on the King, and consequently was perhaps the most universally 
disliked man in France. 50  Louis XVIII, “attached to him with a senile passion,” gave the 
young minister unprecedented influence over policy especially from 1817 to 1819.51 
Decazes’ control of the police bureaucracy and his influence over departmental préfets 
helped keep provincial politics in line with his stated moderation, but state manipulation of 
elections and his arbitrary enforcement of laws against the press and political activities 
garnered him few supporters on either end of the political spectrum. Decazes especially irked 
ultras who believed they were the true champions of monarchy. They distrusted his liberal 
affiliations and were still seething over the important role he had played in purging the 
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Chamber in 1816. Liberals, too, came to distrust his willingness to use state power to ensure 
political tranquility and feared a union between his ministry and the ultras.52 Squeezed 
between two extremes, Decazes and the moderate ministries of the early years of the 
Restoration eventually proved unable to withstand the pressures of polarization.  
In terms of ideological principles, ultras, not ministeriels, were the liberals’ 
archenemies. Since the beginning of the Restoration, liberal journalists in papers like La 
Minerve and La Renommée had portrayed ultras as intransigent members of the high nobility 
with no taste for democracy, and had warned their readers of the ultras’ recidivist absolutism. 
They employed polemical rhetoric to match the perceived threat of these implacable royalist 
enemies. Yet, since 1816, the political gains of ultras had in fact been negligible. By early 
1819, conservative ultras composed a weak minority in the Chamber of Deputies and their 
operatives, at the urging of the centrist ministry, were under attack everywhere in France. 
The state’s arbitrary campaign against partisanship, however, had the opposite effect, 
whipping up oppositional hyperbole among the very partisans on both sides whom it aimed 
to silence. Ultras painted Decazes as a vestige of revolutionary and Napoleonic despotism, 
while liberal journalists accustomed to vicious battles with ultras, simply ascribed the same 
monarchical and anti-democratic motivations they saw in ultras to the decidedly more 
ambiguous ministry and its moderate supporters.  
The tendency to interpret politics according to the uncompromising categories of Left 
and Right, did not prevent the liberals from first appreciating the potential benefits of a 
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moderate ministry.53  At the end of 1818, when Decazes became Minister of the Interior, the 
most powerful portfolio in the administration, more astute liberals like Constant were hopeful 
that the young friend of moderate liberals like Royer-Collard and Guizot would at least curb 
ultraroyalist initiatives. Indeed, compared to the previous ministry, the new ministry included 
a number of left-leaning moderates and seemed poised to enact relatively progressive 
policies. Regardless of the details of the new ministries’ policies—soon to be revealed as 
more conservative than liberals had hoped—liberals saw it as a vast improvement.54 Constant 
wrote to his friend Goyet in December about the “… the triumph of the liberals and the 
nomination of a ministry entirely different from that which has threatened us for some time. 
This is a victory for public opinion.”55 Political winds blowing in the liberals’ favor made it 
easier for Constant to state unequivocally that the voice of public opinion had been heard, 
and that the new ministry would fulfill its duty of responding to the same voice that had put it 
in power.  
The relationship between independent liberals and the ministry, however, quickly 
soured when the ministry did not consistently support liberal initiatives in the Chamber of 
Deputies. During those occasions when the ministry did act in concert with the independents, 
as when it supported—for the moment—the expansion of press freedoms in June 1819, but 
even these occasions did not inspire great confidence among liberal writers and politicians 
who expected more from a ministry supposedly in tune with public opinion. In August, for 
example, a writer for the liberal paper La Renommée using the penname, “Popilius,” 
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complained to the ministers that “the projects on the freedom of the press that . . . we know 
well were not your work; [they] bore the imprint of your hesitation . . . This [lukewarm 
support] is, moreover, the limit of your efforts.”56 Throughout 1819, liberals progressively 
formed a negative impression of the new ministry and especially of Decazes.57 When 
ministerial initiatives began to contravene liberal principles—especially when rumors 
circulated that Decazes would support an ultra-sponsored push to further restrict suffrage—
the liberal press redefined the ministry as the primary force threatening representative 
government and opposing public opinion. As Popilius chided, “some only accuse you of 
weakness, but by associating yourself with the injustice of your [ultra] predecessors, you 
assumed for yourself a part of the bitter reproaches aimed at them.”58 The ministry had 
become with the ultras the “other” that stood against national public opinion.  
Constant for his part feared the damaging effects of this polarizing rhetoric on the 
liberal opposition. He thought that strident language would isolate the bloc of independent 
liberal deputies whose rising fortunes depended on maintaining a shaky alliance with 
moderate ministériels against the ultras. Hotheaded language that painted political opponents 
of whatever stripe in uncompromising broad brush strokes sold liberal publications and 
helped create a clear leftist identity, but it also pushed moderates away and strengthened the 
ultras’ arguments that liberals were the slaves of party interests. Constant warned in La 
Renommée, “I can admit what some suggest is a fact; that the need for popularity motivates 
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liberals; but what risks are run when they only know to find the way to popularity through 
opposition?”59 This admonition against a polarizing popularity contest, however, went 
against those elements of liberal thought that considered the press to be the conduit for 
voicing public opinion’s opposition to authority. As an anonymous writer for La Renommée 
stated, “opposition is [the only tone] worthy of the difficult circumstances in which we 
live.”60 Independent journalists, like their ultraroyalist counterparts, failed to exercise caution 
when they wrote, and acted on the common conviction that post-revolutionary politics were a 
matter of black and white. Strengthened by success and the concomitant belief that public 
opinion supported their side, liberal journals often conflated all groups on their right into the 
enemy of the nation.  
The prospects for a broad liberal/moderate coalition grew slimmer as the tone of 
political debate during the summer elections became more heated. Decazes had an 
unenviable position. Despite incessant criticism, measures such as the easing of censorship, 
which he initially supported against conservative opposition, required that he balance 
pressures from both the king, himself surrounded by ultras such as his brother the Comte 
d’Artois, and liberals in the Chambers.61 Unfortunately, neither ultras nor liberals gave him 
credit for his ability to negotiate in the small space between the polarized factions. They 
either branded him an enabler of revolutionaries or chided him for playing the part of an 
overly ambitious courtier. By the time of the Grégoire affair, Decazes, unappreciated by 
liberals and under pressure from the king, sought political allies on the far Right and 
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especially shunned independent liberals. The supporters of the ministry increasingly attacked 
political enemies on the Left, and in the process strengthened the poles to the detriment of the 
their own places in the Center. Polarization ultimately drowned out all moderation once Abbé 
Grégoire entered the fray.  
Crisis and Fallout: The Election and Ejection of Grégoire  
When he heard of Grégoire’s election to the Chamber of Deputies, the Comte 
d’Artois, the figurehead of the ultras, confronted his brother Louis XVIII asking, “do you see 
where they are trying to lead you?”62 The “they” to whom he referred were liberals—
understood by ultras to mean all the independents, doctrinaires, and the ministry. Artois 
spoke for ultras fearful of the direction the Restoration system of government had taken since 
the dissolution of the Chambre Introuvable. He hoped the election of Grégoire would prove 
to the king that the liberals’ true desire was to overthrow France’s constitutional monarchy 
and spark a revolution. In fact, the people doing the “leading” were ultra electors in the 
département of the Isère who, playing politique du pire, threw their support behind Grégoire 
in order to defeat the ministry’s chosen candidate. It was a cynical move that forced 
independent liberals to negotiate the tension between preserving the electoral system that put 
Grégoire in the Chamber and maintaining their own status in that body. Ultras, by promoting 
the Abbé, emphasized the stark differences between the Left and Right, and forced the 
political poles further apart. They hoped that competition with “revolutionary” liberals would 
be a more effective political strategy than competing for the king’s ear with an insufficiently 
monarchist cabinet. 
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Ultras resorted to such tactics because the elections that year had devolved into a 
competition between the Left and Center, which threatened to make ultras irrelevant. Over 
the summer of 1819, independent liberals directed their electoral campaigns largely against 
the ministry’s chosen candidates. They considered the elections an opportunity to capitalize 
on the general dissatisfaction with the ministry and consolidate liberals in the nation around 
their bloc of more progressive deputies. To achieve this they stressed the necessity of 
defeating any ministry initiative to further limit the electorate, and the importance of  
confronting the perceived growing alliance between ultras and the ministry—a farfetched 
notion considering the mutual antipathy between those two groups.63 The ministry for its part 
engaged in typical strong arm tactics in the provinces, demanding that préfets massage the 
elections to ensure the victory of its chosen candidates. Ideologically, both factions shared 
some liberal values but both resorted to the rhetorical devices of the age to paint each other 
as polar opposites—as belonging to the “other side” of the post-revolutionary divide.64 While 
the independents concentrated on defeating the ministry, ultras, impotent for the moment and 
left out of the competition, used Grégoire to indict the entire electoral system as excessively 
liberal. The sudden appearance of a revolutionary giant on the political scene of the 
Restoration presented what one ultra termed, a “happy pretext,” for the Right’s designs on 
the electoral system.65 In this confused three-way political battle, only the ultras seemed sure 
of their political enemies.  
                                                 
 
63 Harpaz, l’École Libérale, 106, 120.  
 
64 For essential differences see, Jaume, l’Individu, 19. 
 
65 Anonymous ultra journalist quoted in M.H. Carnot’s, “Notice Historique” to Henri Grégoire, 
Mémoires de Grégoire, Ancien Évêque de Blois, vol. 1 (Paris: Yonet, 1840), 216. 
135 
 
Choppin-D’Arnouville, the préfet who convened the electoral college of the Isère and 
assumed responsibility for ensuring that the ministry’s candidate won the département’s seat 
in the Chamber, was well aware of the danger ultra tactics posed. Calling ultras members of a 
party that “shows itself against the national interests,” he wrote after the event that their 
efforts had demonstrated their lack of genuine support for the constitutional system.66 
According to the Choppin-D’Arnouville, soon after the nomination of Grégoire, and up to the 
very day of the convocation of the département’s electoral college, it was clear that his 
candidacy would not be successful. When rumors circulated that local ultras planned to 
support Grégoire over a ministerial candidate, the préfet sensed that ultras would proclaim 
the indignation of the nation over his selection and turn his candidacy into an indictment of a 
ministry that could allow such an affront to royalty. Ever since the Restoration, he claimed, it 
had been the strategy of the “aristocratic party” to take advantage of the smallest event to 
cause a stir, and then take umbrage as the offended majority most worthy of ruling the 
nation.67 This moderate ministériel understood how public opinion worked in real political 
gamesmanship; one simply had to claim its support without theorizing on its meaning. Ultras 
proved more than capable of playing that game.  
 The liberals’ victories in the elections—which their journals took as another sign that 
public opinion was behind them—blinded many to the implications of Grégoire’s presence 
on the political scene.68 As early as August 8, the ultra daily La Quotidienne warned of 
liberal attempts to “grégoriser” the Isère and, claiming their own stake as representatives of 
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public opinion, reported on the flood of concerned letters they had received from their 
readers.69 Despite the attention it normally paid to news in rival journals, La Renommée 
remained aloof throughout August and only late in the month rather blandly mentioned that 
“a great number of liberals also support M. Grégoire.”70 Liberal journals did not take the 
ultras’ machinations seriously, and spent much of the late summer congratulating themselves 
for their compatriots’ electoral successes. Even those writers for La Renommée who were 
aware of the ultras’ tactics in supporting Grégoire failed to see the danger in the Abbé’s 
sudden emergence and instead praised “the rare sagacity of the ultramonarchical faction” for 
choosing a capable and seasoned politician.71 Publicity about Grégoire picked up in 
September so that by September 25 La Minerve noted that the ultra press had published 
sixty-two separate bulletins on his election, while the liberal press still paid little attention to 
it.72 It may have seemed to the independents that an examination of the situation—namely, 
the realization that it would not be hard for conservatives to construe Grégoire as 
incompatible with the current regime—would slow the perceived momentum that their 
strident opposition had won for them. For all of their allegiance to absolute sovereignty over 
the claims of the “people,” ultras demonstrated that they understood how to manipulate 
public opinion to their benefit by letting their press organs condemn Grégoire even after their 
electors had voted for him. 
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To avoid jeopardizing their popularity with those liberals who had supported 
Grégoire’s candidacy, some independents, finally aware of the trap the election presented, 
engaged in a behind-the-scenes effort to persuade him to step down. In a letter dated October 
2, August Staël, son of the deceased liberal icon Germaine de Staël, politely wrote to 
Grégoire that as he (Grégoire) did not actively seek the position, he should not feel shame in 
preemptively resigning in the name of “public utility.”73 Staël reminded him that freedom of 
the press remained in question, that a new restrictive electoral law loomed, and that the 
ministry would likely cast off its few “liberal” members if the affair jeopardized its relations 
with the king.  He urged Grégoire to sacrifice his own standing for the greater good 
regardless of his public support. Staël, indicating that he was sensitive to the unsteady nature 
of opinion, nevertheless believed that “public opinion [was] more sensible on what it fears 
than clear on what it desires.”74 He predicted “your presence in the Chamber will serve to 
divide the friends of liberty, double in anger the strength of the right, and throw back to the 
ultras all those who still distinguish themselves [from the ultras] by nuances.”75 Staël’s letter 
was not an isolated case as many others soon joined in the effort to persuade Grégoire to 
refuse his seat.76
This behind-the-scenes campaign to convince Grégoire to withdraw his candidacy 
contrasted with the explicit and enthusiastic support of the Abbé in the liberal press. 77 La 
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Renommée referred to the election as having “settled public opinion” by rewarding a 
candidate “worthy of France”—an ironic choice of words considering how ultra deputies 
later condemned Grégoire as “unworthy” of sitting in the Chamber.78 Aware of the 
propaganda emanating from ultra and moderate circles alike, the writers in La Renommée 
countered charges that the election was an act of  treason by downplaying Grégoire’s 
republicanism and emphasizing that Article 11 of the Charter forbade investigations into past 
behavior and voting records in old assemblies, including voting for regicide.79 They also 
printed several letters from Isère as evidence of the public support for Grégoire and refuted 
objections to his candidacy based on a residency technicality; an argument that several 
independent deputies later tried to use to forestall Grégoire’s investiture.80 By all accounts, 
the independents’ public face during the Grégoire affair remained staunchly in support of the 
Abbé. 
The impending crisis troubled Benjamin Constant as the extent of the damage that the 
affair could inflict on the liberal cause became apparent to him. Constant turned to Goyet, the 
voice of the Sarthe, and offered a dismal prognosis. He believed that Grégoire’s acceptance 
of the seat would result in the king’s refusal to attend the opening of the Chambers, and that 
the ultras, also refusing to sit with him, would clamor for a purge of both the legislature and 
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the ministry. The ministry would then shift to the right, replacing the few liberal ministers in 
the cabinet with ultras in order to reassure the worried king that the government was in line 
with monarchical principles. On the other hand, Constant predicted that if the efforts of some 
liberals to encourage Grégoire to resign met with success, it would damage the independents’ 
standing among the public that supported him. Constant reiterated the quandary for Goyet: 
“Think it over well: [Grégoire’s] resignation: triumph of the ultras, outburst against all of us, 
discontent of many liberals; no resignation: an attempt at and nearly certain expulsion, 
probable ultra ministry, violation of principles, [and] return to revolution.” He then professed 
to Goyet that his inclination was to fight for Grégoire’s rights by “throwing himself at the 
foot of the tribune [in the Chamber of Deputies] to defend principles.” 81 Constant perhaps 
added this last phrase to reassure the more strident Goyet that he would ardently defend the 
value of public opinion as expressed in an election, but in reality, he had no formula for 
countering the ultras’ cynical exploitation of public opinion. Such maneuvers did not enter 
into the realm of theory in which Constant formulated his concept of the “magic circle” of 
public opinion. In short, his ideas contained no provisions for manipulations of public 
opinion. 
Goyet himself remained predisposed to value the public’s emotional support for 
Grégoire over pragmatic exigencies, regardless of the damage that this incarnation of radical 
oppositional opinion in the country could inflict on the political system. His response to 
Constant thus unequivocally stated his opposition to Grégoire’s resignation. Among possible 
negative results, Goyet claimed, resignation would usher in the “discouragement of 
constitutional electors and the disappointment, and maybe the retreat, of some courageous 
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men who in the departments sit at the head of public opinion.”82 He urged that “liberal 
writers treat the question of purification [expulsion from the Chambers], loudly, frankly, and 
explicitly.”83 The tension between speaking directly to mirror the will of the people and 
managing the tone of rhetoric had created a critical impasse and conflicted once again with 
Constant’s strategic sense of balance. These countervailing strategies exposed the 
contradictions between Constant the journalist and Constant the politician.  
Although not a believer in the absolute rational nature of public opinion—it remained 
the combined voices of individuals—Constant still hoped that reason would usher in 
consensus after political debate. Rational consensus, however, worked on two levels: one 
between the independent liberal politicians as a group and the other between liberal 
politicians and the perceived public opinion of the masses. If liberal politicians acted 
rationally, they ostensibly would come to the conclusion that seating Grégoire in the 
Chamber would jeopardize their successes and the liberties they cherished. Judging by the 
whisper campaign to convince the Abbé to withdraw his candidacy, this first level of 
consensus among politicians was within reach. But to expect rational consensus in public 
opinion on the Grégoire case—in essence, to ask public opinion to reject its expressed choice 
in a fair electoral system and to ignore the Charter’s mandate to forget the past—was 
unrealistic and showed how little theory could account for the contingencies of real political 
behavior. Straining to resolve the tensions between political theory and action, the 
independents as a group did not develop an effective strategy or a plausible rhetorical 
explanation for their actions. Constant wrote to Goyet about his colleagues’ lack of a 
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coherent and unified response to the crisis, "the liberals are as you have read them, united on 
the fundamentals but each going their own way, some by impatience, others by defiance, 
many by desire to shine (briller)."84  Public opinion, the supposed a priori consensus builder, 
failed to unite the disorganized independent liberals, or bring about a rationally cautious 
consensus among the populace on the Grégoire affair.     
Confusion reigned in independent circles as it became clear that the stubborn 
Grégoire would not resign. He himself strongly refuted the idea, suggesting that "giving my 
resignation would be an act of cowardice, and I dare to believe that a stain of this nature 
would never blot my character." 85 Goyet and other more radical liberals supported him, 
noting that the campaign to defend Grégoire had become a cause célèbre among the 
"liberals" in the country. Goyet warned Constant of the negative effect that the resignation 
would invite and urged him not to be involved in or even to publicly approve of the effort to 
persuade the Abbé to resign.86 Public opinion, at least as far as the leftist voters of the Sarthe 
were concerned, had spoken and demanded the satisfaction of seeing Grégoire honored with 
the seat he had earned in an election.  
Decazes and the other ministers, disappointed by the results of the elections, and 
equally shaken by Grégoire’s looming presence in the public sphere, feared for their places in 
the government. Even before the inevitable battle in the Chambers over Grégoire, the shake 
up of the ministry that Constant had feared materialized. Comte d’Artois and the ultras had 
exaggerated the implications of Grégoire’s election and had pressured the king to do 
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something about his ministry and the electoral laws that had allowed such an affront to the 
royal family. Decazes in turn felt the weight of events and realized his political survival 
depended on placating the king and appeasing the ultras. 87  When the ministry changed on 
November 19, ridding itself of three left-leaning members and replacing them with 
conservative politicians, the hope of concerted liberal action by the Left and the Center 
foundered.88 An embittered Decazes, now president of the council of ministers, survived the 
purge—for the moment—and turned his back on independents whose intransigence had 
confounded him throughout the year. In response, La Renommée grew even more strident, 
whipping up opposition to the ministry and pressuring independent politicians still gingerly 
trying to sidestep the Grégoire affair to raise their voices in protest. Constant’s efforts to 
temper liberal rhetoric failed as the polarizing effect of the affair demonstrated his minimal 
influence over public opinion, at least as it was portrayed in the pro-Grégoire liberal press.  
Despairing of a rational solution to the crisis, Constant joined the public chorus of 
voices in support of Grégoire, and against the ministry and ultras, even as he privately 
bemoaned the harm that his election was inflicting on the liberals’ political fortunes. He 
turned to polemics and hyperbole to criticize the ultras’ efforts to expel Grégoire from the 
Chamber before it sat, even going so far as to attribute the move to the ministry. "I am 
convinced," he wrote about the affair in La Minerve, "that the goal of our ministers is none 
other than returning us to revolution."89 It was an ill-advised strategy. Hoping to bolster the 
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confidence of those in support of Grégoire, he conjured up the same polarizing visions of 
revolution and crisis that made the ultras’ condemnation of the Abbé so effective. Constant's 
article appeared on December 1, 1819, a day before the opening of the Chambers, but it did 
not contain a definitive endorsement of Grégoire, rather it merely refuted the ultras’ 
reasoning for the expulsion. His continued ambivalence on how to handle the issue was 
typical for the great majority of his peers.  
The independents’ actions leading up to and on December 6 when the Chamber 
ultimately expelled Grégoire demonstrated in microcosm the contradictions between their 
appeals to public opinion and their participation in the representative system, and weakened 
their political viability. Although they still felt compelled to use radical rhetoric in defense of 
Grégoire’s right to take the seat he had won, their dedication to the new political order took 
precedence. After the failure of last-ditch efforts to encourage Grégoire to resign, the 
independents resolved to fight in the Chamber only against the ultras' reasons for expulsion, 
namely, Grégoire’s "unworthiness" (indignité). 90 They admitted that Grégoire's residency 
status may have made the election "illegal” but downplayed the fact that ultras singled out 
only Grégoire for such scrutiny from the four incoming deputies of Isère. Incidentally, La 
Renommée had repeatedly and convincingly refuted non-residency as an argument 
throughout October and November.91
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Determined at least to avoid a vote on “unworthiness,” independents had to counter 
the combined arguments of ultras, moderates, and the ministry.  “Ministériel” deputy Joseph-
Louis-Joachim Laîné pleaded the unworthiness case against Grégoire in terms of preserving 
constitutional monarchy, claiming that Grégoire and his "frightening memories" were 
"incompatible with liberty [and] with royal legitimacy.”92 Constant responded in the 
Chamber to the charge of unworthiness by emphasizing the Charter’s proscription against 
investigations of politicians’ revolutionary past and called on the Restoration’s spirit of union 
et oubli. He denied that regicides presented an exception to the rule, using the example of 
Joseph Fouché, former minister of police for Napoleon and Louis XVIII, as an example of a 
revolutionary regicide with a far more compromising past than Grégoire’s who nonetheless 
had served the monarchical government. Caution ruled the day, however, and in a rather 
bland conclusion to an otherwise passionate argument, Constant suggested that "we simply 
limit ourselves to deliberate on legality [of excluding Grégoire for residency status]."93 He 
certainly did not throw himself at the foot of the tribune as he had promised Goyet he would. 
Independent deputy Jacques-Antoine Manuel, who had a reputation for radicalism, 
(see Chapter Four) presented a more forceful case against expulsion. Manuel suggested that 
nearly everyone in the Chamber had colluded with distasteful governments. When 
confronting the ultras, he resorted to the same scare tactics they used, accusing the Right of 
proposing a "usurpation of power, an instrument of tyranny that is a mortal attack on the 
Charter."94 Manuel’s speech reflected the independents’ belief in the legitimacy of the 
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current government and the need to defend it from all encroachments, but his rhetoric too 
closely mirrored the polarizing tropes in the liberal press that had encouraged the ultras’ 
extreme reaction to the Grégoire case in the first place. In the end, Manuel’s defense, like 
Constant’s, was only rhetorical and he blandly focused on the motive for expulsion. He asked 
that "the Chamber only deliberate on the question of validity . . . the alleged motive of 
unworthiness should only be presented in the second order."95 The independents in the 
Chamber had found some consensus on how to approach this specific vote, but their rhetoric 
still left them divided in their allegiances between passionate opposition and pragmatic 
survival.  
Ultimately, the Chamber decided on a straight vote for admission or non-admission, 
regardless of motive. As no consideration of Grégoire’s domicile played into the decision, 
the independents’ attempts to maintain what they considered the legality of the procedure 
failed. Still they had an opportunity to stand on principle and save face with liberal public 
opinion by voting for the admission of Grégoire, safe in the knowledge that they probably did 
not have the votes to ensure victory. Yet when the voting began only Charles-Joseph-
Mathieu Lambrechts, out of more than one hundred independent liberals in the Chamber 
voted for his admission.96 It is hard to comprehend what the independents hoped to preserve 
through this surprising showing. The potential for a productive relationship with the political 
Center had already dissipated after the new Decazes ministry assumed power and shifted to 
the right. Only the discontented leftist segment of the populace remained as the independent 
liberals’ political allies, and the liberal deputies’ actions on December 6 drove a wedge 
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between them and these ambiguous partners. Instead of heeding the wills of individuals 
whose opinion mattered in practical political terms—i.e., the non-ultra constituents of the 
Isère who voted for Grégoire and their own constituents like Goyet—liberal deputies acted 
on a vague notion that public opinion demanded that they acquiesce to what by any account 
was an unconstitutional act. Paradoxically, if the reason for not heeding the populace was to 
preserve the constitution that protected the people, the result of their actions was an affront to 
the political system the Charter had founded.  
The main section (“Interieur”) of the La Renommée on December 9 contained the 
first of few liberal examinations of the event. The anonymous author, unwilling to admit to 
his own paper’s volatile tone throughout the year, claimed that ultras had used the Grégoire 
affair to “stir up passions” and increase their popularity. Stating that “the ultras and the 
ministers are not popular . . .  this must reassure the nation,” the author seemed himself to 
have been stuck between believing in public opinion as the voice of the abstract “nation,” and 
believing in the value of individuals’ opinions.97 La Renommée’s editors and writers 
attempted to portray the independents’ behavior throughout the crisis as a unified and brave 
attempt to “defend the national majority that it [the independent coalition] represented;” an 
assertion that many of the liberal public would have failed to appreciate if they had read the 
transcripts of the December 6 session.98 In practice, public opinion proved an unwieldy and 
altogether too labile a concept to use for practical political effect. Rhetorical posturing that 
claimed the support of public opinion without complications took over as the dominant mode 
of debating the makeup of the nation.  
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What did the leftist public actually think about the independents’ showing? Constant 
for one feared the damaging effect that the affair would have among his constituents. He 
wrote Goyet: “I write to you, my excellent friend . . . in order to ask what you think of us. 
But it is not on a point on which our opinions [Goyet and Constant’s] are so unanimous . . . it 
is on the effect that this event will produce among our friends, and on the judgment in which 
they hold, namely, our deputies.”99 Goyet responded after hearing of Grégoire’s expulsion 
and expressed his deep disappointment: “I must not allow you to ignore, my dear Constant, 
that the countrymen [campagnards] appear profoundly afflicted by the indifference of the 
deputies for their constituents.” He protested that prudence and moderation only served to 
weaken the independents’ mandate. Goyet decried how politicians and writers claimed the 
authority of public opinion, but failed to look for the people’s opinion when it mattered most, 
or to honor and value it when it spoke through elections. He pondered: “Why not look for its 
[the independent coalition’s] force in the people . . . why don’t they address their constituents 
and all of France on the current crisis?”100 Goyet exposed a critical fault in Restoration 
liberal theory: in a representative system there was no means by which one could both truly 
listen and respond to the people, and the political system relied on the assumption that public 
opinion would independently and rationally defend it against the encroachments of 
unchecked authority. “Leftist” public opinion could be dangerous for “liberal” political 
careers, so the political leaders chose the more pragmatic course, and in the end, this too 
failed to protect them from political backlash among their constituents and their political 
enemies.  
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Grégoire himself may not have cared about his political fate. He had not chosen to 
run, and only accepted the nomination at the urging of some independents who later failed to 
support him.101 He remained at his lodgings in Paris on December 6 to avoid public 
humiliation in the Chamber. That day, he wrote his friend Lambrechts to express why he did 
not resign and his disappointment with those he had hoped would defend him:  
A resignation would have only therefore succeeded to mask the weakness, and 
speaking frankly, the cowardice of pretended liberals who fearfully follow the 
example of some energetic men placed at the height of the Left. The nation should 
know those to whom it accords or refuses its respect, and the session today will give 
it a good measure of these men.102
Grégoire predicted that after taking “good measure,” the public that had rallied behind the 
independent liberal deputies as the champions of opposition to arbitrary power, would see 
them as the cautious and ineffectual politicians they had shown themselves to be during his 
expulsion.   
Conclusion 
 Independents legitimized their opposition to the ministry and ultras by claiming in the 
press and political debates that they represented “public opinion” as they perceived it in the 
leftist populace. During the Grégoire crisis, they failed to present a unified and ideologically 
coherent response to the crisis surrounding Grégoire’s election because they could not 
resolve the tension between appealing to the masses and maintaining their viability in the 
Restoration system of government. In the end, the independents’ muddled attempts to protect 
their standing in the Chamber left Grégoire without a seat. But their behavior hurt their cause 
even more; their oppositional rhetoric alienated potential allies and falsely raised the hopes of 
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people behind “public opinion” whom they had addressed and to whom they responded 
throughout the year.  
 Unfortunately for thinkers like Constant, the theoretical conception of the populace as 
a body capable of reaching rational consensus and conspiring to enchain authority through its 
dictates had no basis in reality. Instead, he had to contend with a scarred polity sensitive to 
the deep sense of political division in the nation. The frame of national division rendered 
Constant’s theoretical ideas unsuited to the political reality of the era, and this helps to 
explain the disparity between his ideas and his actions during the Grégoire crisis. 
Hypersensitive to the partisan atmosphere, independents backed into a popular oppositional 
discourse that offered them little when they faced a situation that demanded a more 
pragmatic approach to politics. Polarization was an inexorable force, isolating the 
independents when they tried to be pragmatic and committing them to divisive partisanship 
when they followed their constituents’ inclinations.  
The Grégoire affair did not mark the end of the independents as a political force nor 
was it the first instance in which the problem of engaging public opinion presented 
difficulties for them.103 But it did, however, illustrate for a large segment of the leftist 
population, including several independent politicians, that partisan battles are won by 
activists who are not beholden to theory and not afraid to cynically manipulate the political 
system. Ultras who were in danger of becoming politically irrelevant as a fringe group on the 
far Right benefited because polarization pulled the ministry to the Right. Eventually, they 
used the assassination of the king’s nephew, the Duc de Berry, in February 1820 as a pretext 
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to further isolate liberals and convince the king to name an ultra-dominated ministry. This 
shocking event deepened and fixed the divide between the two sides in the post-revolutionary 
debate on the French nation. With the fall of the Decazes ministry, however, the government 
enacted restrictive press and electoral laws that brought liberals and many moderates together 
in opposition.104 The assassination would become another defining event for polarization, but 
even before this, the Grégoire affair had demonstrated the failure of independents to make 
strategic decisions in their opposition to both moderates and ultras. Like the ultras, the 
independent liberals fell into the habit of making clear, polarizing statements about their 
opponents, but this tactic left little space for pragmatic politics. On the other hand, 
dichotomous politics, while damaging to the national sense of unity, later actually helped 
liberals articulate and promote an effective ideological opposition to the government that was 
in step with leftist opinion in the country.  
It was an irony of this era that a lack of formal political parties translated into more 
vicious partisanship. The increased polarization that followed the Grégoire case, however, 
helped liberals to see themselves as more of a “party,” confront a similar case of expulsion in 
1823 with a different strategy (see Chapter Four), and develop a successful election strategy 
in the mid 1820’s. 105 During the 1820s, liberals began to systematically engage the populace 
and successfully integrate a wide spectrum of independent and doctrinaire liberals and even 
                                                 
 
104 For the ultraroyalists success in using this event to consolidate their political support see, David 
Skuy, Assassination, Politics, and Miracles: France and the Royalist Reaction of 1820 (Montreal: McGill 
University Press, 2003). For the political fall out of the assassination for both sides see, Sauvigny, 67-97, and 
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105 For the later organization of opposition during the Restoration see, Sherman Kent, The Election of 
1827 in France (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975), and R.S. Alexander, Rewriting the French 
Revolutionary Tradition: Liberal Opposition and the Fall of the Bourbon Monarchy (Cambridge: Cambridge 
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some royalists like Chateaubriand to act in concert against the arbitrary ultra Villèle ministry 
of the mid-1820’s and the Polignac ministry during the last year of the Restoration period. 
Voters’ organizations such as aide-toi, le ciel t’aidera (help yourself, and God will help you) 
and subscription campaigns took advantage of the polarized climate of the era to galvanize 
broad support for liberal candidates and embark on a practical program for attaining electoral 
victory. Their later successes in 1827 and 1830 testified to the benefits of acknowledging 
polarization and marshaling the support of likeminded citizens rather than assuming that the 
nation—and by proxy—public opinion would magically coalesce around the camp of liberal 
deputies.106 The organizers of these campaigns recognized the oppositional character of 
public opinion but responsibly channeled it into a plan of action that could yield results 
without alarming more moderate politicians.  
 Using the Grégoire situation as a case study of political polarization helps 
demonstrate the power of events to both confirm and complicate the ideological assumptions 
that led to France’s post-revolutionary sense of national division. All politically aware people 
during the period could have articulated the basic differences that divided liberals and ultras 
and could have interpreted Grégoire’s election through this rubric of post-revolutionary polar 
politics. At the same time, liberal politicians realized that acting on their own and their 
constituents’ ideological convictions would damage their political standing. During the crisis, 
Benjamin Constant and his colleagues were confounded by the conflict between the 
conceptual frameworks that claimed political legitimacy both through public opinion and 
                                                 
 
106 Pamela Pilbeam, Republicanism in Nineteenth Century France, 1814-1871 (New York: St. 
Martin’s, 1995), 93-94. See also, Pilbeam, “The Growth of Liberalism and the Crisis of the Bourbon 
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during the Last Years of the Bourbon Restoration,” in Journal of Modern History, vol. 44, no.1 (Mar., 1974): 
26-59. 
152 
 
through adherence to the constitutional political order. They had to rely on both public 
opinion and established institutions in order to mount a successful opposition to forces that 
threatened the Charter as they interpreted it, but they were inflexible when politics demanded 
flexibility and malleable when their constituents and public opinion demanded firmness.  
Balance between the interests of one’s constituency, the conceptual framework of one’s 
ideology, and pragmatic political practice is essential to democracy. For independents in 
1819, none of these factors were well defined. Ironically, because they relied on language 
and concepts whose application had never been allowed to mature in practice, they facilitated 
a further polarization of the nation that they neither predicted nor desired. The Grégoire affair 
thus became a kind of political education for liberals, even as it contributed to their isolation.  
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Chapter Three 
Rival Nations at War: Restoration Nationalism and the Spanish War of 1823 
Introduction 
On January 28, 1823, Louis XVIII opened the new year’s legislative session with a 
speech to a combined meeting of the Chambers of Peers and Deputies. In it, he announced 
his intention to intervene militarily in Spain to help that nation’s King Ferdinand VII reassert 
his monarchical rights over a Spanish liberal junta (Cortes). Few of the men in attendance 
were surprised as the prospect of war had consumed France’s attention for several months. 
Louis defended his decision by stressing France’s responsibilities to contribute to the 
continent’s stability and to repay the nation’s debt to her allies for restoring his throne. 
Reminded of their own suffering during the Revolution, he claimed, the French people 
recognized the need to attack the Spanish liberals before they spread revolution to other 
nations—especially France. Louis declared, “After having given witness to other nations of 
our discord’s terrible effects, we are ourselves now exposed to dangers deriving from similar 
misfortunes among a neighboring people.”1 France was finally ready to reenter the 
international stage as a stable partner in the post-revolutionary European order, and to protect 
her own monarchy in the process.  
Louis’s speech outlined the Restoration’s conflict over the nature and purpose of 
post-revolutionary France. Could the nation overcome its own revolutionary history? Did 
                                                 
1 Archives Parlementaires, series 2, vol. 38 (Paris: Dupont, 1874), 245. 
 
attacking another state because of its constitution jeopardize the balance of liberal and 
royalist ideals in the French Constitutional Charter? In January of 1823 these questions were 
already circulating in the public sphere. During the following year, liberals and ultras 
rearticulated their ideas of France and her role in the world, and used the war as a pretext for 
asserting rival national values in foreign and domestic affairs. As French troops crossed into 
Spain, the French people debated whether their armies represented an aggressive absolute 
monarchy or a cautious constitutional nation. 
That the French needed to intervene was perhaps fitting considering that French 
armies under Napoleon were the original cause of Spain’s troubles. When Spain’s Bourbon 
King Ferdinand VII returned to his country in 1814, the liberal Cortes that had resisted 
Napoleon’s armies for six years wanted the King to uphold their constitution. Ferdinand, 
however, obstinately refused and continued to rule as an absolute monarch. In 1820, Spanish 
troops rebelled before departing to subdue the rebellious Latin American colonies and 
demanded that Ferdinand adopt the constitution. He did so reluctantly, but by 1822 his 
continuing resistance to the Cortes led to civil war between Spanish royalists based near the 
French border and “constitutionalists” in Madrid who held the king under house arrest. At the 
Congress of Verona in late 1822, the European powers, shocked by these events and the rise 
in liberal agitation and rebellion throughout Europe, agreed on the need to prevent the 
Spaniards’ “revolutionary spirit” from reigniting revolution in France and Europe. The 
French delegation at the Congress, led by the new foreign minister Chateaubriand, saw an 
opportunity for France to reassert its stature as a European nation by defeating the Spanish 
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rebels and rescuing Ferdinand.2  
After French troops departed for the frontier in April, the campaign itself was rather 
anti-climactic. Under the titular leadership of the Duc d’Angoulême, King Louis’ nephew, 
the French army entered Madrid in late May, fought one real engagement with the taking of 
the Trocadero fort on August 31, forced the Cortes to capitulate at Cadiz, and freed 
Ferdinand by late September. With Ferdinand back on the throne, the campaign was over in 
five months; it was a surprisingly easy affair compared to the six long years from 1807-1813 
that had sapped Napoleon’s army on the peninsula.  
A foreign war under the Bourbon’s white flag presented Restoration writers and 
politicians with new circumstances, but they relied on the same partisan frames that had 
defined Restoration political culture since 1814. Ultras still claimed to defend a Catholic, 
paternalist model of absolutist government, replete with notions of natural law, societal 
order, and hierarchy, while liberals still argued for political and civil liberties and the right to 
national self-determination. The war, however, lent a palpable sense of urgency to France’s 
internal conflicts. Both camps understood that this was France’s first international 
demonstration of power since Waterloo; how the nation acted externally would either 
alleviate or exacerbate international and domestic concerns over its internal stability. More 
importantly, ultras and liberals thought the use of military force would confirm the nation’s 
domestic values and priorities, thus raising the stakes of intervention even higher.  
A recent article by Kôbô Seigan shows how liberals and ultras used the history of the 
French Revolution to debate the war.3 His interesting insights notwithstanding, Seigan draws 
                                                 
2 René le Vicomte de Chateaubriand, Discours de M. le Vicomte de Chateaubriant, Ministre des 
affaires étrangères, dans la discussion du Projet de Loi relatif à l’ouverture d’un crédit extraordinaire pour 
l’exercice de 1823; prononcé dans la séance du 25 février 1823  (Paris: Agasse, 1823), 22. 
 
157 
 
primarily from two press sources and does not fully address how the war fit into the broader 
context of Restoration politics. His aim, moreover, is to demonstrate how the Restoration’s 
political actors resurrected and refought the Revolution in their debates. Though they often 
used historical precedents in their arguments, however, they did not get these ideas directly 
from the Revolution. The historical narrative of the revolutionary era had already passed 
through the filter of Restoration polarization. Over the preceding eight years, partisanship 
and political events had created a paradigm for understanding both the past and the present. 
Thus revolutionary and Restoration memories contributed to the rhetoric both sides 
employed to think, speak, and write about the war. The failure of national reconciliation at 
the beginning of the Restoration, for example, was just as emotionally traumatic as the 
revolutionary and Napoleonic legacy. Despite all of the relevant comparisons between the 
two eras that politicians made, the nation’s contemporary disunity influenced political 
behavior in 1823 more than memories of 1793 or 1808.4 The political dynamics analyzed in 
this chapter thus deserve consideration in their immediate political contexts rather than 
simply as unresolved revolutionary issues. As a whole, therefore, I choose in this chapter to 
deemphasize the “revolutionary” in “post-revolutionary.”  
Besides Seigan’s recent foray into the subject, however, historians have largely 
overlooked the 1823 Spanish War. It was, after all, a relatively short and bloodless affair. 
The war usually arises in broader discussions of the conservative crack down on liberal 
                                                                                                                                                       
3 Kôbô Seigan, “L’influence de la mémoire de la Révolution française et de l’empire napoléonien dans 
l’opinion publique française face à la guerre d’Espagne de 1823,” in Annales historiques de la Révolution 
française, no. 335, (Jan. 2004), 159-81. 
4 Emmanuel Waresquiel considers the Hundred Days (and the subsequent White Terror) to be the 
foundational moment of Restoration politics. See Emmanuel de Waresquiel, L’histoire à rebrousse-poil: Les 
élites, la Restauration, la Révolution (Paris : Fayard, 2005). 
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movements throughout Europe in the post-Napoleonic age.5 Historians of Restoration 
politics have examined how ultras used the war to solidify and strengthen their domestic 
political power, but they pay little attention to the widespread polarized debate over the 
intervention.6 For example, Guillaume Bertier de Sauvigny describes how the war quashed 
the liberals’ claims of being the true “heralds of patriotism,” but he offers few examples from 
the public sphere that illustrate this change in patriotism during the Restoration.7  Martial 
patriotism had in fact evolved in the years before the war from an idea in service of a left-
wing nation in arms in 1818, to an idea in service of a right-wing monarchical and Christian 
crusade by 1823. Although this shift only pertained to a five-year period and culminated in 
an obscure military conflict, analyzing its manifestations in the public sphere reveals how 
polarization informed essential debates about the nation, and how events and political frames 
interacted in the Restoration.  
The Spanish War also provides a good example of how the frame of national division 
informed liberal and ultra nationalism. Military action provided liberal and ultra politicians 
and writers with an opportunity to articulate their understandings of French history and 
France’s role in the world, but each side needed the other to convey their own ideas about the 
                                                 
5 Approaching the war from this international perspective, Paul Schroeder glosses over its French 
domestic ramifications, and instead focuses on how the war opened up rifts between allies and threatened the 
continental system’s order even as it reaffirmed France’s role in the world. Paul Schroeder, The Transformation 
of European Politics, 1763-1848  (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 627. 
 
6 Across the board, the general consensus on the war in Spain is that it consolidated the ultras’ hold on 
public opinion, guaranteed the support of the army, and humiliated the liberals who opposed it. See, for 
example,  André Jardin  and André-Jean Tudesq, Restoration and Reaction, 1815-1848, trans. Elborg Forster 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 61-62,  Isabelle Backouche, La Monarchie Parlementaire, 
1815-1848, de Louis XVIII à Louis-Philippe  (Paris : Pygmalian, 2000), 101-104, Emmanuel de Waresquiel and 
Benoît Yvert, Histoire de la Restauration, 1814-1830 : Naissance de la France moderne, (Paris : Perrin, 1996), 
358. 
 
7 Guillaume Bertier de Sauvigny, The Bourbon Restoration, trans. Lynn Case (Philadelphia : 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1966), 193. 
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nation and its citizens. By 1823, polarization had permanently conjoined the two sides and 
with such strong bonds that they could not imagine an ideal nation nor explain its past 
without resorting to attacks on contemporary domestic enemies. Liberals and ultras used their 
own internal frames to conceive perfect visions of France, but the frame of national division, 
and events, dictated how they entered political discourse. The prospect of military action in 
Spain, for example, turned Restoration political actors’ ubiquitous calls for unity and 
reconciliation according to their own political terms, into exclusive descriptions of the nation 
predicated upon the defeat of foreign and domestic enemies.  
The rival nationalisms in play in 1823, however, still echoed earlier odes to utopias  
because their proponents still believed all true citizens were behind their efforts. Nationalists 
typically rally public opinion in wartime by emphasizing shared national values, and asking 
people to promote and defend them. Despite the fact that the French people had split on 
almost all political issues up to 1823, and had made clear through their words and actions 
that they disagreed on the war, both liberals and ultras nonetheless believed all of the nation 
was willing to fight for their respective ideas of France.  
The liberals of the Restoration believed in a nation of united people with inherent 
rights to at least a voice in governance if not always sovereign authority. The liberals 
constructed the nation as a sociopolitical entity with a civic conception of a people who 
conveniently shared cultural traits. Despite their low numbers in the democratically-elected 
1823 Chamber of Deputies, liberals also claimed that “the nation” supported their antiwar 
position. Without any power, they portrayed the ultra government as a foreign entity set 
against the oppressed majority of the people-as-nation, similar to the position of the many 
ethnic groups concurrently dominated by Europe’s imperial powers. Liberals, however, 
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stressed political ideology over ethnicity as the driving reason for oppressed “majorities” to 
coalesce around a nationalist platform. Conveniently, the rebellion in Spain had arisen over 
political issues and not geographic or ethnic self-determination. French liberals therefore 
identified more fully with the Spanish rebels, and used the Spanish struggle as a metaphor for 
their own claim that the French people were frustrated political shareholders denied 
participation in ruling the nation.   
The pro-war ultras in power, on the other hand, promoted an illiberal, primordialist, 
and xenophobic nationalist discourse. They championed absolutist government, defined the 
nation in ethno-paternalistic terms of king and family, and branded their political enemies as 
foreign elements in the country. During the Spanish War, ultras promulgated this 
conservative creed through a modern, centralized state apparatus and representative 
institutions firmly in their control. They then saturated the Restoration’s public sphere with 
the idea that democratically-justified public opinion supported their nationalist war policy. In 
short, they rallied national opinion to support a conservative ideology, and in the process 
fashioned a nation that fit with their political ideas and agenda. External and internal threats 
compelled this nation to exert its strength on both foreign and domestic fronts. The war was 
the strongest impetus up to that point in the Restoration for mobilizing the ultraroyalist frame 
of the French nation.8   
In addition to their competing nationalisms, French liberals and ultras magnified the 
war’s significance by expanding the scope of its significance beyond Spain and France to 
                                                 
8 This fits with a general trend in aggressive nationalisms according to which the nation only really 
exists when it is mobilized for combat. As John Comaroff and Paul Stern suggest, “collective identities [such as 
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to external forces.” John L. Comaroff and Paul Stern, Introduction to New Perspectives on Nationalism and 
War, (Australia/US et al: Gordon and Breach, 1995), 5. 
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encompass the whole world. Both sides claimed to defend all of humanity or civilization, as 
well as their specific national community. In the process, rhetoric designed to rally the 
French nation became a complicated mix of nationalist and universalist sentiments. The 
liberals’ ideology of popular sovereignty, and the ultras’ paternalistic model of legitimacy, 
however, brought consistency to each of these simultaneous defenses of the nation and the 
world.  
Many Restoration liberals, with the notable exception of doctrinaires, accepted some 
form of popular sovereignty because they conceived of it as a universally applicable system 
of political organization. The progressive movements of national self-determination they 
championed (in Italy, Germany, Greece, etc.), however, had brought together claims for civil 
and national rights which seemed to belong to two distinct and apparently exclusive 
categories—civil rights and political liberty for all humanity, and national rights to 
sovereignty for distinct peoples.9 Fortunately for them, French liberals’ labile idea of popular 
sovereignty made it possible to combine these two types of rights to make an ideological 
basis for nationalism that simultaneously promoted civil rights for the people writ large, and 
rights of self-determination for a particular community. This hybrid of national and popular 
sovereignty proved flexible enough to rally even the doctrinaires to defend another nation’s 
and people’s rights to independence and political liberty, and to claim that French people also 
enjoyed these rights. 
In paternalism, ultras likewise found a dogma that could link national and universal 
claims. The proponents of paternalism did not consider cultural traits, values, and sentiments 
as the primary attributes that linked members of a community. Although ultras used the 
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people’s common attributes as rhetorical devices to rally political support, they identified the 
essence of the nation with a hierarchical familial chain linking the king and the people, and 
fathers and sons.10 According to the natural law of paternalism, all communities shared the 
same bases of authority, namely God and those kings and fathers to whom He granted 
temporal power. Ultras thus found in paternalism a sufficiently cohesive ideology with which 
they could rally people to defend both the French nation and the Spanish king. 
Universalism complicated the matter of defining the nation and heightened the 
rhetoric surrounding it. Liberals and ultras both made claims for two separate groups of 
constituents: the liberals for France-as-nation, and humanity-as-bearers of rights; the ultras 
for France-as-family under the king, and humanity-as-family under God. Both sides 
portrayed their second, wider-set of human beings in terms of civilization and accused 
enemies of barbarism or primitivism. Liberals, therefore, branded European absolutist 
governments and their loyalists as destroyers of humanity’s shared rights, and ultras 
considered European liberals subhuman.11 During the Spanish War, the dualistic nature of 
both the French nation and humanity spawned a complicated rhetoric of the “other:” 
According to both sides, the parameters of belonging to a morally righteous community thus 
not only extended beyond the nation’s borders and cleaved boundary lines within them, but 
they also paradoxically defined the unitary essence of French identity. Acting on the 
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Nations, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), 46. 
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demands of this universal moral community made people see this war as a far more 
significant affair than its minor military actions suggested it actually was.12
In addition to rival nationalist and universalist ideologies, evolving democratic 
practices also played a part in the war. A recent study by Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder 
explores the connection between nationalism and incomplete democratization. These authors 
suggest that weak institutions in democratizing nations allow elites to use foreign aggression 
to garner support for their agenda and legitimize themselves.13 By 1823, eight years of 
volatile political contestation had caused considerable anxiety among the French over the 
stability and legitimacy of the constitutional regime. Ultras took advantage of this anxiety to 
go to war, and after its successful conclusion, they strengthened their influence in democratic 
institutions by turning a wave of patriotic enthusiasm for victory into a wave of electoral 
support in the 1824 elections.14 Ironically, their success in controlling the Restoration’s 
democratic institutions rested on a propaganda campaign promoting an essentially 
undemocratic idea of society.  
This chapter is an analysis of how rival nationalist claims emerged during the war, 
how they appeared in published and archival sources, and how they drew on and 
strengthened the frame of national division. The first section of the chapter offers a 
                                                 
12 David Bell posits that the Napoleonic Wars had conditioned people to thinking of international 
conflict in terms of total war because, in the post-revolutionary context, military conflict serves imagined 
utopian communities as much as real nations. See, David Bell, The First Total War: Napoleon's Europe and the 
Birth of Warfare as We Know It (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2007). 
 
13 “In the absence of strong state institutions to knit together the nation,” Mansfield and Snyder write, 
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Snyder, Electing to Fight: Why Emerging Democracies go to War, (Cambridge, MA: MIT press, 2005), 9-10. 
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the Napoleonic Wars,” in Daily Lives of Civilians in Wartime Europe, 1618-1900 (Linda and Marsha Frey, eds.) 
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comparison between the two sides’ discourses on patriotism and peace in 1818, when 
occupying allied troops left France, and their stances in late 1822 and early 1823, when the 
prospect of war in Spain loomed. Between these two periods, liberals transformed from 
stridently defiant patriots into pacifists as the ultras arrogated martial patriotism and put it to 
service in support of the war.  The next section focuses on how the French people framed the 
war in debates and exacerbated polarization in the provinces by turning support or opposition 
to the war into categories of belonging and exclusion in the nation. The final section focuses 
on official and unofficial propaganda texts celebrating the troops’ return to France to reveal 
components of the ultra frame for understanding the war and the nation. On the whole, the 
texts and events described in this chapter illustrate how the frame of national division grew 
stronger as partisan rhetoric over the war further polarized liberals and ultras.  
The debates over the Spanish War reflected mutually exclusive conceptions of post-
revolutionary France, and demonstrated the difficulty of conducting foreign policy in a post-
traumatic polarized society. The prospect of foreign war led liberals and ultras to confront 
France’s revolutionary past in the most explicit manner since 1815. Yet their attempts to 
articulate the nation in the context of both contemporaneous partisanship and historical 
precedents only hardened the frames that kept the two sides apart. Ultras continued to rail 
against the Revolution, and found in the Spanish situation a perfect example of the 
revolutionary danger liberalism posed. They gave new life to the Revolution over which they 
had claimed victory numerous times in their pre-1823 rhetoric; only to conjure up its specter 
in Spain and exorcise its influence over the French. Liberals had long repudiated the 
Revolution’s war on monarchy despite its ideological roots in popular sovereignty. The war, 
however, found them defending Spanish liberals who professed similar political ideas to their 
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own, but who also engaged in an explicitly revolutionary act of aggression against a 
monarch. These circumstances thus also forced liberals to revise their understanding of the 
Revolution and its lessons to justify their position. By bringing opposing political ideologies 
and the memories of the Revolution into intense conflict, the war strengthened rival frames 
of the nation and widened the divide in Restoration society.  
Part One: Peace, Patriotism, and France’s role in the World  
Prologue: The 1818 Liberation of France 
In 1818, the ministry under the Duc de Richelieu successfully negotiated the 
departure of foreign troops who had occupied parts of France since Waterloo. Though most 
French people found cause for celebration in the liberation of native land, the event 
highlighted differences in the patriotic sentiments of the Left and the Right. France’s defeat 
in 1815, and the subsequent humiliations of occupying troops, reparations, and internal 
political discord, had shaken the people’s confidence in France’s status among European 
states. Unable to conduct foreign affairs independently, the French focused their competitive 
energies inward and branded domestic rivals as foreign elements. Patriotism, the emotional 
expression of national identity, reflected the unstable poles of Restoration public opinion. 
Should patriotism emphasize love for monarchy, love for the people, or love for the Charter 
that united the two?  When the French called upon these patriotic sentiments, they exposed 
the unresolved arguments beneath them and further exacerbated the division in the nation.  
Both sides framed their patriotic discourses around events of the recent past. The 
Right eschewed the militaristic posturing that had ruined France in the Napoleonic era and 
equated patriotism with ardor for the king and Church. The ultra lexicon of national heroes 
did include Old Regime warriors and émigré soldiers, but most royalists reserved their 
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highest praise for Louis XVIII who had brought peace when he ascended the throne. Liberals 
also decried Napoleon’s wars and their effect on domestic policy, but they admired the 
popular nature of the revolutionary levées en masse, and identified with republican and 
Bonapartist praise for citizen-soldiers, and those groups’ more strident position against the 
presence of foreign troops on French soil. During the first years of the Restoration, therefore, 
the Left’s patriotic rhetoric was far more martial and jingoistic than that of the Right.  
Most French people regardless of ideology disapproved of allied troops on their soil 
but largely remained silent. Some extreme elements in society, however, actively protested 
against the occupation and tried to discredit the new regime by claiming that Louis XVIII 
needed foreign troops to remain on the throne.15  In 1817, for example, an agitator in 
Versailles posted a leaflet calling for a government that would not “deliver France to 
foreigners bound by foot and fist in irons.”16 Political elites on the Left did not resort to such 
sentiments, but as allied powers began to suppress liberal movements in other countries, 
French liberals turned decisively against Europe’s conservative regimes.  They therefore 
thought a troop withdrawal would repudiate the idea of absolute monarchy and confirm 
France’s constitutional government. The liberal writer and politician Eusèbe Salverte 
believed that public opinion had forced the government to make the allies leave, claiming 
that “opinion is entirely national, and almost unanimous” in its desire to keep France 
constitutional and liberal.17  He claimed Richelieu had heard “opinion,” and fulfilled the 
                                                 
15 For continued Bonapartism and resistance to the regime and the allies see, R.S. Alexander, 
Bonapartism and Revolutionary Tradition in France: The Fédérés of 1815 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1991). 
 
16 Archives Nationales (AN), F7-6706,  “Copie d’un écris, dont trois exemplaires ont été trouvés à 
terre, à Versailles dans différens endroits de la Ville; le 22 août,” Police Report, August, 1817. 
 
17 Eusèbe Salverte, Des Pétitions. Dissertation par Eusèbe Salverte, suivi par des considérations sur 
l’immutabilité de la Charte Constitutionnelle (Paris: Dupont, 1819), 39. 
167 
 
nation’s desires. This interpretation simplified the political and economic incentives that 
actually spurred Richelieu to push for the departure, but it reflected a common impression 
among French liberals that France as a progressive, constitutional state contrasted with 
Europe’s authoritarian monarchies.  
 Many liberals believed that the liberation heralded a new era of accord between 
constitutional states and “peoples.”  The “people,” writ broadly and not just referring to the 
French people, were the true beneficiaries of the allies’ departure. According to this line of 
reasoning, the liberation of France was the first step toward concluding peace between 
nations and social classes.18 This optimistic appraisal reflected the liberals’ confidence that 
their recent political successes in France would terminate domestic and international discord. 
The liberal author E. F. Moncey wrote, “The liberals must now carefully commit themselves 
to cementing an indestructible union between all the peoples, to destroying national 
hatreds.”19 This language of international solidarity would later expose liberals to 
accusations of treason and disloyalty to the regime, especially when prejudice against foreign 
monarchs remained its salient feature. But it also shows how, even before the war of 1823, 
liberals incorporated universalist themes in their political conception of the nation.  
 Already in a precarious position in the 1818 Chamber of Deputies, some disconsolate 
ultras actually bemoaned the departure of foreign troops. They had counted on them to 
guarantee the throne’s security, and interpreted their withdrawal as a sign that France was 
distancing herself from Europe’s conservative monarchies. Furthermore, some believed that 
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the stability military occupation had offered was responsible for France’s growing prosperity. 
“You protected the arts and sciences, /And commerce was ever growing;” an anonymous 
poet wrote in an ode to the allies, “We have not with all our finances, / Paid enough for this 
eminent service.” 20  For ultras insecure because of their weakened domestic strength, dark 
clouds seemed to hover on the horizon. 
A few pessimistic souls notwithstanding, most ultras joined in the national chorus 
celebrating the liberation of French territory. But for many of them, Louis XVIII alone 
deserved credit for the troops’ departure, because only the stability of his throne could have 
convinced the allies that France had been rehabilitated enough to allow them to leave. A wide 
swath of public opinion shared this opinion including the poet Denis-François Decors who 
wrote, “Let us celebrate, Oh my verses, the happy deliverance, / Let us admire the prudence 
and high virtue / Of this monarch to whom we owe such a gift.”21 In 1818, there was little 
reason not to be patriotic and rally around the king. He had stabilized the regime and, despite 
the ultras’ strong dislike for his moderate ministry at the time, he had shown himself strong 
enough to appease both domestic and foreign opinion.  
  In the end, despite differing interpretations over its significance, few could argue 
against removing foreign armies and their uncomfortable reminder of the Restoration’s 
inauspicious origins. On the whole, widespread optimism accompanied the evacuation and 
echoed many of the political tracts of the period that called for national unity and political 
moderation. The poet-songwriter P.-A. Ducis, for example, celebrated their departure as the 
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beginning of national reconciliation in his Ode sur le départ des troupes étrangères [Ode on 
the Departure of Foreign Troops](1818). “Let us stifle forever our civil discords,/ These 
impotent regrets and useless hopes,” he implored, “Under the same color, ah! let us all live in 
peace!” 22
Such sentiments of unity, however, did not last. While the nation celebrated, these 
early reflections on France as a resurgent international power held the seeds for the later 
debates over the war in 1823. Opinions on the liberation drew from each side’s 
interpretations of the Restoration: France was either a constitutional state, championing the 
progressive ideals of a new era, or a monarchical state that owed its institutions to the king’s 
bounty. As partisan conflicts intensified in the years between the allies’ departure and the 
advent of the Spanish War, the debate over France’s role in the world diminished under the 
press of domestic crises. When it was time for more troops to leave France—this time French 
soldiers on the attack—these unresolved differences over France’s national identity and role 
in the world reemerged in stronger and starker tones. 
Prewar Debates and the Congress of Verona 
Intervention in Spain was but one in a series of international measures against liberal 
agitation and rebellion in Europe. Austrian troops had invaded Piedmont and Naples in 1820-
21 to suppress aggressive liberal reforms and nationalist movements in those countries. In 
Germany, Prussian agents actively sought out and prosecuted liberal booksellers and 
publicists. In France, the abortive attempts of the carbonari movement to foment revolt in the 
French army met with swift reprisals against its ringleaders and led to suspicions—in some 
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cases justified—about the loyalty of leading liberals in the Chambers.23 The division between 
“peoples” and the conservative monarchies of Europe suggested in 1818 liberal discourse had 
become a reality on the continent.  
In the midst of these troubles, a French diplomatic delegation led by the bellicose 
ultra foreign minister Mathieu de Montmorency traveled to the Congress of Verona. All 
France knew that the situation in Spain topped the Congress agenda. The ruling heads of 
Russia, Prussia, and Austria had expressed their dissatisfaction with France’s political 
turmoil and intimated that France would suffer the most if the Spanish revolution spread 
beyond the peninsula.  A young diplomat, Charles de Bois-le-Comte, attended the meetings 
and described how the decision to intervene strained the delegation. While liberals in France 
criticized the French government for its seeming collusion with absolutist and anti-
constitutional monarchs, the ultra ministry under the Comte de Villèle and its delegation at 
the Congress vacillated between appeasing the Holy Alliance and asserting France’s 
independence. Despite ultra propaganda that favored war as a defense of international 
monarchical principles, the French delegation reacted negatively to the condescension of the 
allied powers. Bois-le-Comte described how an Austrian delegate’s claim that “France must 
consider herself as an agent of the Grand Alliance” did not make the delegation any more 
eager to act. The gathered representatives of Europe, whether aggressively anti-revolutionary 
like the Prussians or cautious like the English, frankly doubted France’s ability to perform 
the task. The Prussians distrusted the loyalty of France’s “children soldiers,” while 
Wellington condescendingly urged France not to get involved for her own safety. The lack of 
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unity in the French delegation raised further questions about France’s readiness to deal with 
Spain.24   
The French delegation’s indecisiveness led to the shakeup of the French mission. 
Montmorency, whose over-conciliatory attitude towards the Holy Alliance disturbed Villèle, 
resigned, giving way to Chateaubriand as foreign minister. The delegation stood at a 
crossroad. Not wanting to appear as the Holy Alliance’s “reporters of the situation in Spain” 
and desiring to preserve “independence of action,” the French seemed to want to avoid war.25  
Chateaubriand, however, was no pacifist. He described intervention in Spain as essential to 
the safety of the Bourbon regime in France. An invasion of Spain would forestall the spread 
of liberalism in France and strengthen the ultras’ hold on public opinion. At the close of the 
Congress, France emerged from the shadow of the allied powers in a final act of liberation 
from the old coalition that had crushed the nation eight years earlier. Bois-le-Comte wrote, 
“The question of Spain returns importance to France. She now aspires to disengage from the 
ties she had had to form.”26 The reasons for war remained the same, namely, the domestic 
threat of rebellion and the pressure from allies who had already marched against 
revolutionaries. But France would not be the servant of the Holy Alliance. Instead, the 
royalist ministry nationalized the war and sold it as a purely French act. 
The prospect of war gave rise to a wave of pacifism among liberals and some 
moderates back in France. One of these moderates, Auguste Frankoual, believed that public 
opinion could tolerate the tension between liberals and ultras, but that “it rejects all these 
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exaggerations which try to lead the vessel of the state out of the port where it has happily 
landed after so many great storms.”27 He seemed to recognize the stability that rested behind 
polarization and longed to preserve it. Frankoual’s appeal for peace, however, went 
unheeded. Liberals and ultras had been arguing for years without damaging the stability of 
the state, but facing the prospect of war, ultras seemed willing to sacrifice internal peace to 
focus on winning a wider ideological battle that France’s borders could no longer contain.  
 Some writers, on the other hand, welcomed a war of aggression as a means of 
unifying the nation and diverting energies wasted on partisan bickering. Angliviel de La 
Beaumelle’s De l’excellence de la guerre avec Espagne [On the Excellence of the War with 
Spain] (1823) and Encore un mot sur l’excellence de la guerre avec Espagne [One More 
Word on the Excellence of the War with Spain] (1823) argued that war would alleviate 
domestic contestation by distracting the nation and externally releasing its pent-up 
aggression. Believing that war was a natural state of society that alternated with peace, La 
Beaumelle saw the impending intervention as an inevitable product of prosperity which he 
claimed, “renders it [the nation] audacious....”28 La Beaumelle advocated national 
rejuvenation through military action. Listing all the ultra arguments for war and pointing out 
their absurdity, he argued that their validity mattered little so long as they could ostensibly 
justify a preemptive attack and restore France’s stature and honor.  For example, La 
Beaumelle considered it irrational to fight a war against an abstract concept such as popular 
sovereignty, but doing so provided a means for arbitrarily deciding when to fight and for how 
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long to continue fighting—thus its “excellence” as a causis belli.29  
La Beaumelle believed that Restoration politicians had sullied France’s honor by 
identifying it with ideological positions. Honor based on political beliefs, he claimed, only 
kept men in contestation with one another. War, on the other hand, offered an opportunity to 
revitalize the nation by strengthening familial honor, the “real” honor that allows men to 
defend parents and friends, and expanding the concept to include protecting the nation and 
the world. With war, La Beaumelle wrote, “we will be able to find our honor related to 
situations that, in the beginning, seemed most foreign to us.”30 The army too would undergo 
a transformation through war, abandoning the “revolutionary principle” of “passive 
obedience,” and replacing revolutionary slavishness with the genuine honor—again familial 
in nature—that comes from sanctioning the king’s decisions.31 The arguments of Frankoual 
and Beaumelle, however, were not representative of the commentaries on the impending war. 
Most politically active people in France thought of the war as a reflection of the domestic 
political climate rather than a threat to general peace or a diversion from partisan politics; 
they viewed foreign policy through the lenses of their own domestic political prejudices.  
Liberals, alarmed by the subjugation of popular movements in Italy, Germany, and 
Spain, saw these acts of repression as attacks on the “peoples” that many had expected to 
enjoy more freedom and political agency after 1818. They hesitated, however, to criticize 
directly the Russian, Prussian, and Austrian rulers of the “Holy Alliance,” because they 
feared ultras would accuse them of attacking monarchy as a principle, thus raising further 
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doubts about their allegiance to Louis XVIII.32 When protesting against the Alliance, liberals 
thus often differentiated between noble ministers who dictated policy and the monarchs who 
stood above reproach. Liberal deputy and writer Edouard Bignon, for example, accused the 
Alliance’s “cabinets” of erecting obstacles to the natural and worldwide development of 
progressive values. “The people’s intellectual forces are directed toward perfecting the social 
order,” Bignon lamented, “In opposition to this tendency, cabinets deploy all the strength of 
their intellectual and material resources to stop this march of peoples and even to turn it 
around.”33 Bignon’s argument applied as well to the ultras in the Villèle ministry as to the 
likes of Metternich of Austria or Nesselrode of Russia. In all these cases, self-interested 
noble ministers duped the kings they served.  
Liberals distrusted the ministers who claimed that they only sought peace in Europe 
after twenty-five years of warfare—even when they largely delivered on that promise. They 
accused Europe’s conservative ministries of turning the Congress of Vienna’s original 
purpose, namely stability, into a more abstract and mutable aim of “peace.” In a pamphlet 
entitled, De la Sainte-Alliance et du prochain congrès [Of the Holy Alliance and the Next 
Congress] (1822), the anonymous author wrote, “In the mind of M. Metternich, peace is only 
a means of supporting a powerful war against the peoples.”34 While the autocratic ministers 
of the Holy Alliance may have merited some criticism for their cynical interpretation of 
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stability, liberals in France for their part overlooked the instability that accompanied the 
peoples’ agitation for rights. Their ideological conviction that France’s Charter reflected the 
people’s and the king’s shared sovereignty and authority, and that all peoples had a right to 
create similar polities, allowed liberals to justify the disruptive effects of rebellion. They 
interpreted the Alliance’s actions in Europe as attacks on their own political convictions, 
rather than as peacekeeping; but in many respects both sides were right. 
The French liberals’ view that European absolutists had set themselves against the 
people drew strength from the well-publicized dissensions among the diplomatic delegations 
at the Congress of Verona. When the British under Wellington objected to intervening in 
Spain, many  French liberals’ interpreted their stance as confirmation that “constitutional 
states” like England and France were natural allies in a struggle against the autocratic states 
of Europe; a contention that fed ultra contempt for the English and the French liberals who 
admired them.35 Some hotheaded leftists even advocated rekindling a broad ideological 
conflict between “free” and monarchical states. If not actively campaigning for hostilities, 
many liberals at least believed that circumstances demanded a show of force against the 
monarchs’ rush to war. Such was the proposal in an anonymous pamphlet entitled, Des 
moyens de prévenir une révolution en France et d’arrêter l’effusion du sang [The Means of 
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Preventing a Revolution in France and Stopping Bloodshed] (1822), which advocated armed 
neutrality among constitutional states to ensure the peace of Europe.36  
 Liberals tried to prevent the war by demonstrating that constitutions posed no threat 
to monarchs or Europe. Antiwar pamphleteers, using the Charter’s success as evidence, 
claimed that constitutional monarchies were indeed the antithesis of revolution. In a 
pamphlet entitled, De la politique extérieure qui convient à la France [Of the Foreign Policy 
Suited to France] (1823), the anonymous author stated that, after years of warfare, France 
chose constitutionalism as its guiding principle and would not tolerate a regression to 
arbitrary government. Therefore, “nothing simpler determines the natural policy of France 
since the restoration. In effect, a constitutional state’s first allies are other constitutional 
states like itself. It is a truth that a child’s reason could grasp.”37 Liberals claimed that the 
international struggle between constitutionalism and absolutism spoke to the essence of the 
political struggle in France. Therefore, whatever decision the French government made 
would reveal its designs for France. “If it is true that the domestic policies of a country 
determine its foreign policy,” the author of De la politique wrote, “and that foreign policy in 
its turn reveals its domestic policy, what is a [state] power planning when it takes for its 
cause arbitrariness over rights?”38 Did going to war reveal that the government did not 
consider France a constitutional state?   
Proponents of the war scoffed at accusations that intervention in Spain revealed the 
arbitrary nature of the French government. Ultras supported Louis XVIII’s right to defend the 
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legitimacy and absolute power of kings, but they also claimed that the manner in which the 
decision to attack Spain developed reflected his love for the Charter and its institutions. 
Recent history had demonstrated the difference between a legitimate monarch’s war and a 
despot’s war. The pamphleteer M. de Parc-Locmaria reminded his readers that Napoleon had 
lied and committed crimes to justify his incursion into the Peninsula and then brutally 
suppressed the Spanish nation. “Louis, on the contrary, from the height of his constitutional 
throne, surrounded by worthy representatives of a nation … reveals in the face of the entire 
world, his principles and his projects.”39 Parc-Locmaria equated the transparency of the 
Restoration system with popular and constitutional consent for war. Not all constitutional 
states had the same priorities, he wrote, and only France among all the great nations shared a 
long border with the most destabilized area in Europe—a fact that surely trumped calls for 
solidarity between constitutional states.  
Defense of popular sovereignty in Spain featured prominently in French antiwar 
pamphlets, but the basic ideas of national sovereignty and a nation’s right to freedom from 
foreign interference did need ideological justifications. An anonymous pamphleteer asked 
during the lead up to the war whether any government could police the domestic policies of 
another. If the answer was “yes,” then what guarantees did France have that the Holy 
Alliance would not force Louis XVIII to abandon his constitution as the French now did with 
Ferdinand VII? “Has the art of governing become so difficult,” the author asked, “that a 
prince is not able to escape from the dangers of popular unrest without compromising his 
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most beautiful right, that of sovereignty?” 40 How could France feel safe when everyone 
knew that the continental monarchs had no love for the Charter, its representative 
government, or the partisanship it spawned?   
For the writer of the controversial pamphlet, Craintes qu’inspire à un roturier le 
projet de guerre contre l’Espagne [Fears that the Project of War against Spain inspire in a 
Commoner] (1823), the French people merited the Charter and its protections because Louis 
knew their “ardor for independence.”41 Independence, the author claimed, existed in two 
interwoven spheres of political activity, domestic and foreign. When ultras revealed their 
designs on the new system by attempting to restrict domestic liberties and roll back the tide 
of progress, they also damaged the autonomy of the French state in relation to its neighbors. 
If autocratic regimes had already abrogated the constitutions of Naples and Piedmont, what 
would stop them from doing the same in France? 42 Only a strong Charter would prevent 
foreigners from attacking, but unfortunately, going to war was a sign of its weakness.  
The issue of national independence also troubled some moderates who opposed the 
war. The author of De la monarchie en France [Of the Monarchy in France] (1822), “D*** 
ex-préfet,” predicted that the Holy Alliance would abandon the French to their own devices 
once French troops had defeated the Cortes, because “the principles of the Charter are by 
definition almost as dangerous for it as those of the Cortes’ constitution.”43 No fan of 
revolution, the author suggested a more cautious approach to the issue of Spain. The Cortes, 
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he claimed, propelled by its revolutionary impulses, would naturally choose to attack France 
and would be defeated. He suggested that France therefore ally with England and stand 
firmly but passively against both revolution and absolutism while awaiting the inevitable 
downfall of these combating systems.44 Such a stand would ensure that both French and 
Spanish sovereignty remained unsullied, and France would not be surrendering its 
independence to foreign kings. 
The ultras, for their part, loudly proclaimed France’s newfound independence when 
the Holy Alliance gave the French government carte blanche in the intervention, and they 
had few qualms about encroaching on Spain’s own freedom of action. According to them, the 
Spanish rebels’ ideology threatened the independence of all nations. The coauthors of an 
ultra pamphlet, Traité sur le droit d’intervention [Treatise on the Right of Intervention] 
(1823), claimed revolutionary ideology in power destroyed a nation’s natural order, and once 
the social hierarchy in one nation collapsed, all hierarchies in other nations were at risk. 
Thus, the authors denied that the question of intervening in Spain involved merely a 
“national” element.  It was instead an international social problem; revolutionaries would 
never stop agitating the lower classes and a national border would not prevent their 
influence.45 The French were not attacking the Spanish people or their nation’s sovereignty, 
only the principles of rebellion. By changing the substance of their argument from the right 
of national independence to the duty of combating revolutionary principles, ultras made a 
domestic political statement as well as justifying an interventionist foreign policy. The 
Traité’s authors alleged that the adoption of revolutionary principles explained the French 
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liberals’ resistance to war, leading them to wonder how “it was possible that the stubbornness 
of some men for empty systems and incomprehensible doctrines could expose us to such a 
great danger?”46 Intervention in Spain remained the only recourse against the great threat of 
revolution; if it failed there, France and the world order faced inevitable destruction.  
The authors of the Traité’s contention that the Left in France supported the same 
principles as the Spanish rebels demonstrated how Restoration divisiveness exacerbated 
political arguments and broadened the war’s significance beyond immediate circumstances in 
France or Spain. Arguing over France’s values and beliefs was an important introspective 
element of the debates over the war, but evaluating how the war reflected Restoration 
France’s essential character also led to claims about France’s status and the meaning of 
civilization. Were France’s actions civilized or did they threaten French civilization? What 
were the stakes for the world if France did not act in Spain? C.-J.-V. Darttey, a liberal writer 
and future sous-préfet under the July Monarchy, argued that war in Spain would violate the 
tenets of a civilized society. Darttey contended that a society could only be civilized so long 
as its people shared goals leading to general happiness. In the context of the war, even the 
ideological differences that divided French public opinion over the Spanish situation could 
not destroy the consensus of opinion in “civilized” France supporting the Charter’s 
constitutional protections. Believing that, “If the will and the practices of a people are in 
equal harmony, this people will be civilized,” Darttey labeled France’s constitutional 
government “civilized”  because, despite political differences, all the French wanted the 
Charter and contributed to its success by participating in its institutions.47 Therefore, it was 
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now incumbent upon France as a civilized nation to prove that it could coexist harmoniously 
with other states and preserve civilization writ large. According to Darttey, the ministry’s 
march to war thus could have but one aim: to foment internal division in order to “occupy the 
minds” while they assaulted the civil liberties all French held dear. 48  Through its disregard 
for its own people’s values, the ministry would attack French civilization itself and threaten 
the world if it sent troops into Spain. 
Ultras were even more likely to see the looming war in broad apocalyptic terms. In 
Dernières considérations sur le Congrès de Vérone [Last Considerations on the Congress of 
Verona] (1822), the Comte de “P…Ki” believed that political and social bifurcation in 
France pointed to a deep divide in all human societies. He considered the convened 
sovereigns at Verona to be the representatives of moral and religious civilization set against a 
minority “occult” group that wanted the “ruin of all institutions.”49 Not only did this 
conspiratorial group threaten Ferdinand VII, it also held all legitimate manifestations of 
government at its mercy, including the French Restoration’s representative system and civil 
liberties. Not convinced by the argument that constitutional states naturally shared similar 
political interests, the count proclaimed that the French Charter and the Holy Alliance existed 
only to preserve “social order.”50  A hierarchical social order alone guaranteed civilization’s 
survival because this order emanated from legitimate monarchs. Legitimate monarchs could 
do whatever was necessary to preserve the social order, and those opposed to them 
contravened nature and forfeited their constitutional rights and privileges.  
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Justifying intervenion in Spain in these broad terms became considerably easier than 
supporting the war as simply an exercise undertaken in the French national interest. The 
Comte asserted that, “The interests of this war are those of religion, morality, civilization, 
[and] of all the institutions that represent them.”51 Just as Darttey saw the Villèle ministry as 
an enemy of humankind, ultras like the Comte believed that anyone promoting revolutionary 
principles threatened Church, king, and civilization itself; and as a result they lost their 
membership in a civilized nation. The ultras thus defended the pillars of their ideal 
conception of France through recourse to universalist themes. 
When they tied the national to the universal, ultras implied that key elements of 
French identity existed outside geographical and culturally specific French traits. Indeed, 
some ultras believed that championing the singular “nation” as an abstract ideal threatened 
the greater civilized world order. Louis-François-Hilarion Audibert, while ardently patriotic 
in his own way, wrote that “the thoughts of statesmen must rise high enough to see the world 
instead of a point. Then they will remain convinced that each nation is but a fraction of the 
Grand Society, of the eternal society.” Audibert accused the war’s opponents of wanting to 
detach each nation from this general good, and of disrupting the world’s harmonious 
operation when they proclaimed national rights.52 He contended that nations had a purpose, 
however. They collectively inherited the role of guarantors of this universal society from the 
Church and its councils, and filled the void that the disintegration of medieval Christian 
consensus had left behind. Audibert thus likened the nations of Europe to accusatory prelates 
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whose order to intervene in Spain was an act of “political excommunication for those who 
throw themselves outside of the law of nations through revolt.”53   
Although both sides looked beyond the boundaries of the nation to illustrate the 
universal causes and stakes involved in the war, they also elevated France’s stature by 
claiming that she alone held the fate of humanity in her hands. The French delegation’s 
refusal to act in the Holy Alliance’s service reinforced this belief. Considering the 
significance accorded the war, the uncertain resolution of the Spanish question at the 
Congress of Verona at first perplexed bellicose ultras and left some liberals hopeful. The 
Congress did not conclude with a definitive order for French intervention, and ultras 
expressed their displeasure that the agreement to allow France to act alone was couched in 
the “language of doctrinaires,” leaving the possibility of war only a “hypothesis.”54 The 
allies supported action against the Spanish revolutionaries but no grand coalition of monarchs 
would march to save civilization. The French delegation had insisted on their independence 
of action and thus the war had become a solely French national affair. Writers on both sides 
of the debate drew on analogies in contemporary French politics and French history to make 
their cases. The French Revolution in particular provided a wellspring of metaphors and 
allusions from which to draw effective emotional motifs to oppose the war or justify it in the 
court of public opinion. 
Using the historical precedent of the French Revolution to address the Spanish 
situation emphasized familiar national themes in a debate that could become hyperbolic when 
it dealt in competing universalisms. The Revolution brought to mind memories and 
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references that all French people understood. The liberal author of Craintes qu’inspire à un 
roturier proclaimed that attacking supporters of the Spanish constitution would bring disaster 
to the Spanish monarchy that the French were ostensibly trying to save. “You are going … to 
respond to me that the fear of seeing Ferdinand and his family devoured by parties is the sole 
motif, the sole goal of your efforts and of your hostile wishes against Spain,” he wrote, “how 
imprudent you are! Do you recall the deadly blow delivered to Louis XVI when the allies 
wanted help him?” 55 In the end, he argued, attacking constitutional Spain would only result 
in spilling a king’s blood, and those who most loudly proclaimed monarchical rights would 
shoulder the blame. This dire warning based on the historical precedent of the Revolution, 
was repeated in many liberal arguments against the war, including its most famous iteration 
that sparked Jacques-Antoine Manuel’s expulsion from the Chamber of Deputies (see 
Chapter Four).  
For their part, ultras painted the Spanish revolutionaries as dangerous copies of the 
French liberals, and depicted French liberals as frustrated Jacobin revolutionaries. M. 
Coustelin, declaring that of the two main political groups in France, “one wants legitimacy, 
the other rejects it,” thought liberals had no loyalty to Louis XVIII or the Charter, but were 
slaves only to passion and power.56  A war had raged since the beginning of the Restoration, 
he claimed, but in unfair terms that served only liberal interests. The liberal minority, as 
Coustelin described them, had incessantly tried to rally the majority mass of non-political 
French citizens against the righteous remnant of the ultras. Unfortunately, this ultra minority, 
“a lamb in prey of the wolf,” blindly celebrated minor electoral victories and the defeat of 
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ineffectual conspiracies and overlooked the threat that the liberals’ mere existence posed to 
monarchy in France and Spain.57 Coustelin referred to the recent history of the Revolution to 
illustrate the danger of trusting political deliberation instead of acting aggressively against 
such mortal enemies. “Why, as in 89,” he asked, “do those who are able to save us sleep in 
shameful security, and deliver themselves to political abstractions instead of guiding 
themselves by the simple notions of good sense and experience?”58 The Revolution served as 
the ultras’ great metaphor for comparison—partly because they used it to discredit liberals 
with facile comparisons to Jacobins, and partly because it still resonated emotionally with the 
French people. 
 Despite their hatred of the French Revolution, ultras had a sense of ownership of the 
Revolution as their and France’s ideological nightmare. They conflated the French and 
Spanish revolutions as they looked for historical evidence to justify intervention in Spain. In 
the Spanish case, an almost personified Revolution—the ultras’ same old enemy—was a 
continuing source of infectious and misleading doctrines.  Lieutenant-Colonel Duchateau, a 
war hawk pamphleteer, even claimed that the Spanish rebellion had not evolved 
independently from the French Revolution, but that French liberals had purposely instigated 
it by seeding revolutionary principles in Spain in order to “illuminate again the incendiary 
torch of revolutions among us [the French].”59  France’s revolutionary past became an ironic 
source of twisted national pride for ultras. They saw the Spanish rebels as a poor imitation of 
genuine French Jacobins. An anonymous pamphleteer wrote that Spain “dares even in her 
                                                 
57 Ibid., 11-12. 
 
58 Ibid., 50-51. 
 
59 L.C. Duchateau, Considérations sur la Nécessité de Faire la Guerre Aux Révolutionnaires 
Espagnoles, (Paris: Trouvé, 1823). 
 
186 
 
illusions of supposed superiority, to utter a language that France is more accustomed to speak 
than to hear.”60 Experience had shown that fighting Revolution was a holy task that only 
experienced French royalists could undertake—indeed, it was their personal burden. Saving 
Ferdinand would do more than protect France and Europe from new revolutions; it would 
give ultras an opportunity to end France’s most tragic episode and create the conditions for 
returning peace to France forever.  
The factors that emerged in prewar arguments over intervention continued to arise 
after Louis XVIII’s speech to the Chambers, but the triumphal chorus of news from the front 
later drowned out antiwar opinions. In this short prewar period, however, important 
ideological points arose. The prospect of war made both sides rethink the relationship 
between the Restoration, patriotism, and peace, and the two sides seemingly reversed their 
positions on these issues—the Left largely abandoned its militaristic posturing and 
conspiracies, while the Right became comfortable wielding Napoleon’s leftover war 
machine. Writers from both sides also found in the prewar debate a forum for voicing their 
opinions on France as a constitutional state, and on the relationship between the government 
and the people. With the international element of war added to these common Restoration 
topics, writers began debating France’s role in the world and whether a civilized nation 
should prioritize its own people or all of humanity. The self-referential aspect that the French 
Revolution brought to Restoration thought, however, limited these questions to speculation 
and kept the focus of the war strictly on contemporary domestic politics. Despite the many 
contemporary factors that played into the decision to intervene in Spain, writers in these 
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debates turned the Spanish war into just another campaign in the ongoing struggle between 
the Left and Right that had started during Revolution. 
Part Two: Debating the War and Framing its Meaning 
Debates in the Chamber of Deputies  
According to the Articles of the Charter, the king did not need permission to send 
troops into Spain; his executive authority extended to all aspects of foreign policy and all 
branches of the military. The war might have been a foregone conclusion, but discussions 
about the wisdom of the endeavor did have their place within the legislative process. The 
Chambers had the right, for example, to debate an official response to the king’s opening 
speech announcing his intentions and to weigh in on the extraordinary loan of 100 million 
pounds (livres) needed to fund the operation. Some of the arguments in the Chambers for and 
against the war echoed those put forth in prewar pamphlets, but they arose in a 
confrontational legislative setting that accentuated the divisiveness of Restoration politics. 
The Restoration’s representative democratic institutions continued to bring opposing sides 
together in debate, but arguments in the Chambers predictably fomented division rather than 
leading to consensus.  
 The prospect of war in 1823 presented deputies with the first significant foreign 
policy issue since the liberation of France in 1818. Deputy Edouard Bignon, the author of the 
prewar tract against the “cabinets,” noted that in 1818 the vote to liberate the country had 
passed without argument, which he claimed demonstrated the Chamber’s belief in a nation’s 
right to freedom from foreign intervention. Why, he wondered, was there now a sudden rush 
to occupy another nation?61 Bignon overlooked the jingoistic tone of some leftists in 1818, 
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but such amnesia did not plague ultra politicians. Indeed, ultras considered the celebrations 
of the troops’ departure five years earlier as a sign that the Left had not really accepted the 
peace that Louis XVIII and the allies brought to Europe. The ultra deputy François-Régis 
LaBourdonnaye thus complained that “all demand peace today with the same furor that they 
formerly demanded war.”62 Labourdonnaye’s statement reflected the lack of appreciation for 
the nuances that differentiated ideological beliefs from political behavior in Restoration 
political debates. While the aggressive policies of the revolutionary and Napoleonic period 
did not accurately represent liberal ideology or policy, the liberals’ joy at the allies’ 
departure in 1818 had seemed to ultras like a victory parade for the discredited regimes of the 
recent past. In these interpretations of events that took place just five years before the 
Spanish War, the memory of that period’s brief shared happiness faded in the face of 
politicians whose political frames forced them to condemn every aspect of their opponents’ 
past and present. 
A pro-business bloc that included bankers, merchants, and increasingly visible 
industrialists sat among the liberal deputies and pragmatically emphasized the war’s threat to 
commerce and industry.  One such deputy was the liberal industrialist from the department of 
Basses-Pyrénées bordering Spain, Jean-Pierre Basterrêche. Basterrêche believed that the free 
movement of commerce alone could guarantee the stability of Europe and preserve Europe’s 
civilization. The question extended beyond the economic benefits of individual deputies, 
Basterrêche claimed, as merchants and industrialists steered the economic ship of the 
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nation.63 Other deputies of the business class such as Prosper Delauney foresaw the 
devastation of the Restoration’s hard-won prosperity. He claimed the war’s short-term effects 
would be “the ruin of industry and of commerce,” and would usher in a period of “long and 
painful privation.”64 These alarming predictions, however, did not deter the war’s supporters. 
Chateaubriand for one was quick to point out the damaging effects of the Spanish situation 
on commerce since 1820. Nothing was worse for business, he suggested, than revolutionary 
instability.65   
 History, however, played the most prominent role in the debates. France and Spain 
had long shared a history of war and peace that often heightened the emotional content of the 
situation. To start, both nations’ Bourbon monarchs traced their roots to France’s most 
popular king, Henri IV (r. 1589-1610). Henri’s story and legacy had long been the source of 
conciliatory discourse in France, but his legacy, too, became susceptible to partisan 
interpretations of his reign and France’s past relations with Spain. Liberal deputy Edouard 
Bignon thought the example of Henri IV’s resolution of the sixteenth-century Religious Wars 
provided a lesson in reconciliation for the Restoration’s political factions, but that it also 
warned against French incursion into Spain. From Bignon’s perspective, the ultras’ Spanish 
royalist allies now played the role that rebellious French nobles had played in the Catholic 
League that had fought Henri IV.  He compared the current Spanish King Ferdinand VII to 
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the French Valois King Henri III (r.1574-1589), the ill-fated precursor of Henri IV whose 
wavering allegiance to the League eventually led to his assassination at the hands of one of 
its enthusiastic supporters. Surely, Bignon argued sarcastically, none of the ultras would 
claim that the Spanish King Phillip II’s support of French Leaguers in their domestic 
struggles created safe conditions for King Henri III. He then averred that “The war you want 
to undertake is a new war of the League.”  Despite ultra claims of protecting the current 
Spanish king against an ungrateful nation, Bignon claimed that by acting as interventionist 
Leaguers, ultras were pushing Louis XVIII to start a war that had the potential to be “as anti-
dynastic as it is anti-national.” 66 He declared that opposing the war was actually a way to 
save the Spanish branch of Bourbons from the fate of the French House of Valois.67  
 The Revolution naturally dominated arguments over Spain. Ultras, however, rehashed 
a litany of “revolutionary spirits,” “revolutionary doctrines,” and vaguely defined 
“revolutionaries” in nearly all debates. They forced the liberals to debate on their terms, 
framing the Cortes’ challenge to King Ferdinand VII as the Revolution reborn or continued 
in liberalism. Some liberals did not hide from this assertion and proclaimed that the 
progressive spirit of the Revolution did indeed persist in France’s own institutions and 
throughout Europe. They pointed to progressive reforms throughout Europe, including in the 
Holy Alliance’s constituent states. The general-turned-deputy Horace François Bastien 
Sébastiani wondered why the “revolutionary spirit” offended so many when it, “Possesses all 
of Europe, and makes itself heard even in some governments which treat new ideas with 
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extreme contempt and aversion.”68 This international argument mattered little however. The 
real issue in the minds of many of the deputies was not Europe’s adjustment to new 
principles, but the concept of revolution as understood solely in French terms.  The 
Revolution had never really ended for many of the deputies. When Delauney claimed that 
“The same war that one wants to make today in Spain, was waged thirty years ago in 
France,”  many of his ultra enemies would agree with him.69  
Once the terms of the debate crystallized, each side blended the plotlines and 
characters from the Revolution and from Restoration polarization and applied a new narrative 
to the war. Each claimed that following their policies would lessen domestic conflict and 
prevent another cycle of revolutionary violence from troubling Europe. Although everyone 
agreed that the two events, the Revolution and the Spanish War, were comparable 
manifestations of revolutionary conflict, the two sides differed when it came to assigning 
correlating roles between the villains and heroes of the two eras. If widespread violence did 
erupt in Spain, who would assume the blame: monarchical interventionists or 
revolutionaries?  
 For Chateaubriand, polarization provided the answer. There were two groups during 
the Revolution: those who supported the king and those against him. Thus all those who 
opposed monarchies now would take the blame if Spanish liberals harmed Ferdinand. But, 
ever the Romantic, he went further than blaming liberals; he wanted to destroy the 
revolutionary spirit that prevented social and political unity. Chateaubriand spoke of the 
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intervention as if it was a matter of personal and national vengeance against an abstract 
enemy more than an issue of protecting a foreign king. He assured the Chamber that France 
was not trying to reassert the Inquisition or bolster despotism, and he urged the deputies to 
see the events in Spain for what they were: “It is its [France’s] old enemy in Spanish garb 
that provokes us,” he reminded his colleagues, “it is the Revolution which, lurking at the feet 
of Bourbons, looks for a second victim.”70 This line of reasoning—that an animate 
“revolution” had returned—resonated especially among older nobles who remembered their 
own victimization during the Revolution. 
 Ultras had recourse to these scare tactics especially when liberals continued to elevate 
people’s rights over monarchs’ legitimacy. If liberals articulated a belief in popular 
sovereignty, suggested that kings ruled in concert with the nation, or simply professed that 
the people have rights, ultras dismissed them as treasonous revolutionaries. The doctrinaire 
deputy Pierre-Paul Royer-Collard, who routinely condemned popular sovereignty and 
professed the king’s legitimacy, for example, became an enthusiastic revolutionary in ultras’ 
eyes when he championed the people’s rights in his speeches against the war. Royer-Collard 
proclaimed that God had given kings to people to represent the people’s interests. He 
declared that “...this principle comes from heaven to console the Earth: that kings are made 
for the peoples and not the peoples for kings; that public consent is the largest and most solid 
base of their [kings’] authority,”71 In Royer-Collard’s statement, the Charter appeared to be a 
sort of political contract, but his religious allusion to a divine hand placing kings on thrones 
hardly sounded revolutionary. The ultra daily L’Etoile, however, called it “a speech in which 
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he reproduced all the doctrines of the Social Contract …” and summed up his position as, 
“The king of France gave the Charter to France, therefore we must truly impose the 
constitution of the Cortes on Ferdinand.”72 Any time the liberal angle on the nature of the 
Charter emerged—that the king entered into a contractual agreement with the people—ultras 
interpreted it as a clarion call for revolt in Spain in the name of popular sovereignty. 
Chateaubriand merely split hairs when he proclaimed that France “pretends neither to impose 
theories, nor combat other theories with cannon fire.” 73 In ultra discourse the Cortes’ armies 
were merely the material manifestations of France’s abstract but real enemy, the ideological 
belief that kings alone did not exercise sovereignty.  
 When proclaiming the sovereignty of the French and Spanish people proved an 
ineffectual strategy for liberals, they turned to a more practical argument based on the two 
nations’ similar institutions. This institutional argument began with the popular liberal belief 
that the French constitutional state should not choose to go to war against another state with a 
constitutional government. The deputy and writer Charles-Guillaume Etienne, discounting 
the Revolution’s precedents, plainly stated that the impending Spanish War “should not be 
the first war undertaken by constitutional France...”74  General Sébastiani thought a 
constitution and its resultant institutions reflected the mutable and contractual relationship 
between a people and its government. He used this argument to discredit a favored ultra 
theme, namely, that rescuing the uninspiring Ferdinand VII from honoring a constitution that 
he had signed preserved the legitimate power of a “grandson of Henri IV.”  Sébastiani 
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mocked these ultras who championed and argued for the power of kings, and yet complained 
of their impotence in the face of constitutions. “Has the grandson of Henri IV ceased to 
reign,” he wondered, “because his power, previously without limits, received some 
constitutional limits? Since when did human institutions and royal authority . . . receive the 
brevet of immutability?”75 For liberals, political institutions like monarchies and 
constitutions came after the people-as-nation became self aware, and Spain’s constitution 
reflected this societal fact. Political philosophy for ultras, on the other hand, started with an 
unshakable conception of monarchical power not alterable by constitutions.  
 Many pro-war royalists, however, proved savvy enough to avoid overplaying their 
absolutist ideology. Although ultras lauded the absolute power of kings, they also 
commanded a sizeable majority in the Chamber of Deputies, a fact that enabled them to 
consider the war as a product of the French Charter and its representative forms. 
LaBourdonnaye, for instance, proclaimed that the Chamber of Deputies would give the 
intervention in Spain a constitutional sanction when they voted to support the king’s decision 
for military action. 76 This sanction, however, by no means translated into solidarity between 
the French and Spanish as constitutional states. LaBourdonnaye emphasized that the Cortes’ 
constitution and the Charter differed at their foundations. The former derived from 
illegitimate popular sovereignty and thus could only protect material interests. Its institutions, 
therefore, were not the voice of a constitutional nation but rather the seeds of new 
revolutions.77  
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 If the ultras’ control of the French government’s institutions in 1823 somewhat 
vitiated the liberals’ contention that constitutional states should naturally cooperate, the 
liberals still argued for a nation’s right to freedom of action. The liberal deputies thus tried 
countering the ultras by focusing on two aspects of a nation’s right to independence relevant 
to the Spanish intervention: France’s right to conduct foreign policy without pressure from 
other states, and Spain’s right to conduct domestic policy without foreign interference. 
Although Louis XVIII made the final decision to invade, liberals maintained the idea in 
circulation since the beginning of the Congress of Verona, i.e., that the king was succumbing 
to foreign pressure. As Bignon declared, “We are French and not the satellites of a foreign 
will; we are French, and not the gendarmerie of absolute power.”78 Royer-Collard shared this 
patriotic indignation when he contended the French had not fought in the nation’s recent wars 
for the revolutionary government or Napoleon’s empire, but for the universal principle of 
national independence. If, he stated, the French government interfered in Spain’s domestic 
affairs at the behest of other nations, it would violate both nations’ rights to enjoy their 
national sovereignty.79 Chateaubriand in response to this charge, however, accused the 
liberals of confusing isolation with independence. Treaties and international agreements did 
not infringe upon a nation’s independence, he claimed, and there was no “shameful yoke” in 
agreeing on policy with equal powers. After all, he asked, “What nation has ever been 
without alliances with other nations?”80  
                                                 
78 Bignon, Opinion, 18. 
 
79 Royer-Collard, Opinion, 6-7. 
 
80 Chateaubriand, Discours , 17. 
 
196 
 
 When persuasion and reasoned argument failed to sway the war’s supporters, only 
righteous indignation remained for the liberal deputies. They tried to frame the debate in 
terms of a sovereign people against the war; of a constitutional government that should have 
followed its political base, public opinion, and opposed the intervention. When these 
arguments failed to stop the rush to war, the liberal deputies stopped relying on themes that 
suggested national unity and tried instead to show how ultras who supported the war did not 
belong in the nation. They claimed that because the war ran counter to the nation’s values, 
principles, and interests, the ultra ministers who had planned the war and convinced the king 
of its necessity did not merit his confidence. Sébastiani accused them of heeding only the 
“language of Coblentz,” a reference to the reactionary émigrés who declared war on their 
own nation during the Revolution, and claimed that “The party that dominates us …has 
become its [the language of Coblentz’s] organ, obeys its prejudices, its old hatreds, and 
wants to make absolute power triumph in Spain in order to bring it back to France.” 81 The 
liberal minority thus made its own government a near foreign entity, and rhetorically 
excluded the ultra majority from “national belonging” based on what they considered the 
ultras’ real political ideology of absolutism. Political affiliation and professed beliefs had 
long before set the contours of competing discourses of national belonging, and the war 
brought their boundaries into sharp focus.  
According to some liberal deputies, if this un-French ultra cabal allowed 
constitutionalism to succumb to absolutism, the Restoration system of government would 
crumble. The ultra ministry, standing outside the contract of king and people, proposed a war 
that actually attacked these two national elements that had come together in the Restoration 
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settlement. “Ministers who counseled such a war,” Sébastiani thus claimed, “rendered 
themselves guilty of the crime of high treason against the king and against the nation which 
is inseparable from him.”82 Ferdinand VII became an afterthought to liberals—the real king 
threatened in Europe was Louis XVIII. Following these increasingly hyperbolic sentiments, 
more liberals turned their divisive rhetoric on their fellow countrymen, branding them as 
criminals and traitors. Basterrêche vowed that if the Chamber voted in support of the war, he 
would throw himself at the feet of the king and tell him that those counseling war “are the 
scourges of France and humanity; that they are the enemies of his family’s happiness.”83 The 
war ran so counter to the interests of France, some liberals contended, that its supporters 
must have had the Charter itself in their sights. The  push to war, even the moderate Royer-
Collard contended, could never have arisen in the royal mind but had to have emanated from  
“a party or a system, which having never understood the Restoration as but a punishment, 
constantly applies itself to keep alive the humiliation of France. … and it [this party] corrupts 
all: the Charter, the representative government, the administration: it would even corrupt, if 
possible, religion.”84 The inevitability of the war had painted the liberals into a corner, so as 
their last resort they claimed the essence of Frenchness for themselves, thus deepening the 
nation’s social and political divide.  
War brought deputies who figuratively represented two separate internal nations into 
bitter conflict as they competed to represent a reformed and rejuvenated France to the world. 
The debates over war confirmed the post-revolutionary rift and suggested its permanence by 
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explicitly drawing it across centuries of French history. The only recourse left was to 
diminish the stature of one’s ideological enemies. By this means, liberals could preserve the 
belief that representative institutions might still hold the potential to represent public opinion 
and the will of the people. In 1823, liberal deputies were hard-pressed to claim that they 
represented public opinion in light of their minority position in the Chamber. Bignon 
maintained, however, that he and his fellow liberal deputies were the “patriotic minority” in 
the Chambers that alone represented the interests of the greater nation. He described the 
condition of the nation at the onset of the war as hopelessly unbalanced between the needs of 
the many and the interests of the few: 
“From one side finally, more than twenty-nine million French people, from 
the other three or four-hundred thousand individuals dreaming, in their 
private interests, of the reestablishment of absolute power with its abusive 
distinctions, its dilapidations, and its disorders.”85
Most ultras had likewise cast reconciliation aside and hoped that the war would 
permanently discredit their political enemies. They saw liberals as dangerous incarnations of 
contradictory theories and hypocrisies rather than as true Frenchmen. While in the past 
liberals had relished France’s military might under Napoleon, their current opposition to the 
war merely reflected their loyalty to self-interest. LaBourdonnaye described them as: 
“Radicals and carbonari, men seduced by new doctrines, and philanthropists 
without foresight; passionate friends of the arts and of industry, and 
calculating economists who only see the government in the Bourse, who only 
see the happiness of the people in the rapid movement of their 
commerce…”86
 Two nations stood opposed within France. Their real numbers, the nuances in their 
political beliefs, the moments of reconciliation between individuals that might arise now and 
then, mattered little in light of the discursive barrier that arose between them. Political 
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leaders in both “nations” responded to influences in the public sphere that simplified reality 
as a stark battle between good and evil. The debates on the war thus strengthened the 
interpretive frame that divided the nation into irreconcilable parties. A battle over the 
meaning of Restoration France that had started with the implementation of the Charter now 
lost all possibility for a peaceful reconciliation. Both sides could agree on only one political 
truth: that being a member of post-revolutionary French society meant living in a broken 
nation.  
 The army, the French group most personally affected by the war, ironically was the 
one sector of society that might have offered an example of unity to the rest of France. 
Liberals assumed that the military’s strong contingent of former Napoleonic soldiers would 
agree with their antiwar stance. The failure of the carbonari movement to incite widespread 
rebellion among the troops, however, should have warned liberals not to put too much faith 
in the army as an ideological ally. Chateaubriand, confident of the army’s loyalty to the king, 
saw national reconciliation springing from the wartime military units that successfully mixed 
old imperial and new royalist troops. The war, he believed, would “create an army” from 
former enemies that would boost France’s confidence and stature in the international 
community by “reestablishing our independence.” Divided politicians would take longer to 
reconcile but they too, Chateaubriand posited, would follow the lead of these newly unified 
companions-in-arms.87 In fact, his prediction seemed to come true by the end of the year, but 
unity in victory would prove to be just a cosmetic fix for France’s divided political culture.  
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War in the Departments: Stifling Dissent, Fostering Division 
 With war now the official government policy, all important employees of the state 
became its champions and overseers of public opinion on the intervention. In effect, préfets, 
judges, prosecutors, and other functionaries became mouthpieces for ultra propaganda. 
Officially sanctioned enthusiasm for the war swept up local officials who promoted the war 
and cracked down on pessimistic antiwar sentiments and liberal protests that continued to 
arise.  
 The Interior Ministry and its Bureau of Police, in particular, wanted to stop the spread 
of “false news” before it turned the populace against the war. Traveling peddlers’ 
(colporteurs) rumors had been inciting political unrest since the beginning of the Restoration 
(see Chapter One), and the government could not tolerate their negative influences on a 
wartime populace. With military action on the horizon, the Interior Ministry sent several 
broadsheets and memos to the préfets, sous-préfets, and mayors, to ensure that the 
government’s message over the war drowned out rumors, and interpretations that ran counter 
to ultra discourse. The language of these “circulaires” thus incorporated many of the ultra 
themes on the war. Shortly before the war, the Director of Police Franchet-Despery, for 
example, described colporteurs as seeders of “germs of sedition” whose sole desire was to 
spread “alarming news” and “declamations against the government.” He thus cast his net 
widely and ordered the arrest of all voyagers who indulge in “shameful speeches” or 
otherwise show “criminal intentions.”88 For many préfets who identified with the ultra cause, 
this vague wording created an opportunity to punish anyone who disagreed with their 
ideology. 
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 With the departure of troops for Spain, Franchet-Despery reacted to increased 
incidents of pessimistic rumor mongering and gave more detailed advice to the préfets on 
what to look for and whom to blame. He offered examples of common “false noises” that 
permeated the public sphere, stating his belief that the hand of a “revolutionary faction” was 
coordinating a mass deception campaign. Franchet-Despery assumed a deep division in 
society between “good French” who remained faithful, or at least silent, on the war and the 
“bad French” who advertised their unsuitability for inclusion in the nation by spreading lies 
about the war. He assured his functionaries that “the government of the king, is strong from 
the support of all the good French … they [colporteurs spreading alarms] are able, however, 
to trouble the security of classes little enlightened.” By criticizing those susceptible to 
antiwar opinions as “little enlightened,” he equated the ultra position with rational public 
opinion and suggested that any opposition to the war was irrational and anti-French.89 The 
préfets in turn posted circulaires with similar divisive sentiments. A broadsheet out of the 
prefecture in Rouen (Seine-Inférieure), for example, warned the people of the department 
that an “enemy faction” hoped to disrupt the government of the king by spreading “the most 
absurd news.”90
The sous-préfet de Coulommiers (Seine-et-Marne), Le Brun de Charmettes, pushed 
the discourse of national division to extremes when he called for the mayors of his 
arrondissement to crack down “alarms” about the war. Pessimistic rumors about the effects 
or outcome of the war, he wrote, reflected the liberals’ “disappointed ambitions” to reorder 
society according to revolutionary principles. Their activities during wartime, Le Brun de 
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Charmettes asserted, “rendered them day by day more foreign in their former patrie, [they] 
have insensibly ceased to be French and make themselves in their souls and by intention, the 
associates and compatriots of all the seditious of the universe.” By contrasting the “unworthy 
French,” with the rest of the nation’s people, Le Brun de Charmettes fomented divisions in 
his small arrondissement and sorted its denizens according to predetermined set of cultural 
values and political principles. “Heaven has chosen between fidelity and rebellion,” he wrote, 
“between religion and atheism, between civilization and anarchy....” 91 Polarization had 
migrated from politics to government administration. This phenomenon was not necessarily a 
new feature of the Restoration, but the war exacerbated the divisions between Left and Right 
as the government now aggressively committed its resources to spreading ultra ideology.  
 The government cracked down on all types of unauthorized public displays of 
opinion, but what exactly constituted a “shameful discourse” on the war? The types of speech 
that caught the authorities’ attention contained at least one of the following three elements: 
pessimistic predictions for the army and the potential damaging effects of war on France; 
repetition of liberal political ideology when referring to the war; or falsifications of the news 
from Spain in ways that suggested the benefits of a French defeat. These three types of 
rumors often blended in a haphazard fashion, leading préfets to misinterpret more innocuous 
opinions as sedition. In addition, the more extreme transgressions took place in public spaces 
where the influence of alcohol was probably as much of a factor as political ideology.  
Before the hostilities opened, much of the apprehension over the war reflected some 
people’s genuine concern for their livelihood. This was especially true among the merchant 
class, whose liberal champions in the Chambers had warned of the risk that war posed to 
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commerce and industry. In March, in the department of Cotes-du-Nord, the leading 
merchants of the ports of Binie and Portieux began a petition protesting the war because most 
of their trade was with Spain and her colonies. Ideological factors did not play into these 
merchants’ desire to preserve their source of revenue. Some officials, however, interpreted 
the voicing of their legitimate concerns as a product of seditious agitation. 92  In early March, 
1823, the préfet of the Aisne suggested of a similar petition expressing merchants’ 
apprehensions that “liberals spread this falsehood to alarm people because the situation with 
commerce is prosperous.”93 These outright dismissals of constituents’ worries suggested that 
ideologically prejudiced authorities judged anyone who questioned the war either as internal 
enemies or unwitting victims of these enemies. 
Seeing dangerous agitation in nearly all forms of opposition was even easier when 
protestors against the war voiced liberal suspicions about ultras’ intentions in going to war. 
The préfet of the department of Charente reported on a seditious speech in which a man in 
the commune of Bois-Bretau declared he wanted the French army to be defeated because “if 
we win the battle it is certain that one would reestablish feudal rents in France and the nobles 
would reassert their rights.”94 Beyond the clearly unwise call for French defeat, this 
statement illustrated a lingering liberal and lower class anxiety about ultras’ intentions for 
France and their loyalty to the Charter. Even after the war’s outcome was no longer in 
question, people continued to voice their suspicions. In Montpellier, for example, a man 
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named Redoulés claimed that if indeed the news about the victory of French troops was 
accurate, then “we would soon have the inquisition in Spain and France.”95  
Concern for the preservation of the Revolution’s social reforms was prevalent among 
the members of the lower classes who had distrusted the Restoration regime since its 
inception. More prosperous people, however, seemed less concerned with the social threat of 
a resurgent nobility and clergy than protective of the principles of constitutional monarchy 
that had opened political opportunities for them. They were more likely to echo liberal 
pamphlets and speeches that defended Spain’s sovereignty and constitutional forms. A police 
report, for example, described the speech of an insurance agent in the department of Puy-de-
Dôme named Perrot who publicly opposed the war and claimed that France had no right to 
remove another people’s institutions.96 Similar declarations defending the sovereign freedom 
of any nation from intervention arose even among lower-level state bureaucrats. The bailiff 
and supernumery in the village of Lombey (Gers) paid a fine and spent a month in jail for 
stating in a tobacco shop that, “it was shameful and despicable that the French government 
fought against such a good cause . . . that it was contemptible that we would want to impose 
laws on Spain.”97 Their dismissals from their posts, of course, followed shortly after police 
reported their comments.  
These incidents suggest that people throughout the country understood that the war 
reflected broad domestic disagreements. They interpreted the events in Spain from the 
perspective of France’s internal discord. Drawing on rhetoric in the political press and the 
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Chambers, people in the departments merged popular stances on the war with their own 
economic priorities, social insecurities, and political beliefs. Préfets and other functionaries 
likewise interpreted local acts broadly, incorporating isolated events into the national 
discourse between conflicting political forces. Widespread instances of seditious remarks 
about the war among unruly drunks only exacerbated the feeling among conservative 
officials that the enemy was as present within France as it was in Spain. Can we blame the 
préfet of Ariège for doing his job when he took umbrage at public cries of, “Down with the 
Bourbons,” “Down with the French Army,” “Shit on the King” and “Long live Napoleon?” It 
is not surprising that authorities considered those who fomented such disorder as unworthy of 
inclusion in the Restoration nation.98 These common wartime interactions between a 
hotheaded populace and a repressive administration only increased the polarization of the 
political landscape.   
 War in the Departments—Promoting the Triumph  
Members of the state bureaucracy did not just oppose public expressions of antiwar 
sentiments; they also promoted support for the war effort through officially sponsored 
celebrations, laudatory literature, songs, and theatrical productions. These manifestations of 
public joy at the triumph of the French military countered the liberals’ antiwar discourse and 
spread instead the ultras’ vision of France.  
 Even before the troops’ return from Spain and Louis XVIII’s reception for 
Angoulême in Paris in December, 1823, government officials on all levels had been 
orchestrating celebrations of the French victory. The Minister of the Interior had ordered that 
préfets of every department organize celebratory fêtes and parades, and that the mayors of 
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those communes in which returning troops maintained their barracks hold congratulatory 
banquets.  Spontaneous outbursts of joy also broke out all over France, and it seems that 
people of all political persuasions took part in celebrating the war’s quick and painless 
conclusion. This widespread joy over the war’s success may well have provided an 
opportunity for national reconciliation but the ultra taunting and gloating that pervaded many 
celebrations reflected the ultras’ belief that France had triumphed over domestic political 
enemies as well as a foreign nation. The celebrations of the end of hostilities thus turned into 
propaganda for an ongoing political battle against liberals. 
 Official festivities usually consisted of a solemn mass, a procession of returning 
troops, and a public banquet for government officials, important citizens of municipalities or 
departments, and military officers. Prefectures and city halls distributed food to the poor and 
homeless to demonstrate the bounty of the king and his government. In several cities, local 
administrators commissioned special musical or theatrical productions to demonstrate and 
praise the accomplishments of the army and its leaders. In the festivities at Troyes on 6 
January 1824, for example, a “Cantatille” or short piece of musical theatre topped off a day 
that included masses, food distributions, and a military review of the local national guards. 
The préfet proudly reported that spontaneous choruses of “vive le roi” interrupted the 
production.99  In Rouen, the prefecture organized a banquet for all 1500 troops of the 3rd 
Infantry Regiment, erected a triumphal arch, and commissioned busts of the Duc 
d’Angoulême and the King, which became the subjects of several couplets and toasts.100 In 
Nantes and several other communities in the department of Loire-Inférieure, laurel leaves 
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and the Bourbons’ white flag adorned every window to celebrate the return of the 14th Line 
Infantry. The préfet in Nantes boastfully claimed that officers congratulated him for 
preparing a better welcome than Bordeaux, thus suggesting that officials used the revelry to 
boost their own reputations as much as they fêted the troops.101 Smaller towns like Mézières 
(Ardennes) also wanted their efforts to match or better those of other towns in content and 
spirit. The prefecture’s report from Ardennes therefore noted approvingly that the mayor 
gave a speech “full of the most monarchical sentiments.”102 As the overseers of public 
opinion, the préfets ensured that enthusiastic celebrations expressing the public’s enthusiasm 
benefited the ruling ultra government by spreading its ideology.  
 In a circulaire to the sous-préfets and mayors of the department of Bouches-du-
Rhone dated 11 October 1823, the préfet, the Comte de Villeneuve, strongly encouraged his 
underlings to design their celebrations as demonstrations of Christian and monarchical 
values, and frame them around ultra political themes that disparaged the liberal opposition. 
Villeneuve reminded his staff, for example, that the war had destroyed the “hydra of 
revolutions” that men who “dared to call themselves representatives of the nation” had 
nurtured.103 These exhortations to frame the celebrations in the same terms that ultras had 
used to launch the war, shows how the postwar festivities kept alive the ultras’ struggle 
against domestic ideological enemies even after their external foes had been defeated.  
Préfets’ reports to the ministry on the celebrations thus stayed on message and 
painted the festivities in ultra colors, combining a healthy dose of flattering platitudes about 
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the king, the Duc d’Angoulême and the troops, with well-established ideological descriptions 
of a nefarious liberal and revolutionary enemy. A gendarme’s report from Rennes, for 
example, described the arrival of the Royal Guard, “victorious from the struggle of 
legitimacy against revolutionary anarchy,” and the community’s unanimous approval of their 
conduct.104 The préfet of the department of the Jura made the same point in a speech to 
returning troops. “It was fitting for a French army,” he observed, “directed by a noble and 
worthy offspring of Henry IV and Louis XIV, to go and close the abyss of revolutions in 
Spain, reassert order and assure the peace of all Europe.”105 Playing down the fact that 
everyone loves a parade—even if only for reasons of curiosity—local officials tried to 
convince the central government that the crowds attending the celebrations confirmed the 
ultras’ command of public opinion. In the department of Morbihan, the préfet reported that 
the demonstrations of joy were “new proofs of an ardent devotion and an inalterable fidelity 
to the legitimate dynasty” in the department.106
Préfets, hoping that the seemingly unanimous satisfaction with the government’s 
foreign accomplishments would lead to further political success on the home front, tried to 
turn the people’s enthusiasm into support for the ultra government’s preferred candidates in 
the 1824 elections to the Chamber of Deputies. In the department of the Indre, for example, 
the préfet noted that “these demonstrations of royalism, good at all times, are particularly 
useful with the approach of the elections.” He even saw the festivities as an opportunity to 
“rehabilitate” the town of Châteauroux by converting the town’s liberals with the good 
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examples of royalist sentiment on display.107 In Carcassonne (Aude), the préfet noted that, in 
general, “apathy is the dominant character of the inhabitants.” With the burst of “royalist 
enthusiasm” that accompanied the celebrations, however, he expressed optimism that the 
“choice [of deputy] will be excellent if the elections take place.”108 Throughout a tour of 
festivities in the department of la Manche, the préfet there noted the benefits of war on the 
public spirit. At his own ball in St.Lo he claimed, “The opinions in this reunion seemed 
unanimous.” At each of these events he met with the departments’ important electors, 
including liberals, and considered the events during his tour “as a sort of prelude to the 
elections.” “Everywhere I heard for a refrain,” he claimed, “even from a mass of liberals, ‘we 
will do what you want.’”109  
The préfets may have had good intentions when they reached out to local liberals in 
their departments. Their attempts to use national pride to overcome internal political 
differences, however, often appeared to liberals as overt “royalizing” for electoral gain rather 
than as an example of genuine compromise between erstwhile political enemies. Ultra 
officials’ attempts at reconciliation were also undermined by their continued branding of 
liberals as traitorous elements unworthy of inclusion in good society. Even when préfets tried 
but failed to bring people together, they were likely to fall back on divisive rhetoric to 
explain why the strategy of reconciliation did not work. In La Rochelle (Charente-Inférieure), 
for example, the préfet’s attempt to host an inclusive celebration at the local theater failed for 
a lack of funds and the party held instead at a tax official’s house ended up excluding several 
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members of the town’s high society because the house was too small. The préfet lamented 
that several “evil doers” (malevolants) seized upon this exclusion as a pretext to host a 
separate commemoration of the war filled with “liberal sentiments.”110 Despite his best 
efforts to cultivate unity at the official event, it seemed that the two sides could not come 
together even when they tried.  
Other préfets were less conciliatory in their assessments of the liberals. The protests 
and acts of vandalism which marred some of the festivities added to their misgivings about 
their liberal constituents. In Mende (Lozère), the secretary-general of the prefecture reported 
that “some bad subjects no doubt tormented by the public enthusiasm profited from the 
darkness of the night to overturn the arc-de-triomphe under which the regiment had been 
received.”111 While events like these disturbed public order, most préfets did little to stop 
equally disruptive royalist crowds from heckling liberals and exulting in the triumph of their 
cause. In Colmar (Haut-Rhin), the préfet himself attended a royalist victory party in which a 
crowd paraded busts of the king and Angoulême through the streets. The préfet brazenly 
reported that he and the crowd stopped under known liberals’ windows and shouted “vive le 
roi” and “down with liberals,” but that “there was no direct provocation.”112  A hostile crowd 
bearing torches and threatening townspeople raised no alarms—so long as the people shouted 
royalist slogans. 
The war brought about an ultra triumph on many levels and seemed to mark the end 
of even the pretense of a balanced political system. In 1824, it was not unreasonable to 
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assume that the political bloc of liberals in the Chamber of Deputies, the press, and at the 
departmental level would simply dissolve as ultras continued to discredit the opponents of 
the war. A look at the celebrations in Grenoble gives a sense of the apparent final triumph of 
the royalist cause. Crowds greeted the arrival of the 25th Infantry Regiment, the préfet 
reported, with an “elan” that “swept up even the most pronounced liberals. Whether from 
shame or calculation, they imitated the royalists’ example.” Of the fifteen-hundred notables 
invited to the departmental fête, only a handful of leading liberals refused to come. The 
préfet asserted that “these men are the same who have distinguished themselves in all times 
by their hatred of the government.” He was sure that these few liberals abstained from 
attending only to remain in the good graces of their party for the upcoming elections. 
Although some might have interpreted these liberals’ obstinate refusal to attend as a sign that 
partisanship remained strong, the préfet assured his superiors that “all passed in such a way 
to shed light on the liberals’ weakness in numbers and to give to uncertain minds a good idea 
of the royalists’ strength.”113 For ultras, attaining their domestic goal of solely representing 
France far outweighed the international importance of what transpired in Spain. 
Part Three: Framing the War in Ultra Nationalist Rhetoric 
 The ultra discourse on the war recast the history of France and Europe since the 
Revolution as a seamless story of death and resurrection, which culminated in the French 
intervention in Spain. As the troops returned and met the acclaim of the populace, this 
triumphal narrative took root in official documents, propaganda, and popular songs and 
poems. The story had many facets: that revolution was a supernatural blight on humanity; 
that intervention in Spain brought the end of the revolutionary era in Europe; that it was the 
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triumph of legitimacy over liberal doctrines; that all France could finally rally around the 
Restoration; that Spain and France were again united by Bourbon blood; and, finally, that 
France had saved civilization, thus restoring her rank as the preeminent nation in the world. 
Royalists successfully framed the war around these elements and drowned out interpretations 
of the events that ran counter to them. They maintained this hegemonic control over the 
message of the war throughout 1823.  
Judicial Felicitations  
 When the ultra Minister of Justice Charles de Peyronnet asked members of the 
judiciary to send their congratulations to the king and the Duc d’Angoulême, judges, 
prosecutors, and justices of the peace throughout France simply drew from the well-worn 
nationalist discourse to create a series of propagandistic “felicitations,” many of which ended 
up in the Moniteur Universel. Their effect was to create an impression of uniform opinion 
both in the government and throughout the provinces. Often criticized by the ultra press for 
its softness on political crimes, the judiciary benefited from this publicity to prove its loyalty 
to the new regime just as the army had done through its discipline and obedience during the 
campaign. Reading the letters from judicial officials highlights the ultras’ success in framing 
the war, even if some of the judges and prosecutors had misgivings over the ultra domestic 
agenda. The postwar felicitations are among the period’s most notable examples of how ultra 
nationalist rhetoric cobbled together narrative elements about the history of France, essential 
political conceptions of national identity, and condemnations of a liberal “outgroup,” and 
tried to inculcate in the populace a vision of the ideal French nation.  
 The members of the judiciary who congratulated the king on the war’s swift end 
adopted the ultras’ vengeful and triumphant rhetoric to describe contemporary events they 
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considered inextricably linked to those of the previous thirty years. They framed the war as 
France’s duty to intervene and stop the same harmful phenomena that had disrupted France 
earlier. The first obvious correlation between the two events appeared in the threat that 
revolutions posed to kings. Many felicitations thus began by reminding the king of the 
misery of France’s recent past. “Widowed of its legitimate kings,” the Tribunal of Mirande 
wrote, “France groaned under the yoke of usurpation and anarchy.”114  Louis XVIII returned, 
the felicitations’ common narrative continued, and saved France, showering it with the 
benefits of the Restoration while remaining vigilant against the return of revolutionary 
threats. The Royal Court of Metz, and many others, although thankful for the benefits of the 
Restoration, suggested that revolution had avoided destruction and simply migrated to other 
nations. Their statement read: “The revolution that the August presence of Your Majesty had 
banished from your kingdom, found refuge in the isle of Leon.”115 This narrative of 
revolutionary displacement came full circle when it echoed the king’s own framing of the 
events in the Spain with which he had opened the Chambers in February 1823, namely that 
the peninsula replayed the painful memories of France’s past for all to see. Revolution 
“succeeded in reproducing in Spain these scenes of disorder and anarchy that signaled the 
first years of our unhappiness,” wrote the Tribunal of Arbois.116 The felicitations suggested 
to people that Spanish revolutionaries had given life to formerly abstract but deeply personal 
and painful memories of the Revolution—they made the present a reminder of a shared 
national history.  
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 To explain how the past resurfaced in the present, judges trained in the skills of 
reasoned debate incorporated the more extreme and fantastic ultra language and imagery in 
their congratulatory letters. They portrayed revolution as outside of nature and natural human 
society and described it in diabolical terms as a perverted sickness or spirit that possessed 
people and deprived them of reason and respect for order. The letters thus drew on a counter-
revolutionary tradition of depicting the Revolution in supernatural terms of monsters, 
demons, and hell. 117  With the motifs of the “hydra of revolutions” or the “abyss” that 
emerged hundreds of times in the judicial felicitations, the judges were able to explain the 
persistence of Revolution and then describe its defeat in Spain in terms of eschatological 
finality.  
 The hydra allusion was a particularly effective way of explaining the spread of 
revolution and its pertinacity. The justices of the peace of St. Quentin (Aisne) declared, “One 
believed that the hydra of revolutions was forever enchained …We were wrong. She hid 
herself under the mantle of hypocrisy, and there, in shadows and mystery, she mixed her 
revolutionary poisons to infect all of Europe.”118 Whatever particular social or political ill 
incited a people to revolt became simply a regenerated head of the same unnatural beast. This 
hydra metaphor explained the spread of liberal principles without engaging in any substantial 
way with their claims, thus forestalling debate over the political present. The many-headed 
monster also helped explain why Louis XVIII’s celebrated return did not end revolution. 
“Sire the revolutionary hydra was only expelled from France,” explained the Tribunal of 
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Gray, “…in all countries as far as the New World she becomes more furious everywhere and 
belches forth her deadly poisons.”119 With the defeat of the Spanish constitutionalists, 
however, the French army had performed the Herculean task of delivering the “last blow to 
the hydra of Revolution.”120
 The mythological imagery of the hydra often accompanied a more Christian allusion 
to hell, the “abyss.” The tribunal of Lure wrote in their congratulations that, “you have closed 
forever the abyss of revolutions; you have stuck down the cruel hydra that devoured so many 
victims.” 121 The abyss proved a useful allegory for the many disastrous effects of revolution 
in society. It was at one time, the source of monsters that plagued humanity, the proverbial 
site of falling into error, and an explicit depiction of the societal rift that revolutions caused. 
In short, the abyss image incorporated the ultra frame for understanding France’s past and 
present, and also illustrated how people employed the frame of national division to craft 
political messages. Everyone had to acknowledge the profound effects of polarization, but 
the boost in confidence that the war brought to the ultras made it seem as though closing the 
divide was possible. The tribunal of Avesnes thus thankfully declared to the king that, “You 
have closed the abyss that threatened to swallow our destinies and from which sprung all 
calamities.”122  The implied content of these saved “destinies” was a unified future for 
France without a deep gulf separating the people.  
 When felicitations did not resort to supernatural allusions to describe the Revolution, 
they turned to metaphors of disease, sickness, and contagious madness to describe its 
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ideological tenets and hint at the disfigurement of humans and society that resulted from 
unhealthy political principles. The real transformation of the prewar “cordon sanitaire,” a 
military quarantine district set up in the early 1820’s on France’s Spanish frontier to prevent 
a yellow fever epidemic from spreading to France, into the army that marched into Spain, 
helped propagate the idea of the war as preventive medicine.  The Tribunal of Vouzières, for 
example, claimed the king prescribed war “to preserve our soil from the contagion of 
Revolutions.”123 What form did this disease take? The felicitations often vaguely referred to 
it as “revolutionary doctrines,”  “revolutionary principles,” or a “false philosophy,” whose 
main components were the principles of popular sovereignty, absolute liberty, and equality. 
The Tribunal of Montpellier declared that, “This false philosophy which, delighting in hopes 
of a chimerical perfection, allows thrones to sit on volcanoes and makes peoples prey to the 
horrors of anarchy.”124 Using the language of contagion and disease to describe dangerous 
doctrines spread the war’s effects beyond France. The lawyers attached to the Tribunal of 
Réole declared that “This illustrious and sweet conquest, Sire, was the first need of the 
paternal heart of Your Majesty, as the destruction of unhealthy doctrines and of revolutionary 
maxims was the first need of nations.”125 Medical analogies in the felicitations thus also 
reinforced the universalist aspects of the ultra nationalist rhetoric on the war because all 
humans were susceptible to disease.  
By describing how the king and his army defeated a universal threat, the felicitations’ 
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authors suggested that the war confirmed France’s important place in the world. “All the 
thrones were threatened by [the Spanish revolutionaries’] audacious and sacrilegious 
enterprise,” wrote the Tribunal of Toulon, but only French soldiers under a legitimate king 
knew how to defeat the international liberal cabal.126 Because thrones were the backbone of 
society, the Tribunal of Draguignan described the intervention as a “war undertaken for 
civilization itself...”127 France was no longer a defeated nation but an international savior 
whose prominent place in the world met the expectations of the most optimistic prewar 
opinions. The writers of the royal felicitations never doubted the preeminence of French 
culture in the world, but they could now point again to her martial strength as a point of 
national pride. In a letter congratulating Angoulême, the Tribunal of Figéac asserted that 
France was back in “the first rank of nations by its power as she was by her civilization.”128 
The felicitations thus contained the ironic element of ultra nationalism by which the French 
nation grew stronger and more in line with nature when it protected universal values.  
 Ultras, as noted, associated legitimacy with a paternal absolute monarchy, and 
felicitations that made claims according to this principle of rule applied its benefits to both 
the world and the nation. In this respect, paternal legitimacy became an inclusive national 
and international value that the war’s successful outcome preserved. “The dogma of 
legitimacy,” the Tribunal of Dole’s felicitation read, “[the] sole guarantee of the repose of 
nations, has just been cemented by glory.”129 A strengthened principle of paternalistic 
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legitimacy, the Tribunal of Saint-Dié’s felicitation also suggested, would benefit France and 
herald a future in which all the French would embrace the king’s “paternal scepter” and 
“forget deplorable and deadly dissensions in the bosom of peace and happiness.”130  These 
authors of felicitations thought curing one side of its erroneous political beliefs while 
asserting universal principles would overcome France’s domestic disputes and bring the 
nation and world together.  
 The swift victory in Spain of universal and national values persuaded the judiciary’s 
members that erstwhile opponents of the war would heal themselves of their errors and show 
their patriotic fervor for the ultra model of the nation. The people, claimed the felicitation of 
the Tribunal of Réole, are “more and more proud to be French.”131 All the French, the Civil 
Tribunal of Agen claimed, would live in a hierarchical society that would enable France to 
enjoy “repose and happiness, [and] the sweet fruits of a paternal reign.”132 The troops’ 
example provided the needed catalyst for a grand transformation of Restoration society; the 
Revolution would finally end and society would come together. Those on the Left were even 
invited to partake in the joy, “After so many examples of bravery and generosity, may the 
enemies of the correct system,” the Tribunal of Commerce of Calvi beseeched, “heartily 
reunite with all your faithful subjects and may all cry in one voice, Long live the King!, Long 
live the Duc D’Angouleme, Live forever the Bourbons!”133 According to some of the 
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felicitations, there was room for everyone in the national and royal parade. 
 The war also revitalized the Spanish and French amity that Napoleon’s invasion and 
the subsequent turmoil in Spain had damaged. Felicitations thus portrayed the war as a 
charitable act that would return dividends in friendship and stability on the borders of France.  
The Tribunal de Lure’s felicitation claimed that the war brought “true liberty to a 
neighboring people torn by anarchy and civil war, to a people naturally the friend and ally of 
the French.”134 Many others went further in cementing the bond between France and Spain 
when they used the same paternal terms that had made the war a European priority. In the 
case of Spain these international links were especially close because of the nations’ shared 
Bourbon heritage. Some remembered, for example, how Louis XIV was purported to have 
declared when his grandson ascended to the Spanish throne in 1700, “il n’y a plus de 
Pyrénées” (The Pyrenees are no more). Authors of the felicitations seized on this quip and 
inserted it in many of their letters. Spain was no longer a foreign country, the Tribunal of 
Montargis claimed, “We are but a single family, il n’y a plus de Pyrenees!”135 Spain too 
could now enjoy the same benefits of paternal monarchy as the French.  
 Despite a resurrected love for Spanish brethren and token references to national 
reconciliation as a result of the war, political attacks still surfaced in the felicitations. Many 
law courts could not resist the temptation to gloat and punish the liberals for their antiwar 
stance and thus they reinforced the frame of national division when honoring the king. They 
found easy targets in those liberals who continued to express their misgivings about the war. 
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“Some worried minds,” wrote the Royal Court of Agen, “some sick at heart, inappropriately 
draw sinister augurs for public liberties from this [victory].”136 Felicitations countered those 
who continued to oppose the government by warning leftists that the war was, as the Tribunal 
of Barbesieux declared, a “memorable lesson for the artisans of revolutions.”137 This lesson 
became in essence a last acknowledgment of the liberals’ existence as a political group 
because the ultra government confidently planned them to push them out of the system in the 
1824 elections. From the bench at Figéac, the drafters of a felicitation declared, “may your 
domestic enemies, Sire, if some still are able to exist, recognize their errors and become 
again your faithful subjects, enjoying in peace the benefits of your government.”138 Hundreds 
of similar messages filled the pages of the Moniteur, and several hundred others were 
produced but not printed. Together, they offer a glimpse at how nationalist ultras framed the 
war and reinforced their own frame of the nation in the process.   
The War in Cultural Media 
 In November, 1823 spectators at the Grand-Théâtre of Bordeaux were treated to a 
one-act allegorical “ballet of circumstance” entitled, Les Lauriers d’Ibérie [The Laurels of 
Iberia], which the local authorities had commissioned to celebrate the war in Spain. The 
ballet retold the history of France in dance and song from the time of the mythical Frankish 
king Pharamond to the march of French troops into Spain in 1823. Throughout its historical 
narrative the villain, Discord, repeatedly attempts to sabotage the “chosen” people and kings 
of France while Genius (génie) defends them. Over the march of time, kings prove that they 
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can overcome Discord’s machinations. Henri IV, for example spares the life of a member of 
the Catholic league calling out to his soldiers, “Stop, he is a Frenchmen!” Discord comes 
back, however, during the Revolution with monsters from hell including Envy, Hatred, 
Vengeance, and Furies, but this time Genius grows the wings of victory and fights them off. 
The ballet then abruptly concludes with a triumphal march in which Spanish ladies and 
French cavaliers dance together and representatives of all of France’s social classes unite in 
celebration.139
 In this one act, the ideological frames that ultraroyalists used to define and defend the 
Spanish war reappeared on stage: kings governed by divine right, the French had a special 
role in the world, and supernatural forces caused divisions in society. What stands out in 
descriptions of the ballet, however, is its seamless transition from the Revolution’s defeat to 
the triumph of French arms in Spain. The absence of any reference to the intervening years 
matched the royalist interpretation of the Spanish war as the last act of the Revolution, and 
intimated that the war had ended the Revolution, thus removing the final barrier to national 
unity. It was as though the Restoration with its polarized polity had never existed.  
Performances of plays like Les Lauriers took place all over France in the fall and winter of 
1823-24. They were part of a large official campaign to celebrate the war which, combined 
with an even larger body of unofficial spontaneous poems and songs, praised the French 
triumph in Spain.  
 Not all songs celebrated the war, however, as a few isolated cases of antiwar songs 
appeared throughout 1823. These grew scarce over time but their content highlighted 
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remaining leftist sentiments that countered the ultra pro-war discourse. C. Hyacinthe, for 
example, had warned that the war would disturb France’s prosperity in his song, Dithyrambe: 
La France en alarmes aux bruits de guerre contre l’Espagne [Dithyramb: France in Alarms 
from the Sounds of War against Spain](1823). The work affirmed the author’s allegiance to 
the “paternal king” who brought prosperity to France but questioned the political motives of 
those pushing the war. “Is it liberty you want to destroy / In the heart of the Castilian?” the 
poem asks. If so, the author warned, “Do not tarnish your glory. / Of my tragic history / Read 
the sad accounts;” echoing the liberal warning in the Chambers about the danger foreign 
intervention posed to kings. 140 Less restrained authors—who remained safely anonymous—
called on the military to disobey. Claiming that France’s leaders had “lost their minds,” the 
author of an untitled song from Metz reassured the soldiers that the Spanish would see them 
as brothers and that they should, “reserve all their blows / for the agents of the ministry.”141 
Such antiwar rhetoric only fueled ultra indignation, but it soon disappeared—at least in its 
published formats. The most popular leftist songwriters and poets were simply unprepared to 
challenge military aggression in verse, so when war came, they ignored it or even added their 
voices to the victory celebrations. By the end of the war, a few left-leaning songwriters and 
poets were celebrating the army’s exploits, and their focus on the martial glory of France 
simply migrated from Napoleonic nostalgia to Royalist glory in Spain. For the most part, 
however, leftist songwriters and poets largely followed the lead of prominent liberals and 
refrained from comment for fear of seeming treasonous or ungrateful for the French victory. 
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Royalist lyricists, meanwhile, wrote works in support of the ultra political program 
and imbued them with a decidedly antagonistic anti-liberal tone. The framing of the war that 
Les Lauriers d’Ibérie achieved without words was matched in the explicit language of 
songwriters and poets. Their songs and poems reasserted the union of paternal monarchy and 
faith as the natural basis of society, chastised liberals for being un-French, reiterated the 
connection between the intervention in Spain and the French Revolution, and proclaimed the 
salvation of humanity and civilization.  These themes all came together in a general call for 
unity among the French—naturally, according to ultra terms—and for alliance with the 
Spanish.  The celebratory songs and poems went beyond all other literature on the war in 
outlining the ultra nationalist creed. Heady days of fêtes and parades put the populace in the 
right frame of mind to bolster this lyrical propaganda’s effectiveness and inspired political 
support for the ultra regime.  
 Many collections of poems and songs came from the efforts of the préfets who 
organized the celebrations. Thus it is not surprising that all sorts of soldiers, bureaucrats, and 
other officials suddenly fancied themselves lyrical artists. One such poetic creation was La 
Couronne Poetique du Prince Généralissime [The Poetic Crown of the Prince 
Generalissimo] (1824), a large collection of celebratory texts financed through a subscription 
campaign whose donors included members of the royal family and numerous government 
officials. Its introduction stressed its political tone by proclaiming that “our collection will 
therefore be received with interest by all the good French, by all the faithful Spanish who 
owe their upcoming happiness to the wisdom of our Bourbons and the union of the Princes of 
Europe against revolutionary factions.”142 While its editors suggested that the songs in La 
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Couronne had emanated from unanimous public opinion in support of the war, their 
substance qualified them as examples of one-sided ultra propaganda. 
 Poems and songs celebrated the war for saving the natural union of altar and throne. 
In a series of couplets, an author named, “Adjutant Grigoul,” described the liberals of Spain 
as “A party that believes itself master / of changing God and king.”143 In a similar vein, an 
“old soldier of Condé” vividly described the Spanish threat for the benefit of returning 
soldiers at a Parisian banquet. The Spanish rebels, he wrote, were “cohorts without restraint, 
with audacious sacrilege / Burning Iberia and threatening at the same time / Both priest and 
altar, both prince and the state.”144 Such sacrileges, as the ultra authors described them, 
threatened France’s own restored Catholicism and upset the natural order of all societies. In 
other poetic attempts to portray the war as a defense of natural order, writers emphasized the 
private family metaphor to make paternalistic ideology relevant to the general populace. G. 
Menard de Rochecave, for example, described the crimes of revolutionaries against this order 
in his cantata, L’armée française en Espagne [The French Army in Spain]: “The Father 
succumbed to the hand of his sons, / Mothers reject their daughters, / No more friendship, no 
more families.”145  The poet assumed that everyone could identify with these painful 
descriptions of families torn apart by unsafe doctrines and give their support to the protection 
of the greatest father in society, the king, to ensure their own household remained safe.  
 The sanctified royal bloodline of Bourbons became a central feature of many 
celebratory texts. The victorious Duc d’Angoulême, who by many accounts made a rather 
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dull impression in person, emerged from the war as a “worthy son of Henri Quatre, [and] the 
savior of enchained Bourbons.” 146  All the monarchical figures of the campaign from 
Ferdinand VII to Louis XVIII found themselves likewise transformed into near religious 
symbols for the sake of sanctifying and promoting the paternal nation. The poet J. H. 
Aldebert compared Louis XVIII and Angoulême to the story of Christ in a poem about 
“Louis” who, “Like the Supreme Being had done before, Sent his Son among us.”147 Almost 
blasphemous in its use of metaphor, this kind of religious enthusiasm for the monarchy 
nonetheless dominated ultra rhetoric on the war.  
 This marriage of monarchy and religion formed the backbone of the ultras’ 
nationalistic justifications for war. Using traditional, conservative religion to turn national 
identity into a crusader’s platform, the ultras extolled the virtues of their idealized paternal 
nation as the only model for France because God Himself had instituted the system. This 
confidence in the religious foundation for political beliefs overrode considerations for 
another nation’s right to self-determination. The poet Angélique Salmon thus asserted that 
divine guidance condoned the French goal “To deliver Iberia, returning to it in one stroke / 
Her religion, her monarch, and her ancient laws.” 148  France’s religious and monarchical 
legacy also justified sacrificing one’s life for the nation. For those bemoaning the loss of life 
during the Spanish campaign, the Abbé de Bonnevie consoled them with a nationalist creed 
of monarchical legends and faith. “If the native soil is denied their bodies,” he declared, “the 
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faith of Clovis takes care of their soul.”149 Such praise of self-sacrifice to the past and present 
nation is a classic hallmark of a nationalist program. Although the war’s relatively few 
casualties probably diminished the impact of this rhetoric, it illustrated the ultras’ 
nationalistic conception of France. 
The ultra conception of the French nation as an inclusive entity, however, had no 
room for liberals or revolutionaries—they were anathema to civilization itself. The royalist 
songs and poems conflated Spanish and French liberal revolutionaries and contrasted them 
with upstanding citizens who valued their king and religion.  On one side of the battle stood, 
“humanity,” on the other a small faction of “ingrates,” or worse, inhuman monsters. The 
author Vergeil in his ode to the Duc d’Angoulême called the liberals of Spain, “a factious 
inhuman party.”150 An anonymous poet imagined the war as a mythic struggle between good 
and evil and called those French liberals who supported Spanish rebels “vile and perjured 
children” of an “indignant” France.151 According to Angélique Salmon, French and Spanish 
liberals relished only power behind their progressive fronts. “Traitors, you affect noble 
sentiments;” she railed, “your mouth always vaunts independence, / And your avid hands 
seize power. / Nothing is sacred for you, and your authority / Relies but on crime and 
impiety.”152  According to these accounts, the inclusion of unreformed liberals within the 
French national family was no longer possible. They branded liberals as the dangerous 
domestic “other” and contrasted them with an ideal vision of a uniformly royalist French 
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people. The prolific royalist songwriter, Charles-Joseph Rougemaître, went so far as to 
proclaim that only war supporters were “worthy of the name ‘French.’”153 Poets’ praise for 
France’s natural order of throne, Church, and family contrasted with their portrayal of the 
unnatural monsters and hydras that opposed this order. M. Bressier, for example, portrayed 
Louis XVIII invoking God to purge the earth of a “frightful monster.”154 Other authors 
equated spreading liberalism with the hydra that featured so prominently in judicial 
felicitations. Thus the “old Condéen” praised the defeat of a “bloodthirsty hydra,” while M. 
de Frenay referred to the more politically descriptive “hydra of anarchy.”155  
Depictions of unnatural opponents and poetic hydras played a prominent part in the 
ultras' effort to portray the war as the last throes of the French Revolution. To make this 
historical connection songwriters and poets recast the constitutional uprising in Spain as an 
addendum to the political and social changes of the previous hundred years. Bernard-
François-Anne Fonvielle wrote, “This racket of a long-winded century / Troubles the peace 
of the world through its clamor,”156 and conflated rebels in Spain with the revolutionaries of 
the 1790’s to remind the people of the stakes involved in fighting the war. This theme 
showed up in a poem called Stances sur la Guerre d’Espagne [Stanzas on the Spanish War] 
(1824). “Some Jacobins, of the impious race / Overturned all the altars,” wrote the author 
“Min. F.” But now, “Their reign finished on Earth / This sect resisted in vain. /Antoine 
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[Angoulême] is armed with thunder / To purge them from the human race.” 157 Finally, the 
long nightmare of the Enlightenment and the Revolution had ended.  
 This sense of a passing era tempered the vindictive nature of some of the ultra poems 
and songs. Peace’s greatest gift, claimed many of the songs, would be the union of the sister 
nations of France and Spain. By freeing Ferdinand and removing the threat of European 
revolution, the war gave hope to two nations that had suffered from the past thirty years of 
conflict. Now Spain and France both would enjoy the repose that France had attained in the 
Bourbon Restoration. “Brave Spaniard,” wrote the Chevalier Jacquelin, “fulfill your 
destinies! / This is the day when two peoples united / Are going to repeat: no, no more 
Pyrenees!”158 Just as France had allied her destiny with the Holy Alliance, Spain too (in the 
words of an anonymous songwriter) had joined this “unanimous concert of the most powerful 
nations” that would “fill forever the abyss that revolutions open.” 159 The war had expanded 
the extent of civilized Europe through exorcising Spain’s demons. Its royal bounty knew no 
limits. 
 France could also finally enjoy domestic peace and repose. So long as the French 
learned to enjoy, as Rougemaître called it, “liberty without license,” internal disputes would 
drown in a chorus of broad royalist enthusiasm. 160 Scenes of jubilation in which citizens 
flocked to welcome the troops home became promising augurs of things to come. 
Partisanship would not disappear without effort, but the first steps towards reconciliation had 
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been achieved. In Le nouveau chant français [The New French Song] (1824) M. Capelle 
called on the nation to take advantage of the war’s opportunity to heal: “Frenchmen, on this 
solemn day, / Let us forget our conflicting paths; / Under the laws of a paternal king / Let us 
reassume our brotherly titles.”161 His appeal for peace and unity elucidated the pragmatic 
voice of Restoration royalist moderation. It acknowledged the split in society and hoped that 
with the triumph of the royal army, partisans would set their grudges aside. For the more 
enthusiastic and spiritual ultras, the war fulfilled God’s plan for France. As a song written for 
the celebrations in Troyes claimed, “The prophecy is finally fulfilled! / France, God just 
granted your wishes, / From all sides, there is nothing bur harmony / Perfect accord, and 
happy French!”162 This fortunate result had little to do with the democratic principles 
incorporated in the Restoration Charter. Unity had arrived by the hand of God—but humans 
still inhabited the earth, and their prejudices were too strong for victory to defeat.  
Conclusion 
 All the ultras’ hopes for the war had come true. Ferdinand sat again on the Spanish 
throne unencumbered by a “revolutionary” constitution. Public opinion supported the war 
and its results, and people seemed content with ultra rule in France. Considering the rout of 
the liberals in the 1824 elections (they won only 17 seats out of 428), it was not unreasonable 
to conclude that the war did indeed end political contestation in France. Even moderates like 
Billecocq voiced hopeful sentiments that the war would “consummate” the Restoration and 
its “new institutions … rally the vast majority of the French around the reigning dynasty and 
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its tempered monarchy, and show to Europe a France guaranteed on the outside by an 
imposing strength and on the inside by paternal laws.”163 But it was not to be.  
Two major factors ensured that political polarization would continue despite the 
victory in Spain. The first was the viciousness of the backlash against the liberals. If unity 
had been the sole focus of the celebratory discourse in the winter of 1823-24, it might not 
have hardened the hearts of liberals, but ultra gloating over the war set liberals on a 
determined path to reassert their position, eventually leading to their success in the elections 
of 1827 and the removal of the Villèle regime. The second factor was postwar Spain itself. 
For all the ultra rhetoric about the absolute power of kings, their own power in France came 
from electoral victories in a constitutional representative system. When Ferdinand 
immediately set out on a campaign of brutal repression and revenge, it vitiated ultras’ claims 
of moderation and compromise. Few ultras would have tolerated the arbitrariness of 
Ferdinand in their own country, and none had an answer for why Spain continued to be 
unstable after the glorious intervention. In sum, bitter feelings and disappointment followed 
in victory’s wake.  
 Royalist commentators on the results of the war had little new to offer as the brutality 
spread across Spain. For many the great post-revolutionary political struggle continued. 
Pierre-Sébastien Laurentie, for example, believed that a new domestic war must be “pressed 
with the same ardor as the first.” 164 Ultras believed that they no longer needed to defend 
their exclusive reading of the Charter and the Restoration—the time for dialogue had ended. 
The Charter must no longer tolerate contradiction; as the author of Des résultats de la guerre 
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d’Espagne [The Results of the Spanish War] wrote in 1824, “it [the Charter] wasn’t given to 
eternalize the political quarrels and make them descend into the bosom of household foyers,” 
and there was no room for “revolt and felony” in its institutions.165 Victory had given the 
ultras confidence that their conception of essential French identity would become the 
normative model for the whole nation. The corollary of this assumption was a continued 
demonization of liberals. Isidore-Marie-Brignole Gautier claimed that the war had 
“demonstrated to the least clairvoyant that these men, today enemies of all legitimacy, are 
anti-French and anti-loyal.”166 Ultras like Gautier did not understand that partisan ideologies 
flourish best when opposition to them persists. In a way, these continued attacks were 
providing ideological life-support for the ultras’ necessary enemies. Without an “other” the 
ultras might have lost their enthusiasm and political passion. Absolute victory itself 
threatened to undermine the effectiveness of the ultras’ message. 
 The ultras could keep contestation alive in France, but there was little they could do 
to fix Spain.167 It took only a year for liberal and other antiwar writers to reenter the debate 
with the examples of renewed internal violence in Spain acting as a foil to ultra 
triumphalism. An “Elector of Paris” claimed that building a national consensus out of the war 
would never happen because it was “an enterprise that was neither royal, nor national, but all 
ministerial.”168 If there was any benefit to emerge from the conflict it was the example that 
                                                 
165 M. A. de  B***, Des résultats de la guerre d’Espagne; précédés d’un coup d’oeil sur la révolution 
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166 M. Isidore-Marie-Brignole Gautier (du Var), Des indépendans, des libéraux, des constitutionnels;  
ouvrage adressé aux électeurs Français (Paris: Ponthieu, 1823). 
 
167 M. Chavard, L’Observateur Parisien, ou coup-d’oeil sur les résultats de la guerre d’Espagne sur la 
situation des esprits en France, et sur les premiers fonctionnaires de l’état, (Paris: Dentu, 1824), 10-11. 
 
168 Anon. (un électeur de Paris), De l’opposition; de la guerre d’Espange; et des élections générales 
aux électeurs de 1824, (Paris: Everat, 1824), 23. 
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Spain’s continuing problems gave of the dangers of fanaticism and the “counterrevolutionary 
hydra.”169 The Spanish royalists seemed a sad lot of obscurantist reactionaries when 
compared to the French troops who had shown themselves loyal, and the Duc d’Angoulême 
who proved magnanimous in victory. Jean-Marie Duvergier de Hauranne wondered, “what 
became of our influence, the just price of our spilled blood?”170 In the liberal estimation, 
there were no winners in Spain, but France had definitely lost something by presenting to the 
world this sad example of French impotence in following through on a foreign policy 
decision. Instead of the war ushering in the proud return of post-revolutionary France to the 
world stage, a theme which had featured prominently in the ultras’ pro-war rhetoric, the 
liberal belief that French intervention would meet harsh international criticism and fail the 
judgment of history came to seem the more likely outcome. The future minister under the 
July Monarchy, Narcisse-Achille Salvandy, noted in 1824 that regardless of prewar opinion, 
all sides were now paying for the war, all sides had fought in it, and thus all had to share in 
its failures. Ultimately, Salvandy thought that future historians would sadly note without any 
reference to ideological distinctions that “Terror reigned over the Spanish, and the French 
army was there.”171  
 In perhaps the greatest political conversion of the Restoration, the erstwhile perfervid 
ultra writer Joseph Fiévée harshly condemned the war within a year of the great “victory.” 
His observations on its true effect precisely summed up its real legacy. “The war in Spain 
may appear to be a guarantee against what one calls moral contagion,” he wrote, “[but] who 
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is able to deny that it divided minds, gave more ardor to passions, [and] gave birth to 
suspicions between the parties which reciprocally sharpened them?” 172 Fiévée astutely 
recognized that two rival political ideologies remained and both of them made claims for the 
true nature of the nation. He saw that the war’s true effect was to ensure that polarization 
would only increase in France.  
 Placed in the context of an ongoing debate about France’s post-revolutionary national 
identity, one could argue that the war in Spain was the most important event during the 
Restoration. Ideology had separated the nation from the moment of the Charter’s inception. 
Liberals and ultras alike had used largely domestic political traits and behavior as a basis for 
articulating national identity and rallying support for their policies and opinions. But these 
efforts were incomplete bases for nationalist rhetoric before the war raised the stakes to a 
wider international framework. It took the prospect of exposing France to the scrutiny of the 
world to transform domestic political practices into full nationalist programs. In the process 
of this transformation, both sides realized that partisan claims for national identity stretched 
beyond the ethnic nation and incorporated transnational expressions of political solidarity. 
Although this international political context complicated the classification of French 
nationalism during the period—offering multiple national and international characteristics of 
essential French identity—it also suggested that nationalism is much more dynamic and 
ambiguous than most theorists have recognized.173 Some have argued that hegemonic state 
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power is a necessary factor for nationalism, and by that account, the ultras came close to 
meeting the threshold of modern state nationalism. But minorities in government such as the 
Restoration liberal deputies also have the ideological resources needed to foster nationalist 
programs and mobilize them in representative institutions and the press.   
  The Restoration political culture that had normalized polar contestation helps explain 
the development of these two nationalist responses to the war. The entire political discourse 
of the Restoration up to 1823 had consisted of an internal dispute over the meaning of post-
revolutionary France. Politicians, writers, and common witnesses to political activity had 
proved unable to resist interpreting France’s identity through its domestic political divisions. 
With the advent in 1822-23 of an international stage on which to show post-revolutionary 
France to the world, the nation lacked the internal cohesiveness necessary to unify public 
opinion around which particular idea of the nation should represent the country. Major events 
like wars can often bring people together in consensus on the meaning of the nation, but the 
inability of the Spanish War to do this for France demonstrated how entrenched partisan 
identity had become during the Restoration. The classic war theorist Clausewitz, himself a 
contemporary of the Restoration, famously wrote that war is “a continuation of political 
intercourse, carried on with other means.”174 In the context of the Spanish War, the ultras 
tried to continue their domestic policy of defining the identity of France as a paternal 
monarchy by going to war to protect the Spanish king. But if we interpret Clausewitz more 
broadly, the war simply acted as a second front for the political contest between liberals and 
ultras, exacerbating contention and strengthening France’s partisan divide.  
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During the Restoration, ideological conceptions of the nation had lent themselves to a 
new vision of French society in which division and contestation became the normal frames 
for understanding France’s post-revolutionary condition. This chapter’s study of the Spanish 
War demonstrates how political differences and dueling nationalist rhetorics combined to 
increase the great divide in Restoration political culture. Yet how could French soldiers have 
risked their lives for a French nation that remained a subject of debate? Are we to believe 
that all the soldiers who marched were committed royalists? The fact that the army followed 
orders more likely demonstrated that irremediable political divisiveness had indeed become a 
banal facet of French society. The government could count on the army because its soldiers 
followed orders from the king, not from those who bandied vicious political attacks. The 
marching soldiers thus symbolized a nation that had become habituated to political division 
and accustomed to the state’s role as the tie that bound its divided subjects.  
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Chapter Four 
Manuel’s Expulsion and the Personification of Partisan Identity 
Introduction 
Over the course of the Restoration, Jacques-Antoine Manuel acquired a reputation as 
a fiery orator. His passionate speeches in the Chamber of Deputies supporting freedom of 
expression, liberty of the press, and electoral rights often rattled his reactionary ultraroyalist 
enemies. In 1822, for example, he famously stated in the Chamber that France had only 
welcomed the Bourbons back “with repugnance” in 1814.1 In the past, immunity for deputies 
at the tribune had protected him from consequences for uttering such inflammatory 
statements, but on 28 February 1823 the normal rules of the Chamber no longer applied. 
After a purported “defense of regicide,” Manuel faced expulsion from the legislature. As 
ultra Deputy Duplessis de Grenaden saw it, the Chamber was not merely a governmental 
institution; it should also be “like a head of the family who inflicts on one of its members a 
domestic correction; who chases him from the family.”2 By alluding to France’s 
revolutionary, regicidal past, Manuel stained France’s family honor and earned the 
irreversible reprobation of his legislative colleagues. After his expulsion, both sides saw 
Manuel as an incarnation of the polar divide in post-revolutionary France. For leftists, he 
                                                 
1 Manuel had uttered his famous line, “La France n’avait vu arriver les Bourbons qu’avec répugnance”  
(France had only witnessed the arrival of the Bourbons with repugnance) during debates over censorship in 
January  1822. Archives Parlementaires (AP), series 2, vol. 37, (Paris: Dupont, 1874).  
 
2 AP, series 2, vol. 38, 473. Such language is reminiscent of the Old Regime lettres de cachet, which 
confirmed a noble’s paternal rights over his children.  
 
became a hero, for ultras, a symbol of the nation’s discredited revolutionary past. As the 
ultras saw it, he had stepped beyond the limits of belonging that defined a true Frenchman. 
 Deputy Grenaden marshaled the ultras’ ideological construct of paternalist legitimacy 
to explain Manuel’s unworthiness to serve in the king’s government and justify his removal 
from it. Previous chapters have illustrated how this ultra framework competed with the 
liberal framework of the nation as a collection of individuals with inherent rights. In short, 
ultras conceived of society as a hierarchical family, and prioritized preserving the chain of 
authority from the king, through fathers, to the whole nation. At the other end of the 
spectrum, liberals considered individuals and their collective wills the basis for society, and 
made protection of individual rights the object of politics. Partisan politicians and writers on 
both sides argued in common that they defended “true” French people against the 
encroachments of the domestic “other” embodied in their political rivals. The Spanish War 
triggered more pointed debates over France’s national identity and exacerbated the 
exclusionary rhetoric used by both sides. After Manuel’s expulsion, these arguments affected 
the behavior of functionaries and the public at large who either attacked him or praised him. 
From 1823 until his death in 1827, Manuel was a symbol of the conflict between the two 
ideal conceptions of the nation that dominated political culture during the Restoration.  
 Manuel, a native of Provence (Barcelonette) and former officer in the revolutionary 
army—he served under Bonaparte in the 1796 Italian Campaign—spent much of the early 
Restoration as a legal consultant. In 1815, he earned a seat in the Chamber of Deputies to 
represent his home département of the Basse-Alpes, and served until the dissolution of the 
Chambre Introuvable. In 1818, the Vendée elected him to represent that département as its 
deputy and he won that seat again in 1820. A colleague and friend of prominent men like the 
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Marquis de Lafayette, Benjamin Constant, the banker Jacques Lafitte, and the famed 
songwriter Pierre-Jean Béranger (his best friend), Manuel stood out as the “independent” 
liberals’ most fiery orator. From the moment of his entrance into the Chamber, he became a 
focal point for ultra attacks on liberals. For many ultras, Manuel was the stereotypical 
revolutionary who paid lip service to the constitutional monarchy while secretly longing for 
the return of revolution.3  
  The Manuel affair and its impact on political activity in France was an extension of 
the debates over the war in Spain. Manuel delivered the controversial remarks that led to his 
expulsion in a speech opposing France’s intervention in Spain, and backlash against him 
typically accompanied pronouncements in favor of the war. While the French army waged 
war in Spain, redefining French nationalism and patriotism in matters of foreign policy, the 
French state struggled to control the discourse on Manuel on the domestic front. Well 
coordinated and widespread subscription campaigns to honor Manuel, and impromptu 
welcoming committees that cropped up wherever he traveled demonstrated the leftist 
populace’s identification of him as a symbol of opposition to the ultra regime and a true 
patriot. Ultra officials countered by criticizing his followers as ungrateful citizens who were 
as dangerous as the Spanish revolutionaries fighting French troops in Spain. This struggle 
over the public’s perception of Manuel sustained debates on the meaning of the war vis-à-vis 
national identity even after the success of the war had become self-evident.  
The two main political camps identified Manuel either as an incarnation of virtue or 
of vice. He became more than a simple actor in the political struggles of the Restoration; his 
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name and image became symbols for the promise of a progressive nation, or the memories of 
a tragic past.4 Revolutionaries had elevated the Republic’s stature by creating and 
promulgating the image of Marianne, Napoleon had created a cult of personality around his 
person, and the Bourbon family had recourse to the longstanding iconography of monarchy 
to celebrate their elevated stature. During the Restoration, an age in which republican and 
Napoleonic imagery were officially prohibited, liberals also used people to personify virtues, 
but drew upon more current and concrete examples of virtue to represent their political 
ideals. Manuel and Sergeant Mercier, the national guardsman who refused to remove him 
from the Chambers, thus personified both the progressive values dear to liberals and leftists 
and resistance to the hegemony of ultras in the government. Campaigns throughout France to 
honor Manuel and Mercier drew the ire of ultra authorities and stimulated a countering 
discourse which characterized Manuel as an example of the worst form of revolutionary and 
anti-monarchical vice. 
Early nineteenth-century French politicians, especially ultras, continued to operate 
according to the Old Regime code of honor.5 Under normal circumstances, a universally 
accepted code of honor ensured that gentility and propriety ruled even in the Chamber, 
despite the incisive debates that emerged in that setting. Only cases of egregiously 
unacceptable behavior would incite politicians to withdraw the respect due a fellow member 
of the government and passionately condemn him. Abbé Grégoire did not merit honor 
because he was a regicide and ultras claimed that Manuel lost his honor through his 
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rhetorical combativeness. When ultras found a pretext for expelling Manuel, they withdrew 
the respect for him that honor dictated—honor already withdrawn in the ultra press—and 
branded  him an illegitimate Frenchmen, inherently unworthy of inclusion in the polity. They 
promulgated the idea of Manuel’s unworthiness through their press organs and through the 
state bureaucracy, which by 1823 was firmly under their control. Supporters who protested in 
his name in turn found themselves branded with the same stigma of dishonor as Manuel. 
Ultras imagined and promoted a society of French people grounded on the Christian, 
absolutist, and paternal forces of order which gave the nation life and protected it from 
outside threats. They accordingly withdrew the benefits of belonging to the French nation 
from discredited outsiders—namely French people politically incompatible with the new 
regime—who prevented the realization of an ideal post-revolutionary nation.6 Adopting this 
framework for understanding the nation gave meaning to ultras’ conception of their own 
worth and allowed them to feel self-consciously superior to those who rejected it.7 By 1823 
ultras had become savvy propagandists and, just as they had done for the Spanish 
revolutionaries, they promulgated political stereotypes to sell and contextualize their 
ideological frame of the nation. Broad labels for political enemies such as “revolutionaries” 
were effective tools for defining entire groups of people as unworthy of inclusion in the 
nation. But when they attacked Manuel, they used him to personify the dangerous liberal 
other and interpreted events related to Manuel as signs of the spreading contagion of 
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revolutionary interests that they had combated in Spain. Ultras also considered people who 
praised Manuel to be contagious carriers of principles dangerous to the nation.8 The ultras 
retained Old Regime honor and noble prejudice and compounded them with exclusionary 
discourse that often accompanies partisanship in democratic societies. 9 While the familial 
terms they used were remnants of a longstanding discourse of paternal authority, ultras also 
mobilized the more modern resources of a centralized state and a democratic public sphere, 
to propagate an image of Manuel as hostile to national regeneration. 
This chapter analyzes published and archival sources to illustrate how the 
Restoration’s competing frames emerged as guides for specific political and state activities 
during the period. The first section describes events that led up to and took place during 
Manuel’s expulsion from the Chamber of Deputies. Ultras justified the action by defining the 
nation and its institutions as emanations of the king’s paternal power, and claimed that 
natural, unwritten laws readily apparent to logical royalists necessitated Manuel’s removal. 
In his defense, liberals marshaled their own conceptions of a post-revolutionary nation 
dependent on the input of its citizens and the dignity of the bond between the king and 
people. Claiming that the Charter trumped all arbitrary applications of force, they rested their 
case on a literal reading of the law and tried to stop the war and prevent Manuel’s expulsion 
because those actions threatened the entire nation, including the king. The second section 
                                                 
8 It is little surprise that during this period categories of deviance and social control that are still 
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Democracy in Europe (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 55.   
 
242 
 
uses police records to explore the effect that the event had on people in the provinces. 
Several case studies show how ultras described people who manifested their support for 
Manuel as ungrateful social pariahs hopelessly corrupted with revolutionary interests. This 
section also examines the subscription campaigns in honor of Manuel and Mercier to see in 
turn how leftist activists throughout France tried to elevate the two men into exemplary icons 
of French identity. The last section examines Manuel’s funeral in 1827 to show the lasting 
impact of the events of 1823 on the psyche of a divided nation.  
Examining Manuel’s expulsion and its aftermath in the context of the Restoration’s 
divided polity, reveals the power of frames to influence action and help people understand 
and categorize the political world in which they live. The frames of the nation expounded in 
Chapter One of this dissertation were more than static concepts that broadly outlined political 
positions; they were also tools in the hands of able politicians and writers. Ultras underscored 
their belief in the hierarchal familial order of the nation by branding Manuel and his 
supporters as outside the social norm, while liberals championed the dignity and protection of 
the individual under the Charter by protesting his expulsion and elevating him to the status of 
national hero. Political division during the Restoration was not only a phenomenon in elite 
Parisian discourse, it showed up in the activities of leftist activists throughout France and in 
the state functionaries who tracked them. The events described here reinforced the idea of 
irreparable national division and showed how people experienced living within this polarized 
frame of the nation. When both these parties acted, they drew on ideas in elite discourse and 
made the abstract idea of belonging to a nation more tangible and experienced—national 
division as a concept became incarnate in the contrasting portrayals of Manuel, his 
supporters, and his detractors.  
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Part One: Manuel’s Expulsion  
Creating a Regicide 
Abbé Grégoire’s expulsion from the Chamber of Deputies in 1819 had set the 
precedent for Manuel’s later removal, but that was not the first time the government had 
removed people from positions of power based on their political opinions or past behavior. 
Partisan behavior went against the spirit of reconciliation and forgiveness that supposedly 
characterized the Restoration era, and yet numerous state functionaries and administrators 
found themselves unemployed if a superior thought their beliefs were incompatible with the 
monarchical government. How did royalists justify these actions that seemed to contradict 
the spirit oubli in Article 11 of the Charter?  
Chateaubriand thought expulsion a necessary condition for the success of the 
constitutional monarchy. In De la monarchie, he suggested that ultras should accept the 
representative system and turn it to their advantage but should also guard against 
revolutionary recidivism by being “vigorous, without ceasing to be constitutional.”10  
Chateaubriand justified expelling people who harbored “revolutionary interests” from official 
positions because their complete removal would “purify” (épurer) the king’s government.11 
According to him, “Justice is not vengeance, oblivion (oublié) is not a reaction; it is not 
necessary to persecute anyone, but it is equally not necessary, in fact it is dangerous, to 
confide offices to the king’s enemies.”12  Chateaubriand thus promoted a deep purging of the 
state machinery, for only a complete sweep of the government would “satisfy public 
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condemnation [of revolution].”13 While these warnings addressed specifically the army and 
the state bureaucracy, and not necessarily the Chambers, Chateaubriand’s prejudices against 
those who colluded with revolutionaries and his conception of unworthiness entered the 
lexicon of Restoration royalists as they sorted the “good” French from the “bad.” In a broader 
context, through Monarchie Chateaubriand helped spread the idea that representative 
government was an inevitable product of France’s political evolution, but he also stressed 
that participation in it was not a privilege all should enjoy. It was only a matter of time before 
ultras applied their “vigorous” inclinations against deputies who represented revolutionary 
principles in general (Grégoire), and those who espoused them in the Chamber (Manuel).  
The effort to purify the Chambers began in earnest with an extra-constitutional 
restriction of the electorate. In May 1820, responding to widespread fear of liberals following 
the February assassination of the Duc de Berry, the new prime minister Richelieu and ultra 
deputies proposed the “Law of the Double Vote,” so named because it gave citizens in the 
wealthiest tax bracket two votes in the elections to the Chambers compared to other citizens’ 
one vote. In effect, this legislation gerrymandered the electorate along class lines and ensured 
that wealthy ultras in the départements would enjoy disproportional representation. Liberals 
rightly interpreted this as a cynical attempt to redefine citizenry and ensure ultra domination 
of the legislative process—in essence to “purify” the Chamber permanently.14 As 
demonstrations against the law erupted in the streets of Paris, many liberals considered their 
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14 The debates in the Chamber of Deputies over the Law in June confirmed the widening gap in 
Restoration political culture. More centrist liberals began to realize that without ministerial support, fighting 
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bill while most moved to the left to fight it. See Alan Spitzer, “Restoration Political Theory and the Debate over 
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opposition to it as a heroic stand against despotism.15 Manuel argued against the bill with his 
characteristic pugnacity suggesting that ultras risked instigating “new revolutions,” by 
altering the Charter’s provisions for fair representation.16 After its successful passage, many 
on the Left shared Manuel’s conviction that the Law of the Double Vote had destroyed the 
compromise outlined in the Charter. As the carbonari movement proved, “new revolutions” 
indeed became the last hope for many liberals who only a year earlier had reveled in electoral 
successes and defended the system of government outlined in the Charter. In the elections of 
1820, the ultras benefited from the Law and increased the number of seats they held in the 
Chamber of Deputies, bringing that body closer to the purity that they regarded as essential to 
the preservation of the constitutional monarchy. Manuel, whom they considered the most 
blatant contagion of leftist thought within that institution, remained in the Chamber as a 
reminder of the ultras’ unfinished work. 
Over the next two years, ultra complaints about Manuel grew steadily. In 1822, he 
uttered the notorious quip about France’s “repugnance” at the Bourbon’s return. His name 
was also associated with the conspiracies of that year, bringing his loyalty to the monarchy 
further into question. Manuel seemed impervious to criticism, however, and unabashedly 
continued to rail against ultras and the exclusively ultraroyalist Villèle ministry that emerged 
in late 1821. Ultras could not abide his use of the rostrum in the Chamber of Deputies to 
inveigh against the government, considering it an affront to the king himself that sullied the 
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Chamber’s special status as the bond between king and people. During the elections of late 
1822, for example, ultra deputy Isidore-Marie-Brignoler Gautier complained about, “An 
orator who, by his loquaciousness and wise cracks acquired for himself a certain celebrity in 
the liberal party, did not fear to say and want to prove that the return of the Bourbons in 
France was seen by her [France] with repugnance....Is it possible to match the audacity of 
this imposter?”17 Gautier urged the electors in his department to “...reject the men presented 
by this party that calls itself French, that speaks in the name of the people, and that, by its 
political conduct, shows itself its most implacable enemy.”18 Fellow ultra Jean-Claude 
Clausel de Coussergues took these sentiments further, suggesting that “The liberal people, or 
rather the tribe of liberal people who pretend to be French, was defined by one of its orators: 
it is the people who saw the return of the Bourbons with repugnance.”19 Clausel de 
Coussergues damned Manuel’s opposition as evidence of a stain on his character; Manuel 
and his ilk were no longer French and thus did not deserve any special treatment, even within 
the Chamber itself.  
The ultra daily paper, l’Etoile, assumed to speak for the people of the Vendée who 
had voted for Manuel, claiming that, “M. Manuel sees the Bourbons on the throne with 
repugnance and the immense majority of Vendéens see with repugnance M. Manuel as 
deputy of the Vendée.” The paper cited the president of that département’s electoral college 
who claimed that Manuel’s election would be, “painful for the heart of the king,” and decried 
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the power of a small minority of Vendéens to give Europe this “grand subject of pain and 
shame.” Ultras felt especially chagrined that the Vendée, the heart of counterrevolutionary 
opposition during the Revolution, sent someone to the Chamber whose “unpunished outrages 
and privileged sedition” were an affront to the memory of locals who had died fighting 
against revolutionary principles.20
Historians of the Restoration have given Manuel’s expulsion some attention, but they 
usually depict the event as the ultras’ spontaneous reaction to his speech on the war. 
Evidence suggests, however, that ultras had considered his removal from the Chamber well 
before he made his speech. While the above citations point to the general and longstanding 
enmity that ultras had for him, in the beginning of 1823—during the feverish prewar 
debates—the ultra press began to insinuate that a final solution to the problem of Manuel’s 
presence in the Chamber was needed. In the ultra daily, Le drapeau blanc, the editors placed 
removing “unworthy” deputies and initiatives from the Chamber at the top of their wish list 
for the new year. “We wish that the Chambers never obey any other voice than that of public 
opinion;” they wrote, “that the noble Chamber of Deputies rejects he who is unworthy; 
maintains itself independent, does not lend support but to what is pure, allows to drop or even 
casts off that which is dubious and stained.”21 Although the editors of  l’Etoile did not refer 
to Manuel by name, they too left no doubt as to their aspirations for the new Chamber when 
they wrote, “We assume that the first question that will be stirred up in the Chambers will be 
the exclusion or admission of a famous deputy. One believes that this Chamber will manifest 
                                                 
20 L’etoile, no. 807 (14 January 1823):2. 
 
21 Le drapeau blanc, no. 1 (1 January 1823): 1.  The use of the singular, “he,” to describe the unworthy 
suggests that they had someone in particular in mind.  
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loudly its repugnance at seeing him seated in its midst.”22 These statements in the popular 
royalist press must have resonated with the many ultra deputies who began haranguing 
Manuel from the moment he rose to speak on February 26.  
The Chamber of Deputies, February 26-27, 1823 
Arguments for and against the Spanish War over the winter of 1822-23 (see Chapter 
Three), raised the level of animosity between the two camps before Manuel spoke in the 
Chamber. Liberal and ultra deputies both had referred to the Revolution and its precedents in 
their arguments over the war, but when Manuel resorted to this comparative approach, he 
confirmed the ultras’ belief that he was a revolutionary at heart. He began his speech by 
refuting the claim that Spanish liberals posed any threat to the French state. Manuel stated 
that the king of Spain’s reasons for refusing to accept a constitution mirrored the ideology of 
royalists in France whose loyalty to the Charter he questioned.23 He tried to downplay the 
threat from Spain, but in doing so, he made the mistake of drawing parallels to the 
revolutionary history of France.24 He challenged the Chamber to come to terms with all the 
dangers that revolution posed for any form of government by asking, “The revolutionary 
spirit is without doubt dangerous, but is the spirit of counterrevolution any less so?”25 To 
illustrate this point, Manuel reminded the Chamber of the damage to the royal family that 
followed the allied intervention in the French Revolution. His line of reasoning led to the 
following statement triggering the ultras’ indignation and bringing about his expulsion: 
                                                 
22 L’etoile, no. 812 (17 January 1823): 3.  Emphasis in the original. 
 
23 AP, 2:38, 26 Feb. 1823, 438. 
 
24 This was all too common a technique in Restoration politics. See the classic work on the subject, 
Stanley Mellon, The Political Uses of History: A Study of Historians in the French Restoration, (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 1958). 
 
25 AP, 2:38 26 Feb. 1823, 438. 
 
249 
 
“Must I say that at the moment the dangers to the royal family became graver, that is when 
France, revolutionary France, sensed that it needed to defend itself in a new way, with a 
totally new energy . . .”26  Before he could finish his sentence, ultras in the Chamber rose to 
interrupt him and demanded that the President of the Chamber silence Manuel for his 
“defense of regicide.”27 This vague reference to the execution of Louis XVI pushed the 
ultras’ patience too far, and they reacted immediately to this sudden outrage with calls for his 
removal. 
An anonymously written eyewitness account of the event in Le drapeau blanc 
reinforces the idea that Manuel’s expulsion was indeed premeditated. According to this 
account, several ultras had been heckling him without pause throughout his speech and 
accusations of regicide had begun well before he had reached the critical passage:  “Then we 
lead kings to the scaffold,” M. Augier de Cheseau retorted when Manuel voiced his 
opposition to the war; “You make yourself the advocate of revolutions” several voices on the 
Right clamored against Manuel and added, “these same doctrines you defend led to the 
scaffold.” Just before Manuel’s final affront, M. de Sesmaisons protested, “You justify 
regicide!” Ultra deputies even hinted at his exclusion by mocking Manuel’s reference to 
“French citizens,” asking, “Are you talking about you?....citizen?” to the laughter of the right 
wing of the Chamber. Liberal deputies’ efforts to bring the session to order met with a 
                                                 
26 Ibid., 439. 
 
27 Ultras prided themselves on their level-headed nature in debates; looking down on passionate 
rhetoric. William Reddy explains, however, that, “Passion is allowable in the public sphere, in the form of just 
anger in defense of the public good and a combative spirit towards one’s political foes, especially those who act 
(in one’s own opinion) in such a manner as to vitiate the rule of legitimacy, the application of the law, the good 
order of civil society, or private morality.” Reddy, The Invisible Code, 60. 
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scornful reproach from Ravez, the President of the Chamber, who claimed that he alone 
policed the Chamber.28
In the context of this buildup, Manuel’s half-finished statement contained all the 
evidence ultras needed to judge him as incompatible with the regime. Manuel meant his 
statement to be a warning against regicide; he thought it wise to remind the Chamber that 
during the Revolution the threat of outside intervention had forced the French people to take 
drastic measures. In other words, if the royalists wanted to protect the person of the King of 
Spain, then they should bear in mind the lesson of history and not intervene in Spanish 
affairs. Ultras heard—or chose to hear—a different message, however, and, as they had made 
clear in their expulsion of Grégoire, a regicide had no place in the Bourbon government. By 
drawing the comparison between the two eras Le drapeau blanc claimed “he made himself 
an apologist for regicide” and ultras could no longer allow him to be “encouraged by 
impunity.” 29 Solidly in power in 1823, ultras extended the definition of unworthiness that 
they applied to Grégoire to anyone who referred to regicide without reflection and remorse. 
The issue was referred to a special committee to determine Manuel’s punishment. Its 
members returned the next day proposing his expulsion.30 The ultra deputy Comte François-
Régis de Labourdonnaye, began the Chamber session of 27 February with a proposal for 
expulsion on the basis of that body’s “higher jurisdiction” to police itself. Labourdonnaye 
recognized the immunity of deputies for speeches in the Chamber but posited that this legal 
                                                 
28 Le drapeau blanc, no. 58 (27 February 1823): 2-3. 
 
29 Le drapeau blanc, no. 58 (27 February 1823): 1. 
 
30 The next day, Manuel attempted to defend himself by submitting to the president what he intended 
to say if the ultras had allowed him to finish, but they would not allow the president to read it. Manuel claimed 
that his statement was to have ended, “. . . [and] placed in movement all the masses, exalted all the popular 
passions and thus led to terrible excesses and a deplorable catastrophe in the middle of a generous resistance.”  
It was, however, attached to the official record. AP, 2:38, 27 Feb. 1823.  
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benefit came with a duty to “punish the faults, offenses and crimes committed in the exercise 
of this liberty.”31 Ultras did not specifically address which article in the Charter supported 
expulsion, but presented what to them seemed like a commonsense interpretation of its 
intent. Akin to Chateaubriand’s claim in De La Monarchie, the Charter’s sentiment of 
forgetfulness and forgiveness did not protect “revolutionary interests” in the government. 
The liberals condemned the ultras for prosecuting a deputy who spoke from the 
tribune, and noted a fortiori the absurdity of judging Manuel on the basis of a statement that 
he did not finish.32 After addressing the lack of evidence for Manuel’s “defense of regicide,” 
liberal deputy Charles-Guillaume Etienne accused the right of not respecting the rules 
governing the Chamber and stated that a vote without some formal process would deny 
Manuel the basic protections of law that even the pettiest criminal received.33 Such an act, 
Etienne proclaimed, would replace the reasoned procedures of the Chamber with the violent 
whims of a majority and would “burn at the same time the right of defense, law, justice, and 
liberty.”34 For many liberals the spectacle of passionately vengeful ultras who repeatedly 
interrupted Manuel and then refused to let him speak further was incompatible with duties of 
a legislature or a judicial court. As the doctrinaire Comte Louis-Beaupoil de Sainte-Aulaire 
dryly noted, “Messieurs, it is a bizarre spectacle that an accused is booed by his judges!”35  
                                                 
31 Ibid., 444. 
 
32 Liberal deputy Stanislas Girardin railed against the President in an examination of the session 
published after the event. According to Girardin, from the very moment of the ultras’ interruption of Manuel, 
the president set the tone and the parameters of the debate by tying Manuel’s word “energie” to the death of 
Louis XVI. Stanislas Girardin, Examen de la conduite du Président de la Chambre des députés; dans la 
discussion relative à la proposition faite par M. le Comte de la Bourdonnaye, le 27 février, pour exclure M. 
Manuel de la Chambre des Députés (Paris: Plancher, 1823), 7. 
 
33 AP, 2:38, 27 Feb. 1823., 445.  
 
34 Ibid., 446. 
 
35 AP, 2:38, March 3, 1823, 470. 
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Saint-Aulaire’s sentiments mirrored those of many moderate royalists and 
doctrinaires, who might have earlier preferred to see the hotheaded Manuel removed from 
the Chamber, but who also felt that the ultras’ proposed expulsion demanded strict legal 
analysis. Even deputy Laîné, a veteran centrist royalist who in 1819 had clamored for 
Grégoire’s expulsion, admitted that although he voted to consider the proposition (in his 
bureau) to prevent “a similar scandal” from occurring again, he nevertheless demanded that 
the proceedings against Manuel follow basic rules of law. Laîné reminded the Chamber that 
the act of expelling a sitting deputy had no precedent in the Restoration (Grégoire had not yet 
taken the oath of office at the time of his expulsion), and that it was necessary to address the 
issue within the following parameters: whether a proposal for expulsion was absolutely 
essential to the survival of the Chamber; if a new law allowing expulsion was within the 
“core rights” or unwritten code of the Chamber; and if the Chamber had the right to impose a 
penalty mandated by such a law, especially when applied retroactively.36 In his short address 
to the Chamber, Laîné urged ultras to defend their extralegal proposal in terms of 
constitutional legality. But over the next few days the debate over Manuel’s fate became a 
forum in which rival conceptions of legality competed—some allegedly based on the letter of 
the law and some on concepts of justice that transcended formal legal strictures. In these 
debates on the source and reach of the Chamber’s power, both sides marshaled many of the 
ideas behind their rival conceptions of the nation, and ignited  an ideological debate on 
legality, sovereignty, and the meaning of French identity. 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
36 Ibid., 452. 
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The Ultra Case for Expulsion 
Ultras insisted on Manuel’s expulsion to fulfill the demands of the natural laws 
governing society. They sidestepped the Charter’s limitations on their actions by referring to 
what was for them the common sense dictates of a hierarchical paternal order. If the written 
law of the land admittedly contained no provision for Manuel’s removal, Deputy Duplessis 
de Grenaden argued, then legal grounds to remove a deputy from the Chamber could be 
found in the self-evident “positive laws” that predated society and cemented the king’s 
legitimate power as the father of the country. He argued that using the faculties of human 
reason one could recognize a crime against society’s natural order without recourse to written 
law.37 According to this a priori code, the Chamber as an expression of the king’s political 
authority automatically had, as La Bourdonnaye stated, “high jurisdiction over its members 
on all which is relative to the order of its deliberations and the public order that this power is 
especially charged to maintain.”38 When crime disturbed the maintenance of order in the 
Chamber, the deputies thus had to purge unhealthy elements by means of “internal 
policing.”39 There was no choice in this matter, for the preservation of the natural and social 
order was essential to the monarchy’s survival—any other response would be shirking the 
deputies’ duty to protect society. Ultras thus believed they could define a crime and its 
penalty and apply it retroactively in a single proceeding.40
                                                 
37 AP, 2:38, 3 March 1823, 472. 
 
38 AP, 2:38, 1 March 1823, 457. 
 
39 When asked how the government felt about the expulsion, the minister in attendance that day, ultra 
M. de Corbière, used the phrase, “interior policing,” in order to remove any association between the actions of 
the Chamber and the king’s policies. He clearly felt the proceedings on expulsion should continue. AP, 2:38, 3 
March 1823, 489. 
 
40 Perhaps most remarkable in this strategy is the extent to which it mirrors the types of arguments 
Jacobins used on the eve of the Terror. Enlightenment thought had been a target of royalists since before the 
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Ultras also justified bold action against Manuel on the basis of honor. Ultras, 
particularly sensitive to ideals of gentility and decorum, thought that representative 
institutions needed to maintain the same protective self-management that characterized the 
royal court during the Old Regime. Thus Labourdonnaye appealed to the “anterior principle . 
. .  that in France one still calls honor, which does not permit any body whatsoever of 
preserving in its breast a member who soils the dignity of its character.”41 By claiming this 
distinguishing trait of honor, the ultras distanced themselves from liberal colleagues whose 
revolutionary morality did not merit their respect. In fact, they thought Manuel’s presence in 
the Chamber threatened their own honor. Grenaden warned that if members treated unworthy 
revolutionaries with honorable respect, the Chamber would become, “. . . an object of 
scandal and ignominy.”42 Ultra disgust at the prospect of sitting with Manuel thus reflected 
the divide in French political culture—honorable royalists and sullied liberals were two 
separate peoples, and the ultras assumed that only people like themselves were legitimate 
Frenchmen deserving of the privilege of serving the king. 
Aware that the expulsion they proposed closely mirrored the arbitrary actions of the 
revolutionary Convention, ultras made every effort to minimize this similarity. Grenaden 
suggested that the action against Manuel was “nothing odious and is especially not able in 
any way to be compared to the judgments of those execrable assemblies of memory . . .”43 
He instead accused the liberals of trying to promote the legacy of the Revolution and 
                                                                                                                                                       
Revolution; their use of a common element of it reflects the extent that they were willing to speak a modern 
political language to further their aims.  
 
41 AP, 2:38, 1 March 1823, 456.  
 
42 AP, 2:38, 3 March 1823, 472. 
 
43 Foremost in everyone’s mind was the expulsion of the Girondins from the revolutionary Convention 
on 31 May 1793. Several references to this event punctuated the proceedings. Ibid., 473. 
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suggested that they “cease looking in this sewer in order to find some good; stop praising its 
benefits and its happy results as you call them.”44 In reality, both sides pointed to the 
Revolution both for precedents to follow and to avoid. In this case, Grenaden forestalled the 
inevitable comparison to specific events in the Revolution by attacking its overarching 
political ideals.  
Grenaden’s argument for the Chamber’s arbitrary powers exposed key differences 
between the liberals and the ultras over the meaning of representative government and 
sovereignty. While liberals believed that governments existed both to protect the people and 
grant them access to the management of their own lives, ultras saw government institutions 
as organs for social control. Grenaden argued that “The repression of disorders and crimes is 
a necessary condition for the existence of society. It is the principal aim of government and 
laws.”45 While most liberals believed that electing officials resulted in a body that—when 
combined with royal authority—embodied or shared some form of sovereignty, ultras 
steadfastly held to their belief in absolute authority and considered the legislature merely an 
instrument of monarchical power. Contaminated representative institutions contravened the 
king’s absolute right and duty to enforce order. People who placed the rules and rights of the 
Chamber before the dignity of the king demonstrated a dangerous misunderstanding of the 
nature of sovereignty. Ultras brought this ideological issue of rival conceptions of 
sovereignty to bear on the Manuel incident, and found support among those deputies who felt 
the Chamber deserved special protections against the past excesses of revolutionary popular 
sovereignty. Grenaden warned that preventing deputies from maintaining a pure Chamber 
                                                 
44 Ibid., 474-75. 
 
45 Ibid., 472. Emphasis added. 
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would allow “the impious and senseless dogma of popular sovereignty, fundamental base of 
all the edifice of revolutionary doctrines,” to enter into the Restoration government and usher 
in the “most dreadful despotism.”46 It was a convoluted argument that tied the safety of 
representative institutions to the preservation of absolute sovereignty.47
Ultras strengthened the appeal of these political arguments for expulsion by resorting 
to a xenophobic interpretation of Manuel’s speech and his intentions. For many ultras, 
liberals were a foreign element in the country and anyone who spoke a foreign political 
language like Manuel’s had no place in France’s institutions. They suggested that when he 
spoke from the tribune, his actual words mattered little because their meanings were different 
from those of the ultras. Ultras thus reiterated the popular idea that liberals spoke a different 
language, one incompatible with monarchy (see Chapter One).  Indeed, ultras claimed they 
were incapable of interpreting Manuel's statement in any way other than as a declaration of 
rebellion. As an article in the ultra daily la Quotidienne explained, “. . . the liberals have 
subjected the words of our language to the same modifications that they have subjected our 
institutions; they hear them in their manner, and as they have not, up to this point, published 
their dictionary, we are obliged to assume the definitions in their discourse.”48Claiming to be 
unable to understand how Manuel could make his statement without it being an apology for 
regicide, the ultras blamed their incomprehension on the presence of foreign elements in the 
                                                 
46 Ibid., 475.  
 
47 Some ultras pointed to the English Parliament as an example of a stable representative system that 
was not based on popular sovereignty and that also had an accepted history of expulsion. M. Hyde de Neuville, 
for example, delighted in reminding the Chamber that the British Whig Charles Fox, a hero to many liberals, 
had voted to expel a member of Parliament. Ibid., 479. The reception of Manuel’s expulsion in Parliamentary 
circles in London, however, was far from positive. See, Comte de Marcellus, M. de Marcellus to M. de 
Chateaubriand, London, 5 March 1823, in Politique de la Restauration en 1822 et 1823, (Paris : Jacques 
Lecoffre, 1853). 
 
48 Anon., “Paris 28 février,” La Quotidienne, 1 March 1823, 3. 
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Chamber and the nation. They construed any and all statements remotely critical of the ultras 
or the king’s policies as treasonous. The ultra case was a simple one by their admission. In 
their estimation, Manuel’s crime was merely a symptom of a larger problem, namely that 
liberals with their dangerous principles and their incomprehensible “revolutionary slang” still 
sat in the Chambers.49
Shortly after the event, ultra deputy Charles de St. Hilaire wrote a pamphlet that 
examined Manuel’s expulsion in relation to the Charter and predictably found that ultras did 
not violate any of its articles. In a rather tendentious reading of that document, he even 
construed the Charter’s admonition to forget the past (Article 11) as justification for the 
expulsion. St. Hilaire contended that although the Charter demanded that all forget the past, 
liberals still could not shake their old radicalism and clamored for the preservation of the 
Charter against the encroachments of absolutism. He implied that, through their 
intransigence, it was the liberal bloc that did not embrace the spirit of oubli. By holding onto 
discredited beliefs about the abuse of power, liberals selectively remembered what had no 
place in the new regime and ignored the pain that oppositional attitudes towards monarchical 
power had brought in the past “There is no abuse of this prevision,” St. Hilaire concluded, 
“there are only the present day abuses of the liberals.”50 St. Hilaire thought that liberal 
opposition to the expulsion on the basis of the Charter matched Manuel’s speech in its 
audacious sedition. “These complaints would not be received but as vain protestations, if 
those who express them were isolated simpletons. But when one hears them resound in a 
sacred space, where the men to which the most honorable and respectable mission of 
                                                 
 
49 Ibid. 
 
50 Charles de St. Hilaire, Commentaire sur la Charte constitutionnelle pour répondre aux plaintes des 
libéraux sur sa prétendue violation (Paris : Ponthieu, 1823), 10-12. 
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representing thirty million individuals and of defending and supporting their rights sit, they 
necessarily produce a profound impression in France and in Europe.”51 During the Manuel 
event, the ultras largely ignored the lack of any clear provision in the Charter for expulsion, 
but later reinterpreted its provisions to justify their action as a brave defense of the 
constitutional monarchy and its institutions.  
The Liberal Rebuttal 
St. Hilaire embarked on his exegesis of the Charter because, during the debate on 
Manuel’s expulsion, liberals based their arguments largely on the Charter’s legal strictures. 
They maintained their confidence in the Charter as the source of the Restoration’s legitimacy 
and correctly reminded the Chamber that it did not contain any provision for the removal of a 
sitting deputy. The liberal deputy and former Napoleonic general, Maximilien-Sébastien Foy, 
began the proceedings on March 3, claiming that the Chamber was not a courtroom and 
chastised Ravez for even allowing the discussion to take place: “I say that Monsieur 
President fails his duty if he submits to ordinary forms of discussion a proposition so 
extraordinary, a proposition which is outside of the rules, outside of the Charter, outside of 
Justice!”52 As the cornerstone of their argument, liberals continually emphasized the moral 
and political importance of the Charter’s spirit of compromise and attempted to demonstrate 
how the expulsion of a member of the Chamber undermined both the letter of Charter and its 
intent, and in turn threatened the monarchy itself. By defending the king’s gift of the Charter, 
                                                 
 
51 Ibid., 3. 
 
52 AP, 2:38, 3 March 1823, 467. Liberal deputy Stanislas Girardin also railed against the President in 
an examination of the session published after the event. According to Girardin, from the very moment of the 
ultras’ interruption of Manuel, the president set the tone and the parameters of the debate by tying Manuel’s 
word “energie” to the death of Louis XVI. Stanislas Girardin, Examen de la conduite du Président de la 
Chambre des députés; dans la discussion relative à la proposition faite par M. le Comte de la Bourdonnaye, le 
27 février, pour exclure M. Manuel de la Chambre des Députés (Paris: Plancher, 1823), 7. 
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they hoped to avoid accusations of harboring revolutionary principles and hold the moral 
high ground in the debate.  
Liberals complained that the expulsion of a deputy challenged that portion of 
sovereignty that the king relegated to the people. Although most liberals publicly eschewed 
the idea of unfettered popular sovereignty after having witnessed the abuses of mass 
democracy in the Revolution, they still railed against arbitrary actions that countered the will 
of the people as expressed in an election. They argued that the monarch alone reserved the 
right to dissolve the entire Chamber, and then only for the explicit purpose of calling new 
elections as Louis XVIII had done in 1816. If the Chamber autonomously expelled Manuel, it 
both negated the will of the people who had voted for him and usurped a monarchical 
prerogative, effectively undermining the two political forces that lay at the foundation of the 
Restoration compromise.53 If the ultras removed Manuel, the Chamber would be following 
the example of the Jacobin majority in the revolutionary Convention of 1793-94, whose 
reckless abuse of power proved so costly to the nation.  
This argument fit a conception of legitimacy held by liberals in both doctrinaire and 
independent circles, according to which the Charter’s delineation of the duties and rights of 
various branches of government defined neutral spaces of negotiation. Practical sovereignty 
resided not in a single body—and especially not in a portion of one body, in this case the 
majority in the Chamber of Deputies—but in the political process itself.54 Nearly all 
participants in the Restoration’s system of government agreed that ultimate sovereignty 
                                                 
 
53 Saint-Aulaire challenged the ultras, stating, “You do not have the right to expel a deputy from the 
Chamber without invading the rights of the electoral colleges and the royal prerogative.” AP, 2:38, 3 March 
1823, 470. 
 
54 Jaume, L'individu effacé, ou, le paradoxe du libéralisme français (Paris : Fayard, 1997),  63. 
260 
 
originated with the king, but he had portioned the exercise of practical sovereignty to 
himself, his ministry, and the Chambers. The legitimacy of any political action rested upon 
the respectful and cautious deliberation of policy among these three entities—it ensured that 
the delicate balance of government necessary for the preservation of social order would 
remain intact. When one arm of the government rashly acted on an emotional whim, as the 
liberals accused the ultras of trying to make the Chamber do, it arrogated to itself the rights 
of the other two and vitiated the legitimacy of the whole. As General Foy observed, “If this 
principle [of the right to expel] is admitted without modification, the sovereignty will 
henceforth reside in the current majority of the Chamber of Deputies, it will no longer reside 
in the great body politic, composed of the King and of the two Chambers in which hereditary 
royalty must hold the strongest hand and exercise supremacy.”55 Maintaining balance in 
government was the theoretical prerequisite for locating some portion of sovereignty in 
representative institutions, and arbitrary action by any branch of government necessarily 
hindered its legitimate expression.  
More conservative doctrinaires also believed that sovereignty derived from the 
exchanges between various branches in government, but unlike independents, doctrinaires 
argued the legitimacy of these exchanges depended on the “sovereignty of reason.”56 
Sovereignty resided neither in representative institutions nor in absolutist monarchy, but 
rather in the expression of reason by those most qualified to understand the needs of 
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56 Summing up the doctrinaire, François Guizot, on truth and sovereignty, Pierre Manent writes, 
“Men’s only conceivable sovereign is neither their will not their consent, but the natural rule of their will or 
consent by right, reason, justice, or the moral law . . . it is up to political action to bring sovereignty about in just 
decisions.” Pierre Manent, An Intellectual History of Liberalism (Princeton: Princeton University, 1996), 100-
101. 
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society.57 Countering the ultras’ arguments based on natural law, doctrinaire deputies 
emphasized a rational response to the crisis, demanding that rational actors work together to 
find the truth, rather than bluntly re-stating the ideological prejudices of the deputies who 
argued for Manuel’s expulsion. 58 For a sovereign and legitimate response to the crisis to 
emerge, it had to be the result of honest negotiation, not reaction. For doctrinaires, the ultras’ 
refusal to use agreed legislative processes to arrive at an accurate interpretation of Manuel’s 
statement—and to properly interpret the dictates of the Charter concerning such a 
statement—prevented the realization of a rational response, and contributed to an overall 
failure of the government to exercise legitimate sovereignty.  
Regardless of their beliefs in sovereignty, several liberal deputies simply demanded 
that factual truth drive the political process, and expressed their concern that the ultras 
improvised the facts of the situation to create “self-evident” conditions necessary for 
Manuel’s expulsion. If the Charter intended the Chamber to be a conduit for public opinion, 
it had to deal honestly with facts and not with confident but baseless assertions of the truth.59  
Liberals claimed that ultras could not even understand the facts if they insisted on a 
tendentious reading of Manuel’s speech. In particular, they attacked the ultras for presuming 
                                                 
 
57In this sense, the doctrinaire liberals’ idea of sovereignty closely resembled the idea of rational 
public opinion developed during the Old Regime (see Chapter Two). For more on the sovereignty of reason, see 
Laurence Jacobs, “’Le Moment Liberal.’ The Distinctive Character of Restoration Liberalism,” The Historical 
Journal, 31 issue 2 (Jun., 1988), 482, Aurelian Craitu, Liberalism Under Siege: The Political Thought of the 
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58 Aurelian Craitu states that the search for sovereignty in doctrinaire political philosophy can only 
evolve by “allowing for the confrontation of independent and equal powers capable of reciprocally imposing on 
each other the obligation of seeking the truth together.”  Craitu, 283. 
 
59 Lucien Jaume asserts that Constant, in particular, insisted on the natural expression of truth in 
government and thus equated politicians in power who claimed to know the “truth” with the dangerous moral 
self-satisfaction of the revolutionary governments. Jaume, L'individu, 69.  
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to know Manuel’s intent when they interrupted him, and for using their own prejudicial 
understanding of his intent to banish him and solidify their power.60 Saint-Aulaire expressed 
his concern that ultras arrogated truth as their special preserve and then boldly proclaimed 
their rectitude when in fact they had no way of knowing what Manuel had intended to say. 
He declared, “I affirm that never has been found a country so savage, and in which the ideas 
of reason were so bizarrely understood, that one would refuse an orator the right of 
explaining his thought; that one had persisted in saying to him: ‘you had the intention of 
saying such a thing’ while he himself declares a contrary intention.”61 The ultras’ attempts to 
legalize the illegal and redefine the intentions of both Manuel’s words and the laws of the 
Chamber rankled those liberals who claimed that sovereignty rested on honest and rational 
deliberation, or who simply believed that government should not attempt to divine the “truth” 
from insufficient evidence. 
No formal declaration of solidarity between rival factions of liberals emerged from 
the debates over Manuel, but the participation of doctrinaires in his defense pointed to the 
growing convergence of liberal opposition.62 Noted doctrinaire liberal Pierre-Paul Royer-
Collard, formerly a defender of the Décazes ministry and the decision to exclude Grégoire 
from the Chambers in 1819, accused the ultras of putting their prejudices against Manuel 
                                                 
 60 Outrage over the ultras’ interpretation of Manuel’s half-finished statement spread in liberal circles. 
An angry reader of  Le Constitutionnel wrote in a letter to the editor, “ . . . they are only able to derive [a guilty 
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ahead of their loyalty to the government of the Charter “I have not been the protector of 
license and all species of excess is odious to me,” he declared, “I will say frankly, however, 
that there are in these exaggerated pleas, injustice and too little attention to the nature and 
needs of representative government.”63 Normally moderate in his speech and sentiments in 
the Chamber, Royer-Collard decried the arbitrary nature of the ultras’ actions and adopted 
the same alarmist language he had chided independents for using in earlier crises. He 
portentously declared to the whole Chamber, “You are placed, Messieurs, between unlimited 
liberty which is the life of representative government and the limitation of this liberty which 
is its downfall.”64 The case demanded taking sides, and unlike what had transpired in the 
Grégoire case, standing on principles trumped cautious liberals’ political pragmatism. 
Intimations that the end of representative government under the Charter was drawing 
near clarified the debate for liberals; instead of being an isolated incident, the Manuel case 
became a defining moment in the battle to define post-revolutionary France. Even more 
conservative moderates sensed that the ultras did not want to heal the rifts that remained from 
the Revolution but rather wanted to win outright the war that the two “nations” of France had 
waged for thirty years, and do it through the very institutions liberals held dear. Centrist 
deputy Casimir Perier thought that through their subversion of the rules of the Chamber, the 
ultras took on the role of the arbitrary majority that the sad history of the Revolution had 
discredited. He reminded the ultras that “You do not want to be compared to the Convention? 
Well, you would be right not to imitate it.”65 Perier thus adapted the discourse on 
“revolutionary interests” that ultras’ used to justify their actions and claimed that reaction 
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and its principles, rather than revolution, threatened France’s political stability. Majority-rule 
democracy, which had set such dangerous precedents in the radical phase of the Revolution, 
was now in the hands of those counterrevolutionaries who had most loudly condemned it.  
The “trial” ultimately resulted in the expulsion of Manuel from the Chamber for the 
duration of his term through an ultra-dominated voice vote that was essentially a spontaneous 
acclamation in favor of the proposal for his removal. But physically removing Manuel from 
the Chamber on March 4, proved more difficult and revealed even more dramatically the 
extent of the Left’s ire.66 When the National Guard entered the Chamber to remove Manuel, 
the entire left half of the hall—and a good portion of the center—rose in protest and the 
situation almost resulted in violence. After admonishing words from Lafayette, National 
Guard Sergeant Mercier refused to remove Manuel, and the army gendarmerie had to execute 
the task under the recriminations of a hostile liberal bloc. In a show of solidarity among 
liberals hitherto disorganized and at times mutually suspicious, sixty-three resolved to share 
Manuel’s fate and accompany him out of the Chamber for the remainder of the session. 
Lafayette explained the reasoning behind his and his colleagues’ retreat: “There are no longer 
either municipal or administrative elections, or any of the popular elections, or freedom of 
the press, or properly constituted juries, or representation emerging from the bosom of the 
nation; those guarantees of 89 and 91 whose reestablishment would have been easy and swift 
no longer exist.”67 Ironically, those who had spent eight years fighting expulsion now chose 
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self-expulsion as a means of expressing their disappointment that the institutions of the 
Charter now represented the antithesis of reconciliation and compromise.  
Part Two: The Manuel Affair and its Meaning in the Provinces 
Immediate Reactions 
Manuel’s expulsion was a highly publicized event, but it was overshadowed by news 
of the war in Spain. Without extensive press coverage of its aftermath, the cafes and streets 
of France became the primary forum for debating the meaning and merit of the event. Ultras 
viewed it in the context of the Spanish War and combined their enthusiasm for the armed 
intervention in Spain with their disdain for Manuel. His expulsion became a symbolic 
purging of revolutionary interests from the entire nation, and triggered real persecution of 
activists in the provinces as revolutionary contagions. For ultras, liberals who supported 
Manuel became as suspect as those who protested the war, and through their ingratitude and 
obstinacy, revealed themselves as anti-French and beyond rehabilitation. Leftist 
constituencies throughout France turned Manuel and Sergeant Mercier into a national heroes; 
embodiments of perfect Frenchmen fighting for the people’s rights. These two conceptions of 
Manuel and his supporters vied with each other in the battle for public opinion between the 
two sides of the Restoration political divide. 
During the trial in the Chamber, Manuel’s supporters and detractors had taken to the 
streets to voice their opinions on the matter. According to police reports, a crowd of fifty to 
sixty young men accompanied Manuel from the Chamber to his residence each day of the 
trial, shouting inflammatory statements in his support and against the ultras and the war.68  
                                                                                                                                                       
also states that, “Lafayette saw the expulsion of Manuel as part of an ultra attempt to destroy the legislature.” 
238. 
 
68 Genaudel Le Commissaire de Police, “Rapport,” Paris, 1 March 1823, AN F7-6720. 
266 
 
The event energized radical youth all over Paris, alerting the ultra press to the power of 
demagogues like Manuel to consolidate opposition. Most accounts of unwarranted political 
activity in favor of Manuel met with the ultras’ scorn because of their theatrical nature and 
the supposed cowardice of the activists. L’Etoile, for example, described a scene in which 
“liberal screamers” in Paris surreptitiously looked for an escape before meekly shouting 
“Vive Manuel, vive liberté.” 69 Le drapeau blanc, on the other hand, declared that the 
convergence of street radicals and liberal deputies revealed the dangerous aspect of liberal 
thought. The editors noted that “the two great sects of revolutionaries, aristocratic and 
demagogic” always came together whenever righteous people attacked a revolutionary 
principle. In this case, the editors portrayed these two leftist groups from different social 
classes as unified in their defense of the principle of popular sovereignty, and, by extension, 
they were natural supporters of regicide. “This grave incident adds to the divergence of 
opinions and the irritation of minds,” the drapeau’s editors wrote, adding that it would also 
make it easier to distinguish those with “generous hearts” and those for whom “political 
crimes were an elixir that increased the audacity of their challenges to royal authority.”70 
According to the ultra press, how one reacted to Manuel’s expulsion became a marker for 
national identity and belonging.  
Liberal deputies also contributed to public interest in Manuel’s expulsion by 
distributing copies of their declaration of protest to constituents in the départements. 71  The 
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declaration accused the ultras of adopting “a doctrine subversive to all social order and all 
justice,” by turning the Chamber into a court for the trial of a member. The ultras, so liberal 
deputies declared, would turn Manuel’s expulsion into a pretext for a complete reversal of 
the Charter’s protections. This, combined with the war, was an explicit attempt to 
“consummate counterrevolution” as the principle to guide France henceforth, and expose the 
nation to “foreign occupation.” “Not wanting to render us complicit in the evils that this 
faction has been able to attract to our patrie,” the deputies declared, they decided to remove 
themselves from the Chamber as the last remnant of politicians who actually still honored the 
Charter.72 Combined with the ultras’ divisive reaction to Manuel’s speech, this liberal 
declaration spread the idea that the men who composed the government of France 
represented two different cultures and nations whose divisiveness extended to all France. 
Manuel may have left the Chamber in disgrace, but he entered the public sphere as a symbol 
of progressive values.  
Ultra authorities feared the divisive effect the liberals’ declaration would have 
especially because, as one official posited, “the least village must be infected by it.”  73
Throughout France préfets, police commissars, and gendarmes, went on the offensive against 
any manifestation of support for Manuel. Their efforts, however, were counterproductive. 
Indeed, Manuel’s case might well have drifted into nation’s collective memory as just 
another political crisis but the constant surveillance of him, his supporters, and their activities 
ensured that his name would continue to attract notoriety and remind people of the event and 
the ideological struggle that spawned it. The Ministry of the Interior, the main administrative 
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body of the government that directed the police and the vast state bureaucracy, helped keep 
the affair alive through its constant communications to government officials concerning 
Manuel’s whereabouts.74 Government officials in Paris collected as much information on 
Manuel from the départements as they could to keep apprised of his activities and the effect 
his expulsion was having on the populace. 75  Local functionaries in turn reinforced the elite 
discourse of division by reading events through the polarizing lens of national politics. With 
the successful prosecution of the war, those conducting the surveillance seemed convinced 
that their efforts were merely part of a mopping up mission in the long struggle to redefine 
France. Many official reports confidently asserted that the types of people who supported 
Manuel proved that liberals were in decline, and confidently mocked a party that “has only 
been able to find its support among the dregs of the nation.”76 The self-confident tone of 
many police records, however, belied the state’s inability to erase political contestation 
throughout France. 
Where is Manuel? 
 According to police records, Manuel seemed to be everywhere and nowhere in the 
spring of 1823, triggering a rash of communications up and down the state hierarchy. Vague 
and contradictory reports of Manuel’s travels arrived constantly at the ministry and generated 
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many equally imprecise responses.77 A typical example is a letter from the préfet of the 
département of the Marne, relaying information from the sous-préfet of Rheims about the 
preparation of liberals in the town to give Manuel a triumphal parade upon his arrival in that 
town.78 As in several other cases that spring, Manuel did not show up. Nevertheless, the 
préfet ordered the mobilization of the gendarmerie and the police to prevent any 
disturbances, reminding all those in his jurisdiction of the need for vigilance against liberal 
agitation.79  
More rumors of Manuel’s travels reverberated through the department of Ardennes, 
and as in Rheims, the préfet ordered a strict surveillance of local liberals lest Manuel arrive. 
In this case, the préfet tied Manuel’s supposed travels in the area to his more genuine concern 
for the political ramifications of a liberal giant on the situation in his own département. “One 
has assured me that the object of this action [Manuel’s trip],” the préfet wrote, “in addition to 
the immediate project of fêting Manuel and bearing him in triumph, is to prepare in advance 
the liberals’ elections for next year.”80 The préfet used the rumors of Manuel’s travels to 
draw attention to the real political ramifications of liberal networking. Whether or not 
Manuel showed up was immaterial; the use of his name and fame were effective means of 
reinforcing partisan loyalty for both sides and preparing for future political battles.  
In May, authorities implicated Manuel as an accomplice in a criminal act of 
conspiracy, but again, these allegations derived from spurious news of his travels. The préfet 
                                                 
77 AN F7-6718. No less than thirty different notes pertaining to passports and visas for travel to certain 
departments and cities in the spring of 1823 are found in Manuel’s police file yet few pertain to documented 
trips Manuel actually took..  
 
78 AN F7-6718, Préfet de la Marne to Minister of the Interior, Chalons, 18 April 1823.  
 
79 Ibid. 
 
80 AN F7-6718, Préfet des Ardennes to Minister of the Interior, 21 April 1823. 
 
270 
 
of the department of the Rhône wrote to the Minister of the Interior about a rumor that 
Manuel had stopped in the town of Chalons-sur-Saône in the neighboring department of 
Saône-et-Loire, and that while he was there, local liberals arranged for the purchase of 500 
muskets from an arms dealer.81 In the same letter, however, he expressed frustration with the 
lack of exact information on Manuel’s whereabouts and read liberal mischief into this 
deficiency. “What is remarkable,” he wrote, “is the care that the liberals took to hide 
Manuel’s voyage by announcing, the moment he left Paris that he retired to his house due to 
illness.”82 According to this account, shoddy police work was not to blame for the 
mysterious appearances and disappearances of Manuel, but rather the machinations of 
liberals. In reality, Manuel never went to Chalons-sur-Saône that spring. 
This manipulation of news concerning Manuel’s whereabouts became commonplace 
during the spring of 1823. Later in May, the préfet of the Rhône assured the minister that if 
Manuel arrived in Lyon, the capital of his département, there would be little fanfare as the 
“heated partisans” of the city had cooled off.83 Yet, after learning that Manuel had never left 
Paris; he changed his tune and asked the Minister for news of Manuel’s travel plans. In a 
letter he sent to Paris on June 8, he noted that the local liberals “announced it [Manuel’s 
arrival] daily,” and surmised that perhaps “it is only a means employed by them to feed the 
sort of fermentation that exists here.”84 If we are to take the préfet’s letters at face value, 
either Lyon’s political scene had changed considerably during the period between the end of 
May and the first week of June from cool to “fermenting,” or the préfet had joined in the 
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game played by both sides in which the idea of Manuel became a tool for political 
motivation.   
Exasperated by the volume of information concerning Manuel and its lack of clarity, 
the préfet of Saône-et-Loire finally wrote the Minister of the Interior that “all that one reports 
to your Excellency concerning the diverse circumstances of the voyage have no basis.”85 He 
cited the eagerness of local police commissars who mistakenly placed Manuel in the town of 
Chalons-sur-Saône and in the city of Dijon. 86  After condemning the rumors and insinuation, 
however, he nonetheless noted their political power: “The fact alone of the presumed arrival 
of this unworthy deputy was an event interesting enough to spark my attention since it could 
give rise to a movement among the liberals and maybe to some scenes capable of 
compromising the public tranquility.”87 Had he considered the matter further, he might also 
have noted the effect these rumors had on his colleagues. A national political scandal united 
them together in action. Functionaries throughout France had recast the Manuel affair as a 
local concern and in the process increased their vigilance against “revolutionary interests” in 
their own jurisdictions. While police surveillance of political crimes was a constant feature of 
prefectural administration, events like the Manuel affair provided state officials with an issue 
to rally around and refocus their efforts. When préfets spread news of Manuel up and down 
the chain of command, they promulgated the idea of his unworthiness and its impact on local 
circumstances, reinforcing the idea that Manuel and his supporters posed a threat to social 
order. 
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The cases highlighted above demonstrate that a mere rumor of Manuel’s arrival in a 
city was enough to excite both liberals and ultra officials.  In some cases support for Manuel 
could spark a small riot, thus justifying the government’s claim that liberals disrupted the 
Restoration’s social order. One such event occurred in the provincial city of Clermont-
Ferrand on the night of July 11-12, 1823. During these two days and nights, liberals there 
congregated in support of Manuel, professing their identification with the larger liberal cause 
and earning for themselves the enmity of local authorities. Local functionaries saw in these 
disturbances the effect of revolutionary principles in the city, and used the ultra discourse of 
unworthiness to label local supporters of Manuel as equally outside the national norm.  
Clermont-Ferrand’s “Manuel moment” had a farcical air because, again, he himself 
never passed through the town. As had happened earlier with authorities in Chalons-sur-
Saône, Dijon, and Lyon, officials in Paris in a letter dated 6 July warned local officials in 
Clermont-Ferrand of Manuel’s impending arrival there. The news set off a flurry of activity 
aimed at forestalling any troubles that might arise. The préfet of Puy-de-Dôme was 
particularly concerned that the arrival of this man of “baneful celebrity” would be able to stir 
up a “class of people ignorant and forlorn enough” to give him their zealous support.88 On 
the night of 11 July, a group of about two-hundred people who expected Manuel’s arrival 
escorted a carriage through the Riom gate. Seeing the carriage, several people cried out, “It’s 
him!,” despite the efforts of others to show that it was not. It did not seem to matter who rode 
in the carriage, however, as the crowd followed it into the center of the city. A group of local 
police agents and other officials gathered to confront the crowd and they soon discovered that 
Manuel was not inside the coach, but rather General Lauriston, a former Napoleonic general 
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and current member of the king’s household. Lauriston, “singularly furious” because of his 
reception at the gate and the subsequent parade, tried to identify himself, but the crowd 
insisted that he was none other than Manuel.89  As night fell, cheers of “vive Manuel,” “vive 
liberté,” “down with the police,” “down with the gendarmerie,” and even “down with 
Lauriston!” erupted in front of the inn where the hapless general lodged. The next day, a 
similar scene occurred but the gendarmerie quickly dispersed the crowd.90  
 The events in Clermont-Ferrand generated a considerable amount of correspondence 
between state officials, including the préfet, the gendarme officers, and the Minister of the 
Interior. These reports cast the events in Clermont-Ferrand in the same terms as royalists 
throughout France used to describe the liberal opposition. Such a ruckus, the chef d’escadron 
of the gendarmerie remarked, “Is proof without doubt of the bad mindset (mauvais esprit) 
that animates some of the inhabitants of the city of Clermont, to show support for those who 
dare to praise regicide is an odious infamy.”  He subsequently asked the Minister of the 
Interior whether crying, “vive Manuel!” was the same as crying, “Down with the king.”91 
The préfet in turn used the events to verify the tainted reputation of several inhabitants of the 
city who were already under suspicion. Most of these were the typical sort of Restoration 
troublemakers, students and soldiers on half-pay; but for the préfet, these were the foot 
soldiers of the real enemy, the liberal politicians.92  
That préfets and gendarmes would mirror the language and classifications of the 
central royalist government in Paris is not surprising; their careers depended upon their 
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political affiliations. In addition, they were usually outsiders in their jurisdictions, and placed 
in their posts to ensure conformity in the application of the law throughout the nation. 
Emotional distance from the subjects they ruled reinforced the divisive stereotypes which 
they read into local events. But even local officials such as the commissars of police, adopted 
the discourse of national politics to describe local activists, branding them with monikers that 
suggested their unworthiness as citizens. They condemned M. Rodde, an employee in the tax 
office as, “a man virulent and excessively dangerous.” They portrayed the bourgeois lawyer, 
M. Marmoulet as, “a man not less dangerous than the first.” They even accused M. and Mme. 
Blondeau, the director of the local college and his wife, of professing “bad principles and 
manifesting them openly.” The commissars suggested that these people had long been a 
potential source of agitation in the community, and their presence in the town alone could 
explain how the events that had unfolded could have taken place. The “virulence” of 
revolutionary principles was on display in these degenerate denizens. “As for Manuel,” they 
proclaimed, “he has not yet appeared [and] all signs make us believe that some agitator 
discontented with the calm we enjoy made use of these unfortunate events to spread disorder 
among us and trouble our tranquility.”93 The report revealed a community already split, as 
was the nation, between opposing political camps. Although the commissars shared the city 
with liberal citizens, they defined the community along political lines, and declared that the 
agitators were outsiders whose political disturbances threatened the safety of the good 
citizens who supported the government. When they made claims for the community, it was 
clear that certain types were not included.  
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 In the end, only Mme. Blondeau appeared in court and received a fine. Fearful that 
the school her husband ran would corrupt the youth of the city—student activism being a 
constant source of anxiety among Restoration officials—the Director of Police in the 
Ministry of the Interior wrote the Grand Master of the University to ask that he take, 
“suitable measures to repress the spirit of insubordination and malevolence” in the school.94 
In August, an aide to the préfet of Puy-de-Dôme duly reported the temporary suspension of 
the school and a fine levied against Blondeau that brought the incident to a close.95 Although 
Manuel’s expulsion had occurred in early March, the state’s watchful eye over events 
relating to him gave his expulsion a political longevity that the press alone could not sustain 
and in places far removed from political life in Paris. 
Manuel the Unholy 
Through its efforts to reassert the sanctity of the king and promote a hierarchical 
social order, the Church proved to be a stalwart ally in the ultra program of rebuilding the 
nation along counterrevolutionary lines. In particular, Jesuit missions to localities throughout 
Restoration France were perhaps the most visible manifestations of the “de-
revolutionization” of France, becoming reactionary carnavals—purgative events meant to 
regenerate the nation.96  The Catholic Church also became a strong ally in ultra propagation 
of the discourse of worthiness and unworthiness.  For the most part, Restoration clergy 
followed the state line on Manuel and aid in defamatory attacks on his person. Thus in the 
department of Seine-et-Marne, close to Paris, the préfet described a simple baptism as a 
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suspicious event of political import. On 28 March 1823, the préfet wrote to the Minister of 
the Interior that a local merchant, M. Gueuvin of La Ferté-sous-Jouarre, had invited Manuel 
to be the godfather of his child and attend a grand celebration with Gueuvin’s large family 
and local friends. The préfet feared that the occasion would be the “pretext of some 
scandalous acclamations . . . an approval of the anti-royalist conduct of this deputy and an 
indirect affront toward the government.” He warned the mayor of the town of the affair, and 
ordered the local captain of the gendarmerie to stop by any legal means the “inconveniences” 
that would arise from the religious ceremony and its probable attendance by liberals. 97
 This letter sent in March should have alerted the central administration to the 
potential trouble in La Ferté sous Jouarre, but it took a high-profile court case to generate a 
state response. In May, the publisher of the liberal journal Le Courrier Français was on trial 
for libel—a common occurrence for liberal publications after the reformation of press laws in 
1820. The minister wrote to the Bishop of Meaux to see if charges in the Courrier 
concerning a parish priest in the diocese of Meaux who had refused to allow Manuel to 
attend a baptismal ceremony were true. He asked the bishop to explain the specific diocesan 
rules that ordained such action if it had in fact occurred.98A diocesan official, Sr. Guifferat-
Virgen, answered in lieu of the bishop. According to him, canonical law prevented those 
deemed “unworthy” from being baptized or being present at a baptism. At the ceremony in 
mid-April, the parish priest of La Ferté sous Jouarre had determined on the basis of Manuel’s 
“anti-monarchical” statements in the Chamber of Deputies, that the ex-deputy was not fit to 
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be a godparent.99 Summarizing the events that transpired in the town that spring, Guifferat-
Virgen concluded that; “the former deputy, by accepting the role of godfather and allowing 
himself to be accompanied to the church by a part of the populace that he had excited, 
wanted the liberal party to insult religion and the government at the same time.” 100 By 
refusing to allow Manuel to participate in the sacrament, the priest had saved a child from 
receiving baptism while being held in the hands of an anti-French pariah. At the baptismal 
font in a small town, a common ceremony suddenly became a forum for national politics. 
Both the parish priest and Guifferat-Virgen interpreted their Church roles as champions of a 
specific vision of national worthiness. Through incidents like these, the Catholic Church 
reinforced its attachment to its secular ultra allies, adding a layer of religious validation to the 
campaign against Manuel.  
Souscriptions: Making a Liberal Icon 
  On March 23, 1823, two voyagers stopped at an inn in Nancy and loudly discussed 
the Manuel affair. Before they left, they produced a sheet of paper and wrote their names on 
it, and pledged 55 francs each to purchase a gift for Sergeant Mercier. The sergeant was now 
a national hero for refusing to remove Manuel from the Chamber of Deputies and for 
conducting himself in a manner befitting the ideal French national character. Leaving it at the 
restaurant, they hoped that others would join their effort and contribute to the cause. The 
innkeeper, however, discovered the paper the following day and destroyed it. 101  While they 
failed to gather supporters, several other initiatives throughout France successfully collected 
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funds through similar subscription campaigns (souscriptions) and delivered honorific gifts to 
Manuel and Sergeant Mercier. 102   
Through souscriptions, liberals throughout France did their part to keep Manuel’s 
name in the public sphere. These campaigns with their gifts of crowns, medals, swords, 
liqueurs, and even ceremonial firearms, were legal according to the codes of the day, but they 
galled the ultra state officials because they demonstrated the resilience of the liberal 
opposition. Those who pledged money to honor a sullied political figure and a disobedient 
soldier had the audacity to publicly declare their disapproval of the ultras who brought about 
the expulsion, and to successfully network with others to show their continued ability to rally 
the Left to action. If liberals could successfully bring people together to honor Manuel and 
Mercier, then they could potentially rally voters to bring liberals back into the Chamber. 
Prosecuting the proponents of these campaigns, however, tested the limits of ultra 
domination. Ultras tried to use the state machinery to promote their vision of an ideal 
ultraroyalist nation and distinguish the good Frenchman from the corrupted Frenchmen as 
they had done in the Chamber, but they had to work within the limits that the legal system 
imposed on them in the départements. 
Through souscriptions Manuel and Mercier became symbols of the leftist opposition 
to the ultras’ abuse of authority, and examples of patriotism and ideal national character. As 
one national campaign for a medal honoring Manuel proclaimed, “from time to time it is 
necessary to recognize the noble names and the traits that prove their devotion to their Patrie 
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with strong resolve…”103 Souscriptions countered ultra authorities who considered 
demonstrations in support of Manuel as a sign of contagious unworthiness. Not willing to 
cede the fact that certain elements of the nation could legitimately label Manuel and Mercier 
heroes, authorities considered subscription campaigns simply a “means which the factious 
adopt in order to stir up trouble,” rather than a genuine expression of their ideals concerning 
national character.104 Two different readings of the affair emerge in the interaction of the 
government and activists over the subscription campaigns. Liberals maintained their 
cohesiveness through networking to support national heroes, while ultras considered the 
efforts yet another sign of the inherent unworthiness of liberals and leftists who praised 
apologists for regicide and recalcitrant soldiers instead of the king. 
A lengthy correspondence between authorities in Rouen over a campaign in honor of 
Mercier demonstrated the language that state officials used to describe the souscription 
phenomenon. After hearing of Manuel’s expulsion on March 5, 1823, the master of requests 
for the département of Seine-Inférieure predicted in a report to Villèle that the leftist lower 
classes of the city, already upset over the war and “too blinded by their interests to appreciate 
the conduct of the king’s wise government,” would react poorly to the news.105 His 
presentiments proved correct by the middle of the March, when he learned that Rouen 
liberals in the National Guard planned to honor Sergeant Mercier with an honorific musket. 
Local officials naturally took umbrage to the idea of liberals honoring a defender of regicidal 
values with a weapon. First, the local authorities wanted to ensure that the gun would not be 
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of “a caliber of war,” and thus illegal. Then they would inspect the inscription to see if it was 
illegal.106  
In a letter from the ministry of the Interior to the préfet of Police in Paris, the minister 
described the maneuvers of the  “revolutionaries of Rouen” as part of a larger plot emanating 
from Paris. The man supposedly responsible for the wider contribution campaign, M. Lemire, 
had already been the subject of surveillance in the South and West of France. This individual 
of “crude immorality” had spread alarm throughout the country and distributed “dangerous 
writings.”107 Officials in Rouen drew from the language that Paris used to describe Lemire to 
describe the local people involved in the souscription. In a letter from the prefecture dated 29 
March, for example, the local merchant Duhamel who organized the campaign is described 
as “a man whose opinions couldn’t be more violent” despite his rather comfortable bourgeois 
life and lack of past criminal behavior. Despite the alarmist tone of the préfet and his staff, 
the local prosecutor informed the prefecture that he doubted that Duhamel had broken any 
law.108 Two forces, one pushing the officials to an extreme interpretation of the contribution 
campaign as a sign of criminal unworthiness among the population, and another forcing the 
issue back within the letter of the law competed in Rouen, leaving the royalist in charge there 
with more rhetoric than direction for action.  
Royalists in the Chamber may have justified their actions against Manuel by asserting 
their majority rights and backing their claims with an ideological defense of natural law, but 
their confidence in these abstract justifications for action did not always carry down through 
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the state bureaucracy.109 The Bureau of Analysis in the Ministry of Interior wrote the préfet 
of Seine-Inférieure that the inscription, “Fusil of honor given by the National Guard of 
Rouen to Sgt. Mercier,” signified a crime of “defamation and calumny” against the National 
Guard.110  But as much as the préfet’s master of requests wanted to take action against the 
“revolutionaries” of Rouen, the prosecutor informed him definitive terms that the musket and 
its engraving did not actually violate the law. In addition, the official notified Paris that 
actions such as the dedication of the musket would only serve to rile up the liberals of Rouen 
and inflame the already heated political environment. In short, the préfet would not pursue 
the matter further and let Paris handle it in the future.111  
The inability to prosecute Duhamel and others in Rouen who had been involved in the 
souscription exposed a fundamental weakness in promoting a partisan agenda through the 
machinery of a modern state. The essentially liberal checks and balances inserted into the 
legal system created boundaries which even the most strident opinions of national 
unworthiness could not cross. While the Chamber, the representative body, succumbed to 
ultra majority rule and expelled Manuel, and most préfets in 1823 tended to mirror the 
political biases of the ultra deputies, the wider state apparatus still included officials who 
considered themselves to be disinterested bureaucrats. It is impossible to discern the political 
leanings of the prosecutor in Rouen from the police records on the souscription campaign, 
but his hesitancy reflected the internal limits that ultras encountered when they overplayed 
the import of individual events. Liberals had seized on Manuel’s expulsion as a last-ditch 
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effort to define the ideal character of the nation, and ultras proved unable to stifle their 
efforts. Despite disappointment at their failure to prevent liberals from lionizing the 
unworthy, ultras needed liberal opposition to remain as a counterpoint to their own efforts to 
define the ideal national character. The ultra vision of the nation depended upon keeping the 
concept of leftist unworthiness in circulation and the liberals’ souscriptions provided ultras 
with an opportunity to do just that.  
Part Three: Manuel’s Last Stand: The Funeral at Père Lachaise 
The successful outcome of events in Spain discredited much of the liberal opposition 
(from the point of view of the Right), so that by the end of 1823, Manuel had largely receded 
from the public sphere. The subscription campaigns proved that elite liberals still had 
supporters throughout France, but when compared to the triumphant din of ultra propaganda 
over the war, they could not keep Manuel’s name—or the ultra deputies’ actions against 
him—in popular memory for long. He himself tried to reenter politics in 1824, but failed in 
his bid for reelection. Only after his death in 1827 at the age of fifty-two did Manuel once 
again become the center of controversy. His funeral triggered an outpouring of grief among 
the leftist masses in Paris who took advantage of the occasion to again elevate Manuel as an 
exemplar of national virtue and show their support for opposition liberals. It also gave 
Restoration authorities one more opportunity to portray Manuel as an example of the inherent 
unworthiness of the liberal bloc.  
Even before the event, the press and authorities expected Manuel’s death to stir the 
passions of his supporters and create a scene similar to one that occurred during the liberal 
deputy General Foy’s burial in 1825.112 The liberal paper Le constitutionnel reported on 20 
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August 1827 that Manuel had gone to Jacques Lafitte’s chateau outside Paris to convalesce. 
When the Director of Police in Paris, Franchet-Despery, found out that Manuel had indeed 
died on the 20th, he sent warnings out to the préfet of the département of Seine-et-Oise and to 
local mayors to expect demonstrations. He seemed particularly eager to avoid having Manuel 
buried in Paris as the chance for mobs of unruly mourners would greatly increase. 113 Lafitte 
himself, however, had already written the authorities of his and Manuel’s brother’s intentions 
to inter the body in the Parisian cemetery of Père Lachaise.114 A series of bureaucratic 
hurdles confronted Lafitte and his coterie as they tried to make arrangements for the transfer 
of the body. Instead of the two days of preparation normally needed for a funeral, a full five 
days passed before the cortege was given permission to bury the body in Paris, and then only 
on the condition that the funeral procession could not enter the interior walls of Paris. It 
would have to reach the cemetery only through exterior boulevards. 115
The police closely watched Lafitte’s château at Maisons as dozens of mourners 
traveled there to offer their respects to Manuel’s body as it lay in state. Among them were the 
prominent liberals the Marquis de Lafayette, Augustine-Jean de Schonen, Alexandre Mechin, 
and the songwriter and Manuel’s best friend, Pierre-Jean de Béranger. Although all were 
saddened by their friend’s death, they understood its potential to rally the leftist contingent in 
Paris. Lafitte at first requested an immediate transfer of the body to its final resting place in 
Paris to avoid its “putrefaction,” but then abruptly decided to embalm the body at his estate 
                                                                                                                                                       
112 AN F7-6718, Minister of the Interior to Colonel de la 1ère Legion de Gendarmerie, Paris, 20 
August 1827. For information on Foy’s and Manuel’s funerals and their place in the French tradition of 
funerals, see, Avner Ben-Amos, Funerals, Politics, and Memory in Modern France, 1789-1996 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2000), especially pages, 88-92. 
 
113 AN-F7-6720, Franchet Despery to Minister of the Interior, Paris, 21 August 1827. 
 
114 AN-F7-6720, M. Lafitte to Préfet de la Police, Maisons sur Seine, 21 August 1827. 
 
115 Ibid. 
284 
 
and delay the funeral, blaming the authorities for stalling.116 In fact, the fault for the delay in 
interring Manuel’s body lay more with the liberals who sent invitations to the funeral to more 
than eight-thousand merchants and other residents of Paris. Not surprisingly, the authorities 
expressed their outrage over the changed nature of the event—it had gone from a private 
ritual to a mass spectacle loaded with political undertones. 117  
Liberals understood the symbolic value that Manuel had accrued since his expulsion. 
The souscription campaigns for him had established his name and image in the iconography 
of the Left. They mourned the loss of their colleague and fellow soldier in their struggles 
with the government and the ultra faction, but they remained political animals at heart. They 
knew that the ultras still despised Manuel and continued to sully his reputation, and feared 
that his funeral would provide one last chance for ultras to humiliate him and his fellow 
liberals. Béranger prophetically wrote, “We fear both the censor for his eulogy and the police 
for his convoy,” 118  and thought that a more subtle procession would be wiser because, “the 
ingratitude of which he was the object merits this lesson.” Lafitte, who actually made the 
arrangements, complained that “the hateful authority that had pursued the living Manuel 
pursued him still after his death.” 119 There was therefore poetic justice in having Manuel 
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return to Paris with the support of the nation; it would demonstrate the resilience of liberal 
opposition despite the ultras’ vengeful repression.  
On Friday, August 23, the procession of four carriages left Maisons in the morning 
accompanied by an escort of gendarmes.120 Some cheers went up in the various villages 
through which the convoy passed but the move went largely without incident until it reached 
the Paris walls. At the Barrière des Martyrs, a crowd of young men forcefully took the casket 
off of the hearse and tried to carry it through the streets. Failing this, they proceeded to take 
the harnesses off of the horses and pull the hearse by hand. An accompanying gendarme 
officer described the young men them as, “a group of hotheads who pulled the hearse by 
hand and by their actions and countenances showed themselves to be animated by evil 
dispositions.” The officer quickly restored order after this “revolutionary ovation” and tried 
to get the cortege to the cemetery as quickly as possible, but met with more scenes of 
disorder along the way. 121 The whole event had taken on the air of a protest rather than a 
funeral.  
Franchet-Despery described the events to Prime Minister Villèle, suggesting that 
liberal politicians orchestrated with radicals in Paris to embarrass the authorities despite 
Lafitte’s, Lafayette’s, and Mechin’s calls for order. According to his agents, several liberal 
agitators distributed a printed call for the parading of Manuel’s body through the site of 
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Louis XVI’s execution.  People threw crowns of laurel and oak at the party and a gold crown, 
funded by one of the souscriptions at the time of his expulsion, sat on top of the hearse. 
Peddlers sold little medallions of Manuel, and members of the procession purportedly offered 
money to onlookers with which they could purchase them. Franchet-Despery did not doubt 
the collusion of the liberals to create this disorder and claimed that Lafitte had spent fifty to 
sixty thousand francs on the procession. 122  
Whether or not the event was the product of political bankrolling or a more 
spontaneous show of affection, the people of Paris came out in force and soon dominated the 
proceedings. Several thousand persons grew quickly to crowds of tens of thousands who 
chanted “Honor to Manuel, honor to the worthy defender of our rights,” as they wrested 
control of the funeral from the liberals and the gendarmerie alike and again pulled the hearse 
by hand.123 When Sergeant Mercier showed up and removed his own crown, another offering 
from the subscription campaigns, and placed it on Manuel’s coffin proclaiming, “this crown 
belongs to him as much as to me because if I showed some energy, it is he who gave me the 
example of courage,” the crowds grew even more animated and disobeyed all orders to 
harness the horses and leave the street.124 The political spirit of the age threatened to turn the 
gravitas of Manuel’s funeral into a farcical battle of wills between the people and the state. 
Only Lafitte’s timely intervention with the gendarmerie saved the situation from becoming 
violent when he convinced the crowd to allow two horses help pull the hearse.125 It was a 
liberal compromise.  
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Once in the cemetery, a large crowd gathered to hear Lafitte, Lafayette, Béranger, and 
de Schonen give their eulogies to Manuel. The crowd reacted enthusiastically to their words 
of praise for the deceased mixed with political pronouncements. Lafitte stated that liberals 
should have spent all their time since Manuel’s expulsion protesting this “violation of 
national representation,” but failing to do so, they could rest content knowing that Manuel 
nonetheless stood by them without complaint. He declared Manuel worthy of inclusion in the 
patrie’s canon of illustrious men predicting, “France recognizant will never forget your 
public virtues....”126  
Souscriptions established Manuel as an embodiment of public virtues, and in death, 
he became a martyr to the nation. By no accident, Manuel’s grand monument sat next to that 
of the liberal deputies, former general Maximilien Foy and Stanislas Girardin, both of whom 
defended him at the time of his expulsion. Lafayette carried out the last act of Manuel’s 
national apotheosis by bringing these three together as figurative lieux de memoire—no 
longer just men, but inspirational sites for rallying an ideal national identity. Lafayette noted 
their power to remind the French of the significance of these individuals’ lives to the greater 
national history. “Here, Messieurs, I see myself surrounded with funereal monuments that 
recall great afflictions and great memories, of grand talents and illustrious victims.” 127 Like 
Lincoln at Gettysburg—an apt analogy considering the melee that preceded the funeral—
Lafayette turned the fallen into symbols that could unify people through the mere 
recollection of their sacrifices for the nation.  
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In polarized Restoration France rejection of the political “other” accompanied most 
calls for national unity, and Manuel’s funeral was no exception. In the spirit of Manuel, who 
seemed to find the most incendiary language to match his every political act, the last speaker, 
the deputy de Schonen, spent as much time castigating the ultra opposition as praising his 
fallen comrade. He reiterated the difference between heroes like Manuel and Foy, and the 
ultras whose character and opinions “real French” people could not abide. “Your enemies, 
the eternal enemies of France never conquered you!” he declared to the deceased. Later in his 
speech, de Schonen borrowed the ultras’ old charge against Manuel of “unworthiness” and 
turned it against them proclaiming, “You were the worthy elected of the patrie, and we will 
not be unworthy children of it.” 128 It seemed partisan rancor was so strong that one could not 
praise the dead without measuring them and the rest of society with a political litmus test.  
The political content of the eulogies was not lost on the authorities. Franchet-Despery 
reported that the first speeches contained some passages “dictated by the worst spirit,” but 
nothing unexpected for a gathering of liberals and Parisian agitators.  He mocked Lafayette 
for offering nothing new beyond “old theories and passionate declamations.” De Schonen’s 
partisan eulogy, however, startled the police director with its stark divisive language.  It was 
“written with extreme and violent fanaticism,” Franchet-Despery complained, “where one 
noticed the words, ‘the people of France, the people are the strength, and the people are 
equality…’” In his estimation, “it was truly a call to revolt.” 129 Calling on the “people” 
became a seditious sentiment when de Schonen drew the boundary of belonging around those 
who approved of Manuel’s life and example. Franchet-Despery understandably did not 
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approve of de Schonen’s xenophobic language in front of an unruly crowd. The crowds 
during the procession had demonstrated their perfervid political enthusiasm; the last thing the 
police needed was a passionate call of opposition to ultras and the authorities.  
Franchet-Despery’s men only managed to round up some suspects for disorderly 
conduct on the day of the funeral, but the ultra government’s real enemies remained the elite 
liberals who spoke and the principles they espoused. Because the cemetery was a protected 
spot and the service was ostensibly a religious one, no laws existed to curtail the speakers or 
punish them for their pronouncements—but printed words were another matter. The 
newspaper le Courier Français, for example, had tried to print a testimonial honoring 
Manuel before the funeral but the censors had intervened to prevent the publication of any 
incendiary commentary on Manuel’s life or death.  Lafitte’s close friend with whom he 
published his account of the funeral later, the historian François-Auguste Mignet, quickly 
accused the censors of mimicking the inquisition. He called them, “The Holy Office of spies 
charged to proscribe all that is honorable, of protecting all that is vile, ...”130 Prepared for 
more divisive language from the pro-Manuel camp, the censors were ready when Lafitte and 
Mignet published their own account of the funeral.  
On 19 September, the prosecutor M. La Palme brought charges against Mignet as the 
primary writer of this account, and his publisher, Gaultier-Languionie, for “exciting hatred 
and contempt for the royal government,” defaming the Chamber of Deputies, and printing a 
“provocation to rebellion.” 131 In his arguments, prosecutor La Palme took offense to the way 
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in which liberals recast Manuel’s expulsion as a heroic act. He railed against the orators at 
the funeral who pointed out the crown of oak presented to Manuel through a subscription 
campaign as a sign of his “triumphant” expulsion from the Chamber of Deputies. “Is not 
presenting this expulsion as a triumph for M. Manuel,” he asked, “by all evidence the same 
as vowing to shame the conduct of those who pronounced this expulsion?”  He found de 
Schonen’s speech the most odious for its divisive phrase, “eternal enemies of France,” used 
to describe the Chamber. 132 The fault for these words in La Palme’s estimation lay not with 
de Schonen himself, but rather with the editors of this account who packaged the entire 
funeral as an apology for revolutionary principles. He declared that the work, “exhumed the 
frightful doctrine of sovereignty of the people.” 133 As much as he proclaimed his disdain for 
the polarizing effect of the funeral, by defending Manuel’s expulsion one more time, La 
Palme could not help but contribute to the partisan understanding of the event.  
Those who mourned Manuel and those who tried to control the event understood that 
the funeral was primarily a political action. Pére Lachaise became a political site as soon as 
the eulogies for Manuel began and his specter loomed large over both the crowd and the 
authorities. Even in death, he upset ultras by defying their vision of the French as universally 
in support of their policies. The funeral showed that even sacred spaces and events were not 
immune to the infection of partisanship. In birth, as in the baptism at Le Ferté-sous-Jouarre, 
and in death, partisan categorization became an unavoidable aspect of the French people’s 
existence. 
                                                 
 
132 Ibid., 19-20. 
 
133Ibid.,, 74. 
291 
 
Conclusion 
Soon after the July Revolution of 1830, a procession of national guardsmen from the 
town of Charonne made their third annual pilgrimage to Manuel’s tomb to honor him for his 
defense of French liberty. After the troops laid a tricolor flag on his tomb as “a gage of the 
recognition of the people towards the energetic defender of its rights,” the mayor of 
Charonne praised the deceased in a speech regaling in the recent momentous events. “Your 
grand soul will have applauded our efforts and our successes,” he assured Manuel, and then 
promised that all present would help preserve the revolution. To cries of “Gloire à Manuel,” 
the parade marched off.134
The public memory of Manuel soon marched off as well. In truth, he was no lasting 
lieu de memoire, but existed as a political and social phenomenon for a few months as a 
symbol of a larger dynamic of political conflict. Partisanship was a creative force that could 
turn any event, person, or idea into a vessel for the public consumption of politics. Manuel 
was not the only news of 1823 and so other events and people quickly replaced him as focal 
points of political discourse. For the remainder of the Restoration at least, his name was 
synonymous with the most strident brand of liberal opposition to the ultras, but after the 
installation of a putative liberal regime and the movement of the opposition further to the left, 
Manuel was no longer relevant to the political contexts of the 1830’s and 40’s. New 
oppositional figures and events stepped in to replace Manuel and other figures of the 
Restoration as rallying points for the Left.  
Manuel’s ephemeral fame coincided with the hardening of political lines in France. 
Combined with the Spanish War, the events in the Chamber in March 1823 marked the 
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definitive solidification of post-revolutionary polarization. There would still be exceptions to 
the strict categories of political Right and Left—self-described moderates, extemporaneous 
allegiances between certain ultras and liberals, and ideological variety on either side—but by 
1823, the main political discourse of the era had crossed the threshold of intolerance. With 
the lines between the government and the opposition firmly established and the chances for 
compromise remote after 1823, however, it became easier to identify political allies and 
engage in more effective political action. It is perhaps no coincidence that shortly after 
thousands of people took to the streets of Paris to praise Manuel at his funeral, liberals 
successfully regained their standing in the Chambers in the elections of 1827.135  
People read more significance into Manuel’s expulsion and later events because of 
the grand scale of political conflict in the Restoration public sphere. Manuel—and the 
activities triggered by his name—reminded people that France was divided into two camps, 
both of whose members defined themselves within the context of a polarized polity. Without 
iconic events and figures to help people understand sociopolitical conditions, the sheer 
volume of political news would perhaps have made people feel irrelevant and helpless in the 
face of France’s continued and inexorable evolution into a polarized society. Many leftists 
were always ready to voice their opposition to the government, but they needed a cause 
célèbre to risk acting on their political passions; Manuel, for a few brief moments, provided 
them with one. On the other end of the spectrum, framing the relatively frequent unrest in 
provincial towns and cities of France using the discourse of unworthiness with which ultras 
defined Manuel, gave functionaries and policemen a greater sense of purpose in their 
maintenance of order. People of all classes and in all regions of France used Manuel’s name 
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to identify with political processes that were largely out of their control, and found meaning 
in their relationship to the post-revolutionary French nation. Few of the activists in Clermont-
Ferrand or elsewhere referred to the ideological points that liberal deputies brought up in 
their defense of Manuel when they took to the streets, but they nonetheless felt a connection 
to the political world that was beyond their geographic and demographic reach. Manuel was, 
for a time, the personification of themselves as ideal French citizens. Unfortunately, 
revolution was perhaps inevitable from the moment that people began to think of their 
political enemies as foreign, unworthy, or otherwise incompatible with correct-thinking 
French people, and themselves as members of the true nation.  
The Manuel case highlights the power of the Restoration’s rival political frames to 
instigate national political action and to penetrate multiple levels of society and regions. 
Liberal deputies stridently supported the inalienable right of the people to claim some portion 
of sovereignty. When they perceived that this crucial aspect of their understanding of the 
nation was undermined they removed themselves—in the name of the people—from what 
they considered a corrupt government. They then turned Manuel into an exemplar of the 
ideal citizen in their conception of the nation; he embodied the frames they used to define the 
nation. Ultra deputies considered Manuel foreign to the paternal and familial concept of the 
nation to which they adhered, and made Manuel an outsider antithetical to the values they 
considered the essence of French identity. As news of the expulsion spread, people all over 
France and from all walks of life acted within these two rival frames, internalizing them and 
making them relevant to their immediate life situation and surroundings. Souscriptions 
testified to the level of commitment of leftists to their progressive framework of the nation, 
just as the diligence of officials who monitored them testified to their belief in an equally 
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compelling opposed framework. The clashes in the provinces of these two ideologies of 
national belonging and between those caught up in these battles were features of a broad 
national debate. Despite the strong adherence of people to one or the other of the dominant 
partisan frames, Manuel and the events surrounding his expulsion concretized for most 
French people the reality of living in a nation permanently divided by the contestation 
between the left and right wings of political culture.   
295 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Five 
Two Nations Singing: Polarization and Working-Class Chanson 
Introduction 
In 1819, Paul-Emile Debraux and Paul Tournemine released volume one of Les 
soupers lyriques, the first in a series of songbooks featuring works by urban songwriters.1 
They wrote in their introduction that the “liberation of our patrie,” referring to the departure 
of allied troops in late 1818, had inspired them to publish songs for group singing.2 Debraux 
and Tournemine believed that singing could rid the country of its domestic strife and unite 
the nation in celebration. Yet songs and singing were not ideal platforms for conciliatory 
sentiments. Group singing, in particular, often exacerbated post-revolutionary sociopolitical 
polarization. No matter how cloaked in metaphor, satire, or escapism a song’s political 
sentiments may have been, those who wrote songs and those who sang them did so in a 
sociopolitical arena plagued by virulent divisiveness. In this environment, it became 
impossible for songwriters to be completely apolitical, or to prevent others from reading 
politics into both songs and their singing. Seen as the political objects they inevitably 
                                                 
1 Their partnership would fracture in 1821, when Tournemine took over Les Soupers without, 
according to Debraux, consulting the contributors. From then on, the two released rival collections. Tournemine 
retained the title, Les soupers lyriques, while Debraux went on to publish his and his colleagues songs under the 
title, Les soirées lyriques. Both series collected songs from the goguette writers although there was little 
crossover of writers between the two collections. It seems that Tournemine welcomed contributions from a 
wider circle of songwriters than Debraux and he originally intended. There might have been a political 
dimension to the split based on the seemingly more moderate tone of Tournemine’s and his colleagues’ songs 
after 1821, but this is speculation. See Debraux’s introduction to Paul-Emile Debraux, (ed.), Les Soirées 
lyriques, pour faire suite aux deux premières années des Soupers Lyriques, par les mêmes auteurs, vol. 1 (Paris: 
Renaudière, 1821), ii. 
 
2 Paul-Emile Debraux and Pierre Tournemine (eds.), Les soupers lyriques, première année 1819, 4 
vols., vol. 1  (Paris: Doublet, 1819), ii.  
became, Restoration-era songs thus reveal the breadth and depth of post-revolutionary 
division as even joyous and hopeful refrains became the soundtrack for political conflict. 
 This chapter analyzes Restoration songs and singing to help illuminate the 
relationship between the polarized political identities of elites and non-elite popular culture, 
and to assess the degree to which the partisan discourse of formal politics penetrated the 
public sphere. These songs give some insight into how members of the lower class responded 
to the political world that excluded them. Analysis of songs and singing in the Restoration’s 
city streets and cafés suggests that the political polarization of the era affected the writing, 
performance, and reception of music among members of the lower class. Opening sites for 
political activity, songs and singing became markers of sociopolitical affiliation and tools for 
constructing post-revolutionary political identities that addressed social status as well as 
ideological orientation on a national scale. 
With no access to formal politics and limited involvement in the public sphere of 
political publications, the great majority of the French people had to create alternative spaces 
for political activity. Sheryl Kroen identifies some of these spaces in Politics and Theater, 
such as missionary auto-de-fés for the destruction of revolutionary and Napoleonic 
memorabilia, and street demonstrations at performances of Tartuffe throughout France. 
Kroen’s work, as discussed in Chapter One, shows how the lower class used acts of protest as 
a means of engaging in the debate on the nature of post-revolutionary France outside of 
institutional and electoral politics.3 Members of the lower class made their political voices 
heard through their engagement in these group activities. Her convincing arguments 
notwithstanding, Kroen avoids textual expressions of lower-class political sentiments to 
                                                 
 
3 Sheryl Kroen, Politics and Theater: The Crisis of Legitimacy in Restoration France, 1815-1830 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 20. 
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concentrate on the “performance” of politics during the Restoration, thus leaving the 
connection between the concepts of “high politics” and the political activities of the people 
under-explored.  
Popular songs provide insight into this connection because they were texts, both 
explicitly and implicitly political, which group performance turned into public markers of 
sociopolitical affiliation. A few people read journals and pamphlets aloud in order to 
galvanize public opinion around shared principles and prejudices, but songs went farther by 
encouraging people to announce their political preferences in groups. Putting their lyrics to 
popular airs, songwriters and singers merged words and ideas with the nonverbal experience 
of making music, using easily remembered phrasing to inculcate ideas and sentiments in the 
performers and the audience. The resulting scenes played on multiple levels in both these 
groups as the tunes, the styles of singing, and the composition of the singing group all 
combined to create unique situations and statements. In the context of Restoration 
partisanship, these multiple layers of experience increased the number of ways that songs 
divided as much as joined people together.  
 Divisive political songs have a long history in France.4 During the Revolution, for 
example, songs such as the Marseillaise and the Réveil du Peuple vied for popularity among 
                                                 
 
4 For some of this history see, Regina Sweeney, Singing Our Way to Victory: French Cultural Politics 
and Music During the Great War (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 2001), Cornwell Burnham 
Rogers, The Spirit of Revolution in 1789; A Study of Public Opinion as Revealed in Political Songs and Other 
Popular Literature at the Beginning of the French Revolution (New York: Greenwood Press, 1969), Michelle 
Biget-Mainfroy, Musique et révolution française: la longue durée (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1989), Robert 
Brécy, La Révolution en chantant (Luynes, France: C. Pirot, 1988), Michael Edward McClellan, Battling over 
the Lyric Muse: Expressions of Revolution and Counterrevolution at the Théâtre Feydeau, 1789-1801 (PhD 
diss., University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1994), Ginette Marty, Dictionnaire des chansons de la 
Révolution: 1787-1799 (Paris: Tallandier, 1988), Roland Mortier et Hervé Hasquin (eds.), Fêtes et musiques 
révolutionnaires: Grétry et Gossec, (Bruxelles: Editions de l'Université de Bruxelles, 1990), Cynthia Verba, 
Music and the French Enlightenment: Reconstruction of a Dialogue, 1750-1764 (Oxford: Clarendon Press; 
New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), Jean Mongrédien, French Music from the Enlightenment to 
Romanticism: 1789-1830 (Portland, Or.: Amadeus Press, 1996), Adélaïde de Place, La vie musicale en France 
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political factions. Under the increasingly populist regimes of the Revolution, the government 
tried to appropriate political songs to rally support among the urban poor. Laura Mason 
describes in Singing the French Revolution how songs and the act of singing itself created 
unstable conditions for propagandizing, as uncontrollable groups of carousing singers 
brought their own meanings to their performances.5 In particular, Mason shows how instead 
of conforming to a homogenized popular culture, songs increased political polarization as 
vying factions adapted songs and singing to their causes.6 Mason claims that during the post-
revolutionary era “singing had moved indoors,” and become the product of specialized 
singing societies that nurtured revolutionary political culture for a later renaissance.7 This 
assessment unquestionably stands for revolutionary sentiments, but I also believe that the 
content coming from these singing societies, or goguettes, deserves more attention. 
Goguettes served as local sites for political expression, but they were also houses of 
production from which  accessible songs destined for public repetition spread to nearly every 
large city in France. Working-class songwriters downplayed songs’ revolutionary content, 
but still echoed, reformulated, commented on, and criticized the era’s partisan politics. Their 
works gave the disenfranchised public an opening into the political world. 
 Not everyone who wrote popular songs was of the “working-class”—this is especially 
true of many of the royalist works in this chapter—but urban artisans, unskilled laborers, 
                                                                                                                                                       
au temps de la révolution (Paris: Fayard, 1989), Jane F. Fulcher, French Cultural Politics and Music: From the 
Dreyfus Affair to the First World War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), and  Sylvie Granger, 
Musiciens dans la ville (1600-1850) (Paris: Belin, 2002).  
 
5 Laura Mason, Singing the French Revolution: Popular Culture and Politics, 1787-1799 (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1996), 6. I am indebted to Dr. Mason for her commentary on a version of this chapter 
presented at the 2008 meeting of the Society for French Historical Studies. 
 
6 Ibid., 211. 
 
7 Ibid., 207. 
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lower-level civil servants, and ex-soldiers wrote extensively. Although they understood the 
socioeconomic stratification of the nation and their lack of access to its political system, they 
did not necessarily consider themselves a “class” in the modern sense of the word. The 
discourse of class during the period included the familiar terms classe ouvrière and 
bourgeoisie, which suggested a contemporary consensus on the basic pattern of modern class 
hierarchies, but the referents for such labels were fungible and varied in interpretation.8 
Moreover, occupational factors that encouraged industrial workers to consider themselves 
members of a distinctive social and political class—the “proletariat”—had not developed 
enough in France for labor alone to bind people. What socially binding principle then led 
people to speak for “workers” and “the people” in the collective, as goguette songwriters 
often did, while criticizing the wealthy ruling class? What did it mean to be “class-
conscious” and express ideas about social inequity in cultural media without a firm 
understanding of the specific parameters of class? 
In his groundbreaking study of class-consciousness, The Making of the English 
Working Class, historian E. P. Thompson explored the cultural aspects of class formation by 
considering the “shared experiences” of the working class. Thompson first articulated the 
idea that people do not experience abstract structures such as class but rather live within a 
                                                 
 
8 Denise Davidson notes this confusion of class terms in Restoration society. She cites Saint-
Simonians, Guépin and Bonamy, who claimed in the early 1830’s that there were eight degrees of class, the 
bottom four—if not five—of which (bourgeois pauvres, ouvriers aisés, ouvrier pauvres, and ouvriers 
misérables) all took part in the working class song culture I describe in this chapter. Denise Davidson, France 
after Revolution: Urban Life, Gender, and the New Social Order (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
2007), 13. Sarah Maza suggests that self-identification as a member of a certain class is a necessary condition 
for historical analysis based on class terms. She uses this theory to prove the fictive nature of the bourgeoisie 
who, it seems, rarely considered themselves as such. When people referred to the “bourgeoisie,” it certainly had 
no direct correlation to the classic Marxist term for the owners of the means of production. Maza’s theory, 
however, does not apply as easily to the Restoration-era lower class. The lower class, whether peasant or urban 
worker, self-consciously identified themselves with many of the class terms that I use freely in this chapter. See, 
Sarah Maza, The Myth of the French Bourgeoisie: An Essay on the Social Imaginary, 1750-1850 (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2003).  
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system of cultural practices defining who they are and what ties they have with members of 
the wider community.9 His position that workers nonetheless collectively embodied the 
working-class as determined by overriding socioeconomic factors, however, left Thompson 
firmly in the camp of social historians who assume the legitimacy of class as an 
unproblematic basis for analysis. The movement from social history with its structures such 
as class, to cultural history and its focus on diverse discourses around which historical actors 
crafted identities has made recent historians hesitant to make broad claims based on class. 10  
 Looking for a compromise between the camps of social history and cultural history, 
Geoff Eley and Keith Nield acknowledge social history’s deficiencies in their recent essay 
entitled, The Future of Class in History, but they do not advocate the complete rejection of 
social structures as bases for historical analysis. Class, they argue, still has value as a field of 
historical study despite its loss of power as the ultimate determinant of historical actors’ 
identities and agency. Eley and Nield are comfortable defining “class” as the result of “the 
advocacy for a particular way of thinking about social identity” rather than as a rigid, 
structurally determined social position.11 They contend that people respond to contingencies 
                                                 
 
9 "Class-consciousness” Thompson wrote, “is the way in which these experiences are handled in 
cultural terms: embodied in traditions, value-systems, ideas, and institutional forms... " E.P. Thompson, The 
Making of the English Working Class (New York: Pantheon, 1964), 11. I believe that historical actors’ 
“consciousness” of the political, social, and economic factors differentiating members of society played a major 
role in post-revolutionary self-fashioning. “Class” identities, albeit contingent and situational, emerged when 
members of the Restoration lower class acknowledged their disenfranchisement.  
 
10 The retreat from social history during the “linguistic turn” that characterized new cultural history has 
had a lasting impact on the study of class. Not satisfied with the retention of structures beneath Thompson’s 
“shared experience”, several social historians turned away from class as an identifiable structure of social 
organization.Three works in particular were emblematic of this shift, especially as it pertained to the issues of 
labor, society, and culture: William H. Sewell, Jr., Work and Revolution in France: The Language of Labor 
from the Old Regime to 1848 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), Gareth Stedman Jones, 
Languages of Class: Studies in English Working Class History, 1832-1982 (Cambridge University Press, 1983), 
and Joan W. Scott, Gender and the Politics of History (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988).  
11 They write, “We might approach class as less an observable or preexisting topography of structurally 
distributed social differences than as a set of emergent claims about how the social world should best be 
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that allow them to “center” on sociopolitical identities such as those associated with the 
formal idea of class. The contingent processes by which this “centering” occurs are not 
reducible to structural or post-structural explanation, but they nonetheless result in 
“sociologically-specified class capacities.”12 In this study, when I use the terms “working 
class” or “lower class,” I follow Eley’s and Nield’s methodology and apply a “class” label to 
those excluded from the Restoration’s political processes, and, in particular, to those urban 
workers who later self-consciously constructed a political identity around the socioeconomic 
structures of industrial labor. An urban movement based primarily on labor and class did 
develop during the July Monarchy, but I contend that during the Restoration, exclusion from 
formal political participation was the “contingency” that encouraged members of the working 
class to use a discourse of class unity that the goguette community reified through singing 
together.    
 Historians of nineteenth-century France have considered goguettes, fraternal 
organizations, dancing clubs, and cafés essential organs for building lower-class communities 
and institutionalizing codes of behavior among members of the working class.13 Historian 
Steven Rowe is convinced that workers wrote songs and participated in the goguettes to 
foster solidarity and redefine social hierarchies in the face of a burgeoning laissez-faire 
economy and sociopolitical bodies that excluded them.14 Rowe’s work supports my 
                                                                                                                                                       
understood.” Geoff Eley and Keith Nield, The Future of Class in History: What Remains of the Social? (Ann 
Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2007), 167.  
 
12 Ibid., 173. 
 
13 Denise Davidson, for example, looks at the post-revolutionary reclassification of class and gender 
boundaries in these settings in her recent work. See especially chapter 4 of Denise Davidson’s, France after 
Revolution (op. cit.).  Maíre Cross has recently started researching Flore Tristan’s involvement with “socialist” 
singing groups in the 1840’s. She too contends that these groups helped foster class unity.  
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contention that the goguette’s function as an alternative community helped songwriters create 
statements about their group identity and the relations within that group. Yet, since his focus 
is on worker identity and not politics per se, he does not deeply explore the connection 
between the workers’ impulse to join groups and sing together and their specific 
commentaries on elite politics. Police scrutiny and repression might well have pushed 
members of the working class to bond in fraternal organizations, but such exclusionary forces 
did not insulate working class songwriters from the currents of elite politics. 15   
 This chapter looks at songs as elements in the broader phenomenon of political 
polarization to facilitate understanding the effect of partisanship on Restoration society writ 
large. The first section examines songs as political artifacts apart from their creation and 
performance. It examines how songs appeared in the street, arrived anonymously in the mail, 
and became the subject of intense police scrutiny; factors all of which triggered partisan 
assessments of their authors, performers, or possessors. This section also considers how the 
police reacted to the goguettes as political organizations and how goguette songwriters 
understood their role in society. The second section analyzes royalist and ultraroyalist 
propaganda, some of it the product of working class songwriters, to show how they reflected 
the Restoration’s political environment and added to the bitter contestation within post-
                                                                                                                                                       
14 Steven E. Rowe, “The Politics of Literature and Literacy: Popular Song Writing and Proletarian 
Poetry in Post-Revolutionary France,” in Historical Studies in Education, 19.2 (special edition) (Fall 2007): 13-
36. 
15 In fact, the important role of songs and singing as a means of engaging with and appropriating the 
political currents of the day was not lost on people living during the Restoration. In The Margins of City Life, 
John Merriman, for example, explores how rivaling gangs from the city of Perpignan’s leftist and royalist 
quartiers used popular political songs to taunt each other. The gangs’ performances of songs that further 
polarized the city and brought the tenor of divisive national politics to the local stage revealed “the cultural 
dichotomy between elite and popular politics.” Although Merriman devotes little attention to the content of the 
songs sung in Perpignan, his work is further evidence that non-elites used singing to construct political 
identities by drawing both on popular media and on prevailing currents in the partisan public sphere.  John 
Merriman, The Margins of City Life: Explorations on the French Urban Frontier, 1815-1851 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1991), 134, 141-43.  
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revolutionary society. The two last sections survey songs from leftist goguettes themselves. 
The penultimate section examines songs that supported leftist ideology, considered liberal 
elites as allies, and took a definitive stand against ultraroyalists and the Right. The final part 
of this chapter analyzes songs from the goguettes that voiced frustration with elite politics 
and either advocated alternative, more radical, political solutions or eschewed politics 
altogether. These last songs that eschewed partisanship provide a missing link between the 
relative political silence of the working class Left vis-à-vis the exclusivity of Restoration 
politics, and the rhetorical class unity that drove leftist politics during the July Monarchy and 
beyond.   
 The songwriters and songs reviewed in this chapter are by no means exhaustive of the 
Restoration’s music scene. Formal musical performances including operas, concerts, and 
vaudeville reviews ran throughout the period, and though politics also crept into these forms 
of music, much of the literature on them does not connect artistic expression to the 
Restoration’s culture of contestation.16 The famed Pierre-Jean de Béranger’s political works 
are also missing from this chapter’s analysis.17 Béranger did not routinely socialize in 
working-class circles; his closest friends were liberal politicians and rich bankers. He was 
without doubt the darling of leftist songwriters, but according to admirers like Eugène de 
Pradel, “Béranger is too profound to be amusing, too perfect to be understood or to be sung 
in the joyous outpourings of dessert.”18 The works of writers like Paul-Emile Debraux, 
                                                 
16 See, for example, Katherine Ellis, Interpreting the Musical Past: Early Music in Nineteenth-Century 
France (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). 
   
17 For a basic history of Béranger and his political relations see Jean Lucas-Dubreton, Béranger; la 
chanson, la politique, la société (Paris: Hachette, 1934) and Jean Touchard, La Gloire de Béranger (Paris: A. 
Colin, 1968). 
 
18 Eugène de Pradel, Chansons Nouvelles (Paris: August Imbert, 1827), 29-30. 
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François Dauphin, and even the ultraroyalist Charles-Joseph Rougemaître, all of whom made 
their only imprint on the historical record through their now largely forgotten songs, give a 
better sense of the working-class response to partisanship than formal music or the body of 
Béranger’s political oeuvre.  
 Previous chapters have explained how partisanship dominated the Restoration’s 
public sphere, influencing formal political institutions, the press, literature, theater 
performances, and street activism. This charged political arena gave rise to an exaggerated 
sense of division in the nation. The era’s variety of thought and action notwithstanding, 
polarization affected all aspects of Restoration history. This chapter provides some insight 
into how this environment affected the era’s songs and how, in turn, these songs contributed 
to sociopolitical divisions during the Restoration. The sheer volume of songs produced 
during this fifteen-year period makes it infeasible to give a comprehensive view of the role of 
music and songs during the Restoration. Nonetheless, this analysis reveals some of the 
dynamics between political contestation and popular culture in the makeup of the post-
revolutionary nation.  
Part One: Songs and Singing in the Context of Contestation 
In 1823, the popular songwriter Paul-Emile Debraux wrote that the chanson “has 
attained a certain degree of importance, and this light genre of poetry in which our nation 
excels and suffers no rival now merits a little more consideration than one awarded it 
previously.”19 Songs, however, shared the stage with all the other forms of media and activity 
by which partisan ideologies spread during the Restoration. The periodical press, pamphlets, 
and literature, for example, conveyed most of formal political sentiments and opinions of the 
era, but most people had no access to the Restoration’s political institutions and therefore had 
                                                 
19 Paul-Emile Debraux, Voyage à Saint-Pélagie en mars 1823 (Paris :Lebégue, 1823), 43. 
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to find other ways to voice their opinions. Conservatives, for example, mobilized political 
support among the underclass with religious missions in the provinces and public auto-de-fés 
meant to purge France of its revolutionary sins. Radical elements on the Left anonymously 
posted seditious broadsheets throughout France and often took to the streets in protest. An 
underclass gang culture based on political affiliation thus emerged in many cities and often 
drew elements of the lower class into broader national political conflicts.20 These activities 
all contributed to the dissemination of political ideas and strengthened the idea that post-
revolutionary France was a divided nation. The song emerged in this environment, speaking 
for common people of all affiliations—and sometimes for the state—and serving as a tool for 
inculcating values and principles.21 The “light genre of poetry” indeed became an important 
political entity, turning the printed word into action and allowing those who sang in groups to 
express political sentiments in a public forum.  
Whatever the official or public reaction to singing, political songs and their singers 
could not help but accrue labels associating them with one side or the other of the post-
revolutionary divide. Police officials and random observers could instantly determine 
singers’ political tendencies by looking at their repertoire of songs (and their lyrics) and the 
contexts in which they sang.22 Outside of their performance, songs became autonomous, 
                                                 
 
20 See John Merriman, Margins, especially Chapter Five’s study of leftist and royalist gangs in 
Perpignan. 
 
21 Robert Brécy cites historian Victor Fournel on this unpredictable element of singing: “In France, the 
song has always been a power, the living and mobile expression of opinion, or rather of public pressure--the 
natural and often redoubtable complement of freedom of the press. It is the soul and the voice of the people.”  
Robert Brécy, Florilège de la chanson révolutionnaire de 1789 au Front Populaire (Condé-sur-Noireau: 
Editions Ouvrières, 1990), 9. 
 
22 In addition to their lyrical content, songs could convey political sentiments through the style in 
which one sang and the imposition of lyrics over familiar music; both these elements added to the variety of 
emotional and intellectual responses. Laura Mason considers these non-textual factors as essential elements of 
the political song. They changed the delivery and reception of songs in ways that simply reading the lyrics 
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unsung emblems of defiance when anonymous people left copies of lyrics in public places, or 
sent them to political enemies in order to disgrace or outrage them. The song thus became a 
political artifact that could stir people to action or conjure up powerful reactions by its mere 
presence. Considering their prevalence and power, it is not surprising that reports on songs 
and singing filled the era’s police records. More than perhaps any genre, songs and singing—
lightening rods for political contestation—both reflected and contributed to the dominance of 
the idea of a divided nation.  
Music’s power to inspire a wide range of actions and reactions among the people and 
authorities led to songs and songwriters assuming an air of importance. Songwriters, if we 
are to believe their lyrics, generally thought highly of themselves and their work, and boasted 
of the important role they played in French society. French songwriters had long claimed that 
their nation was the most lyrically gifted and considered the song an integral part of national 
identity.23 Debraux and his companion François Dauphin, for example, wrote in a guidebook 
for songwriters entitled, Bréviaire du chansonnier, ou l’art de faire chansons [The 
Songwriter’s Guidebook, or the Art of Making Songs](1830), that songs had embodied the 
national spirit throughout the nation’s history, and remarked on the ability of songs to foster 
national solidarity throughout France’s troubled past. Speaking of the Restoration, however, 
Debraux and Dauphin lamented that political polarization had come to dominate French 
songs. “Then the chanson no longer knew to whom to pay attention;” they wrote, “some 
                                                                                                                                                       
cannot convey. This made the medium an inherently unstable form of political expression. See Mason, Singing 
the French Revolution. 
 
23 This tendency among the French to consider their nation the preeminent songwriting nation has a 
long history. In her comments on a version of this paper given at the 2008 Annual Meeting of the Society of 
French Historical Studies, Laura Mason cited the 18th c. Chevalier de Jaucourt who declared that “the French 
prevail over all of Europe for the wit and grace of their songs; having always delighted in this entertainment, 
they have always excelled at it.”  (Permission granted) Similar sentiments were expressed, as we shall see, by 
Restoration songwriters. 
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pulled it to the right; others dragged it to the left.” They contended that partisanship had 
destroyed the sublime connection between songs and the nation and had given rise to works 
that vitiated important national values by coloring them in partisan terms. Debraux and 
Dauphin claimed that political songs had reduced patriotism, for example, to disdain for the 
opposing party rather than heartfelt attachment to positive national virtues.24 The aesthetic 
drawbacks of Restoration political songs notwithstanding, Debraux and Dauphin encouraged 
songwriters to assume their important role of defining the nation even if it meant taking sides 
in the political battles that raged around them. 
For their part, Debraux and Dauphin capitulated on the issue of aesthetics and 
political neutrality because they believed that Restoration songwriters—especially at the 
critical time of their writing (1830)—could not prevent politics from entering into their 
lyrics. “In this epoch when politics have invaded everything,” they asked, “how is one able to 
write songs without politics coming and sliding under the plume of the songwriter?”25 
Despite their dislike for the base partisan sentiments in Restoration songs, Debraux and 
Dauphin suggested that songwriters dedicate themselves to opposing the government. “Under 
a constitutional government,” they wrote, “the song is not able to make what one calls a 
bande à part; it belongs by essence to the opposition party. . .[in this way] the chanson must 
be eminently political.”26 In short, writers could no longer passively assume that their 
compositions reflected the nation. The polarized state of the country demanded that 
songwriters take a political stand, and for most goguette writers, that meant allying with the 
                                                 
 
24 Emile Debraux  and François Dauphin , Bréviare du chansonnier, ou l’art de faire chansons; dédié à 
Béranger (Paris : A Henry, 1830), 52-53. 
 
25 Ibid., 55. 
 
26 Ibid., 59. 
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oppositional Left. Such sentiments, if we assume other writers shared them, helps explain the 
many reports of disorderly singing groups and transcriptions of songs that filled the era’s 
police records.  
In its efforts to crack down on seditious songs and unruly singers, the state first 
watched for works that expressed republican or Napoleonic sentiments challenging the 
monarchy’s legitimacy. During the revolutionary and Napoleonic eras, songs like the 
Marsellaise, Ca ira, and the Chant du départ had rallied civilians and soldiers around 
conceptions of a nation that bore little resemblance to Restoration France. The memory of 
violent urban mobs singing these political songs led Restoration authorities to distrust singing 
crowds in general —especially outside of officially sanctioned events—as threats to public 
order. Police officials in the centrist (Decazes-dominated) ministries of the first years of the 
Restoration, in particular, distrusted both royalist and leftist singers because they spread 
destabilizing partisan contestation. They therefore documented the appearance of songs or 
instances of unauthorized singing sessions throughout France.  
Instances of disruptive singing by ultraroyalist crowds, however, only sporadically 
appeared in Restoration police records. Ultra songs naturally voiced pro-monarchical 
sentiments, and by indiscriminately sprinkling “vive le roi” throughout their songs and 
singing sessions, royalists avoided rigorous state repression. However, when their singing did 
disturb public order or question the king’s choice of ministers, they could indeed draw the 
authorities’ attention. In 1818, for example, a police commissar in the department of the 
Moselle forwarded a copy of a song to Decazes that local ultras had sung after loudly 
declaring their hatred of the ministry. In this case, boisterous group singing triggered the 
police reaction and not the content of the song itself. The commissar accused the local ultras 
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of turning the singing of royalist songs into a forum for spreading calumny against the king’s 
ministry. He reported that “this tiny minority” of ultras in the town had demonstrated in their 
gathering, “new proof of its pronounced hatred for the king’s system and principally against 
your person.”27 With Decazes’ resignation and the ascension of ultra-friendly ministries in 
1820, police accounts of ultra singing like this one became scarce.  
Republican and Bonapartist songs, and the unruly crowds who sang them, therefore 
remained the government’s chief concern throughout the period. Reports from all over 
France testified to the activity of these disenfranchised leftists. The variety and numbers of 
songs sung and instances reported in the archives are too substantial to address in detail here, 
but, in general, they ranged from subtle allusions to past regimes to outright denials of the 
king’s legitimacy and calls for violent civil disobedience. In one case from 1818, for 
example, the préfet of the Corrèze wrote Decazes concerning the seizure of a handwritten 
chanson entitled, “Chanson de la Pomme de Terre,” which announced Napoleon’s imminent 
return to France at the head of an army of Africans.28  The “Pomme de Terre” and hundreds 
of songs like it appealed to France’s urban underclass, but few officials considered such 
fantastic scenarios a genuine political threat. Even the préfet thought that only the “ignorant” 
would believe such nonsense. Judging by sheer numbers, however, the nonsense in such 
songs became a nuisance when police had to keep filing reports on the many hundreds of 
songs like the “Pomme de Terre.” 
Often a singing group’s activities challenged authorities more than the lyrical content 
of songs. In 1822, for example, the police reported that a group of eleven young men greeted 
                                                 
 
27 AN F7-6839, Report, Commissar of Police of the Moselle to Minister of Police, 23 September 1818.  
 
28 AN F7-6839, Report, Préfet of the Correze to Minister of Police, Tulle, 6 February 1818. 
310 
 
passersby at the Paris barrier of Menilmontant with songs “in which they spoke derisively of 
the name of ‘Louis’ and the ‘King’ to provoke laughter” and, according to the préfet, to incite 
a brawl with royalists entering and exiting the city.29 Similar situations occurred in the 
commune of St. Gaudent (Haute-Garonne) during celebrations of the 1823 Spanish War, 
when singing at the ultra Monsieur Francès’ private party generated a countering chorus from 
political opponents in the streets. The préfet reported, with some satisfaction, that M. 
Francès’ formed an ambulatory ultra singing group in retaliation that went on to challenge 
local liberals with disruptive and mocking songs.30 Instances such as these reveal how 
singing acted as a catalyst for political confrontation and deepened divisions between people. 
In addition to reports of provocative singing, transcripts of anonymous songs filled 
police archives as authorities tracked their migration around France by mail, colporteurs, or 
other mysterious means. Often, songs appeared simultaneously in various places throughout 
France, generating a flood of reports to Paris on their appearance and their effect. In 1818, 
the police commissar in the commune of Dôle (Jura) brought some of these “smuggled” 
songs to Decazes’ attention but thought he only needed to quote their first and last lines, as 
he was sure that the police administration already knew them.31 His superior, the préfet of the 
Jura, however, thought the songs were dangerously divisive. He wrote to Decazes that “It is 
with these means [the mysterious circulation of songs]… that dark malevolence, always 
active and circumspect, looks to recruit partisans, to deteriorate the public spirit, or at least to 
                                                 
 
29 AN F7-6839, Report, Drouet and Genaudet (Commissars of Police) to Minister of the Interior, 1822. 
 
30 AN F7-6949, Report, Prefecture of the Haute-Garonne to Minister of the Interior, Toulouse, 5 
December 1823.  
 
31 AN F7-6839, Report, Commissar of Police of  Dôle (Jura) to Minister of Police, Dôle, 31 May 1817.   
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nourish in a certain class of the king’s subjects this spirit of party.”32 These exchanges 
between Decazes and authorities in the departments illustrate how songs, even unsung, 
became symbols for Restoration partisanship. When officials reported them, they 
acknowledged that polarizing political sentiments moved freely around the country—a song, 
it seemed, challenged efforts to maintain public order by simply surfacing in the area.  
The widespread transmission of the song, Ulysse et Télémaque, an allegorical work 
that placed Napoleon, his Empress Marie Louise, and their son Napoleon II respectively in 
the Homeric roles of Ulysses, Penelope, and Telemachus, revealed the remarkable extent to 
which unpublished songs could travel during the Restoration without knowledge of their 
authorship or provenance. Between 1817 and early 1819, the ministry in Paris received 
numerous reports of the song circulating among soldiers on half pay. The préfet of the 
Gironde first wrote to Decazes in August of 1817 that the song seemed to have originated in 
Paris and was inspiring the “most seditious sentiments” in Bourdeaux.33 Decazes had 
apparently been aware of the song for some time and responded that “although the allegoric 
turn which the author has made use of seems to prevent it from becoming truly popular, the 
individuals who propagate it should be the object of strict surveillance.”34  
Ulysse et Télémaque often inspired this mixed reaction from authorities who 
begrudgingly admired the composition’s style but decried its allusions to the Bourbon 
family’s illegitimacy. Reports continued through the fall and winter of 1817-1818, with 
several references to Ulysse’s popularity among “certain classes of society” and even some 
                                                 
 
32 AN F7-6839, Report,  Préfet of the Jura to Minister of Police, Lons-le-Saunier, 4 June 1817.  
 
33 AN F7-6839, Report, Préfet of the Gironde to Minister of Police, Bourdeaux, 14 August 1817.  
 
34 AN F7-6839, Draft Letter, Minister of Police Decazes to Préfet of the Gironde, Paris, 22 August 
1817. 
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“exalted royalists” whose dislike of the centrist ministry explained their interest in the 
song.35 When any seditious song appeared, the police tried to identify those responsible for 
its composition or distribution, an easy task in the case of the half-pay officers caught 
drafting copies of Ulysse in a café in Aix, but not so easy when it appeared on the street or 
arrived in the mail.36 Over the course of 1818, Ulysse et Télémaque emerged in Dijon, St. 
Malo, Nantes, Montpellier, the Var, Rochefort, and in the Vendee. In the Vendée, the préfet 
even presumed its local origins and proceeded to list locals as the suspected authors, unaware 
of its prevalence throughout France.37  
Even as they attempted to negate the spirit of party, local officials tended to think in 
divisive political terms when Ulysse and other songs suddenly appeared in their jurisdictions. 
This became more difficult when anonymous leftist agitators took advantage of this tendency 
to send songs to political enemies in order to bring the loyalty of some local royalists into 
question or simply to anger them. In 1818, the préfet of the Var reported that the loyal M. 
Perruquier of Fréjus, received Ulysse by post from Lyon and promptly turned it over to the 
police in order to reaffirm his allegiance to the government before anyone discovered he 
received it and questioned his politics.38  
Anonymous mailings of songs and repudiations of them became common occurrences 
throughout the period. In 1822, in the commune of Tréson (Nord), for example, several 
people “animated with royalist sentiments” received four seditious songs and turned them 
                                                 
 
35 AN F7-6839, Report, D’Arnaud for the préfecture of Pyrénées-Orientales to Minister of Police, 19 
September 1817. 
 
36 AN F7-6839, Report, Préfet of the Bouches-du-Rhône to Minister of Police, Marseilles, 9 July 1818.  
 
37 AN F7-6839, Report, Préfet of the Vendée to Minister of Police, Bourbon-Vendée, 15 December 
1817. 
 
38 AN F7-6839, Report, Préfet of the Var to Minister of Police, Draguinan, 26 February 1818.   
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over to the mayor. Included among the songs was the particularly vicious “Ronde de la 
France,” which accused the King of impregnating his niece, the Duchess de Berry. 39 In June 
1827, Captain Bourgogne of the 43rd regiment in the fortress of Bellegarde received an 
anonymous letter from Paris. Inside the envelope were four seditious songs, including the 
infamous “Ronde.” Bourgogne forwarded the songs to his colonel expressing his 
indignation. “I am absolutely ignorant,” he wrote, “of who may be the person taking pleasure 
in passing on these writings which strengthen principles so blameworthy and so contrary to 
my own sentiments.”40 These incidents are further evidence of the autonomous political 
valence of songs. With the advent of ultra-dominated ministries in the 1820’s, authorities 
increasingly treated songs in general as carriers of contagious sedition. As transmitters of 
unwelcome ideas, songs became contraband and political weapons in the hands of 
opportunists who played on the era’s penchant for partisan labeling.  
The written song as a textual artifact had limited political power, so the state naturally 
concerned itself more with how singing songs brought people together. Remembering the 
recent history of revolutionary clubs and urban crowds, the Restoration government naturally 
distrusted gatherings and enacted laws against unsanctioned meetings of more than twenty 
people. Spontaneous singing groups threatened the state’s maintenance of public order in the 
streets, but the appearance of goguettes as independent, semi-secret, and, most alarming, very 
popular urban singing societies posed a potentially greater threat as organized forums for the 
expression of potentially volatile opinions. Inspired by the Caveau, the famed eighteenth-
century singing society, and the contemporary success of well-known lyricists like Béranger 
                                                 
 
39 AN, F7-6929, Report, Préfet of the Nord to Minister of the Interior, Lille, 19 August 1822. 
 
40 AN F7-6705, Letter, Captain Bourgogne to Colonel 43rd line, Bellegarde,12 June 1827. 
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and Désaugiers, these groups met to drink, sing, and emulate France’s renowned songwriters. 
Their meetings provided a working-class environment for artistic expression that increased a 
sense of fraternal solidarity among Restoration France’s disenfranchised urban dwellers. The 
goguettes usually featured less seditious songs than those that anonymously made their way 
around France—some clubs forbade political songs altogether—but the state still thought the 
clubs fostered unwelcome nostalgia for past regimes, and kindled partisanship in the nation 
by creating an independent forum for politics.41   
Early police reports portrayed the goguettes as “bastard Masonic societies” that raised 
suspicions but posed no real threat to the state. When informers infiltrated them, they found 
that several, like the “Lapins” (Rabbits) which convened at M. Babier’s Paris residence, 
spent their time innocently drinking and offering toasts to the King and his family.42 One 
1818 report on a Parisian group called the “Amis du terrier des lapins du Midi” (Friends of 
the Midi Rabbits’ Den) described how thirty families or so (including wives and children) 
attended a gathering at a café just outside the city in Montrouge. After their families returned 
to Paris, the club’s male members retreated to a private room in the café owner’s house. 
There they composed and sang couplets that critically touched on some political subjects, but 
unpublished and sung indoors, these songs were not subject to prosecution. The reporting 
officer did skeptically remark, however, on the club’s “republican organization” that 
included a president, vice-president, and secretary.43 Despite political undertones in some of 
the societies, the early ministries of the Restoration generally tolerated them. In a report on 
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42 AN F7-6700, Report, Officiers de paix to Minister of Police, Paris, 13 July 1816.   
 
43 AN F7-6700, Report, Officiers de paix to Minister of Police, Paris, 19 August 1818.  
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more suspect groups, including the Enfants de la folie, the préfet of police suggested that 
despite their propensity to sing “liberal songs and some couplets to the glory of French 
armies,” these groups did not “seem to have any political goal.” 44 Still, the pseudo-Masonic 
secretiveness of the goguettes, the drunken nature of their meetings, and the fact that people 
of questionable allegiance to the regime attended them made the societies worthy of 
continued surveillance.45  
Naturally, the authorities heightened their scrutiny when goguettes explicitly 
challenged the Bourbon state. In one case in 1818, a police informer closely monitored a 
Bonapartist group called the “Sans Gènes” which met under tricolor garlands and repeatedly 
toasted the King of Rome (Napoleon’s son). One member, M. Pargon, an employee at the 
royal treasury, told the police informer that members had to have supported the previous 
regime and not have shown any joy for the Bourbons’ return to power in order to join. This 
same man assured the informer that there were more than twenty similar groups in Paris.46 
That same year, another police official described the “Enfants de la folie” as a meeting where 
members put “exalted liberal ideas that tended to republicanism” to song.47 Despite the 
state’s wariness over their political aspects, the number of goguettes grew steadily during the 
first five years of the Restoration and played an ever more substantial role in the social life of 
the urban working class.  
Government nonchalance over the goguettes disappeared in the conservative backlash 
that followed the assassination of the Duc de Berry in February 1820 and the ascension of 
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46 AN F7-6700, Report, M. Darcourt to Prefet of Police in Paris, Paris, 13 October 1818.  
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ultra-friendly ministries. The growing number of goguettes (at least 40 to 50 in Paris by 
1820) and the correlating increase in the number of members attending had made them and 
their rowdy patrons more visible and irksome to the state. In a circulaire from 25 March 
1820, the Préfet de Police reminded officials that the penal code forbade all unauthorized 
meetings of over twenty individuals, especially when they promoted sedition, blasphemy, 
and immoral behavior. “These reunions,” he wrote, “called goguettes are composed, in 
general, of individuals animated by a very bad spirit.” He complained that composers and 
singers had transformed public eating places into “clubs where they loudly manifest a spirit 
the most contrary to order and tranquility....” 48 Although the préfet did not mention it in his 
report, the recent appearance of published goguette songbooks surely increased the 
government’s alarm over the singing societies.49 In response, the préfet commissioned a 
special internal report on the goguettes.  
The manuscript Rapport sur les sociétés ou réunions lyrico-bachiques/ [Report on 
Lyrical-Bacchic Societies or Gatherings](1820), highlighted the extent of the goguette 
phenomenon, their songs, and the challenges they presented to the regime in terms of 
maintaining public order and preventing the spread of unacceptable political opinions.50 The 
anonymous author of the Rapport described goguettes as refuges for people unable to come 
to terms with the political, social, and cultural stability that had suddenly followed more than 
twenty years of war. He correctly surmised that their songs reflected the social and political 
realities of disenfranchised working class people, and while enumerating the goguettes’ 
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transgressions and threatening aspects, he tried to understand why these groups formed and 
to suggest what the government could do to counter or take advantage of them. From the 
scale of the problem he described in the report, however, it seemed that authorities could do 
little to stop their spread. 
Approaching the problem methodically, the author first ranked the types of goguette 
songs according to order of threat they posed to the state. He considered the great majority of 
them, the “chansons grivoises” (saucy and satiric songs), relatively harmless so long as 
women were not in attendance during their performance. The next category, “chansons 
philosophiques,” raised more concerns because they insulted religion and the clergy, leading 
the author to declare them potentially criminal. “Chansons politiques,” he went on to 
describe, “produce bad effects because even the least significant songwriter who criticizes 
the government’s actions and propagates ideas fashioned in liberal colors . . . procures 
through them [songs] a mass of proselytes for the [liberal] orators of the century.”  
The last category and the most alarming were “chansons militaires,” which the author 
found remarkable for their nostalgia for the Empire, bellicose xenophobia, and vengeful tone. 
The author opportunistically believed, however, that “If external enemies threatened the 
kingdom, they [goguettes] would even be useful to the state, because one often hears in them 
productions that breathe a love of glory and pride in the patrie.” Young people who sang in 
the goguettes had few opportunities for glory anymore, and the author thought they would 
likely welcome the chance to fight for France because they enjoyed singing about patriotic 
war. He suggested the government take an active part in offsetting the goguettes’ political 
and moral threat and preserve their patriotic virtues by regulating them and enrolling 
“prudent, educated, and devoted men into them.” The author unfortunately feared that 
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“liberal papers” had already polluted the goguettes with a strong “hatred of monarchs” that 
needed prompt correction.51 In the absence of a real plan to get goguettes to support the 
government, the authorities ordered the closure of the most offensive clubs. 
 Despite the successful closure of some goguettes following the 1820 Rapport, the 
singing societies rebounded quickly and actually grew in numbers during the remaining years 
of the Restoration. Some societies like the Amis de la Vigne (Friends of the Vine), purposely 
avoided seditious political songs and repeatedly toasted the king and his family, but far more 
were like the Société des Troubadours, in which almost all songs criticized the government.52 
After a renewed effort at closing the goguettes failed, in 1827 the préfet of police decided 
that the best course of action was to tolerate those clubs that applied for permission to meet 
and to monitor them closely.53 These official permissions often came with an order to sing 
only chanson grivoises or satiriques, and to avoid politics altogether.54  
 Songs and singing opened sites for political expression among the lower classes on 
both sides of the political spectrum. In an environment in which the political song had 
become a seditious object and singing had become associated with the disturbance of public 
order, the existence of organized singing societies presented challenges to ministries that 
either wanted to quash partisanship (before 1820), or inculcate ultraroyalist ideology (after 
1820). Regardless of which political persuasion they espoused, songs demonstrated how the 
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frame of national division permeated popular media and how its corollary political ideas and 
activities were not limited to the government and the press. While the Restoration’s political 
elites articulated partisan ideas about the post-revolutionary nation in their forums, royalist 
apologists, goguette songwriters, and the anonymous authors and distributors of political 
songs in the cities and villages of France all contributed to the polarization of the French 
people by echoing or countering elite claims, and turning songs into politically divisive 
weapons. The song became a powerful but independent and unpredictable factor in this 
political culture.  
Part Two: Pro-Royalist Songs 
In 1822, songwriter, playwright, and pamphleteer Auguste Hus commanded all 
lyricists to “Bourbonize! Bourbonize the French song,” but considering the majority of songs 
written at the time, he might have found his order unnecessary.55 Songs praising the 
Bourbons appeared regularly in printed songbooks and state-sponsored publications; and pro-
Bourbon songs dominated the public sphere despite the high profile of seditious works. The 
government naturally embraced songs that celebrated the king and his family, praised the 
peaceful conditions of the Restoration, and lambasted the revolutionary and Napoleonic past. 
Indeed, the first two themes even appeared in many left-leaning goguette songwriters’ works. 
Repeated calls of “vive le roi” in songs did not necessarily signify a political position because 
this pro-monarchical cry was the Restoration’s ubiquitous platitude. Ardent ultraroyalist 
songwriters, however, stood out because they had long embraced polarizing politics and, 
especially after 1820, committed their pens to identifying and fighting enemies of the king 
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and his government. As organs of state propaganda, these ultra-friendly songwriters could 
express their political beliefs without fear of reprisals, and use songs to outline the ultra 
vision for the nation. Their calls of “vive le roi!” belied a commitment to a hierarchical, 
paternalist nation, and a strong condemnation of opposing principles and the people who held 
them.  
Royalist songwriters belonged to the same national singing culture as the goguettes, 
Béranger, and even the seditious songs that circulated through the country. Their songs 
enjoyed as much exposure, if not street popularity, as Béranger’s works, and probably had a 
larger national audience than the goguettes’ regularly proscribed offerings.  Feeding on the 
optimism of the day, royalist writers incorporated goguette lightheartedness into their 
ideological lyrics, bringing vaudevillian sarcasm into their satirical attacks on politically 
active liberals and other more radical leftists. The ultraroyalist songwriters’ efforts, above all, 
aimed to strengthen support for ultras in power, and counter the Left’s high-esteem among 
urban workers. As inheritors of France’s long tradition of popular political songs, they self-
consciously waged an ideological war to retake the medium from the unruly mobs.  
It is difficult to identify an ideal type of ultra songwriter because people of many 
different social, economic, and political backgrounds incorporated pro-royalist sentiments in 
their songs. Members of all social classes wrote royalist songs, from high-ranking 
government officials and nobles, to soldiers, peasants, and urban laborers. For every 
renowned contributor to the royalist canon of songs like the vaudevillist Marc-Antoine-
Madeleine Désaugiers, there were less established and often far more political writers such as 
Charles-Joseph Rougemaître, a low-level government employee and author/editor of several 
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volumes of stridently ultraroyalist songs.56 Ideologically speaking, the lower-class 
Rougemaître exemplified the ultra spirit in his works, the majority of which stand out from 
standard pro-Bourbon songs of the era for their vicious attacks on liberals and other leftists. 
As a frequent attendee of Parisian goguettes, Rougemaître surely brought some of his views 
into these working-class settings. Judging from the popularity of his songs (often reprinted in 
the press), and the existence of at least a few royalist goguettes, it is reasonable to assume 
that ultra propaganda songs had some traction among the urban working class.   
 Ultra songs, like many in the era, often voiced conciliatory sentiments in their 
celebrations of Louis XVIII, his family, and the long-awaited peace that had accompanied 
the monarchy’s reinstallation. Just as staunch defenders of the monarchy had in other media, 
ultra songwriters declared the king’s divinely sanctioned paternal authority to be the source 
of the Restoration’s benefits. An untitled song from 1815, for example, stated that, “In the 
midst of a deadly crisis, / Louis appeared, a celestial spirit; / He came as a father to his 
subjects/ To offer the olive branch of peace.”57 Some ultra songwriters portrayed the 
ascension of the paternal king, who by nature belonged to all French people, as an 
ideological victory for conservatives and demanded that songs of thanksgiving focus solely 
on the king and his family. “Louis by the nation,” wrote a contributor to one of Désaugiers’ 
collections, “Must be loved like a father…/ May our verses and our songs / Only speak of the 
Bourbons.58 Royalist songwriters thus took the themes of reconciliation and forgetting the 
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past (oubli et union) common in other songs and made them conditional upon the acceptance 
of the king as the nation’s father and sole source of the Restoration’s peace. They probably 
reiterated Louis’ legitimacy and role as the nation’s true father in order to compete with the 
many leftist works pining for France’s past regimes. Writers like Michael-Joseph Gentil de 
Chavagnac, countered leftist nostalgia by asserting that national reconciliation could only 
come about with the installation of France’s natural leaders. In a work entitled La cause et 
les éffets, (The Cause and the Effects), he wrote, “If hearts, / Sense the need to unite … It is 
because France / Finally has French princes.59 Celebratory songs from committed ultras’ 
pens politicized reconciliation. They made the acceptance of a restricted vision of 
sovereignty—in this case, absolute paternal sovereignty in the hands of France’s legitimate 
king—the exclusive condition of reconciliation and the sole object of celebration. 
 Despite their narrow vision of the conditions for national reconciliation, royalist 
songwriters still considered unity to be the nation’s normal state and thought of party politics 
as a disease that only afflicted self-interested enemies. Many fervently believed the 
Revolution had split the nation, but from the perspective of the polarized conditions of the 
Restoration, they interpreted this divide in partisan terms. For some ultra songwriters, 
Restoration society consisted of good French people united under the king, the majority, and 
a few opponents whose allegiance to factions prevented their inclusion in the nation. In 
S.E.A. Dinomé’s song, Le premier jour de l’an 1821 (The First Day of the Year 1821), for 
example, even moderate (and vocally pro-monarchist) doctrinaire liberals who did not 
support the ultra government were considered another impediment, albeit a weak one, to the 
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unity of France. Dinome claimed that despite all the commentaries of Guizot, “this coryphée 
of the doctrinaires,” the French would unite in support of the king “without the distinction of 
parties.”60 He implied that without the imposition of parties, the French would rally around 
their natural leader. Singing songs like Dinome’s in public made the ultra discourse of 
national unity particularly effective. These songs portrayed a nation singing together in 
celebration of the king and in stark contrast with elite liberal politicians who only spoke for 
factional interests. In short, politicians who chose party over unity did not join the national 
chorus.  
Royalist songwriters portrayed doctrinaires and their followers as misguided 
partisans, but considered “independent” liberals to be outright scoundrels, unconditionally 
and innately unworthy of France. In 1818, for example, an anonymous songwriter demanded 
their permanent removal from politics, proclaiming, “No more of these good friends of 
France, / These hot partisans of ‘independence’.”61 Ultra songs ridiculed renowned members 
of the liberal opposition such as Lafitte, Constant, and Manuel, portraying them as fools, 
foreigners, and demagogues. An anonymously penned song mocked Lafitte, a millionaire 
banker, for assuming that generosity would yield political gains. “On patrons beneath him, / 
Master ‘Jaco’ Lafitte…spreads money everywhere;” the author asserted, “But we believe that 
that route, / Leads to bankruptcy.”62 Although liberals could not buy the support of the 
working class, royalists feared they could use their rhetorical skills to dupe its artisans, 
workers, and the urban poor. To counter the liberals’ persuasive language, ultra songwriters 
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described them as dishonest and out of touch with good Frenchmen. One songwriter even 
accused Constant of being a foreigner—he was indeed born Swiss—for whom “Language is 
a sponge / That pumps out the lie, / And brazenly distills it,” and called for his immediate 
deportation.63 When it came to attacking liberal speakers, Manuel naturally attracted the 
most attention. In royalist songs, he represented the worst aspects of liberalism because he 
could get ignorant people to accept dangerous principles. A song by “E.L.” entitled, Le 
Patriote par excellence, ou le bon français comme nous en connaissons tant [The Patriot par 
Excellence, or the Good Frenchman Like Many We Know](1824) , for example, described a 
worker reacting to Manuel’s famed quip about France’s “repugnance” for the Bourbons (see 
Chapter Four). “Someone said it to us: / It is with repugnance / That we had welcomed back 
the Bourbons!” the worker sings, “…/ To love them I vainly force myself, / But I cannot find 
them to my taste.”64 Despite its mocking and satirical tone, “E.L.’s” song highlighted the 
threat royalist songwriters’ thought left-wing partisans posed to national unity. Ultras 
assumed that the nation naturally agreed with their political principles, but they also felt that 
liberals like Manuel could weaken the will of the people and pull them from their natural 
love of the king.  
Ultra songbooks featuring these caricatures of liberal politicians nevertheless were 
comprised of a majority of standard royalist celebratory songs. We may assume, therefore, 
that singing sessions featuring both types were common. This contrast between the two 
genres, the laudatory song and the political attack song, outlined the parameters of 
ultraroyalist ideology. The former articulated conditions for national healing, namely, the 
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reinstallation of the legitimate paternal king, while parodies of liberals revealed threats to 
national unity. In short, as ultras described them in music, liberals put self or group interests 
before the nation, championed foreign leaders, engaged in divisive mercenary politics, and 
undermined the people’s respect for the king. After singing numerous songs with “vive le 
roi!,” punctuating their refrains, a group could then sing Nommez-moi, a song which 
portrayed a liberal politician screaming, “Name me! Name me! I am an enemy of the King!,” 
and instantly grasp the difference between royalist fellowship and liberal self-interest.65
Not all royalist songs portrayed party politics negatively. Even though few 
songwriters could participate in formal politics, the inability to avoid partisan language in 
their songs prompted them to move beyond praise for the king and condemnation of enemies, 
and embrace the ultra bloc of politicians. An idealized ultra politician perhaps unsurprisingly 
incarnated all the virtues of the perfect Frenchmen. The author of La fièvre tricoleur (The 
Tricolor Fever), “B.,” suggested “The ultra possesses frankness, / love and sincerity; / He 
adopts for his device / Honor and fidelity.”66 Right-wing songwriters sang proudly of the 
label “ultra” as a badge of esteem. Edmond-Louis Barbier, a popular poet and songwriter, 
proclaimed that “The liberal who will read me, / Will name me, no doubt, ultra. Ah! To that I 
consent.” 67 The anonymous author of the song L’ultra, defied the “greatest songwriters in 
the world” to prove their superiority over him as a “good ultra.”68 By proclaiming themselves 
as ultras, songwriters could distinguish their works from the choruses of “vive le roi” that 
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substituted perfunctory praise for a committed engagement in the Restoration’s political 
battles. 
Royalist songwriters seemed determined to compete with and outdo their political 
rivals in all arenas, including merriment. As equal inheritors of the French singing tradition, 
they enjoyed nights of wine and song as much as those on the Left did, and, so long as the 
king inspired their headiness, ultra songwriters encouraged people to drink and sing with 
ardor. Songwriters such as M. Jacquemart thought singing the king’s praises justified 
drinking and flirting. “On this happy day,” he wrote, “France is en goguette, / Flow, good 
wines, jump young lady, / In the name of the king.”69 Although they encouraged celebration, 
royalist songwriters wanted to avoid having their works associated with the leftist goguettes 
and the riotous singing crowds that raised government suspicions. In Le vrai chansonnier 
(The True Songwriter), Rougemaître urged royalists to avoid the political statements and 
unruly behavior characterizing the goguettes’ productions. “Dear friends, let’s sing, let’s 
sing, / But even in our drunkenness,” he implored, “May a discreet wisdom / Purify our 
songs.” Rougemaître’s plea for decorum implicitly condemned the goguettes, which he 
likened to revolutionary clubs whose “hideous troops / In a threatening club /…/ Presented 
you with blood.”70 Good royalists had to balance the joys of wine and song with their love 
for the king. Only then could they outdo their political rivals in singing and celebrating.  
Rougemaître associated leftist revelry with revolutionary violence, following the ultra 
tendency to consider all political enemies, regardless of ideology or temperament, as violent 
unrepentant revolutionaries. Many right-wing songwriters portrayed goguette singers as 
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fanatical sans-culottes, and interpreted their licentiousness as nostalgia for unfettered liberty 
and revolutionary violence. In an anonymous ultra song entitled, Brutus Bras-de-Fer (Brutus 
Strong Arm), a time-traveling Jacobin from 1793 gleefully encourages Restoration liberals to 
celebrate the return of their beloved popular sovereignty. “No more priests, no more masses, 
/ No more good God, no more kings,” Brutus exclaims, “/ No more grandees, no more 
nobility, / We will recover our rights, / And the people will finally be happy, / Will again 
become sovereign. / What a pleasure, / What a pleasure, / The good times are coming back!” 
71 A songwriting army officer, the Chevalier de Joannis, called even elite liberal politicians, 
“true sans-culottes, / And Jacobins in the mud,” who dared to contest the king’s rights.72 
Royalist songwriters saw revolutionary underhandedness even in the varieties of left-wing 
ideology. In his satirical piece, Les Libéraux, Rougemaître interpreted these variations in 
liberal thought as a sign of the Left’s dangerous changeability and general dishonesty. “This 
impious race of patriots” he wrote, became “sans-culottes” after ’89, pillaged under 
Robespierre, and fell “like Brutus’ monkeys” at Bonaparte’s feet.73 How then, he wondered, 
could they be trusted to uphold their oath to Louis XVIII? 
 In royalist songs, blind adherence to “revolutionary principles” explained the liberals’ 
inconstancy and obstinate rejection of pure monarchical values. In tune with ultra politicians 
and pamphleteers, songwriters considered abstract revolutionary virtues to be contagions or 
supernatural forces. In a diatribe against “La Liberté,” songwriter “A.G.” depicted liberty, the 
Left’s foundational principle, as a monster of diabolic origin: “There was once a monster in 
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hell /  Who in a fit of his rage, / Having one day broken his chains, / To all places brought 
carnage. / Escorted by treason, / We see this bloodthirsty monster / Take the name Liberty, / 
To enslave all the earth.”74 In keeping with the competitive spirit of the day, songwriters then 
lashed out at Restoration liberals infected with perfidious liberty, calling them “secret 
plotters,” “cunning regicides,” “impudent utopists,” and “black Jacobins” who had fallen too 
far under the influence of revolutionary principles for rehabilitation.75  
Ultra songwriters contended that revolutionary principles had undermined the 
liberals’ participation in the Restoration system, vitiating all of their claims of loyalty and 
good intentions. When liberty and treason so often marched together, ultras asked, how could 
anyone trust liberals who proclaimed the rule of law and the sanctity of the Charter? 
Rougemaître, for instance, claimed that the liberals wanted to destroy the “king’s legitimate 
power” by fomenting crime “in the name of law.” 76 Suspicions of duplicity made ultra 
songwriters distrust liberals who cried out “vive la Charte” in chorus with “vive le roi.” 
Royalists assumed this cry had hidden meanings, that it actually insulted the king who had 
given the Charter to the nation. “Do you know how to read / This lovely cry of Vive la 
Charte?” asked songwriter “A.D.-V.C.” in his Le dessous de la Charte (The Underside of the 
Charter),” “I will venture to explain it to you /…/ ‘Alone I allege to make the law / I do not 
know God, or faith.’ / Voila, the underside of the Charter.77 In this song, the ultra songwriter 
danced around the central constitutional problem of the Restoration: the origins and meaning 
of the Charter. In most songs, however, the issue rarely arose. More important than the 
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political niceties surrounding the meaning of the Charter was the liberals’ belief, as ultra 
songwriters imagined it, in the incompatibility of kings and “the people.” Because some 
liberals questioned the nature of this relationship in the Charter, ultras accused all leftists, 
regardless of their professed beliefs on this issue, of adhering to the principle of popular 
sovereignty. “The liberal on all kings, / swears a doctrinal war,” wrote the anonymous author 
of Le liberalism dévoilé: Chant anti-philosophique, (Liberalism unveiled: Anti-philosophical 
Song), “[he] speaks of the people and its rights,/Says that revolt is legal./In his anti-royal 
system,/He has an ideal project/ For an anarchic government.”78 This royalist songwriter 
followed the common script for attacking the Restoration Left: connect the liberals to 
revolutionary principles and then deny their loyalty to the restored monarchy.    
  This strategy naturally led ultra songwriters to accuse liberals and other leftists of 
treason, and to challenge the goguettes’ professed patriotism. Many of the goguettes’ most 
popular songs romanticized the revolutionary and Napoleonic soldier, and contrasted 
patriotic principles with the aristocratic self-interest. Some ultras tried to counter this theme 
by composing verses lauding Old Regime heroes, but those warriors were long dead and 
praising them did not resonate in a post-revolutionary public sphere. Songs about more 
contemporary examples of royalist military patriotism, such as counterrevolutionary émigrés 
and Vendéens, also failed to compete with the flood of leftist works extolling the patriotism 
of the millions of French who had served under recent regimes.  
Ultra songwriters responded by criticizing the Left for placing the “patrie” and the 
“nation” over the paternal king, once again raising the central political question of 
Restoration debates. They considered the popular martial song as evidence of the Left’s 
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misplaced love, and, as they did with “Liberté,” they questioned the value of patriotism. In 
ultra songs, old soldiers so beloved in the goguettes’ productions became mercenaries who 
placed “patriotism” above virtue. “Seduced by gold, some warriors, /” complained the author 
of Libéralisme dévoilé, “Sacrificed honor, laurels, / To the shadow of Patriotism.” 79 Ultra 
songwriters portrayed liberals’ patriotism as camouflage for their true desire to introduce 
revolutionary principles. “The liberal that I critique,” wrote Barbier, “Is this ultra-republican, 
/ Who, always sings this refrain: / …/ Let’s push on to anarchy! / It is for the happiness, the 
happiness of the patrie.” 80 With the advent of the Spanish War, the ultras created a new 
genre of Restoration military songs redefining military patriotism in royalist terms (see 
Chapter Three), but they never stopped attacking the Left for its praise of soldiers loyal to the 
Revolution and Napoleon.  
To sing of politics, the nation, or the people without privileging the king was to invite 
ultra condemnation throughout the period. Pro-royalist songs enjoyed great exposure in the 
press, at official functions, and in their own songbooks, but in general, they had difficulty 
crafting nuanced political messages. Politically, their songs enjoyed the privilege of being 
acceptable to the government and simple to understand. To praise the monarchy was simple, 
but in a polity in which such praise was the norm, ultraroyalist songwriters had difficulty 
differentiating themselves from the crowd. They distinguished themselves only with 
simplified condemnations of their political opposition, but by doing so, they further polarized 
politics and made the monarchical utopia of which they sang more difficult to attain.  
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Part Three: Leftist Goguettes’ Political Songs 
Few working-class songwriters called themselves “liberal” in the same way that their 
counterparts on the Right assumed the titles “royalist” or “ultra.” Rather than parroting 
liberal politicians in the press, their songs combined issues particular to the working class 
with a diverse ménage of leftist positions including some discredited Bonapartist and 
republican principles. Strong class-conscious radicalism pervaded their works, leading them 
to attack aristocratic royalists who supported the regime more viciously than most liberal 
politicians would. Despite differences in temperament, elite liberals and lower-class 
songwriters all agreed that the “nation” meant the French people as bearers of special rights 
and not simply as subjects of the sovereign king. On this foundation, working-class 
songwriters forged a rhetorical alliance with liberal politicians that occluded the variety in 
both lower-class leftist and elite liberal politics, and was strong enough to unite both groups 
against the ultras’ reactionary policies. Although leftist songwriters often hid political 
opinions behind sarcasm and satire—especially in the published collections of goguette 
songs—their songs’ brought polarized elite politics to the urban lower class. 
 Despite their reputation for radicalism, goguette songwriters rarely attacked the king 
and his family in their published works. In fact, many expressed thanks for the benefits of 
Bourbon rule. Their songs of praise, however, could subtly undermine the king’s special 
status by suggesting conditions for monarchical power. In particular, they offered an 
alternative to the ultras’ spiritual conception of monarchical authority as an unquestionable 
and unconditional gift of God. Debraux and his erstwhile writing partner Charles Le Page, 
for example, urged Charles X, “whose heart is the hope of France,” to accept and fulfill 
whatever duties the people gave him. “If our love, in its independence,” they wrote, “For all 
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present offers you but a flower, / It will die if your hand abandons it.” They reminded the 
king that, “The least flower that one merits, / Is worth more than a vain crown.”81 Behind 
their deferential tone, Debraux and Le Page insinuated with their metaphorical gift of a 
flower that the king’s authority came from the people, making him a caretaker answerable to 
the people. The goguette contributor, Perdry, navigated even more dangerous waters when he 
satirically claimed—alluding to a tradition by which a “king” is crowned every Christmas 
after finding a bean in a cake—that legitimacy derived more from chance than through blood. 
“Chance alone renders legitimate,” he wrote, “The rights of this royalty.”82  Singers of this 
work would have had the opportunity to reflect on the true king’s status as they 
lightheartedly sang about the ersatz monarchs they crowned each year.   
Despite hinting at limits to the king’s authority, in general leftist songwriters seemed 
grateful that his return ushered in a period of peace that could facilitate national 
reconciliation and unity. In the calm that followed twenty-five years of turmoil, a sense of 
repose and leisure took hold in many songwriters, and rather than disrupting placid 
conditions with political attacks, they called for national unity after years of division. The 
collegial social world of the goguettes with its culture of obligatory fraternity served as a 
model for the renewed nation. Many songs addressed the problem of post-revolutionary 
division as one of sentiment, as though wine and song alone could unite the French. Debraux, 
for example, thought he could drown discord in wine and song because, “We are all sons of 
the same France.”83 These calls for unity (à la goguette) emphasized the French people’s 
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natural fraternal bonds and powers of self-regeneration while downplaying the king’s role in 
unifying the nation. This stood in stark contrast to royalist songs that considered the king’s 
paternal force to be the sole source of unity.   
Leftist goguette songs spoke of the king and the people’s mutual rights and duties, 
preserving respect for the former and claiming independence for the latter. Songwriter E. C. 
Piton, for example, reminded his audience that “The king counts on the patrie, / The patrie 
expects all from the king.”84 Although disagreements over this relationship between king and 
country fueled the era’s fundamental debate on the nature of the Charter, few songwriters 
diverted themselves from gaiety to engage explicitly in this debate. By underlining the 
autonomy of the French people, however, they reiterated the liberals’ conception of the 
constitution as a contract and followed the lead of many poets in praising the document as a 
national treasure. Many songwriters dedicated works to the Charter and sang of it as the true 
source of the era’s unity and peace. It became the sine qua non of the Restoration’s promise 
of reconciliation and peace. As Eugène de Pradel wrote, “… without the Charter, / All the 
French are lost.”85 After giving France the Charter, the king receded into the background of 
most leftist songs while the nation celebrated without him.   
 Not all goguette songwriters rejoiced over the new era. Indeed many looked primarily 
to the past for inspiration. Some works spoke nostalgically about France’s recent history 
while others condemned the Old Regime, but both genres offered a divisive assessment of 
Restoration society through the lens of the past. Some leftist songwriters considered national 
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reconciliation, as offered by the ultras, illusory because it meant denying the recent past 
rather than resolving differences. They turned to carefully praising certain aspects of life 
during the previous regimes, especially the military exploits that had offered the lower class a 
sense of purpose and identity. Songs such as Debraux’s La Colonne [The Column], which 
considered Napoleon’s column on the Place Vendôme a symbol of a proud but defeated 
nation, became staples among singing crowds throughout France. Praising the past naturally 
led to attacks on ultras, whom songwriters considered accessories to foreign enemies. Leftist 
songwriters condemned upper class treatment of the French people even before the 
Revolution. Rehashing revolutionary rhetoric about aristocrats’ mistreatment of the common 
people, songwriter Pierre Tournemine considered the Bastille a more fitting symbol of 
France’s past than the Vendôme column. “When finally the truth shines, / Let us forget these 
times of regrets,” he wrote, “[When] Crime was in the palaces, / And innocence in the 
Bastille.”86 Although they chose different monuments to represent France, both Debraux and 
Tournemine spoke as much to division in their contemporary society as in the past. A “true” 
symbol of France would remind the people of continuing inequality and arbitrariness, and not 
just lost glory or old injustices. 
Many lower class songwriters recast the Restoration on the whole as a period of loss, 
and pined for civil and political rights for which so many had sacrificed their lives. Their 
songs often portrayed old soldiers or government officials from previous regimes (bannis) in 
order to highlight persistent social inequality and the incompleteness of Restoration unity. 
Exiled old sergeants, dismissed clerks, and disgraced national heroes featured prominently in 
these maudlin patriotic songs. Debraux’s Adieu d’un français [Farewell of a Frenchmen] 
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(1821) depicted an exiled French soldier uttering these last words from France’s border: 
“Adieu beautiful patrie, / Adieu cherished France, / Alas, I am going / To leave you 
forever.”87 Debraux and others commonly referred to these bannis as prototypical 
“Frenchmen” lamenting their exclusion from national unity. The popularity of these songs 
undoubtedly appealed to the many slighted ex-soldiers who attended the goguettes, but they 
also drew upon wider working-class suspicions about the refashioning of post-revolutionary 
society. In addition to their anger at the contradiction between national unity and exile that 
the treatment of the bannis exposed, leftist songwriters also thought their punishment proved 
the Right’s lack of patriotism. One songwriter, “J.A.D.,” for example, wrote that the “ultra-
monarchic” admired “oriental arbitrariness” and “scandalized the national spirit” while 
treating “patriotic love as a crime.”88 They expressed their outrage, in particular, at the ultras’ 
persecution of national heroes in favor of proud émigré aristocrats whose martial abilities 
could not match the accomplishments of honorable Napoleonic soldiers. H. Sybille, for 
example, summed up the attitude of many when he pointed out the contrast of “these proud 
warriors, who honor France, / Next to whom are these intruder warriors....”89 Sybille’s 
condemnation joined many other songs in which the Restoration’s noble warriors appeared as 
“Don Quixotes” and frauds.  
Leftist songwriters were particularly galled that nobles, who did not fight for France 
during the previous twenty-five years, now claimed civil and political rights denied the 
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working class. In the past, service to the state had given members of the lower class a 
modicum of political power, and though the memory of such political enfranchisement under 
previous regimes was often at odds with reality, leftist songwriters contrasted the conception 
of empowerment with the actual and rhetorical exclusion of the working class from political 
participation during the Restoration. Some songs declared that past regimes had recognized 
service to the nation as the criterion for inclusion in the body of citizens. In Le soldat citoyen 
[The Citizen Soldier] (1822), Pradel wrote from the perspective of an old working-class 
soldier reminiscing on how his service once gave him citizenship and allowed him to stand 
up to elite derision. “In vain,” the old soldier proclaims, “Would they dare say to me, 
Laborer, you are nothing. / For I am a citizen.” 90 Songwriters again compared old soldiers 
with émigrés to highlight the injustice of French citizenship and identity in the Restoration. 
They especially criticized ultras for emigrating during the Revolution, and then declaring 
their status as “true Frenchmen.” Mocking this common ultra claim, Debraux portrayed an 
émigré noble complaining about the Restoration’s ostensibly inclusive nature, “Finally we 
push excess, / To the point of naming ‘French, / Some men who, since their childhood, / Did 
not even quit France.”91 Songs like Debraux’s reveal the insecurity of the political and civil 
position of the working class during the Restoration. Without suffrage or the opportunity for 
national service, workers had little to gain from the new regime. Working-class resentment 
only increased when ultras claimed their superiority and flaunted their access to the political 
system.  
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Lack of access to the political system drove working-class songwriters to contrast 
greater society’s faults with the goguettes’ internal cohesive structures. The singing society 
became an alternative world where equal members belonged to a social order with its own 
rules. From the shelter of these mini-republics with elected officers and equal members, 
songwriters mocked the ultras’ attachment to noble birthright and the Old Regime’s defunct 
hierarchy with its arcane rituals and social markers of belonging. In the goguettes, Debraux 
explained, “You banish the symmetry / That one observes at the tables of kings.” The goal 
instead was to “enjoy in peace…your [the goguette’s] laws” and “laugh at the vain etiquettes 
/ Of all the grandees.”92 The goguettes created conditions for working-class people to bolster 
their self-worth vis-à-vis the upper echelons of society. Compared to the goguette’s bawdy 
but equitable atmosphere, songwriter J. Moreau thought aristocratic snobbery was simple 
posturing, and pointed out the absurdity of claiming a higher social status. “May an 
ambitious fool / Speak of his ancestors / And boast of his nobility,” he wrote, “I believe 
myself noble also / When I am drunk.”93 His sophomoric commentary aside, Moreau 
suggested that the social roles of the past no longer had meaning in the post-revolutionary 
world. In reality, both the goguettes’ attendees and returning nobles created fictive worlds in 
their songs that reflected their own conceptions of an ideal society.  
Despite the derisive lightheartedness with which working-class songwriters wrote 
about ultras and their pretensions, they also feared that their enemies in the nobility were 
trying to reestablish feudalism in France. Songwriters combated this threat by ridiculing the 
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Right’s narratives of the past, starting with the story of the origins of the French people that 
ultras had used to justify social hierarchy. In a song entitled Un morceau de pain [A Piece of 
Bread], Debraux referred to the widespread belief that French nobles descended from the 
Frankish barbarians who had enslaved the Gallo-Romans. Instead of valorizing nobles like 
apologists for this historical theory, however, he used the narrative to explain the nobility’s 
rapacity and violent history of repression. “One day the Franks, a people rude and savage,” 
he wrote, “On the Gauls swept down like brutes, / They reduced the vanquished to 
servitude,”94  Other goguette songwriters complained that nobles still harbored nostalgia for 
licensed debauchery at the peasants’ expense and mockingly described the ultras as pining 
for the “good old times” when the nobility’s pleasure determined wrong from right. The 
songwriter Aury, for example, wrote from the perspective of a noble who recalls when 
members of the lower class never complained.  “…they were  happy, / These good peasants 
of France, / To obey the valiant,’ Aury’s fictitious noble sings, “…that a great lord / Did 
them honor / By seducing, in their families, / Either their wives or their daughters! / Ah, how 
happy we were / In the times of our elders.” 95 The idea that nobles could not reconcile their 
past with the relatively progressive features of the new regime became a predominant theme. 
In his song, Le malheureux, [The Unhappy], Debraux described a sleeping marquis, who 
dreamt, “Puffed up with the foolish hopes / For the return of his feudal rights.”96 In fact, 
returned nobles adjusted skillfully to the new political and legal system, but Debraux 
nonetheless reiterated the belief that all nobles secretly longed for a return to the Old Regime. 
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Moreover, he and other songwriters insinuated that the noble mind retained an innate and 
subconscious preference for societal regression. Working-class songs, perhaps more than any 
other medium, perpetuated this perception and contributed to the conviction that post-
revolutionary division was insurmountable.  
A biting assessment of contemporary royalist behavior accompanied these satirical 
assaults on ultra nostalgia. Leftist songwriters claimed that longing for the past made 
returned émigrés unable to forgive and forget as mandated by the Charter. Instead, ultras had 
become slaves to vengeance who spent their time punishing the rest of France for their own 
losses. “Our Grandees, with a criminal hand,” wrote the songwriter Lavigne, “Welcome her 
[Vengeance] and caress her: / They applaud her crimes; / They point out her victims for her / 
Who should fall under her blows: / They have from old thatched cottages, / Chased entire 
families, / In order to satisfy her wrath.”97 This image of “grandees” persecuting peasants in 
their thatched cottages revealed the class-consciousness that underpinned working-class 
political songs. Songwriters gave voice to widespread dissatisfaction with the development of 
new noble (and non-noble) elites who dominated all government positions. Songwriter 
Frédéric Fougéray considered all men who wielded power during the Restoration 
“newcomers.” In his 1823 song Obéis et tais-toi, [Obey and Shut Up], he castigated the ultra 
ministry for its arbitrary assault on those who had risen through merit. “These parvenus, 
through their audacity,” he wrote, “Want to climb higher still: / From the feeble they seize 
their places, / And buy their honor with the weight of gold.” 98 Fougéray’s attack on returned 
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émigrés and other wealthy ultras who dominated the ultra government arose from the 
pervading sense of class persecution fueling working-class songs.  
The conviction among songwriters that the new system was not equitable exposed 
even the king to occasional criticism. Despite the license with which they attacked ultras and 
nobles in general, even slight remarks aimed specifically at the king’s role in government 
could land songwriters in jail. Indeed, both Pradel and Debraux spent several months in 
prison for vaguely worded allusions to the king.99 One way goguette writers could complain 
about the government while avoiding prosecution was to emphasize the humanity and 
fallibility of the new regime’s elite players—including the king—without specifically naming 
them. Early in his published career (and before the government of the ultraroyalist Villèle 
ministry under which he faced prosecution), Debraux criticized kings in general using this 
leveling technique: “See these sovereigns, / Some poor humans / Calling themselves tutelary 
Gods; / These gods of flesh and bone /…/Kings, show less pride; / Like us the coffin claims 
you;...”100 Debraux’s later writing partner, Charles Lepage, used the same approach to 
criticize the king’s cabinet. Following the lead of the Charter, he distinguished between the 
inviolable king and his ministers, and attacked the latter for their claims of superiority. 
“Know the kings of the Earth / Boast well of the most accomplished,” he wrote, “Attack, in 
their ministries, / These false inheritors of Sully /..../ Fight young songwriters / A minister is 
nothing but a man.” 101 Lepage reminded the Restoration ministers of their humanity and put 
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them in their place by referring to the greatness of previous ministers such as Henri IV’s 
famed advisor Sully, the mastermind of that monarch’s conciliatory policies.  
Songwriters attacked ultra ministers and their supporters because they perverted the 
new regime’s political institutions and, more than any other group, prevented French people 
from realizing national reconciliation. Songwriter Eduoard Corbière, for example, accused 
the ministry and its declared supporters in the Chambers (ministériels) of colluding to destroy 
the Restoration system of government. In his song Le budget de 1820, un député ministériel à 
ses collèges [The Budget of 1820, a Ministerial Deputy to His Colleagues] (1819), Corbière 
likened the ministerial approach to politics to a banquet of gluttons. In the song, fictional 
ultra politicians sample and devour the fundamental freedoms that the Left cherished.  “The 
Charter, of freedom / is the rampart unassailable,” one of his ravenous ministerial deputies 
brags, “But [in it] I partook of a certain paté / Whose crust was delectable.” Along with the 
Charter, the gourmands also devoured election laws because they posed a threat if left 
untouched. 102 Corbière thus portrayed right-wing politicians as both avaricious and arbitrary 
and highlighted the contrast between greedy fattened men who destroyed the Charter and 
already unfair election laws, and the goguettes’ singers who drank and ate together in an 
equitable fashion. 
The Catholic clergy also felt the wrath of leftist songwriters, not necessarily for 
religious reasons but because they supported the conservative governments of the era. 
Goguette songwriter Favard (aîné) mocked the Catholic missionary movement’s close ties to 
ultra politicians. In Sermen d’un missionnaire [Oath of a Missionary] (1820), he portrayed a 
Jesuit priest admonishing the people for their love of “grenadiers over crusaders,” and their 
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reading of philosophes rather than scripture. Favard’s cleric rails against a crowd protesting 
the ministry: “You dare to condemn the abuses / That the ministry commits; / I see it, you no 
longer know / To see all, suffer all, and stay silent.”103 For working-class songwriters, 
religious zealots joined the ranks of reactionary enemies opposed to their celebrations. In a 
revised version of the revolutionary war song, Le chant du depart [The Chant of Departure], 
for example, Debraux wrote, “Beat it wicked buffoons, / Censor, minister, / And monk with a 
sinister eye.”104 When they took on the clergy, working-class songwriters did not refute 
dogma or criticize the pious, but saw in the Church yet another sinister form of Restoration 
authority impinging on their liberty.    
 For all their songs’ general political content, urban working-class songwriters rarely 
wrote about contemporary political debates and those involved in them. When not 
complaining about the fate of Napoleonic soldiers or the general iniquity of Restoration 
society, they generally portrayed politically active ultras’ initiatives as nuisances that sprang 
from the deep reactionary impulses leftist songwriters criticized. Songwriters were, however, 
acutely aware of the divisiveness of Restoration politics, and when the situation demanded it, 
they occasionally expressed support for the liberal opposition. In general, they understood 
that liberals in the Chambers valued many of the same principles as working-class leftists and 
so merited praise, especially when compared to their ultra counterparts. Debraux, for 
example, assessed the virtues of deputies in the Chambers in his allegorical song, La charte 
d’amour [Love’s Charter]. He associated personal traits with political opinions and left little 
ambiguity over his own preferences:  “Foolishness and clumsiness, / On the Right have the 
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first row. / Gluttony and Sloth / In the Center establish their camp; / On the Left we admire 
the verve / Bravery and Loyalty / And Minerva placed Honor there / Right next to Liberty.” 
105 Despite their exclusion from political participation, some members of the goguettes 
expressed similar sentiments of solidarity with the liberal elite. The liberal, wrote the 
songwriter A. Gombault, besides “reading Minerve,” voting to “recall the bannis,” and 
respecting “old warriors,” embodied the generosity of spirit necessary for post-revolutionary 
reconciliation. “Without anyone dictating his conduct,” Gombault wrote, “To go with 
greatest haste, / To succor without return / A poor devil in the hospital, / That there is a 
liberal.”   106 They would not have the chance to vote for liberals, but these songwriters knew 
that, of all the wealthy people managing their nation’s affairs, the liberals by nature were less 
likely to offend working-class sensibilities. 
Judging from their songs, the main theoretical debates of the period mattered little to 
the artisans, trades people, veterans, and clerks of the goguettes. Living in stressed, unstable 
economic conditions, they first sought targets that could explain the perceived regression in 
society from progressive principles. Anger inspired some to write songs that met with 
prosecution, and which further animated the divisive street activists of the period. These 
songs, which often appeared transcribed in police archives, lacked subtlety as they leveled 
personal attacks on the restored monarchy and all that accompanied it. When they worked 
within the legal framework, however, leftist songwriters were better able to express class 
prejudices and suspicions that underlay their dislike for ultras and their reactionary 
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supporters. Working-class songwriters identified with politicians who shared their faith in the 
people and who resisted the return to a society that offered fewer civil and political rights. 
Liberals spoke of liberty and equality. Even if these virtues in elite politicians fell far short of 
street radicals’ expectations, the goguettes’ singers and writers could consider them allies on 
the same side of the post-revolutionary divide.  
Part Four: Rejecting of Elite Politics 
In the midst of the Restoration’s incessant barrage of political discourse, goguette 
songwriter J.B. Gagnée chose to ignore the rancor and focus on drinking. “To discuss politics 
/ Has for me few attractions” he claimed, “But a bacchic debate /  Never tires me out.” 107 
For all of their pleas of justice for exiles, their anger at aristocratic privilege, and their 
identification with other leftists, many goguette songwriters shared Gagnée’s frustration with 
politics. Gombault declared that “If many angry people in caustic mood, / To trouble our 
joyous delights, /  Want to talk to us about politics, / That will not do.” 108 The singing 
societies never intended to be sounding boards for leftist politics, but rather an escape from 
the rancor of the period. Songwriter Demailly thus made swearing off politics the foremost 
rule for a goguette, claiming at the end of a song listing his singing societies’ regulations, 
“Especially, no political song; / It ices over gaiety.”109 Was this escapism itself an expression 
of political identity? In a society that did not offer any political outlet for the lower class 
other than petitions, the tendency to avoid politics became a statement of dissatisfaction with 
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the status quo and not simply a capitulation to political impotency. Escapism, mockery, and 
disgust were the symptoms of a class searching for alternatives to ultra and liberal politics. 
By routinely dismissing the partisan rancor above them, songwriters opened a space for a 
new model of politics based on lower class solidarity.  
 Goguette songwriters, like writers of every political persuasion and in every genre 
during the Restoration, wrote effusively on the theme of unity. Songwriter “Béchu” offered 
the following refrain: “Reunite the opposing parties, / And may this cry be repeated: / Good 
French! Let us live as brothers, / For that is the wish of Humanity.    110 We have seen how 
these common sentiments of unity could belie prejudices about the ideal makeup of the 
nation, or hold reconciliation hostage to the adoption of one side’s way of thinking. When 
members of working-class goguettes wrote about unity, they too incorporated ideological 
biases in their songs. More often than taking political sides, however, goguette songwriters 
expressed disappointment at the unrealized promise of the new age, and blamed both 
opposing factions for interrupting with their contestation what should have been a national 
celebration. Some, like Pierre Tournemine, thought France’s unity required genuine 
ideological agreement. “I would like, oh my country, oh France!” he wrote, “That your 
children, having but one color, / For your honor, your independence, / Were in agreement in 
mind and heart.”  111 Tournemine offered no political conditions for this unity, but without a 
doubt, the partisan status quo failed to offer the lower class an appealing vision of national 
unity.  
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 Goguette songwriters imagined the end of contestation through surrender to wine and 
song because partisan politics mitigated any real chance for national reconciliation. The 
songwriter Valentin painted a fanciful picture of implacable political enemies, liberals 
Etienne and Constant, and ultras Bonald and Marcellus, setting their political differences 
aside to toast one another and sing each other’s praise. “Thirty years caused our tears! / May 
instantly,” Valentin hoped, “…Bonald tip one back with Etienne! / May Marcellus sing an 
antiphony, / To the health of Constant.” 112 This song turned political identity into a personal 
trait that any willing individual could overcome. Valentin knew that the goguette could 
maintain the peace of its members through a commitment to good cheer, and thus suggested 
that upper-class politicians and journalists likewise give revelry a chance. His was a working-
class solution to the nation’s discord, and it revealed the exasperation of those whose only 
entry point into formal politics was through singing.  
Although vexing for those songwriters who held out hope for reconciliation, the elite 
politicians’ constant rhetorical battles at least provided humorous fodder for working-class 
songwriters. Debraux, for example, lauded freedom of the press because it opened a window 
on the foolishness of partisan politics. “In my delight / I believe I have already read,” he 
stated, “All the great puppets of the two spirits of party, /  Go on, let them make battle. / Go 
on, may they squabble, / What noise!, what agitation!... / I who have nothing invested in this, 
/ I am going to laugh heartily over it.”113 Debraux spoke for the urban worker who had no 
access to the institutions in which liberals and ultras fought. The polarizing politics of elites 
may have penetrated all levels of Restoration society, but lower class French people only 
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interacted with these politics on a discursive level. Words alone did little to alter lower-class 
social realities, the basic needs and conditions of urban life remained unchanged by debates 
on the nature of post-revolutionary France. Debraux explicitly tied the goguettes’ tendency 
towards distracting celebration to a laissez-faire attitude towards politics. For those who had 
“nothing invested in this,” squabbling elites at least offered prime targets for derision.  
Other songwriters were less forgiving when they emphasized how class divided those 
who participated in the political system from those excluded from it. One typical class-
conscious response to incessant partisan discourse was to condemn all politics as the domain 
of wealthy, egocentric elites looking for fame. As the songwriter Marteau chided in his song 
Chanson de table [Table Song] (1819): “May the orator at the tribune, / Harangue the 
peoples and the kings, /  To make a name for himself in history.”114 Although critical of 
forces that excluded them from politics, many writers considered statecraft a burden that few 
working class people would choose.  
François Dauphin expressed such sentiments in his class-conscious work, L’artisan. 
“My mind concerns itself but little / With the frail vessel of the state,” his character admits, 
“To the great ones alone who fear the storm, / I abandon the till / And I go after my work / 
To laugh and drink with the crew.”115 Dauphin’s fictitious artisan makes no claim to political 
participation. Instead of complaining about his exclusion from politics, he leaves the troubles 
of governance to the “great ones” and abandons himself to drinking and merriment. 
Considering the rampant partisanship that increasingly hampered the Restoration’s political 
system, Dauphin’s abdication of responsibility was also an implicit condemnation of how 
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elites ran in circles when conducting the nation’s business. “To speak of the grandees’ 
disputes / Is an unwise path to take,” Debraux reminded his readers, “Let us save our time, / 
For more agreeable pursuits /…/ Let’s allow the potentates fight. / And good grief, let’s live 
as brothers.”116 Members of the political class proved unable to resolve their differences, but 
the urban working class responded by creating their own conditions for societal solidarity in 
their songs. Rejecting the partisan rancor dividing the upper class was the first condition of 
class-consciousness, and indeed, national unity.  
 Disdain for upper class politicians developed into silent anger when the songwriters’ 
political impotence made it impossible for them to address the issues most important to them. 
Debraux, for example, castigated the rich for abandoning the poor veterans and noted that 
only the wealthy “monsieurs” could fix the damage they caused. In his song Ne parlons pas 
politique [Let Us Not Speak Politically], he asked his audience, “Do you want to know who 
betrayed them [veteran soldiers]? / It is for you, the Monsieurs, to give the reply.” The song’s 
refrain, however, highlighted the pointlessness of trying to work within “the Monsieurs” 
system because one was more likely to alert the police to one’s politics than to meet with any 
success. Debraux capitulated to his impotency and eschewed addressing political problems, 
“Because I no longer like to speak politically, / I no longer speak politically.”117 This 
calculated withdrawal from the political sphere did not mean that the Left gave up advocating 
for social and political priorities, but rather, it reflected a widespread belief that they could 
gain much satisfaction through engaging the rich “monsieurs” who controlled the system. 
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 Songwriters could counsel their friends to ignore politics, but the Restoration’s active 
public sphere made such advice hard to follow. The press, in particular, fed on political 
acrimony and publicized partisan divisiveness to generate readers. As literate members of the 
underclass, songwriters in all likelihood could not avoid coming across and digesting the 
political news of the day. The press therefore came under attack in several goguette songs 
because it fueled the elites’ political contestation. In their song Je n’en veux plus [I Want No 
More of It], Tournemine and Hippolyte Leroy expressed their frustrations with political 
journals. “In our periodical works, /  If I saw nothing on morals,” they wrote, “I have of a 
hundred political speeches, / Deplored the sad colors…And I said: / Each writing / That one 
reads / Offers, under the name brochure, / But a dictionary of abuse / I want no more of 
them.”   118 Sometimes songwriters did not distinguish between politicians and the press, 
especially because many deputies also wrote articles or published speeches in partisan 
journals. Songwriter Louis Voitelain thought that when politicians had access to the press, it 
highlighted how the two sides contradicted each other and ended up vitiating their arguments. 
“Ultras, liberals, / Proclaim they are for the good cause; / And in their speeches, / Each paints 
his system in pink,” he explained, “….All is written in the name of France. / How these 
writers / Good God, are liars.”  119  Leroy, however, berated journalists, and even suggested 
that they caused the great divide in society. He wrote, “And you also, Messieurs the 
journalists, / In my opinion, how deaf you are; / You grow the lists of the factious, / You lose 
yourselves in wicked speeches; / Quit, quit your sterile quill, / Through chansons terminate 
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your trials.”  120 It is interesting to note, however, that none of the songwriters complained 
about the great number of their songs that made their way into the same journals they 
condemned. These songs, as we have seen, were equally capable of exacerbating the political 
situation.  
 Working-class songwriters wrote their share of incendiary political works, but they 
also attacked the “spirit of party” and called on elite members of the government to place the 
nation before their political affiliations. Songwriter Casimir Josselin, for instance, 
condemned state officials for bringing divisive party politics to their jobs. “Judges, 
sometimes in your decisions / The demon of parties presides,” he lamented, “You, deputies, 
in your decrees, / This fatal god also directs you.”  121 Many songwriters attacked anyone who 
purposely adopted the label of “liberal” or “ultra,” because these terms kept people from 
identifying first with the nation. The lyricist Comédon thought that privileging factional 
identity prevented the nation from enjoying the promised peace of the new age. He reminded 
politicians that “We tear at our cherished mother, / With the names of ultras and liberals. / No 
more parties, may honor rally us /… / Let us cry out less strongly, and be good Frenchmen.” 
 122 Pradel echoed this sentiment in his song, Conseils aux ultras et libéraux [Advice to Ultras 
and Liberals], and reminded politicians that “From deadly divisions / Follow revolutions.” 
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/…/ We are French, we must live as brothers.”123 Exclusion from formal politics lent an air 
of authenticity to leftist songwriters who articulated this common theme of unity. Although 
they were as responsible for political bile in the public sphere as any other sector of society, 
by not participating in the system they could ostensibly claim that they were above the 
vicious politics that kept France from healing. 
Working-class songwriters may have written numerous songs about French solidarity 
because they understood that the lower classes always suffered most when politics turned 
bitter and divisive.  With no formal outlet for the expression of political beliefs, working 
class activists could not hide behind the mantle of political legitimacy that shielded most 
upper class liberals, and met instead with violent reprisals and prosecution when they tried to 
voice political opinions on the street. Achille Fosset described the price that members of the 
working class often paid for being politically active in his song, Les conseilleurs ne sont pas 
les payeurs [The Givers of Advice Don’t Pay the Price]. Fosset wrote, “I found myself in a 
crowd, / Someone said to me, cry Vive La Charte, / Me, I cheerfully obeyed right away, / 
Soon afterward, two infamous thugs, / While punching me, for the price of my clamors, / 
made me see that for popular commotions, / The givers of advice don’t pay the price.” 124 On 
the street, political differences led to violence. When prodded to voice political positions in 
public, members of the urban working class exposed themselves to violent retribution, public 
condemnation, and prosecution. It is little wonder that many wary songwriters chose to avoid 
the partisan fracas. 
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 Ultimately, detachment from the political world increased songwriters’ belief in the 
superior patriotism of the working class. Protected from accusations of private or party 
interest by their lack of access to the political system, working-class songwriters believed 
they could speak for the French nation better than partisan politicians could. Debraux, for 
example, sang, “I never praised power, / I never praised parties; / In all times, my voice was 
for France.”125 Dauphin too claimed in his song, La vie du bon laboureur [Life of the Happy 
Laborer], that disinterest in politics was the working person’s greatest virtue because it 
fostered a love for the nation unsullied by partisanship. “To civil discords, / In all times the 
stranger,” he wrote, “Near to servile flatterers / He cannot draw up. / Sensitive to suffering / 
Of the patrie in tears, / He only sees France, / And not the colors.”126 Dauphin portrayed the 
working person as a pure patriot, allied to no one but compatriots and devoted to the patrie 
before self-interest.  
Retaining memories of their agency during the Revolution and excluded for the 
moment from the formal political world, urban shopkeepers, soldiers, artisans, and clerks 
waited for their influence to rebound. Elites conducted their politics largely unconcerned 
about how the working class would react, but in the event the lower class rediscovered its 
political muscle, songwriter Bonichon-Beaugrand warned, “In political matters, / Prudence is 
better than spirit /… / Men of state take guard, / Do not wake the sleeping cat.”  127 The “cat” 
that eventually awoke in 1830 had not been idle through the political turbulence of the 
Restoration. The working class spent fifteen years as witness to political contestation in 
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which it could not join, but which helped it recognize its exclusion from the post-
revolutionary settlement and develop new models of social cohesion. Working-class 
songwriters were not immune to partisanship, indeed they identified with many of the 
assumptions behind elite liberals’ ideology. But the contrast between discord at the top of 
society and solidarity in their goguettes helped the working-class songwriters envision post-
revolutionary France outside the parameters of liberal and ultra contestation—a society 
founded on the principle of lower-class unity.  
 “In me had been born the hope / Of one day seeing the parties die out;” François 
Dauphin wrote in 1821, “But hiding under an enthusiastic air, / I hear hatred buzzing 
around.”  128 While many songwriters tried to distance themselves from the Restoration’s 
formal politics, few actually offered political solutions in their songs that could heal 
sociopolitical polarization. When they voiced their most common ideal for the nation 
comprised of an autonomous people, they alienated conservatives and only exacerbated the 
division in society. In time, their vision became even more radical as it coalesced around 
working-class identity and solidarity, further widening the gulf between the Left and Right. 
The July Revolution, a movement that temporarily merged working-class and elite liberal 
interests, ushered in an equally contentious and divisive era of French politics. After this 
brief period of enthusiasm, the great dividing line in post-revolutionary society merely 
shifted, creating new conservative elites from the Restoration’s moderate liberals and 
opening a space for more class-conscious politics on the Left. Urban workers after 1830 
continued to sing for the disenfranchised, giving voice to a post-revolutionary utopia of 
                                                 
 
128 François Dauphin, “Ma dernière résolution,” in  Les Soirées lyriques, pour faire suite aux deux 
premières années des Soupers Lyriques, par les mêmes auteurs (Paul-Emile Debraux, ed.), vol. 1 (Paris: 
Renaudière, 1821), 86. 
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workers, wine, and song that stood in stark contrast to the exclusivity of the elite political 
world. 
Conclusion 
 This chapter has placed one artistic medium, songs and singing, in the context of 
Restoration politics and the frames that divided the nation. When people sang in groups 
outside of formal performance during this period, they took part in a political activity 
regardless of the content of songs. Where they sang, what they sang, the makeup of their 
singing groups, the tenor of their voices, the comportment of singers, and the tunes over 
which they sang their lyrics all contributed to creating unique political statements with 
multiple interpretive possibilities. These many instances of singing all emerged in a political 
environment, the main feature of which was a widely shared sense of national division.  
People made sense of their political world partly by interpreting incidents of singing 
and songs according to the preexisting polarized frames in currency. Singing thus engaged 
the divided polity, reifying the main feature of Restoration political discourse by creating 
groups who glorified different, and controversial, conceptions of society in their songs. 
Songs and singing created a feedback loop with the hegemonic discourse of division, voicing 
divisive sentiments of their own, reacting to or mirroring elite rhetoric, or rejecting altogether 
the politics of contestation of the day. Even this last response did little to bring the two sides 
together but rather alienated all those who valued the Restoration’s political system. 
 This chapter has featured four general types of songs: Radical songs of the street 
spread outright sedition and blasphemy, angering conservatives and alienating moderates, 
and encouraging the Right to assess the Left broadly as unfit for political inclusion. Royalist 
songs, some officially sanctioned by the government and others published independently, 
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although varied in the degree of their reactionary sentiments, all parroted the main tenets of 
right-wing ideology. More moderate or at least circumspect leftist songs from the goguettes 
promoted many of the same ideas as elite liberals, but brought working-class prejudices and 
sensitivities into the left-wing political message. Finally, a wide selection of songs from the 
goguettes eschewed political life altogether and called for national unity inspired by the same 
feelings of class solidarity that animated their singing societies. The common element in all 
of these genres is that each contributed in some way to further polarizing the French polity.  
 Using songs as a window into Restoration contestation reveals some of the ways in 
which the frames of a divided nation affected cultural media, class, and the larger narrative of 
modern French history. Songs and singing were just one of the cultural forms that promoted 
political ideas. Like artists in visual arts, poetry, and drama, songwriters came under the 
influence of post-revolutionary polarization and divided into two main camps. The tension 
between Romanticism and Neo-classicism in literature and the theater, and in other areas of 
cultural life, may have been the most self-evident and explicitly discussed area in which post-
revolutionary political dualism entered the arts, but no other art form was as popular as 
singing. This exploration of songs helps make the case for the persistence of polarization in 
French society. By looking, in particular, at the songs from the goguettes, the ways in which 
class differences changed the way people understood and managed political discourse comes 
into better focus. On one level, it seems clear that Restoration France was divided into two 
camps, but this heuristic simplification of post-revolutionary French politics did not preclude 
variety in the political sentiments of either side.  
One significant variation in the broad ideological divide of the Restoration is found in 
the era’s working-class milieu. The prejudices and priorities of the lower class colored its 
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political engagement. Members of the working class were as susceptible as any other sector 
of society to imagining the nation as hopelessly divided between those who accepted and 
those who rejected the Revolution, but they viewed this division through the lens of their 
increasingly destabilized urban life, and accordingly highlighted class injustice as the root 
cause of France’s bifurcation. This class parameter suggests that political division had 
creative and responsive elements.  Division was not a static condition and led to new visions 
of social cohesion for the nation. When working-class songwriters rejected elite partisanship, 
they opened a space for a new vision of leftist solidarity built on recognition of lower-class 
consciousness and social cohesion. This development, however, did not alter the idea of a 
permanently divided nation. Industrial-era socialists may have become the new far-Left of 
the nineteenth century, but in the eyes of their political enemies, they were still the “great 
other” of the Revolution. 
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Conclusion 
 French Polarization and the Lessons of Democracy 
Coping with Polarization in France 
 Modern American presidential campaigns are filled with stories about the personal 
characteristics of the candidates, but, in the minds of millions of Americans the candidates 
are merely stand-ins for pre-existing ideological positions. Most Republicans and Democrats 
vote for their party’s candidate regardless of the individual at the top of the ballot. With few 
exceptions, each party’s members make their decisions based on hardwired political frames 
and expect their opponents to do the same. For modern Americans, the idea of a divided 
nation is not news; it is the normal condition of society, regardless of occasional complaints 
about the corrosive effects of partisanship. Similar patterns of party identification and 
divided electorates appear in almost all contemporary democracies.  
 During the Restoration period, French citizens likewise grew accustomed to division 
in their nation. But for them the process of adjustment was more difficult and noteworthy. 
During the preceding twenty-five years they had witnessed destruction on a scale unseen 
since the Thirty-Years War. Most people therefore accepted the Restoration government and 
its promise of peace, but they were unready for the sociopolitical and cultural practices that 
would develop as contending political groups used the new political institutions, the press, 
and the streets of France to expound their rival ideas of the nation. In arenas as diverse as the 
assembly hall and the street, the French confronted post-revolutionary divisions. The idea of 
division fueled military initiatives such as the intervention in Spain and made politicians like 
Benjamin Constant founder in the face of unstoppable political polarization. But it also 
helped people identify their national political values in their choice of associates and the 
songs they sang together; and the political conflicts forced the opposing groups to formulate 
strategies for success in a divided political world. National political division, in short, 
provided a framework for understanding the nation and for taking part in its political and 
social life.  
Political polarization has persisted in France since the fall of the Bourbon Monarchy 
in the Revolution of 1830. With each subsequent regime change in the nineteenth century, 
the categories of Left and Right simply migrated along the ideological spectrum in both 
directions. Individuals and groups realigned on either side of the great divide or formed new 
sub-categories within each side. After 1830, for example, doctrinaire liberals, allied with 
leftists at the end of the Restoration, became the backbone of the Center-Right monarchical 
government, ultras became legitimists on the far-Right of the political spectrum, and the 
remaining liberals splintered into Bonapartist, republican, and socialist groups in the 
oppositional Left. Ideological principles also shifted to the Left or Right, with some concepts 
(for example, popular sovereignty) gaining acceptance in public opinion and others (for 
example, monarchical government) losing popular support. While right-wing ideologies 
occasionally regained their popularity during particular regimes (e.g., the early Second 
Empire) and circumstances (e.g., the Dreyfus case), overall, the French polity and state 
moved to the left over the course of the nineteenth century. By 1900, for example, only far-
Right fringe elements still championed absolutism, the centrist governments of the Third 
Republic had embraced republican principles wholesale, and egalitarian socialist principles 
that were unacceptable or unimagined during the Restoration had become mainstays of the 
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French Left.  Despite these shifts along the Left/Right spectrum, the polarized paradigm 
remained. At any specific point in time during these shifts, people who followed politics 
could identify the political actors to their right and left.1  
 This movement along the scale of political identity for individuals and for the nation 
as a whole was a prolonged response to the legacy of the Revolution. The enduring concepts 
of the Left and Right helped French people negotiate and make sense of political change, 
providing a stable framework throughout changes in the sociopolitical world that occurred 
with each new regime. The categories that defined the political scale in ideological terms 
may have derived largely from pre-revolutionary and revolutionary contexts, but Restoration 
conflicts inscribed these concepts together in people’s minds as the normative model of 
political alignment.  
 The case studies in this dissertation all point to trends that have continued throughout 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The tension between the two competing ideological 
frames of the nation described in Chapter One, namely paternal/Christian absolutism versus 
popular sovereignty, drove the narrative of nineteenth-century French political history. With 
the fall of Vichy France, absolutism lost its appeal in French society, but right-wing parties in 
France still identify with the Restoration ultras’ emphasis on order before freedom. Other 
Restoration-era themes have also persisted. Grégoire’s and Manuel’s expulsions from the 
Chamber of Deputies, for example, both drew on the categories of belonging and exclusion 
that shape ideal conceptions of the nation. This process of domestic “othering” reared its ugly 
head again with the rise of anti-Semitic right-wing politics in the Third Republic and often 
accompanied broader complaints about the illegitimacy and unsuitability of the republican 
                                                 
1 Alain de Benoist suggested in 1995 that this paradigm is no longer relevant to France’s contemporary 
politics. I, however, find these common sentiments of the early  post-Cold War era somewhat  premature. See, 
Alain de Benoist, “The End of the Left-Right Dichotomy: The French Case,” in Telos, 102 (1995):545-557. 
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form of government for the French people. The Dreyfus affair was thus both a debate about 
the nation and another case of expulsion based on the “political frames” of national 
belonging and exclusion.  
During the Spanish War in 1823 liberals and ultras clashed over two different 
concepts of French nationalism; and each group used ideal notions of national identity to 
define France’s role in the world. These nationalist discourses have driven French foreign 
and domestic policy since the Restoration. The liberal/civic and illiberal/ethnic nationalism 
that liberals and ultras adopted in 1823 still have support in France. The French state itself 
has long identified with the liberal model and has used civic conceptions of the nation to 
justify its program of colonial assimilation and promote the domestic assimilation of 
immigrants. But one need only look at the history of the French state’s actual treatment of 
immigrants or read the statements of recent political leaders like Jean-Marie Le Pen to know 
that ethnic, right-wing nationalism is alive and well in France. The contemporary immigrant 
populations in France who have been left out of the process of French nation building would 
no doubt understand the feeling of marginalization expressed in the goguette songs in 
Chapter Five. Just like the urban workers of the Restoration, disenfranchised immigrants 
have often turned music—such as the rappers MC Solaar and Sinik—to express their 
dissatisfaction with a regime that does not welcome their voices or offer them any acceptable 
political model of national belonging.   
The French people have continued to use ideologically-specific political frames of the 
nation to understand national sociopolitical phenomena and events and voice their reactions 
to them. But they also have continued to bring polarizing language and the frame of national 
division to their interpretations of the world and their actions in it. Polarization is the tie that 
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binds partisan identities together in the context of specific events, and it thus provides 
continuity in French politics. Although polarization creates a certain internal political 
stability, it can also threaten the very state mechanisms that permit it to develop and to filter 
down into society.  
Throughout the nineteenth century and through much of the twentieth, the French 
state tried to mitigate the detrimental effects of internal polarization through external 
imperialist distractions and international competition. France’s nineteenth-century colonial 
efforts, in fact, began partly as an attempt to calm the Restoration’s polarized polity. Twenty-
five days before the end of the Restoration, Marshal Bourmont landed at Sidi Ferruch in 
Algeria at the head of a French army. Both Charles X and the head of his ministry, Polignac, 
had promoted the invasion of Algiers to distract French public opinion from the 
government’s increasing unpopularity. The ultra government’s military efforts came too late 
to save the regime, but the army it sent to Algeria remained for over a century. Unlike the 
1823 French intervention in Spain, a country whose internal political dynamics reminded the 
French people of their own domestic situation, the invasion of Algeria and the colonial 
project that followed offered an outlet for national glory outside of Europe’s political, social, 
and ethnic frameworks. Colonialism allowed political rivals to support the international 
projection of French power in concert and provided the French with a new, specific “other” 
whom people on both sides of the post-revolutionary divide considered uncivilized. Although 
individual French politicians of all persuasions voiced reservations about the colonial project, 
and some domestic rivalries migrated to the colonies, most members of both camps backed 
France’s imperial ambitions.2 French people by and large believed that all of them, 
                                                 
2 The exportation of France’s internal conflict between the clergy and the state is covered in J.P. 
Daughton’s recent work on missionaries in the Third Republic. He writes, “…civilizing policies were 
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regardless of their political affiliations, were inherently superior to the indigenous 
populations of the colonies.  
The sense of cultural superiority that unified the French people when they 
encountered other ethnic groups also emerged when they confronted other Western nations. 
The longstanding and nearly universal French ambivalence to the influences of Britain and 
America, however, has never been strong enough to overcome domestic polarization. Nor 
have the French entirely resisted “Anglo-Saxon” influences in political, social, and cultural 
thought.3  Indeed, France’s own mirroring and rejection of English parliamentarianism 
during the Restoration crept into the era’s polarized debates on the nature of government, and 
no clear ideological lines divided anglophiles from anglophobes. The flexibility that the 
French have always brought to their “othering” of the Anglo-Saxon model of society and 
government, demonstrates how French people of all persuasions have used Britain and 
America as foils for understanding themselves. This introspective comparison between 
nations has increased the social cohesion of France, even if some have bemoaned their 
nation’s lack of progress compared to Britain or America or disparaged the intrusion of those 
nations’ perversely “un-French” way of life into French society. Political cohesion against an 
external other was far simpler in the case of Germany’s immediate military threat between 
the years 1870 and 1940, and it reached its height in the union sacrée between the Left and 
Right during World War One. However, while external “others” of rival nation-states have 
                                                                                                                                                       
commonly wrought in the fires of religious and political confrontation.” J. P. Daughton, Empire Divided: 
Religion, Republicanism, and the Making of French Colonialism (Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 
2006), 16. For information on the heterogeneous origins of France’s “civilizing mission” see, Alice Conklin, A 
Mission to Civilize: The Republican Idea of Empire in France and West Africa, 1895-1930 (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 1997), 11-23. 
 
3 See Jack Hayward’s introduction, “The Anglo-American Counter-Identity” in Jack Hayward, 
Fragmented France: Two Centuries of Disputed Identity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 1-38. See 
also Richard Kuisel, Seducing the French: The Dilemma of Americanization (Berkeley, CA: University of 
California Press, 1993).  
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periodically distracted the French from their internal disunity, the dislike or fear of other 
nations has never fully supplanted the paradigm of internal division in France.   
With the advent of the Third Republic’s parliamentary government, French political 
actors also discovered the virtues of formal party organization as a means of 
compartmentalizing political polarization and, in the process, reduced its destructive 
potential. The United States embraced political polarization in the nineteenth century and the 
Republican and Democratic Parties have become nearly synonymous with government. In 
France, on the other hand, a multi-party system developed under the Third Republic, and 
multiple parties on the Left and Right continue to influence French politics to this day. 
Despite the proliferation of parties in modern France, however, the bipolar structure of 
ideologies has never disappeared. The Left and Right in France have simply subdivided into 
groups with different ideological priorities and political cultures.4  Instead of acting on the 
grand scale of dual (and dueling) abstractions, French politicians of the Third Republic 
divided into multiple interest groups, each capable of effective engagement in the political 
system.5  Although this process of splitting grand ideological constructs into smaller more 
tactically efficient bodies relieved some of the tensions of abstract polarization, the pervasive 
sense of national division persisted in the emergence of political parties. Indeed, the 
fragmentation of ideological interests into new parties actually sustained the sense of national 
division even as it made the division less disruptive within a functioning representative 
                                                 
4 “The function of ideologies is to define the intellectual parameters within which such specific 
questions may be discussed critically, both within and between political traditions.” Sudhir Hazareesingh, 
Political Traditions in Modern France (Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 7-8.  For more on 
the concept of party “tendencies” in Modern France see, David S. Bell, Parties and Democratization in France: 
Parties under Presidentialism (Burlington, VT/Aldershot, U.K.: Ashgate, 2000), and Raymond Huard, La 
naissance du parti politique en France (Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 1996).  
 
5 According to David Hanley, parties form when members of society agree to disagree without 
violence and elites step in to “identify and promote interests in society.” David Hanley, Party, Society, and 
Government: Republican Democracy in France (New York/Oxford: Berghan Books, 2002), 8.  
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democracy. Significantly, the party system in France preserved the Left/Right paradigm 
because each splinter party typically focused on one or more aspects of the commonly held 
left-wing or right-wing ideological conceptions of the nation. Certainly few French people 
who pay attention to national politics would shy away from using the broad post-
revolutionary categories of Left and Right that animated Restoration political culture to 
describe the two principal national political subcultures in their nation. 6  Today, as I have 
suggested, these generalizations still draw on the political frames that the French internalized 
during the Restoration. 
That Familiar Feeling  
I began this project in September 2002, one year after the attacks on September 11, 
2001 which had temporarily unified a shocked United States. By 2002, this unity had already 
dissolved as Democrats and Republicans moved toward their familiar ideological poles to 
debate the post-9/11 nation and its role in the world. These political battles between the two 
parties became a monumental struggle to define the very essence of the American nation. 
Categories of national exclusion and belonging filled the popular political press, painting all 
elections as ultimate decisions on American identity.7 Partisanship in America, although not 
a new phenomenon, is now inescapable; it has marshaled all the resources of mass media and 
consumer culture to propagate political division in all areas of human life. People now 
routinely ascribe political affiliations to a variety of ostensibly non-political aspects of life. 
                                                 
 
6 As Hanley writes, “Today the left/right polarity seems unavoidable insofar as it is based on the 
existence of two recognizable sub-cultures.” Ibid., 179. 
 
7 Reading the titles in the political section of the contemporary American bookstore is to come face-to-
face with the polarizing exclusivity and political xenophobia that characterizes partisanship run amok. See, for 
example, Ann Coulter, Treason: Liberal Treachery from the Cold War to the War on Terrorism (Pittsburgh: 
Three Rivers Press, 2004), and Michael Moore, Stupid White Men ...and Other Sorry Excuses for the State of 
the Nation! (New York: Harper, 2002), among hundreds of other provocative titles from the popular political 
press published in the last eight years.  
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The car one drives, the food one eats, the church one attends, the people with whom one 
associates, and even the way in which people raise their families all have become aspects of 
political identity that situate one on the Left or Right.  
 My point in recalling these recent American divisions is to emphasize the overarching 
effects of polarizing discourse on society. Although historians must separate the present from 
the past, the similarities between the discourses of Restoration France and contemporary 
America were too salient for me to ignore as I conducted my research. In 2003, for example, 
when the United States prepared to go to war in Iraq, I was reading about the 1823 
intervention in Spain. During both periods, proponents of war employed similar arguments 
about the reasons for invasion: military action was needed to remove an imminent threat to 
the nation, and the invasion would ensure the development of a favorable political ideology 
in an important region of the world. Opponents claimed that the invasion would threaten 
international stability and fundamentally contravene the principles that had kept civilized 
nations from preemptively interfering in the internal affairs of other nations. These debates 
about military action drew on and fed the polarized discourse in both eras, strengthening the 
widely-shared political frame that assumed the inevitability of conflict between two 
fundamentally incompatible visions of the nation.  
 The differences between politics in contemporary America and Restoration France, of 
course, far outweigh the similarities. The United States is a long-established modern republic 
with strong centralized and democratic institutions. Most of its citizens accept the 
government’s legitimacy and view its institutions as ostensibly neutral sites for politics. 
Restoration France, on the other hand, could hardly be called a modern democracy. Its 
limited electorate, its institutionalized class structures, and of course, its monarchical head of 
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state all differed from a modern conception of democracy. In addition, Restoration politicians 
and citizens could not agree on the fundamental source of legitimacy behind the government 
and its Constitutional Charter, if they believed in the legitimacy of a constitutional monarchy 
at all. Modern mass media also makes politics in contemporary America a much more 
intrusive experience than it was during the Restoration, exponentially amplifying the number 
of political spaces and events. But the mechanics of the human mind have not changed, and 
considering the common frameworks that encouraged polarization and division in 
Restoration France can contribute to understanding the significance of polarizing frames 
today.    
 In modern America, as in Restoration France, political discourse emerged as a battle 
between two sets of assumptions about moral legitimacy in society and government. The 
divisive political opinions expressed in both eras have inhered in the mind as strongly rooted 
moral constructs that define both personal and collective identities.8  In both eras, religious 
and moral influences have given the political ideologies of both sides a sense of authenticity. 
During the French Restoration, in particular, unresolved religious and moral differences 
merged with ideological concepts of government to form two opposed sociopolitical camps 
and cultures.  Liberals and leftists spoke of the people in terms that dripped with 
Rousseauean spiritual sentimentality. Ultraroyalists, for their part, adorned their absolutism 
with an apostolic stamp of authority. Religious intolerance thus also made its way into the 
practice of French democracy during the Restoration. Through the liberals’ embrace of anti-
clericalism, and the ultras’ insistence on restoring the Catholic Church’s relevance to French 
                                                 
8 Considering the neural link between language and emotion cognitive centers in the brain, the concept 
of emotional legitimacy posited by George Lakoff and Drew Westen seems particularly applicable to this 
phenomenon. See, George Lakoff, The Political Mind: Why We Can’t Understand Twenty-First Century 
Politics with an Eighteenth-Century Brain (New York: Viking Press, 2008), and Drew Westen, The Political 
Brain: The Role of Emotion in Deciding the Fate of the Nation (New York: Public Affairs, 2007). 
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society, religious views became political sentiments that further fuelled the rival factions’ 
commitments to ultimate political victory rather than compromise. 9 Religious and moral 
prejudices made the creation of an internal political “other” easier by blending exclusionary 
rhetoric with longstanding justifications for intolerance.  
Nascent democracy itself brought its own exclusionary dynamic to the Restoration 
political world. Both ultras and liberals claimed the support of public opinion when they won 
elections to representative bodies and enacted new policies. Each group, when it had the 
majority in the Chamber of Deputies, assumed the people were behind them and conjured up 
the righteous wrath of an imagined nation to attack the minority in policies, poems, and 
pamphlets. Because they dominated the government for most of the Restoration, ultras best 
displayed this hybrid of democracy and intolerant exclusion. Operating from key positions of 
power, the ultras excluded their enemies from the polity through quasi-legal measures and 
justified their actions by claiming the right of the majority.10 Although they railed against the 
perfidious influence of unfettered democracy, they often adopted the Jacobins’ language and 
methods, bringing exclusion to state institutions through legislation and the manipulation of 
established rules of political conduct, and justifying exclusion as a legitimate tactic in the 
literary sphere. Although liberals were more conciliatory in their language, they were equally 
guilty of using moral self-righteousness to brand their opponents as unfit for inclusion in the 
                                                 
 
9 For the transformation of religious into political rivalry over the eighteenth century see, Dale Van 
Kley, The Religious Origins of the French Revolution: From Calvin to the Civil Constitution, 1560-1791 (New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999). 
 
10 It may be that Democracy maintains the culture of expulsion through the legal framework of 
elections. Elections heighten the indignation of those in the losing party while bolstering the confidence of the 
winners, and thus do little to mitigate the desire in some segments of the population to rid themselves 
permanently of their internal enemies. What usually follows a transfer of power through democratic processes is 
a backlash aimed at abrogating the opposing, losing side’s gains over the course of their administration. 
Electoral victory impinges not only on new policy—an understandable correction for the winners to initiate—
but in extreme cases it also creates a strong sense of vindicated legitimacy in the newly elected majority. 
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nation. Indeed, the liberals who assumed power in 1830 wasted little time in employing the 
exclusionary tactics which ultras had used repeatedly during the Restoration. Examining 
politics in the Restoration thus sheds light on the inability of many, and particularly 
emerging, democratic regimes to reconcile their ideas of legitimate government with a loyal 
opposition. This problem to some extent also plagues modern America and definitely hinders 
the consolidation of democracy in the contemporary developing world; in short, people often 
see their political opponents as a profound danger to their own interests and the nation.11   
The characteristics of political practice outlined in this dissertation may seem 
commonplace to the modern reader. They are the recognizable symptoms of partisanship. 
Democracy, despite its often beneficial implications for individual liberty, slyly obscures the 
reality of contestation within it—in practice, democratic elections and policies can frequently 
become vehicles for banishing political rivals and their ideas from active participation in the 
polity. The competing ideologies in democratic societies are more than rhetoric; they shape 
fundamental frameworks of individual consciousness, and as such, are by nature 
uncompromising. Winning an election will not win over people’s minds; only the adoption of 
new frames can fully supplant deeply embedded ideologies. The process of reframing is long 
and difficult, and it typically leads to an equally exclusive new framework. Such reframings 
occur only rarely because of the moral convictions with which people cling to their 
ideological positions. The perfervid partisan tone of politics in the Restoration or in 
contemporary America strengthens exclusive ideological frames and makes it extremely 
difficult to reach compromise between groups with opposed and deeply held convictions. 
                                                 
11 For the difficulties that encumbered the implementation of  French democracy in the nineteenth 
century see, Serge Bernstein et al., L’Invention de la Démocratie, 1789-1914 (Paris: Éditions de Seuil, 2002). 
For the problems in instituting democracy in non-democratic societies see, Larry Diamond, Developing 
Democracy: Toward Consolidation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999).  
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The short-term secret to conducting politics effectively in a democracy is to understand how 
opposing camps frame their socio-political worlds and to speak within those frames to 
explain policy initiatives. In the long run, new political frames will slowly gain strength only 
when they resonate with significant aspects of pre-existing moral frameworks.  
I did not write this dissertation, however, to expound on the weaknesses of modern 
democracy or to suggest strategies for conducting politics, but rather to understand how 
polarization in one nascent quasi-democratic society affected national identity. In the end, I 
have come to believe that national identity must be understood as a dynamic process for 
study rather than as a static subject for study. To speak of national identity in broad and 
uncomplicated terms is to misunderstand its meaning as individuals actually live it. This 
foray into Restoration political culture has demonstrated that understanding the nation in a 
democratic society requires understanding how national cultures are created through the 
languages of competing political frames. The nation exists both in the mind and in the world 
when these frames are employed to voice opinions, craft or support enactment of policies, 
and respond to events. When people act on their political convictions, they naturally employ 
frames through which they understand the nation, and they usually expect opposition.  
Real, practical national identity evolves through this process of contestation. Conflict 
endows political frames with vitality and strengthens individuals’ sense of moral certitude in 
their political convictions. When people adopt an identity, they implicitly and sometimes 
explicitly reject other options in the social world. Through this rejection, however, they 
create a rubric for belonging and not belonging that helps define the parameters of national 
identity. The Revolution provided a basic outline for all future political contestation in 
France by dividing political life between the Left and Right, but the Restoration turned this 
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dichotomy into a stable, enduring system of political, social, and cultural oppositions that the 
French people have constantly used and redefined ever since. 
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